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This thesis critically analyses the prospects of constitutionalising environmental 
rights in Nigeria and argues that it has the potential to entrench sustainable 
ecological protection in the Niger Delta region which suffers from endemic 
environmental pollution. The thesis seeks to answer the central research 
question- Should environmental rights be constitutionalized in Nigeria’s legal 
framework? In answering this question, it examines the normative contents of a 
prospective constitutional environmental right in Nigeria and challenges the 
entrenched anthropocentric ethics prevalent in existing environmental literature 
and in constitutions of many countries around the globe.   
Utilising a transnational study of environmental constitutionalism and 
constitutionalization of environmental rights, the thesis argues for the adoption of 
a coalesced anthropocentrism model of environmental rights which protects the 
tripod interests in the environment- present humans, future generations and 
Mother Nature. This liberal approach ensures that environmental rights in the 
constitution are comprehensive and protective of the rights of non-human 
components of the ecosystem which are often neglected in legislative and judicial 
considerations of environmental issues. The original contribution of the thesis lies 
in its development of the coalesced anthropocentrism model which is tested by 
reviewing the constitutions of 196 countries to examine the extent to which this 
model is reflected in the environmental protection legal framework of countries 
around the globe. 
While constitutionalization of environmental rights is not the panacea to all 
environmental ills, it creates an enduring fundamental platform from which the 
environmental problems in the Niger Delta region can be resolutely tackled. 
Specifically, it has the potential to improve environmental protection in the region 
in four critical ways - strengthening the country’s environmental legal framework, 
tackling ecological imperialism and the ‘full belly’ syndrome, improving access to 
environmental justice and incorporating international environmental law and 
principles in the legal framework. However, the thesis has wider application 
beyond the Niger Delta and Nigeria which is used as a case study for other oil 
producing (mostly developing) countries in similar socio-economic circumstances 
and facing endemic environmental challenges from oil production activities 
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This thesis proposes a shift towards a rights’ based approach in tackling the endemic 
environmental degradation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region in light of the repeated 
failure of the regulatory and civil liability approaches to solving the problem. This 
bottom-up approach is a way of empowering the people of the region to take control 
of their environmental destiny. The thesis argues for the adoption of a coalesced 
anthropocentrism model in formulating the environmental rights in order to engender 
a shift from the flawed anthropocentric foundation of environmental rights adopted 
in legal instruments globally to a more inclusive foundation protective of the interests 
of other important rights’ holders in the environment - future generations and nature. 
More importantly, the thesis canvasses for this environmental right to be given a 
fundamental platform by incorporation into the Nigerian constitution as a way of 
fortifying the protection afforded by the right and removing its susceptibility to political 
manoeuvring and rollbacks on the basis of other socio-economic and developmental 
pursuits. In addition, the thesis examines the benefits of adopting a constitutional 
approach to entrenching environmental rights in Nigeria which includes its role as a 
counter-majoritarian policy for safeguarding the rights of environmentally degraded 
minority communities in the Niger Delta; as a safety net for environmental claims 
that fall through the cracks of environmental regulation; and a potent tool to address 
the pernicious issues of ecological imperialism and the full-belly syndrome in the 
Niger Delta Region.  
The thesis argues that in view of the global trend towards environmental 
constitutionalism, adopting this approach in Nigeria will elevate the country’s 
environmental legal framework to international standards and improve the potential 
for enshrining environmental rule of law under the watchful eyes of the generally 
conservative Nigerian judiciary that has shown eagerness to protect constitutional 
rights and principles.   
 
Background 
A clean, safe and ecologically healthy and balanced environment is vital to the 
sustenance of life and enjoyment of basic human rights; yet for the people of the 
Niger Delta region in Nigeria, this has remained an elusive luxury for the past five 
decades owing to the degenerative impacts of endemic environmental pollution 
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arising from oil and gas production in the region. The degradation of the environment 
in the region affects both human inhabitants, natural ecosystems and future 
generations of the populace, yet the government’s regulatory responses to the 
problem have remained weak, cosmetic and generally insufficient in tackling the 
problem.  
The persistent failure of the regulatory system to checkmate environmental 
degradation questions its suitability for entrenched and complex environmental 
issues and leads to considerations of a rights’ based approach which creates a 
bottom-up system built on embedded rights in individuals enforceable vertically 
against the government and horizontally against corporate environmental 
oppressors in the region. These rights assume greater significance when 
incorporated in a constitutional document wherein they constitute a fundamental 
legal fortification against rollbacks on environmental protection policies and political 
manoeuvrings detrimental to environmental protection.  
 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development Goals 
The inexorable link between human rights and the environment has long been 
internationally recognized by Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment of 19721 which stated that ‘man's environment, the natural and the 
man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human 
rights – even the right to life itself’. This declaration was given further impetus by the 
Brundtland Report of 1987 2which emphasised that ‘every human being has the right 
to a clean and safe environment conducive to their health and well-being’. These 
international instruments encapsulated the growing discussions about the need to 
ascribe human rights attributes to environmental concerns by linking the same to 
the human right to life and health. Although the Stockholm Declarations and 
Brundtland Report are essentially anthropocentric in that they focus only on the 
instrumental value of the environment to humans, they formed the basis for 
subsequent expositions of environmental concerns in human rights’ contexts.  
                                                          
1U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Report of the 
UN Conference on the Human Environment, 2-7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).   
2 World Commission on Environment and Development Report, 1987 <http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf > (last accessed 02 December 2015). 
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Judicial bodies subsequently began recognizing the inextricable link of 
environmental protection to the human right to life in the aftermath of the Stockholm 
Declaration and Brundtland Report. In the same year as the Brundtland report, the 
Supreme Court of India judicially recognized the link between environmental 
protection and the enjoyment of the human right to life in T. Damodhar Rao v. 
Municipal Corp., Hyderabad3 where the court declared that ‘…the slow poisoning by 
the polluted atmosphere caused by environmental pollution should also be regarded 
as amounting to a violation of Article 21 [right to life] of the Constitution’.4 This 
decision was based on the prevailing understanding that environmental pollution 
threatened the life and health of the people affected by it and can, therefore, be 
classified as a violation of the human right to life of people affected.  
The link between human rights and the environment is also rooted in the principle 
of sustainable development which forms the cornerstone for balancing human 
rights, economic development and environmental protection. As societies expand 
and human demands of the environment increases to meet basic survival needs, 
rights and obligations have progressively been articulated to address the 
environmental impacts of developmental projects and ensure a balance between 
the idea of a people‘s right to development with the need to preserve the 
environment.5 The importance of sustainable development was first recognised by 
the Brundtland Report of 1987 which linked human rights with environmental 
protection. It defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the need 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own need’ and enjoined nations to ‘ensure that the environment and natural 
resources are conserved and used for the benefit of present and future 
generations’.6 
The sustainable development principle has been expanded to cover various areas 
of human needs with the projection of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
20157 which highlights various aspects of human societal shortcomings that require 
                                                          
3 1987 A.I.R. (A.P.) 171.  
4 ibid, 173. 
5 E Weiss, ‘In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development’ (1992-1993) 8 Am 
U J Intl L & Policy 19, 23-25.  
6 See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 
43.  
7 See UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goals 2015’, available at 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> accessed 14 
July, 2018.  
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to be addressed in other to improve human wellbeing globally. Because the SDGs 
are interconnected, fulfilling environmental protection as a target within the SDGs 
can be subsumed within several of the 17 SDGs, with a few particularly more suited 
to this purpose.8 For instance, Goal 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation); Goal 7 
(Affordable and Clean Energy); Goal 12 (Responsible Consumption and 
Production); Goal 13 (Climate Action); and Goal 15 (Life on Land) address various 
aspects of concerns on the spectrum of environmental protection issues. Some of 
the issues that pose major environmental sustainability problems include pollution 
of water sources by oil and gas effluents (covered by Goal 6); destruction of the 
living environments (habitats) of native species and discharge of polluting chemicals 
and other materials into the environment (covered by Goal 15); emission of 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that can cause climate change (covered by 
Goal 13); depletion of low cost oil and other fossil fuels due to unsustainable 
extraction and consumption of high carbon energy materials (covered by Goals 7 
and 12).  On a whole, therefore, achieving environmental sustainability is premised 
on promoting the SDGs as a holistic platform for ensuring the various spectres of 
environmental concerns are addressed within effective legal and constitutional 
frameworks across the globe.  
Achieving sustainable development requires adherence to environmental rule of law 
as an important feature of environmental constitutionalism. United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) stated that ‘environmental rule of law is central to 
sustainable development and the success of environmental constitutionalism.’9 
Because environmental rule of law deals with issues such as climate change, 
species extinction, and toxic pollution that often cause impacts over extended time 
horizons, as long as centuries, it helps us grapple with uncertainty and risks to future 
generations weighed against costs to the current generation which is the hallmark 
of the SDGs.10 Therefore, the ultimate goal of environmental rule of law is to change 
behavior onto a course toward sustainability by creating an expectation of 
                                                          
8 David Griggs, et al ‘Policy: Sustainable Development Goals for People and Planet’ (2003) 495 
Nature 305–307. 
9 UNEP, ‘New Frontiers in Environmental Constitutionalism’ (May 2017)- 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/20819/Frontiers-Environmental-
Constitutionalism.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>  accesed 11 April 2019.  
10 B Lewis, ‘Human Rights Duties towards Future Generations and the Potential for Achieving 
Climate Justice’ (2017) 34(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 206-226. 
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compliance with environmental law coordinated between government, industry, and 
civil society.11 
While environmental constitutionalism focuses on the implementation and 
effectiveness of incorporating environmental rights, procedures, and policies into 
constitutions around the globe, environmental rule of law focuses on ensuring 
compliance with and enforcement of environmental laws because without such 
effective enforcement, the constitutional incorporation of these constitutional 
environmental rights will merely have paper values.12 Consequently, adopting a 
rights-based approach to improving environmental rule of law provides a strong 
impetus and means for implementing and enforcing environmental protections and 
a corresponding strong impetus to achieving the SDGs.  
The focus of this thesis on a rights’ based approach to improving environmental 
protection in the Niger Delta is, therefore, contextualised within the overall ambition 
of promoting sustainable development in the region with environmental 
constitutionalism and environmental rule of law used as the platform from which 
most of the other SDG goals can be addressed in the region. Extreme poverty (Goal 
1), hunger (Goal 2), poor health services (Goal 3), quality education (Goal 4) and 
gender inequality (Goal 5) are other SDGs that touch on sensitive areas of 
shortcomings in the region and which require urgent attention. However, a 
significant part of these problems have their roots in the environmental situation in 
the region. For instance, poverty, hunger and poor health prevalent in the region are 
largely linked to the deteriorating environment from oil and gas pollution which 
destroy the livelihood of the people leading to poverty and hunger; and the poor 
health arises from the deleterious effects of the pollutants in the environment. 
Effectively addressing the environmental challenges in the region will, therefore, lay 




                                                          
11 UNEP, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report’ January 2019 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/27279/Environmental_rule_of_law.p
df?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > accessed 09 May 2019.  
12 Ibid, 25.  
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Constitutionalization of Environmental Rights - The Global Trend 
In a bid to strengthen environmental rights and improve its impact on environmental 
protection, there is a growing trend across many countries to elevate environmental 
rights to a higher, fundamental level where they are not subjugated to other socio-
economic rights and are also not subject to political manoeuvrings, lobbying and 
short-term planning.  This is achieved by constitutionalizing environmental rights in 
the form of explicit constitutional provisions. Currently, more than 150 countries13 
have constitutional environmental provisions of some kind and in at least 88 
countries, these take the form of explicit constitutional environmental rights.14 
Recent constitutions in all cases make reference to environmental principles, and 
many older constitutions are being amended to include them.15This depicts the 
increasing recognition of environmental right as not just a socio-economic right to 
be progressively attained, but as an inviolable fundamental right without which the 
other basic human rights cannot be reasonably enjoyed. In Latin American 
countries, Ecuador16, Brazil17 and Bolivia18 lead the way in constitutionalization of 
environmental rights while South Africa19 and Kenya20 are among over 30 African 
countries with environmental rights enshrined in their constitutions.  
Kysar21 argues that the concept of environmental constitutionalism (also known as 
Green Constitutionalism) in which certain needs and interests of present and future 
generations, the global community, and other forms of life are given foundational 
legal importance in a country’s constitution, would help to restore conceptual 
                                                          
13The tally includes 88 countries with constitutions enshrining a right to a healthy environment and 
62 additional countries that have other environmental provisions that are not explicitly rights, for 
a total of 150 countries. 
14See UNEP, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report’ January 2019; See also T. 
Hayward, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Case for Political Analysis’ (2000) 48 Political 
Studies 558-572. 
15 See Chapter 4 and the Appendix for a breakdown of countries with explicit constitutional 
environmental rights. 
16 Constitution of Ecuador 2008, art 71 – 74 < http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=5507> 
accessed 15 January 2016. 
17 Constitution of Bolivia 2008, art 33, 34 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016. 
18Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil 2010, art 225                       
<http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federalconstitution> accessed 15 January 2016. 
19 Constitution of South Africa 1996, art 24 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf> accessed 15 
January 2016. 
20 Constitution of Kenya 2010 
<https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf> accessed 15 
January 2016.    
21D. Kysar, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Getting There from Here’ (2012) 1 
Transnational Environmental Law 83-94. 
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coherence and normative priority to the subjects of environmental law. Boyd22 also 
asserts that the rise in constitutionalization of environmental rights raises the hope 
that the wanton polluting ways of the past are gradually giving way to a new era of 
environmental stewardship spurred on by fundamental constitutional obligations on 
government enforceable by the citizens across jurisdictions.  
However, enshrining environmental rights in constitutional forms must be supported 
by the practice of environmental rule of law to achieve any meaningful 
environmental goals. As David Boyd, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and 
the Environment stated, ‘unless the environmental rule of law is strengthened, even 
seemingly rigorous rules are destined to fail and the fundamental human right to a 
healthy environment will go unfulfilled.’23 As a result, there is a growing recognition 
of the importance of environmental rule of law by policy makers and other 
environmental stakeholders focusing attention on addressing the gap between 
environmental laws on the books and in practice and the particularly worrying trend 
of the growing resistance to environmental laws, which has been most evident in 
the harassment, arbitrary arrests threats, and killing of environmental defenders.24 
This also extends to the role that civil society plays in ensuring environmental law is 
implemented and enforced fairly and transparently.The concept of environmental 
rule of law has continued to gain momentum in international environmental law and 
amongst international environmental institutions with the first United Nations 
Environment Assembly in 2014 adopting resolution 1/13 calling upon countries ‘to 
work for the strengthening of environmental rule of law at the international, regional 
and national levels’  and the first World Environmental Law Congress, co-sponsored 
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and UN Environment 
in 2016 adopting the ‘IUCN World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law’ 
which outlines 13 principles to serve as the foundation for developing and 
implementing solutions for ecologically sustainable development. These 
international efforts are laying the groundwork for better collaboration amongst 
countries to strengthen the environmental enforcement programme within domestic 
jurisdictions.   
                                                          
22 D. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, 
and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 3.  
23 UNEP, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report’ January 2019, 5.  




Nevertheless, while the global trend towards constitutionalization of environmental 
rights and environmental constitutionalism holds prospects for improved 
environmental protection, the normative contents of a constitutional environmental 
right are more important than the mere act of its constitutionalization. In this vein, 
the two predominant philosophies on environmental rights – anthropocentric and 
eco-centric approach- come into focus. Although an overwhelming majority of 
countries with constitutional environmental rights have such rights framed in purely 
anthropocentric views, the constitutions of Ecuador25 and Bolivia26 are examples of 
eco-centric entrenchment of environmental rights and have drawn attention to the 
need to reconsider the drafting of the normative contents of constitutional 
environmental rights in purely anthropocentric terms.  
The UN Global Pact for the Environment 201727 attempts to harmonise the 
normative contents of constitutional environmental rights by propounding principles 
that should be enshrined in environmental instruments including the right to an 
ecologically sound environment, duty to take care of the environment, 
intergenerational equity and procedural environmental rights such as access to 
information, participation and access to justice.  
 
Constitutionalization of Environmental Rights- The Nigerian 
Experience 
This global trend towards the constitutionalization of environmental rights has so far 
eluded Nigeria which has continued to rely on the regulatory model of environmental 
protection with its short and long-term deficiencies. Although the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 198128 (ratified and applicable in Nigeria) 
sets out the right of people to a decent environment favourable to their development, 
its provision is largely ignored in environmental regulation debates and is 
unsupported by the general environmental law framework in the country. The 
                                                          
25 Constitution of Ecuador. 
26 Constitution of Bolivia. 
27 Draft Global Pact for the Environment, Paris, 24th June 2017 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/draft-project-of-the-global-pactfor-the-
environment.pdf> accessed 08 May 2019. 
28 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (done at Banjul, June 26, 1981; entered into 




Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as amended)29 does 
not recognize any form of environmental right of the citizens and merely imposes a 
non-enforceable obligation on the government to ‘protect and improve the 
environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria’.30 
By declaring this obligation non-justiciable,31 the Nigerian Constitution effectively 
renders the citizens powerless to hold the Nigerian government accountable for 
environmental degradation and its failure to take proactive steps to prevent it. 
Environmental protection in Nigeria is, therefore, essentially government-reliant as 
there is the absence of any legal framework to support a rights’ based approach to 
environmental protection. 
Consequently, efforts by the Niger Delta inhabitants to protect the environment has 
over the years been focused on a two-pronged approach - seeking judicial 
accountability of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) operating in the region through 
tort law and civil liability suits, and seeking government intervention through stronger 
regulation of the MNCs operating in the region. Both approaches have achieved 
very limited successes as the MNCs consider resulting environmental pollutions as 
mere negative externalities of oil and gas exploration. The MNCs readily monetize 
such pollution by paying compensations awarded by the courts to the communities 
without any significant steps to reduce or curtail continuous environmental pollution 
or even clean up the affected environment.32 Another shortcoming of this approach 
is that the reliance on compensation mechanisms under the civil liability approach 
fails to address the root causes of pollution and lacks inbuilt preventative 
mechanisms to halt, reduce or significantly deter continuous pollution by the MNCs. 
Government regulation of the MNCs is also significantly weak and lacking in any 
effectiveness.  
The failure of government regulation to curb environmental pollution in the region 
arises from a myriad of factors plaguing the system. These factors include the 
absence of an adequate legal framework for maintaining environmental 
sustainability and poor environmental governance system in the country and the 
                                                          
29 CFRN 1999 <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm> 
accessed 15 June 2016.  
30 CFRN 1999, s 20. 
31 CFRN 1999, s 6(6)(6)(c). 
32 In Bodo Community & Others v. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (2014) EWHC 
1973 TCC, the Respondent settled a claim for widespread oil pollution of an entire community’s 
farmland for £55 million and thereafter took no further step to clean up the affected environment. 
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dual-capacity role of the Nigerian government in environmental regulation which 
sees the government act as both a regulator and an active player in the oil and gas 
industry. In addition, Nigeria’s peculiar socio-economic reliance on oil and gas 
revenues which limits the extent to which the government can sanction polluting 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNCs) without jeopardizing Nigeria’s economic 
fortunes is an important explanation for the lax regulatory stance of the government.  
In light of the failure of government regulation and the civil liability approaches in 
curbing environmental pollution in Nigeria, it has become imperative to consider the 
paradigm shift across the globe from the regulatory model of environmental 
protection towards the adoption of a rights’ model for protecting the environment. In 
essence, a ‘bottom-up’ approach of utilizing a recognized and enforceable ‘right’ to 
a clean environment as an environmental protection tool is gradually replacing the 
‘top-down’ approach of depending on government’s regulatory and other policies to 
protect the environment. An environmental rights approach is a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach as it utilizes the peoples’ right to a clean environment enforceable 
vertically upwards against the government, MNCs and other state actors to protect 
the environment as a substitute for the ‘top-down’ regulatory approach which relies 
on the imposition of government-prescribed regulatory policies, measures and 
standards vertically downwards for protecting the environment. 
It is, therefore, imperative to explore the feasibility of adopting a rights’ based 
approach to environmental protection in Nigeria and expand the debate on whether 
constitutionalizing environmental rights has cognizable prospects for improving 
environmental protection in the country. Issues surrounding the normative contents 
of a constitutionalized environmental right and whether an anthropocentric or eco-
centric approach should be adopted in framing a constitutionalized environmental 
right in Nigeria will also form a substantial part of this study.     
 
Research Problems 
The failure of the regulatory and civil liability approaches stem from deep-seated 
problems that have produced a defective and unsustainable environmental 
protection framework in Nigeria. These fundamental problems exist at the local, 
national and international levels of environmental protection in the region.  
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The local level stems from the blind pursuit of a ‘full-belly’ by the inhabitants of the 
region to the detriment of the sanctity of their environment and the lack of access to 
environmental justice for people of the region.  
The national level arises from the weak environmental legal framework and 
ecological imperialism by the other regions determined to keep the Niger Delta 
people environmentally subjugated in a bid to continue unbridled exploitation of the 
natural resources of the region.  
The international level stems from the domestic inapplicability of various 
international environmental treaties that Nigeria has ratified owing to the restriction 
imposed by Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution33 which require such treaties to 
be domestically enacted by Parliament before they can be enforceable.  
These research problems and their impact on environmental degradation in the 
Niger Delta region are extensively discussed in Chapter 1.4 of this thesis. 
 
Research Questions 
This thesis seeks to answer one central question with two sub-questions - 
1. Should environmental rights be constitutionalized in Nigeria’s 
environmental legal framework? 
 
a. Will constitutionalising environmental rights address the key problems 
of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region? 
 
b. How should the constitutionalised environmental rights be normatively 
framed to achieve the desired objectives? 
 
The primary question focuses on the necessity of introducing constitutional 
environmental rights in Nigeria to address the key problems of the weak 
environmental rights legal framework in Nigeria, ecological imperialism and 
environmental injustice in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The first subsidiary 
question analyses the benefits that can be derived from constitutionalizing this right 
and whether those benefits are sufficiently weighty to warrant a constitutional 
                                                          
33 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).  
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amendment to achieve this objective. The question also considers alternative 
solutions such as reliance on international environmental law and private property 
law rights through tort claims and examines why these alternatives are insufficient 
to address the problem.  
 
The second subsidiary question expands the debate by analysing the normative 
contents of a potential constitutional environmental right, focusing on the divide 
between the anthropocentric and ecocentric approach to environmental rights and 
discussing the benefits of implementing a coalesced anthropocentrism approach 
which embeds the environmental interests of humans, nature and future generation 
in a single normative framework.  
   
Research Objectives 
This thesis analyses the concept of environmental rights within Nigeria’s 
environmental legal framework and argue for the constitutionalization of 
environmental rights as a sustainable way of ensuring better environmental 
protection in the country and enshrining civic environmentalism amongst the people 
of the host communities in the Niger Delta.  
The thematic discussions regarding the jurisprudential meaning of rights, their 
application in an environmental context and the opposing philosophies on whether 
humans should be the centre of environmental rights’ models or whether nature, 
non-living beings and animals within the ecosystem should be given equal treatment 
with humans in defining an environmental rights system is analysed in this research 
with the aim of determining the extent to which they can be reflected within Nigeria’s 
environmental law framework. Environmental rights are either normatively framed 
in an anthropocentric or ecocentric model or sometimes a mixture of both in a form 
of ‘dilute anthropocentrism’34 which incorporates protection of the environment for 
humans as well as nature’s intrinsic value. Determining which approach should be 
adopted in Nigeria’s environmental law framework is imperative as it shapes the 
debate on whether the focus of environmental protection in the Niger Delta should 
be on the people of the host communities and the impact of pollution on their lives 
                                                          
34 C. Redgwell, ‘Life, the Universe and Everything: a Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’ in Alan 




and livelihoods or whether damage to the natural components of the ecosystem 
should be included in framing normative environmental rights for the region.  
In this regard, this thesis proposes and conceptualises the coalesced 
anthropocentrism model as an environmental rights’ paradigm which protects the 
relevant interests in the environment and best represents a non-anthropocentric 
perspective of environmental rights which have been so dominant in environmental 
instruments around the globe in a manner that can be considered anthropocentric 
chauvinism.  
This thesis also analyses the extent to which constitutionalising environmental rights 
can make a difference in the environmental situation in the Niger Delta where 
various regulatory models have failed to yield results. Particularly, the unique socio-
political and geographic circumstances prevailing in Nigeria which is unfavourably 
tilted against the people of the Niger Delta leading to a form of ‘ecological 
imperialism’ and producing the ‘full-belly’ syndrome as a side effect are some of the 
key subjects analysed in this research. This thesis examines how constitutionalizing 
environmental rights can tackle this lopsided distribution of environmental burdens 
between the core and periphery regions in Nigeria which unfairly prejudices the 
environmental interests of the Niger Delta inhabitants.  
The thesis supplies a normative context to the discussions above by providing a 
structured highlight of how constitutionalization of environmental rights can be 
carried out within Nigeria’s present legal framework. The location of the rights within 
the constitution, justiciability, hierarchy within the rights’ structure in the constitution 
and enforceability by the judiciary will be discussed. This will require specific 
discussions of relevant provisions of Nigeria’s constitution and how they can be 
altered, substituted or interpreted to embed environmental rights in the Constitution.  
Although this thesis focuses heavily on Nigeria and the Niger Delta, it has wider 
application beyond Nigeria, as the environmental issues faced in the Niger Delta 
(and Nigeria) are replicated in similar ways in many oil-rich developing countries in 
Africa and Latin America. The socio-economic contexts of these environmental 
challenges in these developing countries are also similar to those within the Niger 
Delta, making the analysis in this thesis applicable to these countries. Although a 
significant number of these developing countries in Latin America and Africa have 
constitutionalised environmental rights, these are mostly expressed in purely 
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anthropocentric normative structures (with the exception of Ecuador and Bolivia) 
which this thesis argues undermines the effectiveness of a constitutional 
environmental protection framework. The coalesced anthropocentrism model of 
constitutional environmental rights propounded in this thesis will, therefore, be 
relevant in future reviews of the constitutional environmental rights framework in 
many of these countries.    
 
Significance of the Research 
The significance of this research and its original contribution to knowledge derives 
from four major achievements. First, it links the environmental problems in the Niger 
Delta to the fundamental issues of ecological imperialism and the ‘full-belly’ 
syndrome which have not been considered by any literature on the subject (of which 
there are a lot). Existing literature on the subject35 focus on the government and 
Multinational Oil Corporations (MNCs) as the responsible parties for the 
environmental pollution in the region. This thesis breaks away from this linear 
reasoning and identifies the role that individuals in the region (through the ‘full-belly’ 
syndrome) and individuals from the other geopolitical regions (through ecological 
imperialism) play in the environmental crisis in the region.  
Second, (and more importantly), flowing from the above, this thesis proposes a 
solution not considered in the existing literature on the subject - using constitutional 
rights to address the underlying fundamental environmental challenges in the 
region. Existing literary focus is on improving governmental regulatory controls and 
judicial accountability of oil corporations through stiffer penalties imposed in civil 
liability suits, approaches which this thesis shows to be inherently flawed and 
ineffective. 
Third, this thesis develops the coalesced anthropocentrism model which challenges 
the entrenched anthropocentric models (and available variations such as weak 
anthropocentrism) prevalent in environmental discussions and legal systems 
globally. Redgwell’s dilute anthropocentrism approach36 and Nickel’s 
                                                          
35 See Chapter 1 of this thesis for a discussion of the plethora of literature studies on the Niger 
Delta environmental situation. 
36 C. Redgwell, ‘Life, the Universe and Everything: a Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’ in Alan 




accommodationist approach37 initiated a shift away from anthropocentric thinking in 
environmental literature, but do not go far enough to consider the normative 
incorporation of nature’s intrinsic rights in statutory and constitutional environmental 
protection. This thesis fills the gap by establishing the theoretical and normative 
foundations upon which nature-centric environmental interests can be incorporated 
into statutory and constitutional environmental rights protection. The coalesced 
anthropocentrism model developed in this thesis establishes a benchmark against 
which countries can assess the compliance of their environmental legal framework 
with a contemporary understanding of environmental rights that are liberal and 
inclusive of nature-centric interests. 
Finally, the thesis undertakes a comprehensive global review of the constitutions of 
all 196 countries in the world and assesses their compliance with the yardsticks 
established in the core values of the coalesced anthropocentrism model, thereby 
providing a quick glance for determining the extent to which anthropocentric 
chauvinism is deeply entrenched globally and the need for an overhaul of such 
approach for improved ecosystem protection. Boyd’s global constitution study38 
which analysed environmental rights provision in the constitution of all 196 countries 
in the world utilised unsatisfactory and misleading indicators in assessing the extent 
of environmental rights incorporation in constitutions. The UNEP First Global 201939 
also utilised similar indicators in categorising the incorporation of environmental 
rights in national constitutions. This resulted in the finding of constitutional 
environmental rights in countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi where only a non-
enforceable governmental obligation to protect the environment exists. This thesis 
fills this gap by undertaking a more comprehensive, segmental analysis of global 
constitutions looking beyond the nominal mention of environmental protection to a 
focus on the actual normative incorporation of enforceable environmental rights 
(See Chapter 4 and the Appendix). The findings, shown in the Appendix, further 
analyses the extent to which these constitutions protect the rights of future 
generations and Mother Nature, critical elements in the coalesced anthropocentrism 
model developed in this thesis. 
                                                          
37 J. Nickel, ‘The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope 
and Justification’ (1993) 18 YALE J INT’L L 281–85. 
38 D. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, 
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The methodology employed in this thesis is a transnational study of constitutional 
provisions of all 196 countries of the world, examining the extent of the incorporation 
of substantive and procedural environmental rights in these constitutions and how 
the constitutional provisions influence environmental protection within these 
jurisdictions. Transnational research has been defined as ‘comparative research 
between populations of two or more countries; and the use of literature across 
populations in formulating the research problem and drawing implications’40 
Being a form of comparative research, transnational research utilises qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons of policies in a specific sector across a range of countries 
with emphasis on the qualitative impacts of these policies on social, environmental 
or economic sectors in these countries.41 The qualitative aspect of transnational 
research focuses on a normative comparisons of laws, policies and content analysis 
of legal or constitutional instruments while the quantitative aspects focuses on 
comparisons including meta-analysis, comparing social indicators, comparing 
responses to a common stimulus, comparisons against a standard, and fitting a 
statistical model to two or more countries with a view to aggregating the finding in 
support of a proposed hypothesis.42  
This thesis adopts the qualitative and quantitative aspects of transnational research 
in examining the contents of national constitutions and environmental laws within 
several jurisdictions and comparing the responses in these jurisdictions to 
environmental protection. It aggregates the findings of the study across the 196 
countries and fits it into a statistical model to support the hypothesis that, with few 
outliers, countries with constitutional environmental rights respond better to 
environmental protection issues than countries lacking explicit constitutional 
protection of the environment. The quantitative transnational study of environmental 
rights provisions in countries around the globe also supports the findings that 
                                                          
40T Tripodi, M Potocky-Tripodi, ‘Transnational Research’ in T Tripodi and M Potocky-Tripodi, 
International Social Work Research: Issues and Prospects (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009) 
1.  
41 V Mazzucato, Bridging boundaries with a transnational research approach: a simultaneous 
matched-sample methodology Paper presented at Diaspora and Transnationalism Conceptual, 
Theoretical and Methodological Challenges 10-11 April 2008.  
42R O’Gorman, ‘Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study’ (2017) Transnational 
Environmental Law 435-462. 
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constitutional environmental rights strengthens the environmental law framework 
within countries, improves the chances of success of environmental litigation, 
positively impacts on the ecological carbon footprint of countries and prevents 
rollbacks on environmental protection policies as detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
thesis.  
The data supporting the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 was gathered through an 
examination of all 196 national constitutions for the inclusion of a range of terms 
(earth, environm*, ecology, ecosystem, conservation, future generations, 
intergenerational, natur*, sustainab* ). Where a term was present in the 
constitutional document but referred to elements outside the core features of  
environmental rights and constitutionalism (such as provisions in constitutions 
referring to ‘ownership of natural resources’, ‘resource allocation’, ‘conservation of 
wildlife’ or the use of ‘environment’ in other contexts outside of its ecological 
meaning, e.g ‘environment’ used to refer to premises, surroundings or within other 
sectors), it was disregarded. For those constitutions that contain one or more of the 
researched terms, the focus was on the term that most closely reflected the core 
features of environmental constitutionalism.   
In categorising the dataset, a distinction was drawn between the ‘rights’ and ‘duty’ 
paradigms in environmental constitutionalism, segregating constitutional provisions 
with enforceable individual rights (both substantive and procedural rights) from 
provisions merely providing for government’s duty to protect the environment. The 
former reflects ‘environmental rights’ within the context of the discussion in this 
thesis while the latter encapsulates the constitutional foundation of environmental 
regulation with its weaknesses highlighted in this thesis.  
A dataset was created on the basis of the extent of the incorporation of the three 
constituents of the coalesced anthropocentrism model developed in this thesis. 
Each state was categorized under one of the three broad headings (environmental 
human rights, future generations and nature) guided by the analysis of the 
constituents of coalesced anthropocentrism in chapter 2. The result of this 
categorisation is reflected in Appendix I showing the extent to which 
constitutionalization of environmental rights is overwhelmingly anthropocentric with 
only Ecuador, Boliva and Norway breaking away from this trend of anthropocentric 
chauvinism to constitutionally recognise nature’s environmental interests. 
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The database for obtaining the constitutions of all 196 countries were sourced from 
three main online platforms – Constitute Project, FAOLEX and ECOLEX. 
Constitution Project43 was the primary source of the constitution database as it 
provided up-to-date copies of the constitutions of all 193 countries with national 
constitutions (excluding the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Israel that have no 
national Constitutions). The copies of the national constitutions in the database of 
Constitute Project included the relevant latest amendments of such constitutions 
and, therefore, provided a contemporary database of the latest constitutional 
developments in all 193 countries.  
FAOLEX (the Legal database of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the 
United Nations)44 provided useful copies of national constitutions and was a useful 
source for comparing the findings from Constitute Project. It provided a searchable 
database for transnational searching of specific terms within national constitutions, 
presenting the results with a highlight of all national constitutions providing such 
terms. It, therefore, provided an important way to quickly cross-reference the 
availability of specific terms across national constitutions, although in terms of the 
availability of copies of national constitutions, it was slightly less comprehensive 
than Constitute Project which provided detailed copies of all national constitutions. 
Also, FAOLEX database did not always contain the latest amendments to the 
national constitutions and were sometimes dated and the Constitute Project 
database was, therefore, the primary and more reliable database utilised for the 
transnational study of constitutions in this thesis.  
ECOLEX (an information service on environmental law, operated jointly by FAO, 
IUCN and UNEP)45 was also an important online database of not just national 
constitutions, but environmental legislation and other environmental legal 
instruments of most countries in the world, providing a useful reference for examing 
the development of the environmental legal framework prior to and in the aftermath 
of constitutionalization of environmental rights. This was useful  in analysing global 
environmental constitutionalism by studying the development of the environmental 
legal framework in countries with explicit constitutional environmental rights.  
                                                          
43 Constitution Project database  <https://constitutionproject.org/> last accessed on 15 May 2019. 
44 FAOLEX database <http://www.fao.org/legal/databases/faolex/en/> last accessed on 15 May 
2019. 
45 ECOLEX Legislation database <https://www.ecolex.org/result/?type=legislation> last accessed 
on 15 May 2019. 
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The latest 2019 data on environmental constitutionalism by the First Global Report 
on Environmental Rule of Law by UNEP46 indicates that 150 countries have 
constitutional environmental provisions of some kind and in at least 88 countries, 
these take the form of explicit constitutional environmental rights leaving 46 
countries without any form of constitutional protection of the environment. A 
comprehensive review of the national constitutions of all 193 countries with 
constitutions using the databases of Constitute Project, FAOLEX and ECOLEX, 
however, reveals that only 81 of the 88 countries provide explicit constitutional 
environmental rights that are immediately judicially enforceable as 7 countries – 
South Korea, Spain, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Gabon and Gambia - have 
constitutional rights in manners that are either based on progressive 
implementation, or require legislative instruments to be enforceable. 
The thesis also engages in theoretical discussions of environmental rights models, 
environmental rule of law, environmental constitutionalism and other subjects of the 
research utilising library-based materials, review of latest literature in the field and 
relevant international environmental instruments and declarations by international 
environmental institutions such as UNEP, UN Environment, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHRC) and IUCN.. In discussing the state of 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta in Chapter 1, the thesis relies on 
existing scientific data/graphics laying out the extent of destruction of the ecosystem 
in the region by continuous oil pollution and other available empirical studies on the 
socio-economic impacts of environmental degradation on the lives of people of the 
region, particularly studies by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
other environmental advocacy groups. The extent of degradation of the environment 
in the Niger Delta is well documented in the global and domestic arena as it has 
been a subject of a plethora of scientific and empirical studies.47 Therefore, this 
research does not seek to investigate the extent of degradation but rather builds on 
                                                          
46 UNEP, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report’ January 2019. 
47See UNEP Report, ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’ (2011) Climate Justice 
Programme/Environmental Rights Association, ‘Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, 
Environmental and Economic Monstrosity’, (2008) 
<www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/gas_flaring_nigeria.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2015); Joseph 
Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and 
the Human Right to a Healthy Environment’ (1997) 15 B U Int'l L J 26; T. Ologunorisa, ‘A Review 
of the Effects of Gas Flaring on the Niger Delta Environment’, (2010) 8(3) Int’l J of Sust Devpt 
& World Ecology 12 
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these available empirical studies to argue for constitutional environmental protection 
and canvas for a paradigm shift from the existing regulatory model framework.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
In addition to this introduction, the argument in this thesis is developed across seven 
substantive chapters and the conclusion. A summary of the chapter contents is 
provided below. 
Chapter one establishes the foundation of the research focusing on the endemic 
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta, the socio-economic impacts of pollution 
on their lives and livelihoods and the problem of ecological imperialism suffered by 
the people of the region. The chapter examines the underlying root causes of the 
environmental degradation which lie far away from the oil tanks, pipelines and gas 
flaring pipes that produce polluting effluents. It discusses ecological imperialism, the 
‘full-belly’ syndrome, a lack of access to environmental justice and inapplicability of 
international environmental law as the non-governmental, non-corporate factors that 
account for the perpetuation of pollution in the region contrary to the focus of most 
literature on the government and corporate oil producers as the main causes of 
pollution in the region. The analysis in this chapter is doctrinal, relying on empirical 
scientific studies on the extent of pollution in the region. 
Chapter two utilises a doctrinal approach to establish the theoretical framework for 
environmental rights and dualist models of environmental protection. It discusses 
the jurisprudential meaning of rights and its application in an environmental context; 
the philosophical dualism in environmental rights’ debate based on the 
anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental protection; and 
examines how this dualism influences the normative contents of environmental 
rights in legal drafting, especially at the constitutional level. It argues for the adoption 
of coalesced anthropocentrism model as an environmental rights paradigm 
providing a comprehensive and effective protection for the tripod environmental 
interests of humans, nature and future generations. This chapter aims to identify the 
competing environmental rights models in the contemporary environmental 
literature, the shortcomings of these models and the core values of the coalesce 
anthropocentrism model which make it better suited to environmental protection 
than the pre-existing models.  
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Chapter three proposes and examines one of the general premises on which this 
thesis is based - that a rights’ based approach to environmental protection is more 
effective than a) the regulatory approach and, b) the private law (torts law) civil 
liability approach in enshrining an effective framework for environmental 
accountability. The chapter sequentially analyses the advantages of a rights’ based 
approach over the regulatory and civil liability approaches and discusses how the 
triumph of rights over socio-economic and development goals ensures that 
environmental protection is not subjected to governmental policy prevarications. The 
chapter argues that a rights’ based approach removes environmental protection from 
the realm of policy objectives of government to an established enforceable cause of 
action for citizens, and obviates the monetisation of environmental damages that is 
the bedrock of the civil liability approach. The chapter also examines the concept of 
environmental constitutionalism, environmental rule of law and the role of the 
judiciary in advancing environmental protection through constitutional environmental 
rights provisions.  
Chapter four elevates the discussions on environmental rights to a constitutional 
platform by focusing on constitutionalization of environmental rights. The chapter 
discusses the theories of constitutionalization of rights, the increasing adoption of 
constitutionalized environmental rights in many states around the world and the 
impact of constitutionalization of rights on ecosystem protection. Utilising a 
comparative methodology, this chapter undertakes a global study of constitutions 
and provides a statistical breakdown and graphical representations of the extent to 
which environmental rights are protected in constitutions around the world. Based 
on the findings of this global study revealing the prevalence of anthropocentric 
chauvinism in a majority of constitutions with environmental rights, the chapter 
argues that the case for constitutionalising environmental rights should be non-
anthropocentric, hinged on the inherent fundamental nature of the environment as a 
life-sustaining system and not merely from the perspective that humans have a 
fundamental right to a clean environment. It proposes a normative structure of 
constitutional environmental rights which embodies the coalesced anthropocentrism 
model for adoption by countries.  
Chapter five establishes the second general premise of this thesis- that 
constitutionalising environmental rights have potentially transformative effects on 
environmental protection within a country. The chapter examines the noticeable 
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effects of constitutionalising environmental rights by looking at how it influences the 
environmental law framework and environmental litigation outlook within jurisdictions 
that have introduced these rights. The chapter also argues that while there are no 
definite methodological means of establishing a direct link between 
constitutionalising environmental rights and an improvement in environmental 
protection, the available evidence from a study of environmental legislation and 
litigation post-constitutionalization around the globe makes a strong case in support 
of the view that constitutionalising environmental rights is a landmark step in the 
direction of improved ecosystem protection within a jurisdiction. 
Chapter six applies the analysis in the preceding chapter to the Niger Delta situation 
and reviews the impact constitutionalizing environmental rights will have on the 
environmental legal framework in Nigeria. It examines the various unsuccessful 
regulatory approaches the Nigerian government have implemented over the past 
four decades to halt continuous environmental pollution in the Niger Delta and the 
reasons behind their failures. It proposes and critically examines the normative 
contents and structures of potential constitutional environmental rights in Nigeria 
and how best these rights can be framed to maximise their potential impacts.  
Chapter seven critically assesses the validity of the hypothesis of this study – that 
constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria will address the unique underlying 
environmental challenges responsible for the perpetuation of the endemic 
degradation in the Niger Delta. It sequentially establishes how constitutionalization 
of environmental rights can potentially address the five underlying environmental 
challenges identified in chapter one and why this approach will be effective where 
others have failed. 
The conclusion brings together the premises and hypothesis of the work, 
summarises the arguments, establish the links between these arguments and how 
they answer the research questions set out at the beginning of the work. The 
conclusion establishes that a shift to a rights’ based approach to environmental 
protection (proposed in chapters 2 and 3) when conferred with constitutional 
protection (chapters 4 and 5) will potentially address the environmental challenges 
in the Niger Delta identified in chapter 1 in significant ways discussed in chapters 6 
and 7. Consequently, constitutional environmental rights will create an enduring 
legal framework for the people of the Niger Delta to protect their environment from 





ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN THE NIGER 
DELTA 
“If you want to go fishing, you have to paddle for about four hours through 
several rivers before you can get to where you can catch fish and the [oil] 
spill is lesser … some of the fishes we catch, when you open the 
stomach, it smells of crude oil…”1 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Environmental pollution is the foremost problem facing the people of the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria as they grapple with the constant degradation of their environment 
in the course of oil and gas exploration. Oil pollution contaminates their farmlands, 
crippling their agricultural activities (which is their main form of subsistence); pollutes 
the rivers and ground waters, crippling their fishing lifestyle (as all the fishes and 
marine foods are either dead or soiled with oil pollutants);2 and present health 
challenges due to the noxious smells of these pollutants and contamination of basic 
foodstuffs.3  
Nevertheless, while oil pollution is the immediate cause of the environmental 
situation in the region, it is merely a product or symptom of much deeper, 
fundamental issues plaguing the region and resulting in the environmental 
degradation. The failure to identify and address these fundamental issues is 
responsible for the seemingly intractable nature of the degradation for more than 
five decades.   
This chapter sets the scene for the analysis in this thesis by identifying and 
discussing the root causes of environmental degradation in the region. They extend 
beyond mere government’s regulatory failure and corporate disregard for the 
                                                          
1 Interview with local fisherman reported in Centre for Environment, Human Rights and 
Development (CEHRD)’s Report on the state of human rights abuses and violence in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria, 2008, < 
https://grupos.es.amnesty.org/uploads/media/Vertidos_de_petroleo_de_la_empresa_Shell_en_el
_Delta_del_Niger.pdf> 7, accessed 17 June 2017. 
2 ibid.  
3 J. Baird, ‘Oil's Shame in Africa’ (2010) 156 (4) Newsweek 115. 
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environment, to self-inflicted damages by the inhabitants in search of their ‘full-belly’ 
and includes ecological oppression by the other geopolitical regions in the country. 
The fundamental nature of these issues requires instituting a fundamental legal 
platform through constitutionalization of environmental rights discussed in chapters 
4 and 5 of this thesis and the specific ways this addresses the fundamental 
challenges are analysed in chapter 7.  
 
1.1 Perspectives to the Niger Delta Environmental Conflict  
In empirical environmental terms, the Niger Delta is one of the clearest illustrations 
of the bio-degenerative consequences of anthropocentric activities in the extractive 
industry. It represents an unpleasant example of the ills of unmitigated and un-
managed oil and gas exploration and production activities. The region constitutes 
the bedrock of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues and has remained vital to the nation’s 
economic survival for decades as revenues from oil and gas exploration activities 
in the region account for over 80% of government earnings and 90% of the 
country’s foreign reserves.4  
Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the region at Oloibiri in 1956, 
the environmental landscape of the region has been negatively transformed into a 
tale of unending environmental conflicts and pollution. These conflicts have 
become a recurring theme in national and international discourse, largely owing to 
the seeming intractability of the conflict with its evolving dimensions from a 
resource control struggle to an environmental struggle, and later to political 
agitations for the secession of the region from the rest of the country.5 Significantly, 
the overwhelming perception of the Niger Delta conflict, as derived from existing 
literature on the subject6 and participant studies7, is that environmental pollution 
                                                          
4 World Bank 2007, ‘Nigeria Country Brief’, Washington, available at - 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,me
nuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:36889 6,00.html>  accessed June 15, 
2016.  
5 E. Chukwuemeka, N. Ewuim, D. Amobi and L Okechukwu, ‘Niger Delta Crisis – A Study of 
Evwerem and Otu- Jeremi Communities: Implications For Nigeria’s Sustainable Development’ 
(2013) 1(4) International Journal of Accounting Research 33. 
6 Several literatures abound on this subject. A few include – J. Baird, ‘Oil's Shame in Africa’ (2010) 
156 (4) Newsweek 115; P. Gibson, ‘Niger River Delta: 50 Years of Oil Spills (Cover story)’ (2006) 
29 (46) Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 1-2; H. Yusuf, ‘Oil on troubled waters: Multinational 
corporations and realising human rights in the developing world, with specific reference to Nigeria’ 
(2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 15. 
7 L. Pyagbara, ‘The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a Local 
Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria’, International Expert Group 
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and degradation of the ecosystem from oil and gas exploration activities by the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNCs) is at the epicentre of the Niger Delta conflict 
and is responsible for the environmental problems associated with the region. 
Indigenous people of the Niger Delta region and local and international 
environmental groups place the blame for the environmental neglect and 
degradation on the MNCs and the government while the MNCs and government 
are at great pains to defend their actions and seek to proffer viable explanations 
for the plight of the region which usually include the restiveness in the region and 
inability to secure adequate investments in better oil production facilities.8  
Nevertheless, a critical unbiased appraisal of the Niger Delta conflict has shown that 
the exclusive blaming of the government and MNCs is essentially an emotive 
response to a difficult and complex interwoven situation where the MNCs and 
government are merely the most convenient parties to shoulder the blame. In this 
situation, environmental degradation is seen as the main cause of the conflict and 
neglect of the region, while, in actual fact, it is merely an effect of the wider conflict 
in the region which transcends the activities of the extractive industry. This ‘fallacy 
of the false cause’ further exacerbates the conflict as, in reality, the extractive industry 
is just a small part of the wider conflict in the Niger Delta.  
A significant part of the environmental pollution from oil spills is mostly attributable 
to sabotage of oil facilities and there is also intense competition for the limited 
opportunities for local participation, which often lead to intra and inter-communal 
conflicts.9 These factors are not directly caused by the extractive industry but 
because the MNCs are in more direct contact with the communities than the various 
government agencies, the deprived population usually make demands for social 
services and economic opportunities from the oil companies rather than from the 
inaccessible government.10 When these demands are not met by the MNCs, the 
                                                          
Meeting On Indigenous Peoples And Protection Of The Environment, Khabarovsk, Russian 
Federation, AUGUST 27.-29, 2007; See also J. Singh, D. Moffat, and O. Linden, ‘Defining An 
Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta’, Industry and Energy Operations Division, 
West Central Africa Department, Africa Region, The World Bank, 1995. 
8 K. Higgins, ‘Regional inequality and the Niger Delta’ (2009) Policy Brief No. 5, Overseas 
Development Institute, available at <www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2507.pdf> accessed May 
21, 2016.   
9 Binuomoyo Olayinka et al, ‘Oil spills and the Niger Delta bloodlines: Examining the Human 
Tragedy’, (2017) 8(1) Journal of Life &Physical Sciences 8-18.  
10 A. Adekoya, ‘Extractive Industry and Environmental Conflict: Predicament of Rural Households in 
Nigeria’s Oil Rich Region’, IAIA09 Conference Proceedings, Impact Assessment and Human Well-
Being, 29th Annual Conference of the International Association for Impact Assessment, 16-22 May 
2009, Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana (www.iaia.org), pg.2.    
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indigenous communities become aggrieved and oftentimes resort to violent means 
to press home their demands through lockdowns of the oil facilities11and sometimes 
sabotaging of the oil facilities leading to environmental pollution of the surrounding 
area.12 This practice of sabotaging oil pipelines and other oil and gas facilities is not 
peculiar to the oil producing communities in the Niger Delta as it is a common 
occurrence in other oil producing states in Latin America. In Peru, frequent disputes 
between the oil producing communities and oil producers, such as Canada’s 
Frontera Energy, often result in the sabotage of oil pipelines by the indigenous 
communities leading to widespread spillage of oil into the Amazonian forest.13 A 
December 2018 report revealed that sabotage of oil facilities and pipelines from over 
15 separate attacks in Peru between 2016 and 2018 has caused spills of 20,000 
barrels in total into the Amazon.14 
This practice is replicated in different oil producing communities throughout Latin 
America including Ecuador and Colombia where oil production activities face 
repeated attacks from indigenous communities protecting their sacred indigenous 
lands and ecology from the degradations caused by oil production activities.15 As 
Vazquez asserts, ‘conflicts around hydrocarbons are not new in the three countries 
under study, and they can be traced back to the beginning of oil operations in 
Colombia at the beginning of the twentieth century’.16 Indeed, the causes of 
sabotage of oil facilities in Latin America are similar to those in the Niger Delta. 
Expanding on this idea, Vazquez further opined that ‘from 2000 to 2010, Latin 
America experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of conflicts related 
to natural resources in general and oil and gas in particular. . . Many of the disputes 
were related to oil and natural gas reserves located in the Amazon basin and its 
surrounding areas, home to large numbers of Indigenous Peoples. These 
                                                          
11 For instance, on August 11, 2017, hundreds of protesters in Rivers State in the Niger Delta, 
stormed an oil platform belonging to Shell Plc and locked it down demanding jobs and infrastructure 
development from the company. ‘Hundreds of protesters storm Shell oil facility in Niger Delta’, 
Reuters, 11 August, 2017 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil/hundreds-of-protesters-
storm-shell-oil-facility-in-niger-delta-idUSKBN1AR0VI> accessed 19 June 2018.  
12 United States Institute of Peace, ‘Blood Oil in the Niger Delta’ (2009) Special Report 229, 12.  
13 I Slav, ‘Peru’s Largest Oil Field Stops Producing After Pipeline Attack’ (Oil Price, 04 December 
2018) <https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Perus-Largest-Oil-Field-Stops-
Producing-After-Pipeline-Attack.html#> accessed 08 May 2019. 
14 ‘Canada's Frontera stops production after attack on Peru oil pipeline’ (Reuters, 03 December 2018) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/peru-pipeline/canadas-frontera-stops-production-after-attack-on-
peru-oil-pipeline-idUKL1N1Y824W?rpc=401&> accessed 08 May 2019.  
15 P Vásquez, Oil Sparks in the Amazon: Local Conflicts, Indigenous Populations, and Natural 
Resources (University of Georgia Press, 2014) 1 
16 Ibid, 3.   
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historically marginalized groups have for years maintained numerous grievances 
that have largely gone unnoticed by the rest of the population…’17 These conflicts 
often result in sabotage of oil and gas facilities in Latin America.  
Nevertheless, the conflict in the Niger Delta transcends an environmental conflict 
and environmental degradation is likely an outcome of the wider conflict rather than 
the cause. While there is no usefulness in engaging in a ‘chicken or egg’ debate 
regarding the sequence in which environmental degradation and the Niger Delta 
conflict arose, it is important to highlight the fact that the Niger Delta area has for 
long been the epicentre of numerous overlapping conflicts: between host 
communities and oil companies (mainly over land rights or compensation for 
ecological damage); between oil producing communities and the government (over 
increased access to oil revenue); and between the various ethnic groups in the 
region (over claims to land ownership and sharing of amenities).18 Added to these 
interwoven conflicts are the activities of ‘conflict entrepreneurs’19 benefiting from 
the crises economy and the entrenched lopsided colonial legacy subjugating 
control of the region’s resources to stronger federating units in the country.  
Further support for this view is presented by the World Bank which stated that 
available scientific evidence indicates that environmental pollution from oil 
exploration activities is not of highest concern relative to other issues.20 The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 200621 asserts that ‘the Niger Delta is 
a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and 
services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor 
and endemic conflict’. This highlights the myriad of issues involved in the Niger 
Delta conflict which cannot be solely attributable to environmental degradation but 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 25; See also M Bozigar, C Gray, and R Bilsborrow, ‘Oil extraction and indigenous livelihoods 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon’ (2016) 78 World development 125–135.  
18 J. Oladapo - Oluwole, ‘Niger Delta Crisis and The Master Plan: An Evaluation’, (2009) National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 15. 
19 ibid. 
20 ‘The Niger Delta: A Stakeholder Approach to Environmental Development’, Findings reports on 
ongoing operational, economic and sector work carried out by the World Bank and its member 
governments in the Africa Region, African Region No. 53 December 1995  
21 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Nigeria’, Human Development Report 2006, 
Human Development Indicators Country Fact Sheets. 
 <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NGA.html> accessed 
January 15, 2016.    
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which may, in fact, be plausibly viewed as creating a fertile ground for the persistent 
environmental pollution of the region.22  
In addition to the skewed attribution of responsibility for the Niger Delta conflict to 
environmental degradation, there is also the mis-placement of the blame for 
environmental degradation solely on the MNCs operating in the region. Empirical 
evidence reveals that a significant part of environmental pollution results from 
sabotage of oil facilities by indigenous people and oil bunkering activities by 
criminal elements operating within the region with the knowledge and (alleged) 
connivance of some of the host people and communities.23 Ironically, the sabotage 
of oil facilities by people in the host communities is often carried out as a form of 
protest against oil pollution and environmental degradation by the MNCs not 
minding the fact that the chosen form of protest further creates pollution and 
degrades the environment. This pollution caused by sabotage is in turn blamed on 
the MNCs thus creating a vicious circle that perpetuates the environmental situation 
in the region. 
 
1.2 Geographical and Political Delineation of the Niger 
Delta  
The term ‘Niger Delta’ geographically refers to the cross-network of lands and rivers 
surrounding the Delta of the River Niger as it empties into the Atlantic Ocean in 
Nigeria’s southern region along the Gulf Coast. It covers an area of about 70,000 
square kilometres and is noted for its peculiar and difficult mangrove terrain. The 
whole area is crisscrossed by a large number of streams, swamps, canals and 
creeks.  
                                                          
22 Various governmental agencies have been put in place by the Nigerian government to tackle some 
aspects of the conflict, particularly the infrastructural neglect, poor social amenities and economic 
empowerment of people of the region. The Niger Development Commission (NDDC) was 
established in 1999 to replace the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) established in 1983. Their main aim was addressing the socio-economic perspectives 
to the Niger Delta conflict, and even though the NDDC has made some strides in this respect, the 
fundamental challenges of the region remain unaddressed.  
23 O. Emoyan, I. Akpobori & A. Akporhonor, ‘The Oil and Gas Industry and the Niger Delta: 
Implications for the Environment’ (2008) 12(3) J. Appl. Sci. Environ. Manage 29 – 37; P. Okumagba, 
‘The Politics of Oil and the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan: Its Workability and the 




The region can be classified into four ecological zones: coastal inland zone; 
freshwater zone; lowland rainforest zone; and mangrove swamp zone. This region 
is considered one of the ten most important wetlands and marine ecosystems in the 
world.24 Generally, the region is divided into the tropical rainforest vegetation in the 
northern part and the thick mangrove swamps in the southern part bordering the 
Atlantic Ocean.    
The Niger Delta has the third largest mangrove forest in the world and the largest in 
Africa. It is estimated to cover between 5,400 km2 and 6000 km2.25 The region has 
been declared as a key zone for the conservation of the western coast of Africa on 
the basis of its extraordinary biodiversity.26 It is estimated that there are more than 
46,000 plant species in the region of which about 205 are endemic, and 
approximately 484 plants in 112 families are threatened with extinction as well as 
many animal and bird species.27 
The political delineation of the ‘Niger Delta’ in Nigeria, however, is an expansion on 
its geographical delineation as the term is used to represent all oil-producing areas 
of the country’s southern region including the south-east, south-south and south-
west regions.28 Consequently, some states29 which are geographically outside the 
typical Niger Delta vegetation are classified under the ‘Niger Delta Region’ for oil 
exploration and resource control purposes. As a result, oil-producing states from the 
south-east30 and south-west31 geo-political regions which do not fall within the Niger 
Delta geographical definition are classified under the term ‘Niger Delta’ as a 
geopolitical reference. More areas/communities are added to the classification when 
oil is discovered in such areas.32  
                                                          
24 ‘Oil of Poverty in the Niger Delta’, A publication of the African Network for Environment and 
Economic Justice (ANEEJ), Federal Ministry of Environment Abuja, Nigerian Conservation 
Foundation Lagos, WWF UK and CEESP-IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic, and 
Social Policy, May 31,(2006).  
25 ibid. 
26 K. Ayuba, ‘Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, 
(2012) 12(3) Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Environment & Earth Sciences, 12. 
27Y. Twumasi, & E. Merem ‘GIS and Remote Sensing Applications in the Assessment of Change 
within a Coastal Environment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ (2006) 3(1) International Journal 
of Environmental Research & Public Health, 98.  
28A. Benedict, ‘Breaking Barriers to Transformation of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Human 
Development Paradigm’, (2011) 4(3) Journal of Sustainable Development 15.  
29 E.g. Ondo State. 
30 Abia and Imo states. 
31 Ondo state. 
32 For instance, the recent discovery of oil in some communities in Anambra state has led to 
discussions about including the state amongst the Niger Delta state.  
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The distinction between the geographical and geopolitical reference to ‘Niger Delta’ 
is significant in the context of this thesis because the major problem of 
environmental pollution discussed in this thesis occurs within the Niger Delta as a 
geographical unit with its dense mangrove forests and swamps severely degraded 
by constant and un-remediated pollution dating back several decades. The bulk of 
oil exploration and production in Nigeria is carried out within the core geographical 
states in the Niger Delta, with only minimal oil production taking place in the other 
states, and this explains the predominance of environmental pollution in this 
geographical area. Therefore, a large part of the discussions in this thesis relating 
to environmental pollution and ancillary issues is focused on the Niger Delta as a 
geographical unit and not in its geopolitical reference.  
Nevertheless, as this thesis discusses wider constitutional issues relating to 
environmental rights for oil producing areas in Nigeria generally, it is more suitable 
to adopt the geopolitical reference to Niger Delta throughout this work in order to 
truly represent all oil producing host communities. Also, it is in the geopolitical sense 
that the term is referenced in all government and official sources, legislative 
enactments and policy documents and in most literature on the subject. This is also 
reflected in the name of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which 
portfolio covers all oil-producing states including those outside the core geographic 
region of the Niger Delta. Consequently, it is in the geopolitical context that the term 
‘Niger Delta’ is used in this thesis, except in particular cases where it is necessary 
to distinguish the two references in line with the context under discussion, e.g. in 
discussing the issue of ecological imperialism which is peculiar to the people of the 
Niger Delta area as a geographic unit..  
The Niger Delta consists of 9 states33 in the country with 185 local government 
areas. The region has a steady growing population of approximately 30 million 
people as of 2014, accounting for more than 23% of Nigeria’s total population and 
covering 12% of the country’s total landmass.34 There are over 25 ethnic groups in 
the region including Igbos, Yorubas, Ijaws, Itsekhiri, Efik, Ibibio, Urhobo and Anang.    
                                                          
33 The states are Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. There 
is currently uncertainty whether a 10th state- Anambra- has been included in the delineation by 
Federal Executive directive following the recent discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 
state.   
34Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Statistics 2014, available at 
<http://www.nddc.gov.ng/masterplan.html> accessed June 15, 2017. See R. Tuschl & H. Ejibunu, 
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Figure 1: Geo-Political Map of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria                                
 
                Source: NDDC 2014 
 
1.3 Scope of Environmental Degradation in the Niger 
Delta 
The story of the Niger Delta in the past five decades is a rendition of 
environmental degradation on a monumental scale beyond the regenerative 
capacity of the fragile ecosystem in the region. The commencement of oil 
production in the region in 1958 and its attendant environmental effects on the 
oil-producing areas left an indelible mark on a once blossoming ecosystem which 
supported a variety of plants and animal bio-diversity and was integral to the 
livelihoods of the people of the area whose main occupations involved 
interactions with the environment in terms of fishing and agriculture, both 
subsistence and commercial in nature.  
Indeed, the scale and magnitude of the environmental degradation in the region 
are so profound that from an eco-centric perspective it can be termed ‘ecocide’, 
which is defined as the ‘substantial destruction of an integral part of a particular 
                                                          
‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes of Peacelessness’ (2006) 7(7) EPU Research Papers, 
17.    
53 
 
ecosystem or the unreasonable degradation of the environment in general’.35 
Large portions of lands have been rendered toxic and completely uninhabitable 
as a result of pollution and entire communities have been dislocated from their 
ancestral habitat due to degradation of the environment.36  
In analysing the environmental situation of the Niger Delta, care must be taken 
not to adopt, without scrutiny, the generally held misconception that oil and gas 
exploration activities constitute the sole cause of the destruction of the ecosystem 
in the region. Quite to the contrary, oil exploration activities, although a major 
contributor, is just one of the sources of environmental degradation in the region 
and other major causes include unrestricted and unregulated toxic waste dumps, 
construction of dams and other unsustainable environmental practices in the 
region not related to the extractive industry.37  
Interestingly, one of the foremost incidents – the Koko incident - which drew 
international attention to the environmental plight of the region was unconnected 
to oil and gas exploration. The case of a small town of Koko in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria, gained international attention in 1988 when it was exposed that 
the town was the unfortunate dumping ground for toxic wastes generated and 
exported by two Italian Multinational Corporations—Ecomar and Jelly Wax - in 
1987 in collaboration with a Nigerian accomplice, who leased his residential 
property, located in Koko, for the storage of 18,000 drums of hazardous wastes 
disguised as building materials and allied chemicals for about $100 a month.38 
The Koko incident sparked major changes in environmental protection laws in 
Nigeria as it led to the creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
1988 (FEPA) charged with the administration and enforcement of environmental 
regulations in Nigeria. In addition, the government enacted the Harmful Waste 
(Special Criminal Provisions) Act, 1988, to deal specifically with illegal dumping 
                                                          
35 A. Pettigrew, ‘A Constitutional Right of Freedom from Ecocide’, (1971) 2 ENv. L. 1.  
36K. Ayuba, ‘Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, 
supra, n 26. 
37 H. Yusuf, ‘Oil on troubled waters: Multinational corporations and realising human rights in the 
developing world, with specific reference to Nigeria’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 
15. 




S%20IN%20NIGERIA> accessed 22 April 2015; See S. Ogbodo, ‘Environmental Protection in 
Nigeria: Two Decades After the Koko Incident’ (2009) 15 Annual Survey of International & 
Comparative Journal 13 for detailed discussion on the Koko incident and its consequences.  
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of harmful waste, recognising that this was a significant problem in environmental 
management in the country and specifically in the Niger Delta region.39   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, environmental pollution arising from oil and gas 
exploration and production remains a major cause of environmental degradation 
in the region. Although different figures abound from several studies as to the 
estimated volume of oil spilt into the environment in the region, the various 
estimations are mind-boggling and reveal the extent to which the environment in 
this region has been subjected to wanton and unrestricted pollution. Some 
Studies have shown that the quantity of oil spilt in the region in the past three 
decades was at least 9-13 million barrels, which, put in context, is equivalent to 
50 Exxon Valdez spills.40 Official estimates from the Nigerian government confirm 
the above scenario as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
estimates that 2,300 cubic meters of oil has been spilt in 300 separate incidences 
annually between 1976 and 1996 alone41 while UNDP 2006 also reported that 
between the period of 1976 to 2001, 3 million barrels of oil were lost in 6,817 oil 
spill incidences with over 70% of the spilt oil going un-recovered.42 
According to another NNPC estimate, over 2,567,966 barrels of crude oil have 
been spilt in 5733 incidents in the Niger Delta from 1976 to 2000 and about 
549,060 barrels were recovered while 1,820,411 barrels were lost to the 
environment.43 From the findings of independent experts, an estimated 9-13 
million barrels of oil have been spilt in the Niger Delta since drilling began in 1958 
and about 7,000 spills have occurred between 1970 and 2000.44 The Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) (the largest oil and gas producer in 
                                                          
39 See S. Ogbodo, ‘Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Two Decades after the Koko Incident’, 
supra, n 38. 
40 A. Ite, U. Ibok, M. Ite & S. Peters, ‘Petroleum Exploration and Production: Past and Present 
Environmental Issues in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta’ (2013) 1(4) American Journal of Environmental 
Protection, 78-90; P. Gibson, ‘Niger River Delta: 50 Years of Oil Spills (Cover story),’ (2006) 
29(46) Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 1.  
41 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Annual Statistical Bulletin 2015.  
42 See UNDP 2006, United Nations Development Programme (2006a) ‘Nigeria’, Human 
Development Report 2006 Human Development Indicators Country Fact Sheets. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NGA.html> 
accessed January 15, 2016.    
43 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Annual Statistical Bulletin 2013. 
44 See P. Gibson, supra, n 40. 
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the region) alone has since 1989 recorded an average of 221 spills per year in its 
operational area involving an average of 7,350 barrels annually.45 
More worrisome than the above troubling statistics, however, is the report by 
Amnesty International that most MNCs operating in the Niger Delta 
underestimate the quantity of oil spilt and a large number of oil spills are not 
frequently reported.46 Consequently, the total volume of oil spilt into the 
environment may be 10 times higher than the officially reported figure as the 
MNCs attempt to minimise their environmental liability by concealing the true 
extent of oil leaks from their facilities.47 As a corollary to the above, a sizeable 
amount of these spills go unreported and no record is therefore taken of the 
volume of the spill.  Consequently, the official estimates merely paint a faint 
picture of the true scale of the enormity of environmental pollution by the MNCs 
in the region. The plethora of pending litigations against the various MNCs in 
several judicial forums within Nigeria48 and in foreign jurisdictions49 gradually 
reveals the full scale of the deleterious consequences of such spills on the 
ecosystem of the region. In Bodo v Shell,50 15,000 claimants filed a group action 
in relation to spills of over 6,000 barrels of oil from pipelines owned by Shell 
Petroleum which destroyed farmlands and polluted rivers on a massive scale in 





                                                          
45SPDC Nigeria Brief, May 2015 <https://www.shell.com.ng/media/2015-media-releases.html> 
accessed 14 January 2018. 
46 See Amnesty International Report, ‘Nigeria: Clean it up: Shell's false claims about oil spill 
response in the Niger Delta’ (2015) Amnesty International Ltd, 12 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4427462015ENGLISH.PDF> accessed 09 
January 2018.   
47 J. Baird, J, ‘Oil's Shame in Africa’ (2010) 156(4) Newsweek, 27.  
48 See Chief (Dr.) Pere Ajuwa V. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria(2011) 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, SC.290/2007; The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
v Ambah (1999) 3 NWLR 1 SC & The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v Isaiah 
(2001) 11 NWLR 168 SC. 
49 See Bodo Community & Others V. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (2014) EWHC 
1973 TCC; His Royal Highness Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC) (26 
January 2017) 




Figure 2: Major Recorded Oil Spill incidents between 1979 and 201151 
 
                                      
                                                       Source: Department of Petroleum Resources, 201452  
In the context of the discussions in this chapter, a distinction must be drawn 
between environmental pollution and environmental degradation. These two 
terms, often used interchangeably, are not synonymous in meaning or context. 
While environmental pollution describes the introduction of foreign harmful 
elements into the environment or alteration of the environment by foreign 
                                                          
51 Official statistics are only available covering the period from 1979 up to 2011. 
52DPR, 2014. ‘Nigerian Oil Industry Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012’. Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR).Retrieved from <www.dpr.gov.ng> accessed 15 May 2015. 
S/N  Date Episode State Quantity 
(Barrels) 
1  July, 1979  Forcados Terminal oil 
spillage 
Bende  570,000  
2  Jan. 1980  Funiwa Well blow-out Rivers  400,000  
3  May 1980  Oyakama Oil spillage Rivers  10,000  
4  Nov. 1982  Warri-Kaduna pipeline 
rupture at Abudu-Edo 
Edo  18,000  
5  August, 1983 Oshika Oil spill Rivers  10,000  
6  Jan. 1998  Idoho oil spill Akwa-Ibom  40,000  
7  Jan. 1998  Jones Creek oil spill Delta  21,548  
8  Oct. 1998  Jesse oil spill Delta  10,000  
9  May, 2000  Etiama oil spill Bayelsa  11,000  
10  Dec, 2003  Agbada oil spill Rivers  Unknown  
11  August, 2004  Ewan oil spill Ondo  Unknown  
12  August, 2005  Ughelli oil spill Delta  10,000  
13 August, 2008 Bodo Community Oil Spill Rivers 70,000 
14 May, 2010 Qua Iboe Oil Spill Akwa Ibom 665,000 
15 Dec, 2011 Bonga Field Oil Spill Bayelsa 50,000 
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substances released unto it (in this context crude oil), it does not equate to a 
degradation of the environment in all cases. In a significant amount of cases, this 
crude oil spilt into the environment can be recovered and the affected 
environment cleaned up and remediated thus averting a degradation of the 
affected environment.53 In this context, environmental pollution, where 
appropriately followed up with the effective recovery of the spill, clean up and 
remediation, has minimal impact on the ecosystem of the region. It is an accepted 
fact that some form of spills, especially operational spills, from oil and gas 
exploration activities are a normal occurrence requiring effective management 
and clean up to protect the environment from degradation.54 
Environmental degradation is the reduction in quality of the natural environment 
which is compromised in some way, reducing biological diversity and the general 
health of the environment as a result of the environment being left to suffer the 
deleterious consequences of the pollution either by neglect of the pollution that 
has occurred in the environment or by inadequate clean up and remediation by 
the polluter, thereby leaving the environment to absorb these toxic spills with 
significant damage to ecosystem.55 Unfortunately, the major environmental 
problem in the Niger Delta is the fact that environmental pollution and oil spills 
result in environmental degradation in almost all cases owing to a myriad of 
factors, such as the very low recovery rate of the spills by the MNCs and the 
incomplete, ineffective or inappropriate clean up and remediation of the polluted 
environment.56 In some cases, attempts by the MNCs to clean up pollution has 
been carried out by merely overturning the affected soil - in effect concealing the 
spill from the surface while it seeps down deeper into the groundwater.57 The 
failure of regulatory oversight on the part of the government allows such practice 
to go undetected and without remedy. 
                                                          
53 K. Ayuba, “Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria”, 
supra, n 36.  
54 Shell 2016 Annual Report, 18, available at <https://reports.shell.com/annual-
report/2016/servicepages/download-centre.php> accessed 11 July, 2017.   
55 Thomas J.Deana, Jeffery McMullen, ‘Toward a theory of sustainable entrepreneurship: Reducing 
environmental degradation through entrepreneurial action’ (2007) 22(1) Journal of Business 
Venturing 50-76. 
56 A. Tolulope, ‘Oil Exploration and Environmental Degradation: the Nigerian Experience’, (2004) 
International Information Archives, 387-393. 
57 S. Worgu, ‘Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Environmental Degradation  and  Poverty in the Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria’, available at <http://www.lumes.lu.se/student99/stanleyW/econs-paper.PDF> 




It can be observed from the official estimates of oil pollution enumerated earlier 
that less than 25% of oil spills are successfully recovered by the MNCs in almost 
all reported cases of spills. For instance, from 1976 to 1996, a total of 4647 oil 
spill incidences occurred spilling approximately 2,369,470 barrels of oil into the 
environment of which 1,820,410.5 (77%) were not recovered.58 In effect, within a 
period of about 20 years, almost 2 million barrels of oil has been absorbed into 
the environment of the Niger Delta unrecovered. The extent of damage done to 
ecosystems as a result of this wanton absorption of oil spills into the environment 
has led to the warning by the United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
in its 2009 report59 that the ecosystem of the region would lose its ability to sustain 
itself within the next 30 years if no urgent steps are taken to remediate the 
environment.  
The adverse effects of environmental pollution from oil spills in the region is well 
documented in several scientific studies conducted in the region which reveal that 
all aspects of the ecosystem in the region are gradually losing their sustainability 
and the wildlife, aquatic and agricultural systems in the region are dying at an 
alarming rate.60 Because most of these oil spill incidences in the Niger Delta occur 
on land, inland waters, swamps and the offshore environment, no aspect of the 
ecosystem is spared.  The health implications for people of the region is 
enormous as tests conducted in various communities in the region have revealed 
that the groundwater systems which they depend upon for fresh water supply 
have visible coats of oil spills centimetres thick in some instances.61  The health 
implication of environmental pollution is a globally recognised concern. The 
United Nations Environemnt Assembly of UNEP in a 2017 report estimates that 
approximately 19 million premature deaths globally are estimated to occur 
annually as a result environmental pollution from extraction of natural resources 
particularly oil and gas exploration and production.62 UNEP 2016 report further 
                                                          
58 UNDP 2006, supra, n 42. 
59 UNEP Report 2009, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland available at 
<http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmen
tofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx> accessed January 25, 2016.    
60 O. Odeyemi, & O. Ogunseitan, ‘Petroleum Industry and its Pollution Potential in Nigeria’, (2011) 2 
Oil & Petroleum Pollution, 223-229.  
61 J. Ebegbulem, ‘Oil Exploration and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Critical 
Analysis’, (2013) 4(3) International Journal of Business and Social Science, 12.  
62 UN Environment Assembly, ‘Towards a Pollution-Free Planet: Background Report’ UNEP 2017 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/21800/UNEA_towardspollution_long%2
0version_Web.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 09 April 2019.  
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estimates that environmental effects on health represent 23 per cent of deaths 
globally, the figure increases to 26 per cent for children under 5 years and to 25 
per cent for adults between the ages of 50 and 75.63 The World Helath 
organisation (WHO) also estimates that over 7 million people die annually from 
stroke and heart disease, respiratory illness and cancersdirectly linked with 
environmental pollution.64 
In the Niger Delta, studies have shown the serious health impact of repeated oil 
pollution and gas flaring in the region to include lung cancer, heart diseases, 
intestinal diseases from ingesting oil infested water and marine lifestocks such as 
fishes and crabs, rising cases of throat infections and increase in maternal 
mortality rates of pregnant women in the region dying from pollution-induced 
pregnancy diseases.65 
Apart from the health and physical effects of environmental degradation in the 
Niger Delta region, one of the insidious consequences of environmental 
degradation is that it creates environmental refugees as people are forcefully 
dislocated from their habitats which have been made uninhabitable by the 
pollution.66 Environmental degradation leaves local populations with two basic 
options:  
a. migrate from the degraded environment to a more habitable place and become 
environmental refugees or environmentally displaced people, or  
b. remain in the degraded environment and risk increased morbidity and mortality 
through exposure to pollution and depleted, degraded, or contaminated food and 
water sources.67 
                                                          
63 UNEP 2016, ‘Healthy Environment, Healthy People’ Thematic report Ministerial policy review 
session Second session of the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations 
Environment Programme Nairobi, 23–27 May 2016.  
64  WHO, ‘Air Pollution, Climate and Health’ 2018 Report 
<https://www.who.int/sustainabledevelopment/AirPollution_Climate_Health_Factsheet.pdf>  
accessed 02 May 2019. 
65 J Babayemi,  M Ogundiran,  O Osibanjo, ‘Overview of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects 
of Pollution in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria’ (2016) 26 (1) Environmental Waste 
Management, 12; S Ukemenam, ‘Causes and Consequences of Air Pollution in Nigeria: A Case 
Study’ (2014) 2(2) South American Journal of Public Health 4.  
66 Gregory S. McCue, ‘Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to 
Involuntary Migration’, 6 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 151 (1993). 
67 A. Gabriel, ‘Women in the Niger Delta: Environmental Issues and Challenges in the Third 
Millennium’, cited in O. Adedokun, ‘Assessment of Oyster Mushrooms Found on Polluted Soil for 
Consumption’ (2015) 6(5) Natural Resources, 15.  
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Although the filial nature of the communities in the Niger Delta region results in 
the seamless absorption of these environmental refugees by other communities 
with which they share ancestral linkages and thus conceal the exact scope of the 
environmental refugee problem in the region, this pollution dilemma is an 
unpleasant situation for most people of the host communities in the region.68  
Overall, the deleterious consequences of environmental degradation in the region 
cannot be overstated and this has always formed a focal point for agitation by 
indigenous activists, civil society and environmental groups and international 
organisations (such as Friends of the Earth and Climate Justice) demanding 
better environmental management system in the region and improved 
environmental welfare for the people of the region.69 
 
Figure 3: Samples of Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta  
         
 
 
                                                          
68 J. Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy: Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
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69 A. Tolulope, ‘Oil Exploration and Environmental Degradation: the Nigerian Experience’ (2004) 




         
 
                  Source: Climate Justice/Friends of the Earth 2011 
The extent of environmental degradation in the region is so severe that a 2011 
report by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)70 found groundwater 
within the region contaminated with oil by-products including benzene, thought to 
be a carcinogen, a substance capable of causing cancer in living tissue. The UNEP 
report indicated that a ‘sustainable recovery’ of the area could take up to 30 years 
to achieve and the ecosystem in the region could lose the ability to sustain itself 
within 50 years if the current trend continues unabated. 
 
1.4 Fundamental Challenges of Environmental Protection 
in the Niger Delta 
The widespread and intractable environmental pollution in the Niger Delta discussed 
above has its roots in other factors deeply rooted in the legal, geopolitical and socio-
economic landscape in Nigeria. Attempting to stop pollution without addressing 
these root causes is bound to fail, as evidenced by the various futile efforts 
implemented by the government in this regard since the first major oil spill in 1979.71 
                                                          
70 UNEP 2011, ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’ 
<http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf> accessed June 21, 2016.   
71This includes the establishment of OMPADEC (and later the NDDC) to FastTrack socio-economic 
and infrastructural development in the region; promulgation of the Environmental guidelines and 
standards for the petroleum industries in Nigeria (EGASPIN) in 1992 and the tightening of 
regulatory approvals for oil and gas exploration activities in the region. See See Federal Ministry of 
Environment Abuja, Nigerian Conservation Foundation Lagos, WWF UK and CEESP-IUCN 
Commission on Environmental, Economic, and Social Policy, May 31, (2006) Niger Delta Resource 




These efforts have been treating the symptoms of the disease rather than the illness 
itself. A diagnosis of the real problems reveal the underlying issues as the weak 
environmental rights framework in Nigeria; ecological imperialism; lack of access to 
environmental justice; inapplicability of international environmental law and the ‘full-
belly’ syndrome. These are critically analysed below. 
 
1.4.1 Weak Environmental Rights Framework in Nigeria 
The weak environmental legal framework in Nigeria has impacted negatively on the 
country’s environmental management strategies for curbing pollution from oil 
exploration.  
Over the years, the Nigerian government has attempted to implement a wide variety 
of environmental regulations, practices and policies to protect the environment and 
is yet to find an effective and sustainable policy for improving environmental 
protection in the region. The MNCs operating in the region have found it convenient 
to pollute the environment while paying token fees as fines or clean up and 
remediation fees as prescribed under various environmental regulations imposed 
by the government.72 Various civil liability suits instituted against the MNCs for 
damages to the environment arising from their oil and gas exploration activities have 
succeeded in securing significant financial compensations for the host communities 
but have not reduced the pollution of the environment. In Chief (Dr.) Pere Ajuwa V. 
The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria,73 the Federal High Court 
awarded 150 billion naira compensation to the Claimants for environmental pollution 
of their farmlands by Shell Petroleum. In Bodo Community & Others V. The Shell 
Petroleum Development Company,74 an English High Court awarded £55 million 
compensation to the Claimant for damages to their houses and other properties by 
the Respondent in the course of oil and gas exploration while in The Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria v Isaiah75 over  $3.6 billion was awarded against 
                                                          
72A. Tolulope, ‘Oil Exploration and Environmental Degradation: the Nigerian Experience’ (2004) 2 
Environ Inform Arch 387–393; E. Ukala, ‘Gas Flaring in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta: Failed Promises and 
Reviving Community Voices’ (2011) 2 Wash & Lee J Energy, Climate, & Env't 97; V. Aghogin, ‘Gas 
Flaring, Government Policies and Regulations in Nigeria: A Myth Or Reality” (2008) 
<http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10394/3633/aghogin_victorb(1).pdf?sequence=1> 
accessed 15 January 2016. 
73 Chief (Dr.) Pere Ajuwa V. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria(2011) Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, SC.290/2007. 
74 Bodo Community & Others V. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (2014) EWHC 1973 
TCC. 
75 The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v Isaiah (2018) 11 NWLR 168 SC. 
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Shell Petroleum in 2018 for the widespread damages to coastline communities 
arising from the bonga oil spill that occurred  in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011. 
Despite the severity of the environmental degradation highlighted by the UNEP 
Report 2011, very little has been done by the government to rein in the MNCs and 
curtail continuous pollution of the environment. Rather, prior to this UNEP report, 
the government had embarked upon a restructuring of the country’s environmental 
management system with an agency established to handle issues of oil spills and 
cleanups – the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA)76- and 
a new environmental regulator – the National Environmental Standards And 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA)77 - established to replace the pre-
existing regulator78with renewed powers and contemporary mechanisms to 
effectively regulate environmental impacting activities. The focus on establishing 
institutions and regulators mask the real deficiency in the legal structure/framework 
these institutions are to operate under in ensuring better environmental protection 
in the country. More importantly, it ignores the absence of enforceable 
environmental rights by citizens and relies solely on a regulatory approach to the 
problem. 
The weak environmental legal framework in Nigeria does not entail an absence of 
an environmental management framework. Constitutional and statutory provisions 
exist on environmental matters creating a similitude of environmental rights, but 
which fall short of creating any cognizable framework within which issues of 
environmental rights can be sustainably managed. Section 20 of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) obliges the government to 
“protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest 
and wildlife of Nigeria”. This constitutional obligation requires the establishment of 
an environmental protection framework by the government to safeguard the 
environmental integrity of all parts of the country, including the Niger Delta. 
However, the non-enforceability of this provision79 renders the provision unhelpful 
in the environmental situation in the Niger Delta, as the government has not taken 
                                                          
76 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) Act 2006. 
77 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 
2007. 
78 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). 
79 Section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution renders Chapter II of the Constitution, which includes Section 
20, non-justiciable, meaning no suit can be instituted before any court of law to compel its 
performance. See Fawehinmi v. NNPC (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 654) 123.   
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any proactive step to fulfil this constitutional obligation and no administrative step 
can be taken to compel the government.  
To further compound the problem, the 1999 constitution is unclear on where the 
power of regulating the environment lie between the central government and the 
federating units. Because ‘environment’ is not included in the constitutional 
delineation of legislative powers in the Second Schedule to the Constitution,80 there 
is a legal flux regarding which tier of government has the power to regulate it. 
Technically, this omission should confer such power on the federating states, as the 
Nigerian Supreme Court has held81 that any matter not expressly listed in the 
constitutional legislative lists belongs to the states as a ‘residual matter’. Flowing 
from this decision, areas of domestic environmental issues such as pollution control, 
waste management, urban planning, land reclamation etc., are, therefore, 
undoubtedly within the ambit of state power to regulate. States within the Niger Delta 
region can, therefore, lay claim to the constitutional power to regulate environmental 
issues within their jurisdictions and can, therefore, institute different frameworks and 
guidelines on the subject. However, none of the states82 within the region has 
enacted any legislation or imposed any environmental guidelines to protect the 
environment in their jurisdiction despite huge revenue allocations received annually 
from the proceeds of oil and gas sales assigned to the region under the derivation 
formula in Section 162 of the Constitution.83 The states are content to enjoy the 
financial benefits of oil and gas exploration from their jurisdictions but unwilling to 
institute any environmental framework to protect the environment in the aftermath 
of the exploration activities, leaving such task to the central government.  
Despite the constitutional uncertainty, the obligation of the central government to 
regulate the environment in relation to oil and gas exploration can be drawn from a 
combined reading of Items 39 and 68 of the Exclusive legislative list in the Second 
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Schedule to the Constitution which confers on the central government power over 
‘mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural 
gas’ and ‘any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned 
elsewhere in this list’. In fulfilment of this constitutional obligation, the government 
has put in place disparate pieces of the statutory environmental regulatory 
framework to regulate the environmental impact of the MNCs in the course of their 
activities. The Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 mandates the 
performance of environmental impact assessment by all companies before carrying 
out their activities while the National Environmental Standards And Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) (Establishment) Act, 2007 established NESREA 
as an environmental regulatory agency to supervise the protection of the air quality 
and environmental integrity of all areas of the country.84   However, NESREA was 
inexplicably exempted from handling environmental issues arising from oil and gas 
exploration.85 This leaves the regulation of environmental issues arising from oil and 
gas exploration with the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA). None of these government agencies has any clear-
cut environmental framework for managing pollution by the MNCs but rather rely on 
incongruent and un-coordinated environmental guidelines such as the Associated 
Gas Reinjection Act (AGRA) 1979, Effluent Limitation Regulations of 1991, Harmful 
Wastes (Special Criminal Provisions) Act of 1988 and the Environmental Guidelines 
and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2002 promulgated 
by DPR. 
EGASPIN is the closest to an environmental regulatory framework Nigeria has, as 
it is designed to minimise oil pollution and protect the environment. It also sets out 
the approach to be adopted regarding contamination of the soil and groundwater, 
with the person responsible for the contamination required to restore the soil and 
groundwater to appropriate safety levels under threat of fines, potential 
imprisonment and loss of a license.86 While EGASPIN represents a reasonable 
regulatory framework, at least in terms of its target values, its practical impact on 
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environmental protection is diminished by the impracticality of some of its provisions, 
e.g. the requirement that oil spills be cleaned up within 24 hours,87 at a time when 
the spill is likely not to have even been discovered coupled with the fact that it takes 
far longer than 24 hours to clean up a significant spill. The overzealousness in such 
provision renders it largely unenforceable and practically cosmetic. In addition, the 
legal status of EGASPIN is unclear as it was released as a guideline by DPR without 
reference to any specific primary legislation backing it. It, therefore, appears to be 
more of an administrative guideline than a statutorily backed regulatory framework 
for MNCs in the oil and gas sector in the country.  Moreover, as with most regulations 
in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, EGASPIN is largely ignored, both by the MNCs 
and the government in dealings relating to environmental matters in the Niger Delta 
region.88 
The statutory enactments and guidelines discussed above all focus on different 
aspects of environmental regulatory issues and do not contain any reference to 
environmental rights in any manner or form. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1990 incorporates a reference to 
the rights of people to a clean and general satisfactory environment89 but this stand-
alone provision is largely overlooked within environmental discourse in the country. 
Situating this provision within the general environmental protection framework in 
Nigeria creates difficulties, not least due to the lack of a suitable environmental 
framework within which this provision can be implemented. While a similar 
constitutional provision would be capable of institutionalising a framework on its own 
and superintend over all other statutes, the ACPHR provision is situated within a 
maze of disparate statutes on environmental protection from which it is difficult to 
analyse how article 24 of ACHPR can be implemented.90 This leaves a grossly 
undeveloped environmental rights framework in Nigeria with its attendant 
consequence on the continued pollution of the Niger Delta region without any form 
of judicial restraint on the MNCs.   
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1.4.2 Ecological Imperialism in the Niger Delta 
Another fundamental challenge is the socio-political dimension to the 
environmental conflict flowing from Nigeria’s political structure, peculiar revenue 
sharing formula and assignment of environmental burdens in the oil and gas sector. 
The people of the Niger Delta communities constitute a minority group in the 
geopolitical scheme of Nigeria. Notwithstanding its population of over 30 million, its 
vast oil and gas wealth and constituting almost 12% of the total land mass of the 
country, the people of the region are still regarded as a minority group in 
comparison to the three major ethnic groups- Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – in the 
North, East and West of the country respectively. The resultant diminished 
influence that the region exerts in socio-political discussions in the federation and 
the inequality in the environmental burdens shouldered by the region bears the 
hallmark of ecological imperialism which is a subset of internal colonialism. 
 
The plight of the people of the region as a minority group has always been 
recognized and formed the subject of major consideration prior to independence 
by the British Government during colonial times. The Willinks Commission was set 
up by the British Government in 1958 to consider the agitation of the minority 
groups in Nigeria in the lead up to independence and to propose a way of allaying 
the fears in the proposed single political entity - Nigeria.91 This was in recognition 
of the fact that the socio-political set up of the country was unfavourable to minority 
groups who would be vulnerable to domination by the majority groups in the 
federation.  
 
In the course of the commission’s sittings, one of the major ethnic groups in the 
Niger Delta -the Ijaws - argued that the peculiar problems of those living in the 
creeks and the swamps of the Delta were not understood and indeed were 
deliberately neglected by both the regional and federal governments.92 Meanwhile, 
the indigenous traditional rulers from the area, many of whom had concluded 
“treaties of protection” with the British in the 18th and 19th centuries, argued that 
the British should revoke the treaties and allow them to revert to their previous 
position of independence, rather than become a part of the Nigerian state.93  
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92 ibid.  
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Nevertheless, despite admitting that these fears of the ‘poor, backward and 
neglected’ indigenous people of the Niger Delta were well founded, the 
Commission rejected the plea by the minority groups that they should be allowed 
to be independent of the Nigerian nation. This was partly because such request 
was outside its term of reference, and it was, therefore, not qualified to advise Her 
Majesty on the structure of the Nigerian federation, and partly because, in its 
opinion, it is seldom possible to draw a boundary that does not create a fresh 
minority.94 This refusal to severe the minority groups of the Niger Delta from the 
rest of the Nigerian federation prior to independence laid the foundation for the 
current situation of the people of the region. 
 
It is imperative to note that the agitation of the Niger Delta people at this point was 
not in any way connected to resource control, as oil exploration and production in 
the region had not begun on any commercial scale, rather it was a genuine fear of 
domination and imperialism by the rest of the federation. The rejection of this 
agitation proved to be an ominous sign of things to follow. 
 
The concepts of internal colonialism and ecological imperialism are interrelated and 
have been developed in the literature relating to environmental justice and 
distortion of environmental burdens.95  Internal colonialism is the converse situation 
of the typical colonialism experienced in several continents of the world prior to the 
21st Century whereby foreign powers dominate, annexe and subjugate other 
people and administer their affairs. In internal colonialism, the dominant and 
subordinate groups coexist and are indigenous within the same society. In other 
words, internal colonialism refers to the domination and subjugation of a group of 
people by other groups within the same political state structure.  
 
Internal colonialism is closely linked to the concept of ‘core’ and periphery’ groups 
whereby the core group refers to the dominant ethnic group within the political 
structure while the periphery group refers to the politically weaker ethnic group 
which offers the path of least or no resistance to domination by the core group.96 
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While internal colonialism manifests in different spheres of a nation’s political 
structure, where it manifests in an environmental perspective relating to ecosystem 
degradation and environmental pollution, it is aptly referred to as ecological 
imperialism.   
 
Ecological imperialism can, therefore, be described as the state of wanton natural 
resources exploitation and inequitable distributions of environmental hazards (or 
externalization of costs of production) by powerful socio-political groups within a 
country. It manifests in the inequitable placing of environmental burdens on a weak 
section of the population for the benefit of the strong section of the population within 
the same state. Adeola97 theorizes that ecological colonialism explains the 
relationship between the Nigerian government/MNCs/dominant core ethnic groups 
and the peripheral indigenous Niger Delta people whereby political power by the 
core ethnic groups has been used to appropriate and transfer resources from the 
periphery to develop the core areas, while leaving the whole environmental 
burdens on the periphery and creating economic impoverishment and increased 
inequality among the periphery ethnic groups.  
 
Adeola’s theory finds support in the outcome of the National Dialogue convened by 
the Nigerian government in 2005 to discuss important issues facing the federation 
and allow for the respective regions to air their historical grievances.98 The 
representatives of the Niger Delta region jointly put forward a request to increase 
the derivation formula99 from 13% to 50%, sought more resource control over the 
oil and gas products gotten from the region and better environmental pollution 
management within the region. Unsurprisingly, the representatives of the other 
regions jointly denounced the request of the Niger Delta, claiming it was unrealistic 
and impractical, particularly because it will be disadvantageous to the other regions’ 
interests. In effect, the core regions utilised their political and numerical advantage 
to suppress the environmental grievances of the Niger Delta periphery region and 
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ensured the Niger Delta continued to solely bear environmental burdens of oil and 
gas exploration which benefitted the other regions even more than the Niger Delta 
region.     
 
The environmental situation in the Niger Delta is a classic case of ecological 
imperialism which hinges on four main pillars-  
i. a central hegemony which controls and exploits the resources of oil-rich 
Niger Delta minority for the benefit of the dominant ethnic groups in other 
regions of the country; 
ii. the union between these core ethnic groups to perpetuate the resource 
exploitation in their favour;  
iii. degradation of the ecosystem and destruction of the basic modes of 
subsistence of the minority groups; and  
iv. inadequate response to or neglect of the ecological degradation of the 
minority group’s environment with focus only on the resources generated 
therefrom.  
 
The first pillar of ecological imperialism is displayed by the federal government 
(central hegemony), which is controlled by elites from the core ethnic groups, 
enacting statutes and policies aimed at exploiting the resources of the Niger Delta 
region for the development of other regions by depriving the people of the Niger 
Delta region of their property rights and other rights necessary to benefit from their 
resources. Statutes like the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978 
stripped the people of the Niger Delta of their entitlement to the petroleum 
resources and land respectively and conferred same on the government. Other 
relevant legislation in this respect includes the Oil in Navigable Waters Act Decree 
No. 34 (1968) (Nigeria), the Oil Pipelines Act Decree No. 31 (1956) (Nigeria), the 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (1979), and the Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations (1969).  
 
The second pillar was the result of the British amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates to form a unified Nigeria in 1914, while the third pillar stems 
from the destruction of the farmlands and marine foods in the rivers which are the 




The fourth pillar is illustrated by the government’s lack of regulation of the MNCs’ 
oil pollution activities, inadequate response to the environmental degradation of the 
region and neglect of its deleterious consequences provided oil and gas exploration 
continue unhindered. An example is the enactment of the Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act of 1985 which, while banning flaring of gas by the MNCs, permits 
flaring of gas if no other economic way of oil extraction is available. In essence, 
while the adverse environmental and health effects of gas flaring are 
acknowledged, flaring of gas will be permitted where to do so will enhance oil 
extraction and to do otherwise will impede exploitation of more oil from the fields. 
Thus, the health and environmental well-being of the people of the region are viable 
trade-offs for resource exploitation.100 
 
In Gbemre v. Shell,101 a Federal High Court in Nigeria declared the Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act of 1985 unconstitutional as it legalizes acts which constitute direct 
threat to the life and well-being of the people of the region in breach of the 
constitutional right to life of the people of the region guaranteed under Section 33 
of the Constitution. However, in keeping with the general tenor of ecological 
imperialism, the government ignored the court’s ruling and took no step to restrain 
continuous flaring by the MNCs in accordance with the decision.     
 
Adekoya102recognised the effect of the power differentials between the geo-political 
regions with respect to the Niger Delta situation, arguing that- 
 
 “Because oil wealth is shared to all federating units, any arrangement 
to commit more resources to develop the Niger Delta will be at the 
expense of other regions, which are more influential in the national 
polity and will clearly meet strong resistance.”  
 
In essence, the socio-political structure of Nigeria is disadvantageous to the 
clamour for resource control and environmental decontamination by the Niger 
Delta. It was in a bid to prevent the current lopsided political structure and its effect 
on the Niger Delta that the Willinks Commission of 1958 in its report recommended 
that the region should be conferred the status of a special development region to 
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be developed directly by the Federal Government. The Niger Delta Development 
Board was established in 1961 to implement this recommendation but overall, the 
region has lapsed into neglect and this reflects in the level of environmental 
degradation currently witnessed in the region.  
 
In cognizance of the fact that they are too weak politically, economically and 
socially to resist the federal government, dominant ethnic groups and MNCs, the 
indigenous communities of the Niger Delta resorted to a violent struggle to stake 
their claim for better treatment by the other regions. Ako103 argues that ‘the reasons 
for the pervasive violence in the Niger Delta include the decision of hitherto 
voiceless, subordinate and underprivileged minority groups to take up the gauntlet 
and challenge state structures and institutions controlled by majority groups who 
have been grossly unjust over time in the distribution of national resources’.  
 
However, aside from the use of violence, there have been other concrete political 
moves made by people of the region to assert their socio-political rights in the 
federation. One of the most remarkable of these means is the preparation of a bill 
of rights by the various groups in the region containing declarations of their 
inalienable rights and making demands for better resource control and safer 
environmental practices in the region.104 These bills of rights include the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights, the Kaiama Declaration, Akaka Declaration of the Egi People, the Oron 
Bill of Rights and the Warri Accord.105 In 1990, the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) presented its manifesto, the Ogoni Bill of Rights, to the 
government and the people of Nigeria. The document demanded fair compensation 
for oil pollution, decontamination of the polluted environments in the region, a more 
equitable distribution of oil revenues, and more political autonomy for the Ogoni 
people.106 The Kaiama Declaration on its part was couched in the following words-
107 
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“All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the 
Ijaw territory belong to the Ijaw communities and are the basis of our 
survival... We cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our 
communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and 
resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent…it 
is our wish to remain part of the Nigerian family, but not in conditions that 
would undermine our survival and demean our humanity"  
The wording of the Kaiama Declaration, which bear similarity with the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776, is evidence of the realisation of the skewed 
socio-political distribution of power within the Nigerian federation and the push by 
the Niger Delta people to even the balance by asserting their inalienable 
fundamental right to freedom from oppression by the dominant ethnic groups.108 
While these bills of rights have failed to actualize their objectives, and have not 
gained any form of recognition within the legal or political structure of the country, it 
highlights the importance of the social and political distribution of power in the 
attainment of environmental rights and justice. It is, therefore, evident that ecological 
degradation in the Niger Delta can be attributed to a combination of ecological 
imperialism and the lopsided socio-political structure of the country especially in 
areas of resource exploitation, material allocation, and distribution of power among 
various subnational groups. Ako,109 for instance, asserts that the absence of political 
and economic power by the Niger Delta inhabitants who are most impacted by the 
adverse effects of the Land Use Act 1978110 is a fundamental reason why the Act 
has not been abrogated. The incorporation of the Land Use Act in the Constitution 
makes it hard to repeal or amend the Act as it requires the same procedure for 
amendment of the Constitution itself. The Niger Delta region does not have sufficient 
representatives at the central political structure of the country to push this through, 
and the other core regions benefitting from the status quo will easily block any such 
move.  
Tackling ecological imperialism in the region requires a fundamental legal provision 
that can be utilised by the people of the region to assert their environmental rights 
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and prevent the continued subjugation of the environmental integrity of the region 
to the economic interests of the other regions. A constitutional environmental right 
is capable of fulfilling this objective as it superintends over all legislation and can be 
utilised to prevent any legislative activity or other governmental actions that 
undermine the ecological integrity of the region. The promulgation of the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights and Kaima Declarations were the result of fruitless search by people of the 
Niger Delta region for a fundamental legal platform to assert their environmental 
right to freedom from pollution and continued degradation. While these declarations 
lacked any political force and failed to achieve their objectives, a constitutional 
environmental right will have a potential impact on the socio-political structure of the 
country in terms of its ability to address the ecological imperialism problem facing 
the region. 
 
1.4.3 Lack of Access to Environmental Justice 
One of the outgrowths of ecological imperialism in the Niger Delta is the struggle for 
environmental justice by people of the region, seeking ways to protect themselves 
from environmental inequity and the skewed distribution of environmental burdens 
arising from oil and gas exploration in the region.111  
Environmental injustice implies any undue imposition of environmental burdens on 
communities that are not parties to the activities generating such burdens. As stated 
by Adeola,112environmental injustice arises from parties reaping the economic 
benefits of natural resources exploitation without bearing the burden because their 
communities are insulated by distance from direct sources of toxins. Bullard defines 
environmental justice as ‘the principle that all people and communities are entitled 
to equal protection of environmental and public health laws and regulations.’113The 
basic tenet of the equality principle in the concept of environmental justice is that all 
parties should be entitled to identical or comparable environmental burdens or costs 
and rewards or benefits.114 In this context, environmental justice requires that the 
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cost of pollution should be fairly distributed and no single group is required to bear 
an unduly large part of the environmental burdens without corresponding benefits, 
especially where the group bearing less environmental burden is enjoying most of 
the environmental benefits.115 
Environmental injustice, therefore, results where the costs of pollution are unfairly 
distributed among individuals or areas.116 Bullard, on his part, associates 
environmental injustice with environmental racism which he defined as ‘racial 
discrimination in environmental policymaking, the enforcement of regulations and 
laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste facilities, the 
official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our 
communities, and the history of excluding people of color from leadership of the 
ecology movements’.117Thus, according to him, environmental racism as a subset 
of environmental injustice refers to any policy, practice, or directive that differentially 
affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or 
communities based on race or color’.118  
While environmental racism often includes the segregation of groups based on race, 
in some communities, such segregation is not based on race or the colour of the 
groups or communities unfairly prejudiced with environmental burdens. Within 
communities of the same race or colour, environmental racism can take the form of 
tribal or ethnic segregation of communities and the imposition of unde environmental 
burdens on such groups or communities as a result.119   
The situation in the Niger Delta can be aptly described in this light seeing the 
disproportionate environmental burdens borne by the minority ethnic groups in the 
region without commensurate benefits from the resource exploitation giving rise to 
such burdens. Although the root cause of such environmental injustice in the Niger 
Delta is traceable to ecological imperialism, environmental injustice can also take 
the form of ecological racism which involves ethnic discrimination in environmental 
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policy formulation, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws at local, 
national, and global levels. This form of environmental injustice is promoted through 
the systematic exclusion of minority groups in vital environmental policies and 
decisions.120 In this case, the various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta are regarded 
as minority ethnic groups within the country and are systematically excluded from 
environmental decision making, policy formulation and implementation. The major 
factors responsible for this heightened environmental injustice in the region are the 
minority status, lower socio-economic status, powerlessness and systematic 
marginalisation of the people of the region.  
Different definitions of environmental justice highlight the different perspectives from 
which it is viewed.  The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
defines environmental justice as ‘the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of 
all people, regardless of race, colour, national origin, culture, education or income, 
with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations and policies’.121 Fair treatment in this context means that no group 
of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental 
consequences resulting from environmental-impacting activities, particularly where 
such activities are carried out in their immediate environment.  
Realistically, it is an accepted fact that people of the immediate environment where 
environment-impacting activities are carried out will no doubt feel the impact of such 
activities more than people in communities geographically distanced from the 
location. There is no way of physically sharing this environmental burden equally 
between the host communities and the non-host communities - short of 
unreasonably taking the environmental pollutants and dumping them on sites in the 
non-host communities - for the purpose of ensuring such communities also feel the 
environmental impacts. Consequently, the argument against disproportionate 
sharing of the environmental burdens as a way of ensuring environmental justice 
does not focus on the physical environmental burdens, such as resulting pollution 
and degradation of the environment, but on the mostly procedural involvement of 
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the major bearers of the burdens in decision makings relating to their environment. 
The EPA, therefore, calls for ‘meaningful participation’ of such host communities in 
decision making relating to their environment.  
Four pillars of meaningful participation in this context were identified by the EPA to 
include the provision of ‘appropriate opportunity’ to affected communities to 
participate in the environmental decision-making; the contribution of these 
communities should be capable of influencing the outcome/decision rather than 
being merely cosmetic and irrelevant; the concerns of the affected communities 
should be given considerable weight in the decision-making process; and the 
decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially 
affected.122  
Adopting these four pillars of meaningful participation will ensure that even though 
the host communities will continue to generally bear the physical environmental 
burdens of the activities, they will be involved in making decisions relating to 
environmental issues in their communities. As a result, they will have a voice in 
determining the most effective ways of tackling these environmental issues and 
obtaining adequate compensation for such impacts. This perspective was adopted 
by the United Kingdom’s National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) 
which defined environmental justice along two dimensions: deprived communities, 
which may be more vulnerable to the pressures of poor environmental conditions, 
should not bear a disproportionate burden of negative environmental impacts;  to 
ensure this, all communities should have access to information and to the means to 
participate in decisions which affect the quality of their local environment.123 The 
second point which deals with access to information and participation in 
environmental decisions is viewed as the way of ensuring the first point – the 
disproportionate burden of environmental impacts- is averted. In essence, the 
vesting of inalienable procedural environmental rights on people of host 
communities is central to the achievement of environmental justice.124  
                                                          
122 ibid. 
123 National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC), ‘Meaningful Involvement and Fair 
Treatment by Tribal Environmental Regulatory Programs’ (2004) NEJAC Publication 5 
available at <https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/national-environmental-justice-
advisory-council> accessed April 15, 2017.    
124 A. Obiora, ‘Symbolic Episodes in the Quest for Environmental Justice’ (1991) 21(2) Human 
Rights Quarterly 466 at 477.  
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Three theories of the causes of environmental justice have been developed in the 
literature: neighbourhood transition theory; eco-racism theory; and political and 
economic power model.125 The neighbourhood transition theory focuses on the 
relative economic power of the host and non- host communities of environmental-
impacting activities. This theory posits that economic power determines the extent 
of environmental justice enjoyed by host communities.126 An economically strong 
host-community will have the power to demand better environmental treatment and 
cannot be ignored because of its economic contribution to the country. An 
economically weak host community will, however, be voiceless and likely to be 
ignored.  
Although this theory addresses an important factor that accounts for the 
marginalization of host communities, it is a rather simplistic explanation which does 
not take account of the myriad of other issues at play, such as the socio-political 
structure of the country, the historical perspectives of marginalization and the 
suppression of the voice of the people of the region.  Also, the definition of economic 
strength is relative and may be misconstrued to refer to the actual economic wealth 
in such a region and not its economic contribution to the country. For instance, in 
terms of economic contribution, the Niger Delta can be classified as the strongest 
economic base in the country as it produces the oil and gas that accounts for 90% 
of the country’s economic revenues. However, extreme poverty is prevalent in this 
region and its actual economic strength is not commensurate with its economic 
contributions.  
The eco-racism theory focuses on the deliberate targeting of minority groups for 
environmental injustices on the basis of race or ethnicity.127 This theory ascribes 
environmental injustice to racial or ethnic discrimination and the intention to subject 
such group to environmental degradation on the basis of their race or ethnic origin. 
                                                          
125 S. Gbadegesin, ‘Multinational Corporations, Developed Nations and Environmental Racism: 
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126 G. Mbamalu, C. Mbamalu and D. Durett ‘Environmental Justice Issues in Developing Countries 
and in the Niger Delta’, paper delivered at the International Conference on Infrastructure 
Development and the Environment, Abuja, Nigeria, 10–15 September 2006, 5. 
127 R. Ako, Supra, n 91, 293. 
79 
 
Although racial or ethnic factors may account for the exclusion of certain groups 
from environmental decision making, it is more likely that such exclusion or 
subjecting to environmental injustice was primarily because such group offered the 
path of least resistance owing to their lack of economic or political power or weak 
regulatory system to prevent such occurrence. For instance, the dumping of toxic 
waste in Koko community in the Niger Delta 128 by an Italian firm may be ascribed 
to eco-racism by a western power, but it is more likely because the area was seen 
as a site where there will be the least resistance to the toxic waste dump owing to 
the weak environmental regulation in the country.  
The political and economic theory posits that the lack of political and economic 
power is responsible for environmental justice in a region.129 This theory bears the 
hallmark of ecological imperialism in that it highlights the ecological subjugation of 
an area on account of its relative weakness in economic and political power. While 
ecological imperialism focuses on the environmental degradation resulting from 
such subjugation, the environmental injustice in this situation arises from the 
exclusion of the subjugated group from participation in environmental decision 
making in relation to issues affecting them. This theory is most suited to the plight 
of the Niger Delta region as the people of the region are systematically excluded 
from participating in or influencing decisions regarding their environment on account 
of their lack of political influence and socio-economic strength relative to the other 
regions in the country.  
In the Niger Delta context, therefore, environmental justice requires an equitable 
access to environmental amenities/resources necessary to protect the ecological 
integrity in the region. It also entails the subjecting of corporate and government 
bureaucratic environmental decision making to democratic scrutiny and 
accountability with meaningful participation and access to information by the people 
of the region. The absence of this procedural platform for people of the region results 
in their exclusion from environmental decision making with respect to oil production 
activities that affect their environment. This makes it easier for the MNCs, with 
government approval or acquiescence, to commence and perpetuate oil production 
activities that prejudicially affect the environment with little or no inhibitions and is 
                                                          
128 See page 57 for the discussions on the incident.   
129 P. Francis, ‘For the use and common benefit of all Nigerians: Consequences of the 1978 Land 
Nationalization’ (1984) 54(3) Journal of the International African Institute 5 at 7. 
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one of the underlying reasons why environmental pollution in the region has proven 
difficult to halt or control. 
 
1.4.4 Domestic Inapplicability of International Environmental 
Treaties / Principles 
International environmental law recognises the protection of the environment as an 
essential part of protecting the well-being of humans. The inexorable link between 
human rights and the environment has long been recognized by Principle 1 of the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972130 and was given further 
impetus by the Brundtland Report of 1987.131 Over the years, this principle has been 
developed at the international level to a point where there is a growing acceptance 
that the right to a safe environment is an inalienable right of all people. The Draft 
Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment132is the first international 
instrument that comprehensively addressed the linkage between human rights and 
the environment. It proclaimed the accepted principle that environmental and human 
rights principles embody the right of everyone to a secure, healthy and ecologically 
sound environment. The Draft Declaration established the environmental dimension 
of established human rights, such as the rights to life, health and culture and 
included procedural environmental rights, such as the right to participation, 
necessary for the realisation of the substantive rights.  
Although the draft declaration lacks any international legal force on account of its 
non-ratification by member states, the principles proclaimed in it influences 
environmental governance around the world and highlight the generally accepted 
environmental rights of people. Part 1(2) of the Draft, for instance, proclaims that ‘all 
persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment. 
This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible’. Part 1(4) incorporates 
inter-generational environmental rights by proclaiming that ‘all persons have the 
right to an environment adequate to meet equitably the needs of present 
generations and that does not impair the rights of future generations to meet 
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equitably their needs’. This provision seeks to protect the environmental rights of 
future generations to a clean environment and is an advance on the original concept 
of environmental rights which focused on the rights of present people to a clean and 
safe environment.  
In relation to the Niger Delta situation, Part 1(5) directly addresses the issue of 
environmental degradation by proclaiming that ‘all persons have the right to freedom 
from pollution, environmental degradation and activities that adversely affect the 
environment, threaten life, health, livelihood, well-being or sustainable development 
within, across or outside national boundaries.’ This provision encapsulates the core 
elements of an environmental right to a clean environment which the people of the 
Niger Delta require to protect their environment. Unfortunately, as stated earlier, the 
Draft Declaration does not have the status of a treaty and lacks any binding effect, 
and it merely operates as guiding principles to nations willing to incorporate its 
provisions in their domestic legislation or Constitutions. In the same vein, the Draft 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010 which seeks to provide 
eco-centric protection for the environment and mother earth lacks any legal force as 
an international instrument in view of its non-ratification by states.  
In respect of ecosystem protection, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity133 
imposes an obligation on parties to take appropriate measures to protect the 
ecosystem and biological diversity within their territory. This convention is binding 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and Nigeria, being a 
signatory to this convention which she has ratified, is therefore obliged to ensure 
that activities within its jurisdiction do not threaten the biological diversity and 
ecosystem of the Niger Delta region. Nevertheless, having regard to the problem of 
enforcing international law obligations on account of the sovereignty of states and 
lack of a binding judicial mechanism that can be utilised against state actors, it is 
difficult to hold the Nigerian government accountable for non-compliance with this 
obligation. Even where it is possible to hold the government accountable at the 
international level, enforcing this obligation at the domestic level faces a 
fundamental constitutional hurdle arising from the non-domestication of the Bio-
Diversity Convention. Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution renders all 
international treaties and conventions inapplicable within the country unless, and 
                                                          
133 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 available at <http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-
en.pdf > accessed 15 March 2019. 
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until, it has been domesticated by the country’s parliament – i.e. adopted as a local 
legislation by the country’s parliament.134  
Apart from international legal instruments, there are several international 
environmental principles which are generally relied upon in addressing various 
environmental issues around the globe. The polluter pays principle, precautionary 
principle, no-harm principle and the prevention principle135 are relevant international 
law principles that to various extents are applicable within the context of the 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. The polluter pays principle, for 
instance, is applicable to hold MNCs responsible for paying compensation and costs 
of clean-up of the environment for pollutions arising from their activities, while the 
prevention principle obliges the government and MNCs to take proactive steps to 
prevent activities that may result in harm to the environment. However, the judiciary 
in Nigeria is unwilling to apply these international principles within the domestic 
jurisdiction as they do not form part of the corpus juris136 of the country’s legal 
system.137  
Presently, only the polluter pays principle is applied by the Nigerian courts to hold 
MNCs responsible for environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region and this is 
only on the basis of the domestication, by the Nigerian parliament, of the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) 1969138 by 
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Ratification 
and Enforcement) Act 2006.  
Kotze139 argues that international environmental law is weak to address pressing 
environmental issues around the globe owing largely to two key problems: lack of 
compliance with and enforcement of environmental laws, norms and standards and; 
the non-existence, and/or lack of adherence to and enforceability of universal, 
fundamental environmental rights. Added to these key problems are unique legal 
hurdles peculiar to different jurisdictions. In Nigeria, there is the added constitutional 
                                                          
134 See See Fawehinmi v. Abacha (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 575) 45. 
135 See  P. Birnie & A. Boyle International Law and the Environment (Oxford Press 2009) 3; T. 
Kamminga, ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’ (1995) 1 Environmental Policy in an 
International Context 111-131.  
136 Literary translated as ‘body of law’. 
137 See Attorney General of Abia State & 35 others v Attorney General of the Federation (2002) 3 
NWLR (Pt 764)1. 
138 Adopted 29 November 1969; Entry into force: 19 June 1975; Replaced by 1992 Protocol which 
was adopted 27 November 1992 and entered into force on 30 May 1996.  
139 L. Kotze, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 199-233.  
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challenge of the domestication of international environmental instruments and 
principles before they can be applicable and enforceable in the country. This creates 
difficulty in relying on international environmental law to protect the environmental 
rights of the people of the Niger Delta.  
The absence of an environmental rights framework in Nigeria creates a gaping hole 
which established international environmental conventions and principles could 
have partly filled in enforcing the right to a clean environment in the Niger Delta. The 
inability to rely on these international conventions and principles, therefore, further 
isolates the region from any form of effective legal framework to rely upon in 
asserting their environmental rights and this allows for the continuous environmental 
pollution of the region by the MNCs with impunity and acquiescence from the 
government.  
 
1.4.5 The ‘Full-belly’ Impediment to Environmental Protection 
“Without a belly full of food and other vital needs, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms become meaningless” - Rhoda Howard 140 
Howard’s ‘full-belly’ thesis reflects the scepticism with which impoverished people 
in deprived communities view theoretical discussions about human rights and other 
legal entitlements which do not immediately translate to immediate sustenance.  
This scepticism often results in general disinterest in abstract legal entitlements in 
favour of short-term immediate sustenance. In most cases, this translates to such 
impoverished people selling their birthrights for a ‘plate of porridge’ by trading off 
their legal entitlements (civil, political, economic and environmental rights) for short-
term physical handouts like food and money, often given by their oppressors (e.g. 
environmental polluters). It is difficult to convince a hungry man that abstract legal 
rights are more important than collecting money and foodstuffs that will feed his 
family for the coming days.  
The ‘full-belly’ thesis was first propounded by Howard in 1983 wherein she argued 
that ‘economic rights to basic needs are just as important as civil and political human 
rights and that the latter rights cannot be achieved until basic economic needs are 
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secured’.141 She focused her thesis on Sub-Saharan Africa, taking examples from 
East and West African countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria, and argued that 
the push for improved civil and political rights in sub-Saharan Africa has largely 
failed due to the impoverished nature of these societies which makes the people 
devalue civil and political rights in favour of measures that will satisfy their basic 
economic needs. Often times, this leads to a trade-off of political freedoms and other 
civil rights for economic benefits and is exploited by the political elites to deprive the 
people of their civil and political rights under the guise of fending for their economic 
interests.  
Howard cited prominent African leaders like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Colonel 
Acheampong of Ghana who espoused this view to support the political subjugation 
of their people. Nyerere is quoted as saying “…Only as his poverty is reduced will 
his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human 
dignity become a fact of human dignity”142 while Colonel Acheampong, a Ghanaian 
military dictator that was overthrown and executed, argued that “One man, one vote, 
is meaningless unless accompanied by the principle of "one man, one bread”.143  
Reflecting on this theory, Olawuyi144 posits that the thesis is a ‘theoretical anchor for 
the position that social, economic and cultural rights are important and vital and must 
be respected and protected with equal vigour’. He further contended that- 
“The full-belly thesis takes a functionalist approach to debates on how 
attempts to respect, promote and fulfil human rights could fail if they do 
not reflect justice perspectives or take into consideration basic social, 
economic and environmental needs”145 
Olawuyi’s contribution to the full-belly thesis adds a new dimension to the 
functionalist perspective of the thesis by considering environmental needs 
(interpreted as rights in this context) as included in the bouquet of social and 
economic rights that propel impoverished people to disregard civil and political 
rights. In essence, he argues that the environmental rights of impoverished people 
are just as important as civil and political rights and that failure to protect the former 
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142 Julius K. Nyerere, ‘Stability and Change in Africa’ (an Address to the University of Toronto, 
1969), printed in Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), C30-31.  
143 Amnesty International, ‘Background Paper on Ghana’ (London: Mimeo, 1974) 9. 
144 Damilola S. Olawuyi, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Carbon Finance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 172-175.  
145 ibid, 174.  
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will lead to failure to advance the latter. Even though environmental right was not 
included in Howard’s initial elucidation of the thesis, Gwam146 argues that 
environmental rights must necessarily be considered amongst the socio-economic 
rights that propel people to disregard civil and political rights until the former rights 
are satisfied and that protection of human rights must extend beyond civil and 
political rights but necessarily incorporate environmental and other economic rights.  
Theoretically, Olawuyi and Gwam’s positions are faultless because it has long been 
internationally recognised, since the Stockholm Declaration 1972147 and Brundtland 
Report 1987,148 that environmental rights i.e. having a clean environment, is central 
to the enjoyment of the other basic civil and political human rights like the right to 
dignity, right to private life etc.  Nevertheless, their argument misjudges the central 
focus of the ‘full-belly’ thesis but adopt an idealistic and theoretical approach to a 
consideration of the choices that impoverished people face in negotiating rights.  
Howard’s ‘full-belly’ thesis focuses on the bifurcation of human rights based on the 
practical needs of impoverished people and not based on an idealistic view of what 
these people need or should recognise as important. In essence, by ‘social and 
economic rights’, she intended the right to adequate nutrition, financial provisions 
and a minimum standard of health care for the sick and elderly in their society. 
Environmental rights and a clean environment are, no doubt, idealistically important 
(and are, in fact, central to achieving adequate nutrition and health care), but to 
people severely impoverished for decades, lacking the ability to provide food and 
basic nutrition, lacking financial provisions to obtain adequate health care for their 
sick and elderly, they do not consider a clean environment as practically and 
immediately necessary when compared to the immediate provision of food, money 
and medicines. They, therefore, willingly trade off a clean environment (and other 
associated environmental rights such as participatory rights, access to information 
in environmental matters, access to justice, rights of Mother Nature etc.) alongside 
other civil and political rights, for immediate food and basic provisions. Certainly, 
these environmental rights alongside other civil and political rights will enable them 
to achieve their quest for food and basic provisions in the medium and long-term, 
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but it remains abstract rights to them in the immediate short term so long as it does 
not translate to physical gains they can immediately rely on to satisfy their hunger.   
In essence, therefore, the ‘full-belly’ thesis in its pure and practical form considers 
environmental rights as included in the bouquet of other civil and political rights that 
impoverished people willingly sacrifice for physical sustenance needs. Viewed from 
this perspective, protecting environmental rights require that the socio-economic 
needs (in this context, food, money, medicines and other immediate sustenance 
needs) of the impoverished people be satisfied, otherwise attempts to enshrine 
environmental rights will only result in failure.  
 
1.4.5.1 ‘Full-Belly’ Syndrome in the Niger Delta  
The Niger Delta region is a model case of the application of the ‘full-belly’ thesis as 
an impediment to environmental rights. Despite having amongst the most polluted 
environments in the world, the impoverished people of the region are focused 
majorly on the immediate short-term gains of food, nutrition and financial rewards 
and are willing to trade the sanctity of their environments to achieve this. The 
inhabitants of the Niger Delta are amongst the poorest people in the whole of 
Nigeria, as over 70% of the total population in the region live significantly below the 
poverty line,149 according to Amnesty International studies in the region.150 
Considering that Nigeria is currently ranked third in the world in terms of poverty 
with over 60% of its population living below the poverty line,151the plight of the 
impoverished people of the region can be better understood, as they rank as the 
poorest amongst the poor in Nigeria.  
The oil companies whose activities cause the environmental pollution and 
degradation in the region capitalise on this high poverty rate to advance financial 
compensations and other basic sustenance provisions to the people as a way of 
                                                          
149 The International Poverty Line, according to the World Bank, is $1.90 per day. See the 2017 
global poverty update from the World Bank available at 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/2017-global-poverty-update-world-bank> 
accessed 09 March 2018.  
150 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta – 2016 
Report’ <https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/nigeria-petroleum-pollution-and-poverty-in-the-
niger-delta-report/> accessed 13 December 2016.  
151 See World Bank, ‘Nigeria: Poverty & Equity Data Portal 2017’ 
<http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/NGA> accessed 15 February 2018.    
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diverting attention from the polluted environment.152 As a result, the impoverished 
people of the region consider environmental rights as ‘abstract luxuries’ that do not 
satisfy their immediate basic needs.153  
To further worsen matters, the inhabitants take the ‘full-belly’ syndrome one step 
further by deliberately polluting their own environment in search of the fulfilment of 
their ‘full-belly’. Two major ways this is done are – 
a) By criminally sabotaging and vandalising pipelines in the region to cause oil 
spills and consequent pollution which, they hope, will ultimately lead to payment 
of financial compensations to the inhabitants of the affected communities by the 
oil companies concerned; and 
b) By operating illegal oil refineries which create widespread pollution.154  
 
Pipeline Sabotaging and Vandalism 
Official statistics from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)155 
reveal that over 90% of oil pollution from ruptured pipelines are caused by pipeline 
vandalism by inhabitants in the Niger Delta region.156 
Although vandalism and sabotage are often viewed as a means of civil protest by 
the people against the activities of the oil companies (this is the narrative advanced 
by most community leaders and stakeholders in the region), the paradox inherent in 
this approach renders this excuse absurd and untenable. To claim that communities 
and their inhabitants sabotage and vandalise pipeline and create widespread oil 
pollution as a way of protesting against widespread pollution by the oil companies 
is incomprehensible and illogical. Economic motives are unarguably behind such 
                                                          
152 John Ottuh, ‘Poverty and the Oppression of the Poor in Niger Delta: A Theological Approach’ 
(2013) 3(11) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 256.  
153 A. Adedeji and R. Ako ‘Hindrances to effective legal response to the problem of 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta’ (2005) 5(1) UNIZIK Law Journal 415 at 415–39. 
154 Okolo, Philips & Etekpe, Ambily, ‘Oil Pipeline Vandalization and the Socio-Economic Effects 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region’ (2010) SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/ssrn.1723169. 
155 NNPC 2018, ‘NNPC Records Massive Reduction in Pipeline Vandalism’ 
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2018. According to the report, a total of 16,083 pipeline breaks were recorded within the last 10 
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156 There are no independent statistics on the extent of oil spillage caused by pipeline vandalism, 
as the widespread militancy and volatility of the region makes it difficult for independent bodies 
to conduct assessments of the extent of sabotage by the inhabitants. The official figure from 
the NNPC, which is often disputed, is, therefore, the only source of statistics on the extent of 
pipeline vandalism in the region. 
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vandalism, as they seek ways to claim compensation from the oil companies for the 
resultant pollution.  
Ibaba and Olumati157 argue that economic motive is central in their actions, stating 
that ‘while serving a social purpose in terms of protesting against deprivation, the 
economic gains from vandalization is paramount in the minds of the actors’. Okoko 
concurs with this view, arguing that ‘… those who support (pipeline vandalization) 
feel justified in line with the national syndrome of ‘national cake-sharing’,158 besides 
the prevailing feeling of discontent occasioned by neglect and deprivation.’159  
Certainly, the impoverished people of the region are unconcerned about the 
environmental impact of their activities so long as they achieve a ‘full-belly’ from 
their actions, thereby trading environmental sanctity for economic gains.  
 
 
Illegal Crude Oil Factories/Oil Bunkering 
Another application of the ‘full-belly’ syndrome by the inhabitants involves engaging 
in illegal crude oil processing activities utilising make-shift facilities to process crude 
oil illegally scooped from vandalised pipelines or other oil exploration facilities 
installed by the oil companies. The haphazard manner of processing the crude oil 
and disjointed manner of these illegal ‘factories’ results in widespread pollution of 
the immediate environment from such activities as shown in Figures 4 and 5 below.  
This practice, also a form of oil bunkering, is a major source of environmental 
pollution in the region and the oil companies ascribe a significant part of the 




                                                          
157 S. Ibaba and J. Olumati, ‘Sabotage Induced Oil Spillage and Human Rights Violation in 
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benefits from public funds. 
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Source: Wall Street Journal161 
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From the discussions above, it is apparent that the Niger Delta inhabitants play a 
role in the environmental pollution that they complain about, and while oil spills 
from the MNCs account for most of the major pollution incidents, the contribution 
of the inhabitants in pursuit of their ‘full-belly’ is not insignificant.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The environmental challenges in the Niger Delta is a product of deep-seated 
fundamental issues having their roots in the lopsided geopolitical structure in the 
country, the extreme poverty in the region and the poor environmental legal 
framework. Focusing on the role of the government and MNCs alone in 
addressing the environmental problem in the region will be problematic as it 
ignores the various stakeholders involved in the perpetuation of the problem. 
Also, unreservedly casting the Niger Delta inhabitants as victims of pollution will 
be oblivious of their contribution to a significant part of the pollution. While the 
extreme poverty in the region and the natural human quest for sustenance may 
explain their ‘full-belly’ pursuit, this does not excuse such actions which 
undermine the environment and certainly imposes some responsibility on them 
to also work towards protecting their environment.   
While avoiding the apportionment of blame for pollution between the government, 
MNCs and individuals, this chapter identifies the key challenges responsible for 
the intractability of the environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. This sets 
the scene for discussing the role of constitutional environmental rights in 
addressing these challenges in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 7 will specifically 
analyse how constitutionalising such rights will potentially impact each of the 
challenges identified in this chapter. 
Before delving into that, however, the subsequent four chapters will establish the 
theoretical framework on which constitutionalization of environmental rights is 
based. The chapters analyse the theoretical basis of environmental rights, its 
importance in environmental protection and the benefits of these rights attaining 
constitutional status and protection. It is from this theoretical foundation of 
environmental rights and constitutionalism that the potential solution to the key 








“… there will be resistance to giving the thing “rights” 
until it can be seen and valued for itself: yet, it is hard to 
see it and value it for itself until we can bring ourselves 
to give it “rights” – which is almost inevitably going to 
sound inconceivable to a large group of people”. – 
Christopher D. Stone1 
As Stone asserts above, ascribing ‘rights’ to inanimate objects and other non-
human sentient beings in the environment generally encounter resistance on 
account of their non-human character which makes it difficult for their intrinsic 
worth to be appreciated and protected by humans. This paradox of the rights’ 
debate is exemplified by the focus of national and international legal instruments 
on the instrumental value of the natural habitat to humans and yet resistant to the 
idea of this natural habitat having intrinsic value worthy of protection by legal 
instruments. The underlying environmental ethic behind this paradox is the belief 
that protection of the environment for human benefits equates to the protection of 
the environment as an entity. In actual fact, the instrumental value of the 
environment to humans is often at the expense of nature’s interests and the 
competition of interests between humans and nature which leads to human 
exploitation of nature’s resources is viewed as acceptable so long as ‘the rules of 
the game are fair’.2    
This chapter examines the theoretical bases of environmental rights and analyses 
the jurisprudential concept of rights and its application in environmental contexts. 
The chapter discusses the nature of environmental rights, the convergence of 
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nature’s rights with the environmental rights of humans and the development of 
environmental rights from its anthropocentric origins in the early 19th century to its 
present stage encompassing the rights of future generations and nature. The 
various theoretic models of nature’s rights such as holism, biocentrism, 
physiocentrism and ecocentrism are discussed with a view to determining which 
theory best represents the incorporation of nature’s rights in the environmental 
rights debates and provides an effective option for protecting nature’s rights and 
its intrinsic environmental interests.  
This chapter argues that the concept of environmental rights has to be looked at 
beyond the human-centric perspective (anthropocentrism) which focuses on the 
instrumental value of the environment to humans. Nature’s right in an ecocentric 
perspective is an important aspect of environmental concern that should be 
incorporated in relevant legal instruments in a merger of human and nature’s 
environmental interests in a coalesced anthropocentric approach. This approach 
preserves the central position of humans as the alpha environmental entity with 
pre-eminent environmental interests but also ingrains nature’s intrinsic value and 
interests as a vital component of ensuring holistic environmental protection.  
This chapter identifies ecocentrism as the preferred approach for protecting 
nature’s interests as it ensures that harmony of human and nature’s interests is 
paramount in coalesced anthropocentrism unlike biocentrism and physiocentrism 
which encourage competition of interests between humans and nature within a 
‘marketplace of interests’.3 Where conflicts inevitably arise between these rights, 
as they often do between different rights’ holders, the resolution will be predicated 
on the pre-eminence of human environmental interests. For instance, the right of 
some species (such as mosquitoes or other viruses) to exist within an ecosystem 
may be understandably restricted on account of their threat to human health or 
existence within that ecosystem; the right to non-disturbance or non-exploitation 
of woodlands or other forested ecosystems can be restricted to enable humans 
to acquire necessary infrastructure for development, provided such resources are 
exploited reasonably and in a sustainable manner.      
 




2.2 Jurisprudential Concept of Rights  
The idea of ‘rights’ in the contemporary era is so proliferated that virtually every 
issue of legal, social or political concern is framed in a ‘rights’ context without due 
regard for the import of such classification. Merrills4 noted that it is easy to mix up 
issues of preferences and morality with the more significant issue of rights in most 
contexts, due to the often casual use of these terms, yet most of such discourse 
could be validly made in other contexts outside of ‘rights’. He also posited that this 
proliferation of rights and right holders have unwanted consequences as it not 
only multiplies the occasions when right holders come into conflict with each other 
but also generates tension between rights as a basis for actions and other moral 
considerations.5 Essentially, rights are more than just another way of expressing 
preferences, desires, entitlements or moral claims, but act as a ‘trump card’ which 
raises a claim of entitlement from morally neutral grounds to a position of legal 
enforceability or protection.6  
The idea of ‘rights’ has been variously described as ‘an astonishing moral 
phenomenon’,7 ‘a remarkable development in human consciousness’,8 and ‘the 
most dynamic legal concept of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’.9 It 
represents the reasonable minimum demands upon society that are rooted in 
moral values and thus places compelling principles on the side of the person 
asserting the right.10 Ignatieff11 argues that “rights are not just instruments of the 
law; they are expressions of our moral identity as a people”. In this sense, rights 
can be viewed as a reflection of the most important moral values of a people which 
they represent and the translation of such values to rights is to ensure the 
protection and enforcement of the values. Boyd12 refers to rights as providing 
recognition for society’s most cherished values, such as dignity, equality, and 
respect and the language of rights have considerable symbolic force and can be 
                                                          
4 J. Merrills, ‘Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects’ in Alan Boyle and 
Michael Anderson (Eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (OUP 1996). 
5 ibid, 4. 
6 ibid. 
7 J. Mahoney, The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, development, and Significance (OUP 
2007) 3. 
8 ibid. 
9 J. McHugh, Comparative Constitutional Traditions (New York Press 2002) 12. 
10 H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton University 
Press, 2nd ed., 1996) 5. 
11 M. Ignatieff, ‘The Rights Revolution’ (2000) CBC Massey Lectures, Toronto, 15. 
12 D. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, 
and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 8.  
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a source of political power. Similar to Ignatieff’s position, Boyd’s view reflects the 
importance attached to societal values which are then translated into rights for 
their protection and enforcement. 
A ‘right’ generally refers to a moral or legal entitlement to have or do something. 
Entitlement in this context portrays a justiciable claim over something that can be 
staked on a moral or legal foundation. This distinguishes it from the more casual 
use of ‘right’ to separate good from bad deeds (or right from wrong choices) in the 
English language, although it may sometimes coincide or correlate to having a 
legal or moral right to take such step or make such decision. Thus, saying a 
person did ‘the right thing in the circumstance’ will generally refer to making the 
correct or acceptable response to an act or situation as against staking a claim or 
entitlement, although such response may be based on legal or moral rights.  
Nevertheless, the societal expectation of right from wrong deeds may sometimes 
be opposite of ‘rights’ in the jurisprudential sense. As Bowie13 pointed out, a 
person may have the right to do something that is the wrong thing for him to do, 
e.g. gambling. While the act of gambling is generally considered the wrong thing 
by society and is thus not a part of societal values, it may be permissible within 
the legal system in the society and thus a right to gambling may exist in such 
society. Conversely, something may be the right thing for a person to do, yet they 
may have no right to do it, in the sense that it would not be wrong for someone to 
interfere with the person engaging in such act e.g. a father taking custody of a 
child from an alcoholic or drug abusive mother who has been awarded custody 
by the court despite her alcohol or drug abuse. As a result, contrary to Ignatieff’s 
consideration of rights as a reflection of the moral values of a society, rights do 
not always reflect societal values on various subjects but can run counter to such 
values.  
In the jurisprudence of rights, they are derived from foundations much deeper 
than societal values, expectations or individual desires. Also, distinctions between 
moral and legal entitlements are expressed in the jurisprudential concept of rights. 
Three perspectives of rights explain the concept as applicable within a legal 
                                                          
13N. Bowie, ‘Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin: Book Review’ (1977) 26(4) Catholic 
University Law Review 12.  
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framework. Campbell14 espouses the ‘societal rules’ perspective which views 
rights as deriving from societal rules on a given subject expressed in concrete 
terms and conferred on individuals for the protection of their self-interests. Thus, 
Campbell argues, ‘rights are only of importance to those seeking to protect their 
self-interest from the predation of others’.15 However, he concedes that rights 
cannot be equated with societal rules, even though derived from them, as  
“…although there cannot be rights without societal rules, there 
may be societal rules that are unconnected with rights. Not all 
behavioural directives or authoritative requirements for human 
action can be interpreted plausibly as involving the rights of 
others’. 
Campbell’s ‘societal rules’ perspective is predicated on legal positivism as it 
focuses on those rights which are already expressed in positivist forms in legal 
instruments or other ascertainable forms. It does not elucidate on the origin of 
those societal rules translated into rights neither does it seek to explain the criteria 
for determining which societal rules are translated into rights and which are 
omitted. This is particularly important when dealing with the creation of new rights 
for previously excluded classes, as it becomes necessary to determine whether 
the interests/preferences sought to be protected and made a societal rule is 
worthy of translation into rights. More so, Dworkin’s liberal theory of law proposes 
the idea that “individuals can have rights against the state that are prior to the 
rights created by explicit legislation"16and as a result, there are rights which 
predate the formation of societal rules on a subject.   
Campbell further propounded three theories of rights- the contract theory, power 
theory and interest theory.17 The contract theory limits rights to entitlements 
arising from contracts or promises which the recipient or either contractual party 
can enforce against the other. The contract theory is too restrictive as it does not 
apply to liberty rights and other rights derivable from non-contractual situations. 
The power theory defines right in the context of obligations imposed on another 
person to act in a certain way. Thus, A only has a right to a thing if there is a rule 
                                                          
14 T. Campbell, ‘Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy’ (UCL Press, 2004) 
153. 
15 ibid, 156. 
16 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) 12.  
17 T. Campbell, ‘Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy’, supra, n 14.  
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that makes A’s choice or will superintend over the actions or will of others in 
certain specified ways and circumstances. This presupposes that a right derives 
from power to control, determine or limit how others act in relation to a subject. 
The power theory is positivist in nature as it focuses on rights proclaimed in 
ascertainable form without elucidating on the origin of such rights. It is also too 
narrow and does not give insight on how the rights of persons unable to claim or 
waive such rights are derived e.g. infants or mentally challenged persons. The 
interest theory is grounded on the existence of an obligation to satisfy or protect 
the interests of another person, the rights holder. This theory postulates that a 
‘right’ is the possession of an interest which is protected or furthered by a co-
relating obligation on others to act or restrain from acting in a manner capable of 
having a bearing on the interests of the right holder. The interest theory is broad 
enough to cover all manner of rights and provides a plausible explanation for the 
origin of rights which is founded on the ‘interests’ of the rights’ holder.  
Campbell’s interest theory is a simplistic elucidation of the jurisprudential concept 
of rights but it fails to address the important question of the rendition of interest-
protection into rights. Not all interests are protected in the form of rights, and some 
interests are unacceptable, objectionable and too insignificant to be accorded 
legal recognition as ‘rights’.  For instance, a father may have a justifiable interest 
in the custody of his child but he may not have the right to such custody for various 
reasons. Thus, it is not enough to say that rights are interests for which an 
obligation is conferred on others to protect or refrain from interfering with. There 
must something which distinguishes protected interests from other moral interests 
or desires. 
Dworkin’s18 thesis on rights supplies this missing link with his view of rights as 
‘trumps’ identifying the distinctive feature of rights as against other moral 
preferences or interests. According to Dworkin- 
“Individual rights are political trumps held by the individuals. Individuals 
have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient 
justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or 
to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury 
upon them.”  




Analysed alongside Campbell’s interest theory, it can be said that, as posited by 
Dworkin, rights are designated interests which trump over other preferences and 
desires and are accorded special protection by the legal system.19 Rights, 
therefore, predate positivist enactment or encapsulation of these rights as they 
exist because their protection trumps other collective goals and individual 
preferences. Although Hart’s20 positivist legal theory is the prevailing theory on 
legal rights and rules, Dworkin’s analysis of rights identifies the underlying basis 
of rights as found in positivist legal instruments.21 Regan expounds on this ‘trump’ 
philosophy with the ‘special weight’ perspective by arguing that what makes rights 
trump over other preferences is that they are given ‘special weight’ or ‘more 
accurately, perhaps, rights are special protections accorded certain preferences 
in the form of extra weighting’.22 Reagan’s perspective introduces a positivist 
angle to the ‘trump’ philosophy as he contends that this extra weighting is supplied 
by positivist legal instruments. It is this ‘special weight’ that is the definitive feature 
which distinguishes rights in the legal sense from moral preferences and desires.  
It is not possible to derive the jurisprudential meaning of rights from a single 
perspective or theory. Rather, a blend of the various elements in each theory and 
perspective can lead to a reliable conceptualization of rights in a legal context. 
From the analysis above, it is reasonable to define rights as the legal entitlement 
to the protection of an interest which trumps other preferences or desires on 
account of the special weight accorded to them. This conceptualisation does not, 
however, address all the issues surrounding rights such as the individual versus 
collective rights debate and the resolution of the inevitable conflicts of rights. 
Suffice to state that the conferment of rights is not limited to individuals. A 
collective group can be conferred with rights for the protection of their interests 
which are regarded as important and therefore given special weight to trump other 
interests. Although Dworkin focused on individualism of rights, arguing that “we 
must recognise as competing rights only the rights of other members of the society 
as individuals”,23 undue focus on individual rights and a disregard for collective 
                                                          
19A. Sangai, ‘Trump Rights or Right Trumps? Understanding Dworkin’s ‘rights as trumps’ thesis’ 
(2013), available at <https://searchingtherightanswer.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/trump-rights-
or-rights-trump-understanding-dworkins-rights-as-trumps-thesis/> accessed 23 January, 2017.    
20 H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series, 2nd Ed., 1997).  
21 J. Costa-Neto, ‘Rights as Trumps and Balancing: Reconciling the Irreconcilable? (2015) 11(1) 
Revista Direito GV, 159-187.  
22 D. Regan, ‘Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies’ (1978) 76 Mich. L. Rev 1213. 
23 R. Dworkin, n 16, 23.  
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goals “may prove costly not only for the community but also for the right holder”.24 
Balancing individual rights with collective interests is, therefore, an integral part of 
the application of rights in legal contexts. 
While it is easy to determine the conferment of rights on humans, embedding such 
rights on nature or other abstract entities presents a unique challenge, as the lack 
of appreciation of their intrinsic value reduces the acceptability of their ability to 
bear rights. Nevertheless, the task of embedding such rights is made easier when 
it is viewed from the interest theory of rights focusing on utilising rights to protect 
the interests of the right-bearer. It is from this perspective that several non-human 
entities have been conferred rights including ships, corporations and trusts.25 In 
essence, once it is accepted that nature and the components of the ecosystems 
have interests to be protected i.e. the interest to not be over-exploited, polluted or 
degraded, then embedding rights in nature becomes an acceptable proposition. 
In this sense, abstract entities such as an ecosystem or Mother Nature which 
comprise of different inter-connected and inter-related individual elements formed 
into a whole are capable of enjoying rights provided they have interests requiring 
protection in the form of being accorded special weight over other preferences. 
The aggregation of the rights of the individual elements can be ascribed to the 
collective whole or the collective whole can be ascribed rights on its own as an 
entity. Even though this right may not be as strong as rights of the individual 
elements, it is nevertheless a right capable of trumping other preferences, e.g. the 
right of an ecosystem to exist undisturbed can trump the preference for 
unmitigated exploitation of forest resources by humans. As Reagan opines,26 ‘a 
right which guarantees the preference it protects only a little extra weight is a weak 
right, but a right nonetheless.’ In the example of the ecosystem above, the 
conferment of a right to exist on Mother Nature by the Draft Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME) 201027 may be a weak right, considering 
the unratified status of the instrument, but it is a right nonetheless (in the legal 
sense of rights). Any consideration of the extent of protection it affords an 
                                                          
24 R. West, ‘Rights, Harms, and Duties: A Response to Justice for Hedgehogs’ (2010) 90 BU L. 
Rev. 819.  
25 See C. Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Supra n 1. 
26D. Regan, ‘Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies’, supra, n 22, 25.   
27 See Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010. 
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ecosystem will only arise in the context of resolving conflicting rights between the 
ecosystem and humans.  
Campbell28 posits that where conflicts between rights inevitably arise, the right 
which should prevail is that which belongs to a higher order, serves a graver 
purpose, or is based on a stronger claim or title. These criteria are disjunctive and 
therefore have to be considered separately in resolving conflicts between rights. 
In an environmental context, resolving conflicts between the rights of humans and 
that of nature may depend on the extent to which these rights are entrenched in 
legal instruments. In most countries of the world, the right to economic 
development may be based on a stronger claim or title than Mother Nature’s right 
to exist under the UDRME (as it is a non-binding instrument) and the former will, 
therefore, trump the latter. In Bolivia, however, where the Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth 201029 has been enacted as a domestic legislation, Mother Nature 
enjoys a stronger right than under the UDRME and its right may not be easily 
trumped by the right to economic development. Other parameters may, therefore, 
be employed to reconcile the conflicting rights which will entail a balancing of the 
need for economic development and the preservation of the ecosystem. 
In this context, the discourse on ‘rights’ necessitates a consideration of the ambit 
of environmental rights particularly as it relates to the categories of rights’ holders 
and resolution of conflicting rights by the different rights’ holders in an 
environment. As rights are considered special interests that are given special 
weight to trump other preferences, a reference to ‘environmental rights’ raises the 
question of what interests are protected, for whose benefit and the respective 







                                                          
28 T. Campbell, ‘Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy’, supra, n 14. 
29 Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, of Bolivia 2010, Article 7.  
100 
 
2.3 Ambit of Environmental Rights – Human Vs Nature’s 
Rights 
2.3.1 Rights’ Holders in the Environment 
Over the past three decades, a rights revolution is blossoming owing, in large part, 
to the unprecedented expansion of the concept of rights and its extension to 
previously ‘right-less groups’ such as natural objects, indigenous communities 
and minority groups.30 In the midst of this rights revolution, one crucial issue which 
stands out is the problem of determining rights’ holders with consistency, as 
indeterminacy and lack of consistency are two critical bottlenecks in the ascription 
of rights to specific groups or entities. As Anderson31 stated,  
‘to secure effective implementation, rights must be 
determinate in scope and consistent in formulation…the 
problem of defining such rights to satisfy diverse ethical criteria 
is complicated by the need to make them operate in a legal 
context.’  
A right is only determinate if it can be ascribed to a determinate being or object 
known as a ‘right bearer’ or ‘right holder’. Anderson’s view, therefore, reflects the 
problem of determining the recipients of rights in legal contexts. According to 
Merrills: 
Rights cannot exist as free-floating abstractions, but need 
rights’ holders, for the function of rights, as we have seen, is 
to mark out protected areas for the benefit of someone or 
something, and so the concept of a right without a rights-holder 
is a contradiction in terms.32  
Merrill equates the valid existence of a right with its attachment to a determinate 
right holder for whose interest a protected area is carved out by law and this view 
finds support in academic discussions of rights which are always in the context of 
rights’ holders.  There can be no right without a right holder and although the 
                                                          
30 D. Boyd, supra, n 12.  
31M. Anderson, ‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview’ in Alan 
Boyle and Michael Anderson (Eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(OUP 1996). 
32 J.G. Merrills, ‘Environmental Protection and Human Rights : Conceptual Aspects’, n 4, 31.  
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nature and classification of rights’ holders in different contexts are not fixed, a 
recipient of a right must always exist in every context for which the term is used 
in legal discussions. Stone33 highlighted the three core requirements to be 
considered a holder of rights - the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; 
injury to it must be taken into account in granting it relief – reliefs must be available 
for injuries to it, and the relief must run to the benefit of it. Utilizing these criteria 
for the determination of rights’ holders yield a plethora of animate and inanimate 
objects that are capable of being rights’ holders and the categories of rights’ 
holders are therefore not exhaustive as the formulation of new rights inevitably 
leads to the creation of new rights’ holders.    
In an environmental context, while the idea of ‘rights’ is often equated with ‘human 
rights’, humans are not the only recognized rights’ holders in the environment. 
The rights’ revolution has expanded the application of rights to various entities, 
groups and non-human, non-sentient beings such as the environment itself 
(Mother Nature) and even future generations. Although humans are traditionally 
the subjects of environmental rights, Stone34 pointed out that ‘the world is peopled 
with inanimate right holders: trusts, corporations, Joint Ventures, Partnerships, 
municipalities, nation-states and even ships and thus equating rights with human 
rights is a restrictive interpretation of the dynamic concept of rights’. Stone’s 
exposition is a reflection of the growing recognition of the entitlement of non-
human elements in the environment to legal protection through conferment of 
rights on such elements. The natural habitat and the complex organisms in an 
ecosystem, Stone argues, are capable of being rights’ holder and the conferment 
of determinate rights on such non-sentient elements in the environment such as 
lakes, trees, rocks and forests will not be a strange proposition given the 
conferment of rights on corporations, ships, partnerships and other non-human 
elements. Stone’s proposition, first propounded in 1972, has continued to gain 
traction and increasing recognition of the idea of conferring rights on nature no 
longer sounds as strange as it did back in 1972 with the debates raising different 
theoretical explanations of the basis of such rights.  
                                                          
33 Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? – Towards Legal rights for natural objects’, 
supra, n 1. 
34 ibid, 3.   
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Discussing the ambit of environmental rights, therefore, begins with identifying the 
scope of such rights and rights’ holders, whether they are limited to humans in the 
environment or extend to non-human elements in the environment. Emmenegger 
and Tschentscher35 argue for the rights of non-human elements in an environment 
to be referred to as ‘Nature’s rights’ as distinct from ‘environmental rights’, stating 
that while ‘environment’ always needs a related subject which is environed; in this 
case humans, ‘Nature’, in contrast, is defined without such reference to 
humankind. Accordingly, it is a more suitable term for instruments with a non-
anthropocentric approach. This argument seeks to identify nature and its 
elements as a distinctive and unique rights’ holder without associating it with 
humans owing to the tendency to substitute humans as rights’ holders for all other 
possible rights’ holders in the natural habitat. Nevertheless, this argument 
overlooks the presence of humans as a part of the natural habitat and the 
extensive scope of the term ‘environment’ which covers all natural habitat and 
nature with all its elements. Humans are not the only subject environed within an 
environment, as all parts of the natural habitat – rocks, trees, lakes and all living 
and non-living organisms in nature- are also environed within an environment. 
Therefore, the definition of ‘environment’ does not exclusively relate to humans 
but applies to all elements within a natural habitat.  
According to Kiss and Shelton, the term ‘environment’ can signify any point on a 
continuum between the entire biosphere and the immediate physical surroundings 
of a person or group.36 ‘Environment’ can also refer to the complex of physical 
and biological factors acting on an organism or ecosystem.37 Kotze38 also points 
out that the statutory definition of ‘environment’ under international and domestic 
law – e.g. the National Environmental Management Act 2009 of South Africa39- 
shows that the environment transcends mere ecological interests of humans and 
also includes the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the inter-relationship 
between people and the natural environment. Natural habitat is a part of the 
                                                          
35S. Emmenegger & A. Tschentscher, ‘Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The Long Way to 
Biocentrism in Environmental Law’, supra, n 2.  
36 Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law (Transnational Publishers 2004) 23. 
37 Klipsch Ronald, ‘Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an 
Environmental Due Process’ (1974) 49(2) Indiana Law Journal 210 
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38Louitz Kotze, ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence 
in South Africa’ (2010) 3 Journal of Court Innovation 157.  
39 National Environmental Management Act 2009 of South Africa, Section 24.  
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environment within which both humans and non-human elements dwell and the 
term ‘environment’ is wide enough to cover ‘nature’s rights’ without the need to 
separate the two, except for specific contexts to differentiate humans and non-
human rights’ holders.  
Consequently, the bifurcation between environmental rights and nature’s rights is 
unnecessary, as the latter can be subsumed under the former and they both refer 
to rights’ holders within an environment. However, as a descriptive term, it is 
necessary to use separate terms in referring to humans as rights’ holders and 
other non-human rights’ holders in the natural habitat. In this regard, the current 
trend under international and domestic laws is to use the term ‘Mother Earth’ to 
refer to non-human rights’ holders such as ecosystems, natural communities, 
species and all other natural entities.40  
Mother Earth can be considered as a rights’ holder within the environment going 
by the interests’ theory of rights because the various components of the natural 
habitat have interests which are worthy of protection and, as propounded by 
Dworkin, these interests can be used as trumps over other preferences or desires. 
As a rights’ holder, Mother Earth can be viewed as a single entity representing 
the interests of the various components of the natural habitat, all of which interests 
are protected within a unified right of ‘Mother Earth’. Alternatively, the various 
components of Mother Earth such as ecosystems, species and other natural 
entities can be viewed as individual rights’ holders with separate and distinct rights 
which may within a ‘marketplace of rights’ which Mother Earth represents. In this 
situation, the amalgamation of the individual rights of these separate rights’ 
holders can be represented as the rights of nature as distinct from the rights of 
humans within the environment.  
The first approach promotes harmony within the components of Mother Earth by 
unifying the interests of the various components within the natural habitat under 
a single rights’ holder and discouraging competition within these components. 
Current international and domestic instruments adopt the first approach, for 
instance, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010 defines 
‘Mother Earth’ as ‘the living dynamic system formed by the indivisible community 
                                                          
40 See the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth 2010 and the Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth 2010 of Bolivia.  
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of all life systems and living creatures, interrelated, interdependent and 
complementary, which share a common destiny’. It confers a unified right on 
Mother Earth such as the right to life, the right to water, the right to clean air and 
the right to restoration41 and by so doing it creates a unified rights’ holder for the 
protection of non-human interests in the environment.  
As a subset of human rights’ holders in the environment, future generations 
constitute the third category of rights’ holder in the environment for which legal 
recognition can be provided. Like nature’s rights, this category of rights holder 
poses difficulties in assessing their entitlement to rights on account of their 
futuristic and group-collective nature. As Hiskes42 points out, the difficulty in 
assessing the environmental rights of future generations is that they do not yet 
bear their ‘human countenances’. Furthermore, ‘those countenances seem 
ineluctably lost as faces in a very abstract crowd—as members of a group that 
we can imagine but to which we have a hard time extending group human rights.’43 
He points out that legal rights are not normally extended to persons not yet born 
and thus it is difficult to ascribe environmental rights to future generations. This is 
because the concept of ‘right holders’ depend on determinate objects on which 
such rights are conferred and where such objects are merely futuristic and 
presently indeterminate, it becomes difficult to ascertain the nature and scope of 
the rights to be borne by such future objects. Ball44 further argues that- 
 ‘we cannot know what men and women in distant generations will 
mean by “justice”, nor what they will regard as unjust....the more distant 
the generations, the greater the likelihood that their moral concepts and 
ours will be at least partially or even perhaps wholly incommensurable.”  
As rightly pointed out by Ball, it is difficult to ascertain what the ‘interests’ of future 
generations will be or what their idea of rights, trumps and justice will connote. 
Conferring rights on such future generations based on our present idea of what 
their interests, preferences and values will mean will be unsuitable to the 
jurisprudential concept of ‘rights’, particularly when viewed in the context of such 
                                                          
41 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, Article 7.  
42R. Hiskes, ‘The Right to a Green Future: Human Rights, Environmentalism, and 
Intergenerational Justice’, (2005) 27(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1346-1364.  
43 ibid. 
44 Terence Ball, ‘The Incoherence of Intergenerational Justice’ (1985) 28 INQUIRY 321.  
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rights acting as trumps or given special weight over the preferences, values and 
desires of the present generation. 
Ekeli,45 however, argues in favour of conferring environmental rights on future 
generations but concedes that difficulties lie in assessing the environmental 
needs of future generations and what their concept of justice would be. He 
however argued that future generations should have rights to an environment that 
satisfies their basic biological and physiological needs (bio-physical needs) since 
it is known that there are certain bio-physical needs derived from the environment 
that humans, whether now or in the future, cannot live without and is critical to 
their enjoyment of the environment regardless of the level of development or 
advancement in technologies that would be achieved at some point in the future. 
While Ekeli’s proposition of relying on the ‘biophysical’ interests of future 
generations as the basis for conferring rights on them, there are methodological 
difficulties of ascertaining the exact scope of these biophysical needs in the future, 
as the improvement in technology and other discoveries may substantially alter 
the biophysical needs of future generations from what is termed indispensable by 
present generations.  
Despite these methodological difficulties in evaluating intergenerational 
environmental rights, it is far less controversial and far more acceptable than 
nature’s rights under current international and domestic legal instruments. The 
constitutions of several countries provide for the environmental rights of future 
generations and several court decisions across the globe have emphasized the 
need to protect the environment for future generations. For instance,  Kenya’s 
2010 Constitution46 emphasizes the sustenance of the environment for future 
generations by stipulating that ‘everyone have a right to have the environment 
protected for the benefit of present and future generations’47 while Article 24 of 
South Africa’s Constitution,48 Article 225 of Brazil’s Constitution49 and Article IX, 
                                                          
45Skagen Ekeli, ‘Green Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Protection of Future Generations’ 
2007) 20(3) Ratio Juris 378–401. 
46Constitution of Kenya 2010 
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http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf> accessed 25 
June 2016. 
49Constitution of the Federal republic of Brazil 2010, 3rd Edn 
<http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution> accessed 25 June 2016. 
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Section 1 of the US State of Montana’s Constitution50 entrenches the protection 
of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures.  
At the international level, several legal instruments recognize the protection of the 
environment for future generations as an important aspect of environmental 
protection. The Biodiversity Convention of 1992, the Rio Declaration of 1992 and 
the Charter for Economic Rights and Duties of States 197551 contain provisions 
recognizing the need to protect the environment for future generations. The 
Charter for Economic Rights and Duties of States which was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations was followed up by two other General 
Assembly resolutions - the Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation 
of Nature for Present and Future Generations52 in 1980 and the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution of 2012, ‘The future we want’.53 These General 
Assembly resolutions are not formally binding since they do not constitute a formal 
source of law within the traditional categories of sources of international law. 
However, they have a formative influence on the development of international law 
as they are seen as an "expression of common interests and the 'general will' of 
the international community.54 In this context, they influence the recognition of the 
environmental rights of future generations within domestic jurisdictions. 
Judicial recognition of the rights of future generations can also be found within 
states. In Juan Antonio Oposa v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.55 the Supreme Court 
of the Philippines, while granting standing to a group of Philippine children to 
represent themselves and future generations challenging the grant of timber 
licences by the government that was destroying the country’s natural forests, held 
that “every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and 
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology” of future 
                                                          
50The Constitution of the State of Montana, US, < 
https://courts.mt.gov/portals/113/library/docs/72constit.pdf> accessed 25 June 2016. See also 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr. ‘Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of 
Montana’s Environmental Provisions’ (2003) 64 MONT L REV 157, 160.  
51 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1975), 14 
I.L.M. 251 (1975).  
52 G.A. Res. 35/80, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 15 , U.N.Doc A/35748 , Oct. 30, 
1980. 
53United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/288 of 2012, ‘The future we want’ 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E> accessed 13 
May 2015.   
54 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7Th ed, 2008) 571. 
55 G.R. No. 101083 (Supreme Court of the Philippines Aug. 9, 1993). 
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generations. Also, in Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v. Director-
General Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
and Environment, Mpumalanga Province,56the South African Constitutional Court 
held that the protection of the environment is vital to life itself and must be 
protected for the benefits of the present and future generations.  
In the United States, in addition to the recognition of the rights of future 
generations by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,57 atmospheric trust 
litigations seeking to protect the climate for future generations in cases such as 
Rettkowski v Department of Ecology58 and Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt 
v State,59 are increasingly becoming useful in protecting the interests of future 
generations. In Rettkowski v Department of Ecology, the court acceded to the 
claimant’s request for a judicial order to restrain pollution activities in order to 
protect the environment based upon the public trust doctrine, a legal doctrine that 
entrusts on the government the protection of a healthful and pleasant environment 
for future generations of citizen beneficiaries.60 The doctrine imposes a mandatory 
duty on the state to prevent substantial impairment to the state’s essential natural 
resources for the benefit of future generations and this constitutes an important 
recognition of the environmental rights of future generations.  
The increased recognition of the rights of future generations has led to the 
proposal by Ekeli61 for future generations to be given a voice in democracies by 
the reservation of some seats for them in democratically elected assemblies. 
Various models for the protection of the interests of future generations have 
emerged across the globe including the use of Ombudsman, Guardians, 
Commissioners and Trustees62and these representations will provide political 
                                                          
56 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) para 102. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006). 
58 (1993)122 Wn.2d 219, 858 P.2d 232.  
59 (2004)124 Wn.App. 566 103 P.3d 203.  
60 J Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’ 
(1970) 68(3) Michigan Law Review 471–566. 
61K. Ekeli, ‘Giving a Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future 
People’ (2005) 18 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 429–450. 
62See ‘Models for Protecting the Environment for Future Generations’ (2008) Science and 
Environmental Health Network, The International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School 
<http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Models_Future_Generations.pdf> 
accessed 21 January, 2017.  See also ‘A Case for Guardians for Future Generations’ (2006) 
Mary Robinson Foundation, Climate Justice.  
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protection for the rights of future generations in addition to the legal protection 
provided by the conferment of explicit environmental rights on future generations.   
Flowing from the above discussions, present humans, future generations and 
Mother Earth are the three distinct rights’ holders within the environment. 
‘Environmental rights’ in this context therefore broadly refers to the protection of 
the interests of these rights’ holders within the natural habitat. While current legal 
instruments expound the anthropocentric protection of human interests in the 
environment by focusing on environmental human rights of present and future 
generations, the protection of the rights of Mother Earth is an emerging trend in 
international environmental law and is still surrounded by debates as to the 
theoretical basis, scope and implementation. 
  
2.3.2 Historical Development of Environmental Rights   
“The myopic cornucopian syndrome - that man is the purpose 
and end for which the inexhaustible resources of his 
environment exist - like the Ptolemaic theory of the earth as 
the centre of the universe - must be provided its proper 
demise.”  - Harry W. Pettigrew63 
Environmental rights grew out of the realization of the inextricable link between a 
clean environment and the enjoyment of other basic fundamental human rights. 
The early focus of environmental rights was therefore on the need to protect the 
environment for its instrumental benefit to humans. This approach has however 
been labelled as a ‘myopic cornucopian syndrome’, for good reason, because of 
its disregard of the relevance of protecting the other vital parts of the natural 
habitat for their intrinsic value, unconnected to their instrumental benefits to 
humans. Pettigrew64 argued that the extent of the decimation of the natural habitat 
by humans amounted to ‘ecocide’ - the equivalent of genocide in relation to 
humans- because of the deliberate attempt at significantly and extensively 
decimating useful habitats necessary for the survival of natural elements in the 
                                                          
63 H. Pettigrew, ‘A Constitutional Right of Freedom from Ecocide’ (1972) 2 Envtl L 1; Over ten 
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environment. While genocide is fundamentally condemned and criminalized at all 
levels and is considered a ‘war crime’, ecocide is barely given legal recognition at 
the international or domestic levels despite having similar effects on non-human 
natural habitats.65   
There are broadly two theoretical frameworks for analysing environmental rights 
in modern legal discourse. The human-centric approach (anthropocentrism) 
which has largely remained the dominant theory within legal and political circles; 
and the nature-centric approach which is an emerging framework focusing on 
rights of non-human elements in the natural habitat. Discarding the myopic 
cornucopian syndrome entails moving away from the purely anthropocentric 
exposition of environmental rights to a more balanced approach which 
incorporates the nature-centric approach. The critical question in this regard was 
aptly stated by Boyle66 thus- 
“should we continue to think about human rights and the 
environment within the existing framework of human rights law 
in which the protection of humans is the central focus – 
essentially a greening of the rights to life, private life, and 
property – or has the time come to talk directly about 
environmental rights- in other words, a right to have the 
environment itself protected? Should we transcend the 
anthropocentric in favour of the eco-centric? 
Transcending the anthropocentric in favour of nature-centric approach as 
canvassed by Boyle is a gradual process that requires the re-orientation of the 
thinking in environmental discourse to accept nature’s interests as worthy of 
protection. A study of the development of environmental rights across the globe 
over the past century indicates that this gradual process began in the 1970s and 
is currently at an advanced stage.  Emmenegger and Tschentscher67 identified 
four stages in the development of environmental rights. 
                                                          
65 ‘British campaigner urges UN to accept 'ecocide' as international crime’ The Guardian, 9 April 
2010. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/09/ecocide-crime-genocide-un-
environmental-damage> accessed January 12, 2015.   
66A. Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ 
<http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/0_1221_humanrightsorenvironmentalrig
htsareasses.pdf> accessed 2 December, 2015. 
67S. Emmenegger & A. Tschentscher, ‘Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The Long Way to 
Biocentrism in Environmental Law’, supra, n 2.  
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The first stage of environmental rights which began in the early 1900s focused 
exclusively on the anthropocentric protection of the environment for its 
instrumental benefit to humans of the present generation. As a result, international 
environmental legal instruments of the period were exclusively human-centric. 
The 1875 Declaration for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture signed 
between Austria/Hungary and Italy,68 for instance, was not seeking to protect birds 
for their intrinsic worth but for their relevance to human agriculture. Similarly, in 
1900, the Convention Designed to Ensure the Protection of Various Species of 
Wild Animals which are Useful to Man or Inoffensive69 was ratified to ensure that 
certain species of wild animals are protected for human benefits. In the same vein, 
the Convention for the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State70 
set aside national parks areas for the benefit, advantage, and enjoyment of 
humans. It was therefore obvious that the earliest international environmental 
instruments were exclusively designed for anthropocentric purposes.  
This anthropocentric trend continued into the 1970s and early 1980s as the 
Stockholm Declaration 1972 and Brundtland Report 1987 were founded on the 
‘environmental human rights’ platform. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration 
states that “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and 
well-being…” and although it referred to the need for man to preserve the 
environment for future generations, it leaves no doubt that humans were the 
centre of its clamour for environmental protection. The Brundtland Report 1987 
made this point clearer by stating that ‘All human beings have the fundamental 
right to an environment adequate for their health and well-being’.71 The same 
agenda permeated other international instruments which followed the Stockholm 
Declaration and Brundtland Report. Article 24 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Right 198172 stipulates that “all peoples shall have the right to a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development" while the 1988 
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70 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov.8, 1933, 
172 U.N.T.S. 242. 
71 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 348. 
72 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (done at Banjul, June 26, 1981; entered into 




protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, (known as the San Salvador Protocol) in its Article 11 
states that: "Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to 
have access to basic public services” evincing its focus on humans to the 
exclusion of the natural habitat.73 
The second stage of the development of environmental rights saw the inclusion 
of future generations in the anthropocentric definition of environmental rights in 
recognition of the need to protect the environment not just for present humans, 
but also future generations of humans. While still an anthropocentric approach, 
this approach signified the gradual shift from a myopic view of the environment as 
a source of satisfying immediate human needs to a more sustainable view of 
environmental goods beyond immediate human needs. The Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 197374 for 
instance, recognized the need to protect the natural systems for the present and 
future generations. The Charter for Economic Rights and Duties of States,75 the 
Rio Declaration76 and the Biodiversity Convention77 all called for protection of the 
ecosystem for present and future generations. Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration 
states that- "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”  
Even previous international instruments which had focused only on the present 
generation of humans were revised to include future generations. For instance, 
the Whaling Conventions of 1946 revised the 1931 Whaling Convention by 
providing a new conservationist philosophy which emphasized the need to 
safeguard whales for future generations. This gradual shift in orientation gave rise 
to the inclusion of the nature-centric approach in environmental instruments.  
Almost simultaneously with the inclusion of future generations in the 
anthropocentric definition of environmental rights, the roots of nature-centric 
                                                          
73Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador 1988 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html> accessed 12 May 2017.  
74 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 6, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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approach were already sprouting with the release of Christopher Stone’s piece 
arguing for nature’s rights in 1972. Following Stone’s exposition, the first inclusion 
of nature-centric approach in a legal instrument was done in the Convention on 
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 197978 which seeks 
to protect the intrinsic value of natural habitats. In 1982, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations adopted the World Charter for Nature which included a 
provision that "every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its 
worth to man.79 This eco-centric approach was also incorporated in the 1985 
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources80and 
also found its way into some important international instruments such as the 1980 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources81 and the Berne 
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats.82 
While these instruments provided for respect for nature’s intrinsic values, the 
focus on biocentrism (i.e. focus on living beings within the environment) left gaps 
in the holistic protection of all aspects of the natural habitat. Moreover, these 
instruments stopped short of conferring explicit rights on the natural habitat but 
rather conferred obligations and responsibilities on humans to protect and respect 
the environment. 
The fourth stage of development of environmental rights, however, saw the rising 
acceptance of the position of nature as a right holder requiring legal protection. 
As a result, the focus moved beyond merely seeking protection of nature’s 
interests, to conferring rights on nature. The Universal Declaration of the Rights 
of Mother Earth (UDRME) 2010 was the first international instrument to implement 
this approach and although this instrument lacks any legal force, its principles act 
as guidance for domestic institutions on the need for rights for the natural habitat. 
The enactment of the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth by Bolivia in 2010 is an 
                                                          
78 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats Sep 19, 1979, 
EUROP T.S. No. 104. 
79 General Assembly Resolution on a World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, U.N. 
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80 Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 
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81Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources 1980 
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indication of the impact of the UDRME in propagating the rights of natural habitats 
within domestic jurisdictions and the bridging of the gap between the theoretical 
dualism in environmental rights.   
 
2.4 Theoretical Dualism in Environmental Rights 
The anthropocentric and nature-centric debate represents two distinct 
environmental philosophies pitching nature conservativists against human rights 
propagators. There are middle camps between these extreme views and 
contemporary scholars tend to find middle grounds that best serve the interests 
of both humans and nature and also protect future generations. Ideas such as 
‘biotic rights’, ‘accommodationist’ approach and ‘dilute anthropocentrism’ have 
cropped up to douse the tension that arises when the need to conserve nature 
and the environment is pitched against the satisfaction of basic human needs in 
the exploitation of the environment.83 Understanding the scope of these 
approaches to environmental rights is therefore vital to appreciating their 
implication for environmental protection.  
 
2.4.1 Anthropocentrism and its Scope: Environmental ‘Human’ 
Rights  
Anthropocentrism is a philosophy based on the primacy of humans as possessing 
a moral value higher than other organisms in the environment and being the 
dominant creature within the ecosystem for whose benefit all activities in relation 
to the environment should be channelled. As an environmental concept, it 
emphasises the status of humans in the natural hierarchy regarding care for the 
earth and believes the earth should be preserved for human interests.84  
The anthropocentric approach to environmental protection focuses on the values 
humans derive from a clean and safe environment and seeks to protect the 
environment solely on the basis of its relevance to the satisfaction of basic needs 
of humans and its importance to the enjoyment of life by humans. Under this 
                                                          
83 K. Cuomo, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Common Ground’ (1993)18 YALE J INT’L L 
227.  
84 L. Feris, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: An under-utilized resource’ (2008) 24(1) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 29-49. 
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approach, ‘the environment is only protected as a consequence of, and to the 
extent needed to protect human well-being’.85 In essence, there is a surrogate 
protection of the environment on account of its instrumental values for a purely 
human end.  
Feris86 identifies the two approaches within the anthropocentric view - a strong 
anthropocentric approach that essentially views the environment and all its 
resources from a purely economic point as resources available for human 
exploitation; and the weak approach that views the environment as instrumental 
to human needs and seek to protect the environment for its benefits to humans, 
but also recognizes the intrinsic value of the environment as worthy of protection 
by humans. Proponents of the weak approach propagate sustainable 
development as a means of preserving the environment in the course of 
exploitation of environmental resources by humans.87  
An anthropocentric approach to environmental rights and protection is achieved 
in two basic ways- by re-formulating or re-interpreting basic human rights such as 
the right to life, health and privacy to include environmental rights; or by expanding 
the scope of human rights to provide a new substantive human right to a clean 
and safe environment suitable for the satisfaction of human needs. The first 
approach is essentially a ‘greening’ of human rights i.e. introducing environmental 
standards into pre-existing human rights through evolutionary interpretations by 
the judiciary on account of the inextricable links between a clean and safe 
environment and the enjoyment of basic human rights. It is therefore 
predominantly actualized by the judiciary in the course of enforcing human rights 
through the traditional human rights enforcement mechanisms. This approach 
was first popularized by the Indian Supreme Court in several landmark cases 
where it declared that the protection of the environment by the government is an 
inviolable aspect of the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens to life 
and good health.88 
                                                          
85 A Kiss and D Shelton, International Environmental Law (Transnational Publishers 2004) 23. 
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Equating environmental pollution to a violation of human right to life as was done 
by the Indian Supreme Court is an anthropocentric enforcement of environmental 
rights, because the judicial intervention in this sense is not based on the need for 
environmental integrity, but the protection of the environment for human benefit. 
Also, in Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar89  the Indian Supreme Court held that the 
discharging of untreated effluents into agricultural areas and local drinking water 
supplies had violated citizens’ right to life. In Intellectual Forum, Tirupathi v State 
of AP,90 the Supreme Court declared that ‘all human beings have a fundamental 
right to a healthy environment commensurate with their well-being ... ensuring that 
natural resources are conserved and preserved in such a way that present as well 
as the future generation are aware of them equally’. This ruling extends the 
derivation of the right to life from Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to future 
generations as an extension of the public trust doctrine. Several other decisions 
of the Indian Supreme Court have re-iterated this approach91and this practice has 
been adopted by the judiciaries in several other jurisdictions92 including Nepal, 
Pakistan, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Belgium and several Latin American 
countries.93  
In the European Union (EU), the Right to Life and Right to Private and Family Life 
in Articles 2 and 8 of the EU Convention on Human Rights94 are utilized for 
environmental protection by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This 
is done by greening these rights to include protection from environmental pollution 
which is a violation of the right to enjoyment of life and privacy as enshrined in the 
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EU Convention on Human Rights. In Lopez-Ostra v. Spain95 the ECHR held that 
pollution of the environment is a violation of Article 8 of the EU Convention on 
Human Rights which provides for right to private and family life because pollution 
impacts on an individual’s well-being and prevent him or her from enjoying his or 
her home in such a way that his or her private and family life is damaged. 
However, the ECHR clarified in the subsequent case of Kyrtatos v. Greece96 that 
the degradation of the environment must directly affect private or family life of the 
applicant within the context of Article 8 in order to constitute a violation. According 
to the Court, - 
“the crucial element which must be present in determining whether, in 
the circumstances of a case, environmental pollution has adversely 
affected one of the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 of Article 8 is the 
existence of a harmful effect on a person's private or family sphere and 
not simply the general deterioration of the environment”.  
This decision evinces the pure anthropocentric approach of judicial interpretation 
of existing human rights to cover environmental concerns.  The Court here was 
only concerned with the direct impact of the environmentally unpleasant activity 
on the complainant with no regard to the impact of the activity on the environment 
itself. The Court went further to state that- 
 “the applicants have not brought forward any convincing arguments 
showing that the alleged damage to the birds and other protected 
species living in the swamp was of such a nature as to directly affect 
their own rights under Article 8 of the Convention… "97 
In essence, even if all the birds and natural habitats are destroyed as a result of 
the activity, the Court will not interfere so long as human health and well-being 
are unaffected by the activity.98 This is a classic illustration of the anthropocentric 
foundation of judicial intervention in environmental issues. 
Apart from the substantive rights to life and privacy, other human rights which can 
be ‘greened’ for environmental protection include the freedom of association and 
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freedom of expression as part of procedural environmental rights.99 Freedom of 
association can be expansively interpreted to include the right of environmental 
activist groups to pursue their legitimate objectives of furthering environmental 
protection and the freedom of expression can be used to confer them voice 
needed to stringently push for better environmental protection and challenge 
unwholesome environmental activities in courts.    
The second approach to anthropocentrism in environmental protection is the 
creation of a new substantive human right to a clean environment suitable for 
health and well-being. Various terms are used to classify this right including 
‘habitable’ ‘healthful’ ‘viable’ ‘safe’ etc.100 The clamour for the ‘Right to a Safe 
Environment’ (RSE) is the attempt to enhance environmental protection by 
conferring a new human right to a safe environment in addition to the other 
traditional human rights such as the right to life, liberty, privacy, freedom of 
expression etc. Most literature on the subject of environmental rights concentrates 
on this particular approach. Tim Hayward,101 a leading scholar on the subject of 
environmental rights considers the debate surrounding the creation of this 
substantive new right as largely centred on the question of whether the rights 
should be regarded as fundamental human rights and not mere socio-economic 
rights; and whether the rights should be constitutionalized in view of their 
importance, to prevent political roll-back in their advancements.   
Whichever way the new substantive right is presented, a human ‘Right to a Safe 
Environment’ is an inherently anthropocentric view of environmental rights as 
‘RSE is human-oriented. It does not speak directly to issues such as biodiversity, 
the claims of animals, conservation, or sustainable development’.102 Taylor103 
states that “with limited exceptions, an environmental human right is essentially 
an anthropocentric concept. Environmental protection serves solely human 
interests, reflected in thresholds for harm linked to human needs and concerns.” 
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As stated by Taylor, the defining characteristic of environmental human rights is 
that the standard of environmental protection is tied to the threshold of suitability 
for humans only and not necessarily its suitability for the environment itself. Thus, 
the anthropocentric approach accepts a minimum threshold of harm for the 
environment which does not adversely affect human health, well-being or the 
continued usability of the environment by humans even though such harm may 
be deleterious to the environment itself and could affect the overall integrity of the 
environment. Thus, the ‘right to a safe environment’ effectively connotes a ‘right 
to an environment safe enough for humans’. In a sense, it is a humanly selfish 
view of the environment for the benefits of humans.  
 
2.4.2 Nature-Centric Perspective of Environmental Rights 
The right of nature and all components of the natural habitat to protection from 
unbridled exploitation is the new frontier of environmental rights brought up in the 
fourth wave of the development of environmental rights.  A nature-centric 
approach emphasizes the intrinsic value of the environment and nature outside 
of its instrumental value to humans. It focuses on the protection of the 
environment for its own sake and requires that environmental law develops in 
order to protect the environment beyond human needs. This approach is 
predicated on the interrelationship and interdependence of animal and plant life 
systems and argues that humans have no right to reduce this richness and 
diversity in pursuit of their own needs. The nature-centric approach clamours for 
the conferment of legally enforceable rights on the environment itself i.e. mother 
earth including trees, lakes, mountains and animals of an ecosystem, distinct in 
form and content from the rights of humans to a safe environment.104 This 
approach rejects completely the link between environmental protection and 
human rights105 and clamours for an analysis of the environment from a 
perspective not premised on the satisfaction of human needs but wider ecological 
considerations involving interrelationship between all beings in the environment 
both sentient and non-sentient.  
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Stone,106 a major proponent of the rights of natural habitat, argues for nature to 
be accorded legal rights to protect its intrinsic worth.107  
With regards to the enforcement of this right, he suggests that a guardianship 
system can be put in place whereby an interested party environmental NGOs or 
concerned citizens) can apply to the court for appointment of a guardian to act as 
an effective voice for the environment.  
Stone’s proposal has been severely criticized by some scholars who view it as 
‘unworkable’, ‘utopian’, ‘largely symbolic’ and ‘seeking a quick legal fix’.108 Elder109 
considers it as posing the wrong answer to the right question as conferring rights 
on nature does not address the problem of valuing the intrinsic worth of nature. 
Callicott110 views the concept of nature’s rights as flawed in view of its tendency 
to create rights which are in reality mere moral objectives. Tribe111 refers to 
Stone’s proposal as seeking to create ‘plastic trees’ because, in his view, treating 
nature as a right holder takes away its natural feel and makes it a juristic person, 
a sort of ‘plastic form’. Tribe’s view is echoed by Livingston112 who argues that 
ascription of ‘rights’ to nature makes nature to become a rights’ holder and 
therefore becomes ‘anthropomorphize’ i.e. loses some of its natural appeals.113 
In his words- 
“The language of rights comes at a high cost, for in accepting an exclusive 
metaphor we are precluded from invoking richer and more diverse images 
of the natural world. As a consequence, nature becomes reduced to a 
rights-holder and is no longer "beautiful, alive, mystical, breath-taking, 
frightening, part of us, etc.”114 
Conferring rights on nature does not translate to anthropomorphizing nature, as 
argued by Livingston, as humans are not the only subjects of rights within legal 
systems. Ships, corporations, firms, partnerships, associations and other abstract 
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entities are rights’ holders under the law and these entities have not been 
anthropomorphized by these rights. Similarly, nature will retain its mystical and 
aesthetic feel even with the conferment of rights, as these rights are only intended 
to ensure legal protection for nature’s intrinsic value.  The other criticisms of 
Stone’s clamour for conferment of rights on natural habitat are based on 
resistance to the contemporary realization that nature and its components are 
worthy of legal protection and the need for such protection is not a mere moral 
objective, as canvassed by Callicott, but an important legal objective for the 
preservation of the natural ecosystem which all humans depend for sustenance.  
There are four theoretical views in the nature-centric approach to environmental 
rights – holism, biocentrism, physiocentrism and ecocentrism- and each theory 
examines rights for the natural habitat from a different perspective. Holism views 
nature from a unified, holistic perspective, as a single entity. With holism, there is 
only one unitary interest, as Mother Earth is regarded as a single entity, akin to a 
single individual human. Thus, rights for the natural habitat are in actual fact rights 
for a single entity and there is no diversification of interests for the various 
components in the natural habitat. As a result, situations of conflicting interests 
are impossible, because the various components of Mother Earth do not have 
individual interests, the same way the various parts of an individual human person 
cannot have separate rights.115 This is the approach to nature’s rights adopted in 
the UDRME which refers to Mother Nature as a ‘single, living being with indivisible 
interests’. The weakness of this theory is its impracticality, as it overlooks the fact 
that the various components in Mother Earth are separate entities bound in an 
inter-connected and inter-related network called the natural habitat and conflicts 
are bound to arise between the rights of the various components. It is, therefore, 
not practical to have a unified right for all components in a natural habitat.  
Biocentrism focuses on the rights of the living or sentient beings within the natural 
habitat. It proposes that humans are equal to all other living entities of nature and 
competition is allowed amongst such living entities in the natural habitat.116 
Biocentrism recognizes the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of the living 
beings within an ecosystem and proposes that rights should be conferred on living 
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beings within the ecosystem but competition amongst these living beings is 
permitted so long as the rules of the game are fair.117 It goes further to permit 
natural competition amongst the diverse entities even to the extent of the 
extinction of some species through the competition in a process regarded as 
natural selection. Under biocentrism, conflicting rights amongst the various living 
components in the ecosystem can be resolved by these components competing 
amongst themselves with possible extinction for the weaker component. The 
biocentric theory, therefore, only recognizes living, sentient beings such as 
humans, animals and other micro-organisms within a natural habitat as capable 
of being rights’ holders and the competition amongst these beings can lead to the 
extinction of a species as part of natural selection.  
Physiocentrism is an extension of the biocentrism theory with the addition of non-
living beings to its proposition. In essence, physiocentrism proposes the 
conferment of rights on both living and non-living beings such as lakes, rivers, 
rocks, forests and earth formations within a natural habitat. However, similar to 
biocentrism, it encourages competition amongst the various components up to 
the point of extinction of any species or component as a part of natural 
selection.118 
Ecocentrism focuses on the interrelationship of the various components in a 
natural habitat.  It acknowledges that various components exist within a natural 
habitat and all components are deserving of rights and protection. Thus, both 
living and non-living beings in a natural habitat, including plants, lakes, trees, 
rivers, rock formation and all parts of a natural habitat are deemed worthy of 
protection for their intrinsic value.119 It does not, however, focus on their 
individuality but on their collective intrinsic value as a natural habitat. A key feature 
of the ecocentric theory is that it proposes harmony of the diverse entities within 
a natural habitat, especially harmony between humans and other entities of 
nature. Since harmony is an important factor in ecocentrism, competition amongst 
the various components is prohibited, particularly competition of humans with 
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nature, which is viewed as a destructive rather than constructive factor in the light 
of the propensity of humans to desecrate nature to fulfil human needs. 
Emmenegger and Tschentscher120 argue in favour of biocentrism as the most 
relevant approach to protection of the rights of the natural habitat. They argue that 
ecocentrism and its focus on harmony within the various components of the 
natural habitat ‘is not in keeping with our legal systems which rely on 
individualism, market mechanisms, and adversarial processes’. They, therefore, 
contend that biocentrism should be the relevant new paradigm in environmental 
law, protecting animals and plants as right-holders but leaving non-living natural 
entities (physiocentrism) and compounds without protection if such protection 
does not derive indirectly from their function as a natural habitat for living 
beings.121 
However, it is difficult to accept this view of biocentrism as the relevant paradigm 
in the protection of the rights of the natural habitat. The focus on living beings in 
a natural habitat by biocentrism is a form of ‘species chauvinism’ for which the 
anthropocentric view has been criticised, except that biocentrism, unlike 
anthropocentrism, includes other living beings such as animals and micro-
organisms in its protection. Still, biocentrism views vital non-living beings within a 
natural habitat only for their instrumental value to living beings and this 
discriminatory treatment of the various components within a natural habitat is not 
a sustainable or effective approach to protecting the rights of the natural habitat 
as it creates segregation amongst entities within the same class on account of 
their living/non-living characteristics. For instance, biocentrism regards fishes 
within a river or lake as rights’ holders worthy of protection and the rivers or lakes 
are only to be protected to the extent they function as a natural habitat for the 
fishes and other microorganisms dwelling there. This does not protect the intrinsic 
value of the rivers and lakes as a vital component of the ecosystem and is merely 
an extension of the anthropocentric approach to other non-human living beings.    
In addition, the promotion of competition amongst the components in a natural 
habitat to the point of extinction of some species in the biocentrism approach is 
not an acceptable form of natural selection but a promotion of the ‘Hobbesian 
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state of existence’ based on survival of the fittest within an ecosystem. The ‘rules 
of the game’ for such competition to be determined by humans is an 
anthropocentric intervention in protection of the natural habitat and undermines 
the essence of seeking rights for the natural habitat.  
Although physiocentrism acknowledges the rights of non-living beings within a 
natural habitat, its promotion of competition similar to biocentrism makes it an 
ineffective approach to protecting the rights of the natural habitat. Ecocentrism, 
however, proposes harmony within the natural habitat and adopts an all-inclusive 
approach which recognises both living and non-living beings in a natural habitat 
as worthy of protection. Harmony is important in a natural habitat, as the various 
components within a natural habitat are interconnected and interrelated in various 
ways and this inter-relationship is best protected within a framework of rights 
which ensures harmonious interaction between the various components. The 
UDRME and the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth of Bolivia 2010 both 
emphasise the need for harmony in the protection of the rights of the natural 
habitat. Article 3(1) of the UDRME stipulates that ‘every human being is 
responsible for respecting and living in harmony with Mother Earth’ while Article 
2(1) of the Bolivian Law provides for harmony and ‘dynamic balances with the 
cycles and processes inherent to Mother Earth’ as the first binding principle in the 
law.   
With regards to the distinction between living and non-living beings in biocentrism, 
Article 1(5) of the UDRME stipulates that – 
“Mother Earth and all beings are entitled to all the inherent rights 
recognised in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such 
as may be made between organic and inorganic beings, species, 
origin, use to human beings, or any other status” 
Article 2 of the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development 
1995122 states that ‘nature as a whole warrants respect; every form of life is unique 
and is to be safeguarded independent of its value to humanity’. This runs counter 
to the discriminatory approach of biocentrism which focuses only on the living 
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aspect of nature. Moreover, Mother Earth is defined in article 1(1) of the UDRME 
as a ‘living being’ which includes ecosystems, natural communities, species and 
all other natural entities which exist as part of Mother Earth. It is therefore difficult 
to implement the discriminatory coverage of biocentrism within the current trend 
in international environmental law as it relates to the natural habitat. 
Although conflict of rights is inevitable within a natural habitat, this conflict can be 
resolved through the dynamic balancing of the rights of the various components 
rather than competition between these components in a sort of ‘winner takes all’ 
approach which biocentrism proposes. Article 1(7) of the UDRME provides that 
‘the rights of each being are limited by the rights of other beings and any conflict 
between their rights must be resolved in a way that maintains the integrity, 
balance and health of Mother Earth’. Situations may arise where the right of one 
component of the natural habitat may trump the right of another component, but 
such can be done with balancing of the health of Mother Earth as its main focus. 
For instance, the right of humans to good health will trump the right of mosquitoes 
to live within a habitat close to humans; however, this will not justify the total 
extinction of all mosquitoes in every habitat regardless of their link to malaria or 
other human diseases.   
The ‘individualism, market mechanisms, and adversarial processes’ which 
Emmenegger and Tschentscher advance as a reason for rejecting ecocentrism 
are the core foundation of anthropocentrism which contemporary environmental 
rights seek to move away from.  
In the future, it may be possible to adopt holism as the prevailing theory in 
environmental rights of the natural habitat, as article 1(2) of the UDRME defines 
‘Mother Earth’ as a ‘unique, indivisible, self-regulating community of interrelated 
beings’ indicating that natural habitat may be viewed as a single entity with 
multiplicity of rights amongst the interrelated beings. However, the difficulty in 
ascribing indivisible rights to ‘Mother Earth’ considering the various components 
of the natural habitat makes ecocentrism a more effective theory in protecting the 
rights of the natural habitat and ecocentrism is therefore adopted as the prevailing 




2.4.3 ‘Coalesced Anthropocentrism’ Environmental Rights 
Paradigm  
Various ideas have been proposed to achieve a balance between the 
anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental rights without 
necessarily dismissing the merit of either environmental philosophy in view of their 
varying merits. Nash123 proposes the adoption of ‘biotic rights’ in place of eco-
centric rights arguing that these biotic rights are ‘morally justified claims or 
demands on behalf of non-human organisms, either individuals or aggregates 
(populations and species), against all moral agents for the vital interests or 
imperative conditions of well-being for non-humankind’. He suggests that these 
morally justifiable rights for nature, though not strictly legally enforceable as 
sought by ecocentrists, imposes obligations and responsibilities on humans 
towards ecosystem protection and this will ensure the recognition and protection 
of the intrinsic value of the environment.  The non-ascription of legally enforceable 
rights on nature, however, is a significant shortcoming of this proposal as it still 
leaves nature devoid of significant legal protection which ecocentrism seek. It also 
leaves nature at the mercy of humans as the absence of enforceable rights for 
nature makes human obligations towards nature weak. 
 
Taylor124 suggests a ‘Charter of Ecological Responsibilities’ in place of ecocentric 
rights, arguing that ‘“responsibilities” is used to move beyond the difficulties raised 
by the debates surrounding “legally enforceable rights,” and to focus rather on 
morally significant responsibilities, which must then be translated into international 
and municipal legal obligations’. In his view, imposing such responsibilities 
signifies the recognition and respect which humankind has for the intrinsic nature 
of the environment and will ensure that this recognition and respect guides human 
activities in various aspects including legislative and policy agendas. In this sense, 
the concerns of the ecocentrists will be catered for without necessarily creating 
substantive rights for the environment while humans will remain at the centre of 
environmental protection as championed by the anthropocentric philosophy. 
Taylor’s proposal does not satisfy the demand of ecocentrism which goes beyond 
seeking mere recognition of the intrinsic worth of nature but seeks explicit rights 
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for nature. The value of having ‘rights’, viewed from the interests and trump 
theories of rights, is significant for ecocentrists, as it provides a framework for 
nature to have legally protected interests which can be used as trumps over other 
preferences and desires, including those of humans, where they conflict with 
nature’s protected interests. Merely ensuring that humans value the intrinsic worth 
of nature will not achieve this purpose as it does not provide a legal protection for 
nature from the exploitation of nature’s resources by humans to meet human 
preferences and desires which are based on ‘rights’ of humans, such as the right 
to development. By conferring rights on nature, as sought by ecocentrists, 
nature’s interests can be weighed alongside humans’ in a ‘marketplace of rights’ 
and balancing of these rights will result in better protection for nature than relying 
on ecological responsibilities of humans.  
Nickel125 proposes an ‘accommodationist’ approach which attempts to 
incorporate both anthropocentric and ecocentric philosophies in a single agenda 
by championing the need for humans to protect the intrinsic value of non-humans 
in the environment while admitting of the need not to neglect the satisfaction of 
human needs from the exploitation of the environment.  Nickel, however, did not 
provide a detailed guideline of the structuring of this accommodationist approach 
or how the incorporation of the two philosophies can be actualized. However, 
Nickel’s failure to provide details of the framing or structuring of this approach is 
unhelpful in this regard.   
Redgwell126 provides one of the clearest and well-structured mid-ground positions 
in her proposal of ‘dilute anthropocentrism’ as the preferred approach to 
incorporating both philosophies. She argues that- 
 ‘the exclusively anthropocentric approach of simply valuing the 
environment in terms of immediate human utility is being displaced 
by a more dilute anthropocentrism which recognizes the 
interrelatedness and interdependence of the natural world of which 
human beings form a part.’127  
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In her view, the major problem in adopting a universally accepted approach to 
environmental protection lies in the utilization of ‘unreconstructed 
anthropocentrism’ by policymakers and legislative drafters all over the world. 
Unreconstructed anthropocentrism is the undiluted intention to focus exclusively 
on the satisfaction of human needs from the environment as though humans are 
the only creatures in the environment. She stated that by recognizing the 
importance of the whole ecosystem as a network of inter-dependent beings, both 
living and non-living beings, environmental protection can be structured in a 
manner which balances the interests of humans with those of the environment by 
diluting the focus on human needs and incorporating the interests of other 
participants in the ecosystem.128  
Redgwell’s proposal focuses on the need to dilute the anthropocentric content of 
environmental rights framework in order to allow for more attention to be placed 
on the intrinsic worth of nature. Her proposal, however, does not explicitly canvass 
for the incorporation of ecocentrism in environmental protection as a fundamental 
part of environmental rights framework. By seeking to dilute anthropocentrism, 
her proposal assumes that such dilution will inevitably lead to more inclusion of 
ecocentrism, without necessarily determining the manner, scope and impact of 
such inclusion in a rights’ framework. Indeed, a dilution of anthropocentric 
contents of environmental rights may be counter-productive if it results in greater 
environmental harm to humans in the bid to protect nature. More reluctance and 
resistance will arise if humans continue to suffer environmental harm from a 
dilution of the anthropocentric contents of environmental protection framework. 
Consequently, it can be argued that it is not necessary to dilute anthropocentrism 
in order to recognize ecocentrism.  Instead, it is more effective to incorporate both 
philosophies in their full form within a single framework, as proposed by Nickel’s 
‘accommodationist approach’, in a sort of ‘best of both worlds’.  
The shortcomings of the ‘accommodationist’ and ‘dilute anthropocentrism’ 
approaches can be addressed with the adoption of a ‘coalesced 
anthropocentrism’ approach which focuses on the amalgamation of the 
anthropocentric and ecocentric philosophies within a single environmental rights 
framework. ‘Coalesced’ literally means the amalgamation or combination of two 
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subjects into a single whole and in this context, anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism as two different subjects can be combined into a single whole known 
as ‘coalesced anthropocentrism’. The resulting environmental rights framework 
will incorporate the core ideas of the two philosophies in their full form without 
diluting their core essence in a bid to accommodate the other. By combining the 
two philosophies in equal measure within a single framework, the rights of the 
various components within the ecosystem, including humans, will exist within a 
‘marketplace of interests’ where various rules and principles can be adopted for 
determining the resolution of conflicting rights of the various components.  
Conflict between rights is inevitable where several subjects of rights co-habit 
within a single framework and adopting coalesced anthropocentrism approach 
allows for a unified framework for resolving these conflicts within a rights 
framework. Rather than allowing for competition between these conflicting rights’ 
holders to the point of extinction of species, as allowed under biocentrism, the 
adoption of ecocentrism as the prevailing paradigm for nature’s interests means 
that harmony between the various components is paramount. Therefore, 
resolving conflicts can be based on the recognition, in Article 1(7) of the UDRME, 
that ‘the rights of each being are limited by the rights of other beings and any 
conflict between their rights must be resolved in a way that maintains the integrity, 
balance and health of Mother Earth’. A coalesced anthropocentrism approach, 
therefore, presents an environmental rights framework which promotes the 
harmonious incorporation of the rights of humans (including future generations) 
and rights of Mother Earth with a common goal of preserving and protecting the 
environment (natural habitat) for all of nature without any distinction based on the 
features of the components of the natural habitat. 
The retention of ‘anthropocentrism’ in the description of the approach is an 
indicator of the fact that anthropocentrism will continue to dominate environmental 
protection in whatever form or approach that is adopted. This is because, so long 
as a ‘rights’ language is used or employed in environmental protection, there will 
always be an undeniable deep structural anthropocentrism which characterizes 
‘environmental rights’ in whichever way or form it is shaped or structured. 
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Anderson129 aptly captures the inevitability of human involvement in 
environmental rights in the following words- 
“Even if humans agreed to confer rights upon animals or 
mountains, the act of conferring would still be conceived and 
executed by humans, and the rights could only be enforced by 
humans against other humans. There is, it would seem, a deep 
structural anthropocentrism which inevitably accompanies a 
human-made legal system.” 
Human involvement in environmental rights is unavoidable and inextricable as 
human institutions are required for the conferment, protection and enforcement of 
these rights, including those conferred on nature and other components of the 
natural habitat. These rights are conferred by humans, to restrain other humans 
and enforced by humans against other humans through the judiciary and other 
human political, legal and social institutions. Even Stone,130 a major proponent of 
the rights of nature conceded that conferring and enforcing these rights would 
require human involvement in the appointment of human guardians and these 
rights would be enforced against fellow humans. Therefore, rather than refer to 
this approach as ‘eco-anthropocentrism’ for instance, the use of the term 
‘coalesced anthropocentrism’ is a reflection of the incorporation of the ecocentric 
approach but with anthropocentrism as the central axle on which the conferment, 
expression and enforcement of the resulting environmental rights framework rely 
for its efficacy.  
Adopting coalesced anthropocentrism in environmental rights framework will 
mean that relevant legal and constitutional instruments seeking the protection of 
the environment will contain provisions conferring rights on humans and Mother 
Earth with respect to the environment without distinction as to the hierarchy of 
these rights. The resolution of conflicts between the rights of humans and that of 
Mother Earth will be done by the judiciary or policymakers imposing guidelines on 
how the ‘marketplace of interests’ arising from the environmental rights framework 
will be managed. The Constitution of Brazil,131 for instance, appears to adopt this 
approach by providing for the rights of humans to a clean environment and going 
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further to oblige the government to ‘preserve and restore the essential ecological 
processes and provide for the ecological treatment of species and ecosystems’; 
and ‘protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in the manner prescribed by 
law, of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause the 
extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty’. This provision encapsulates 
the ‘coalesced anthropocentrism’ approach by providing for the human right to a 
clean environment alongside equally providing for ecocentric rights of Mother 
Earth to survival and preservation of vital processes required for the ecosystem. 
The conferment of the obligation on the government to protect and implement 
these ecocentric rights is a reflection of the deep structural anthropocentrism of 
environmental rights highlighted above.  
The advancement in recognition of ecocentrism in environmental rights 
frameworks in the third wave of environmental rights development is arguably a 
major breakthrough in protecting the ecosystem as a whole. As Redgwell132 put 
it- 
“The dam of anthropocentrism has clearly been breached. Given the 
increasing awareness of the interconnectedness of human beings 
and the environment and of the intrinsic value of the latter… nature 
[is] unlikely to simply be ignored; rather, the problem is one of 
reconciling a diverse environmental and human rights agenda.”   
Nevertheless, rather than considering the advancement in environmental rights of 
nature as breaching ‘the dam of anthropocentrism’, coalesced anthropocentrism 
views the situation as the incorporation of the waters of ecocentrism into the dam 
of anthropocentrism. This analogy represents a more practical reflection of the 
extent of ecocentrism in current environmental rights framework. It is a far stretch 
to say ecocentrism has breached the dam of anthropocentrism in existing 
international and domestic legal frameworks. There is as yet no binding 
international instrument with enforceable ecocentric rights, aside from the 
UDRME which lacks binding force on states. At the domestic level, only Bolivia’s 
Law of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010 provides definitive and extensive rights 
for nature, although a number of countries’ constitutions increasingly recognise 
ecocentric rights to varying degrees.133However, as rightly indicated by Redgwell, 
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the protection of nature’s interests is no longer likely to be simply ignored and the 
reconciliation of the diverse interests in a natural habitat can be effectively 
achieved within the framework of a ‘coalesced anthropocentrism’ approach. 
It is essential to distinguish the coalesced anthropocentrism model from holism. 
While holism seeks to protect nature’s interests by conferring the natural habitat 
with a single indivisible interest (as seen in the UDRME), coalesced 
anthropocentrism focuses on the broader issue of equal protection of both human 
and nature’s interests in the environment, while recognising the pre-eminence of 
human’s interests over nature’s in the event of a conflict.  
Based on the foregoing discussions, coalesced anthropocentrism yields a 
definition of environmental rights which incorporates the rights of the three rights’ 
holders in the environment- present humans, future generations and Mother 
Earth. Taylor’s134 definition of environmental rights as referring to ‘the traditional 
rights approach of granting rights and creating duties and obligations to the 
environment, at a level sufficient to ensure the continued survival of present and 
future generations of humanity’, therefore, falls short of the inclusion of a third, 
vital component of environmental rights framework- Mother Earth. A more 
inclusive definition of environmental rights can be stated as the rights of humans, 
future generations and nature to a clean, safe and ecologically sound environment 
suitable for the sustainable use of humans for present and future generations, the 
survival of the essential ecological processes of nature and the equal ecological 
treatment of species and other components of the ecosystem. It is this definitional 
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Figure 6: Coalesced Anthropocentrism Environmental Rights Paradigm 
 
 
The figure above reveals the three pillars of coalesced anthropocentrism in 
environmental legal frameworks – environmental human rights of the present 
generation, environmental rights of future generations and nature’s rights in an 
ecocentric perspective. The incorporation of these three essential attributes of 
environmental rights in any environmental legal instrument is a key determinant 
of the adoption of coalesced anthropocentrism as an ideal paradigm for effectively 
protecting the environment. Thus, contemporary environmental instruments 
which provide extensive environmental rights of humans and future generations 
but lack incorporation of nature’s environmental rights fall short of the adoption of 
a coalesced anthropocentrism paradigm.  
An illustrative example of a contemporary environmental legal instrument viewed 
in this light is France’s Charter of the Environment 2005 which is positively viewed 
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across the globe as a major advancement on environmental rights135 but which 
omits an essential aspect of environmental rights protection – nature’s rights - in 
its substantive contents. France’s Charter of the Environment was enacted with 
the objective of bringing French law in line with foreign models of environmental 
protection and entrenching sustainable protection for the environment to the same 
extent as other constitutional human rights.136 The charter provided wide-reaching 
environmental rights provisions including the express provision of the right to live 
in a balanced environment which shows due respect for health; the incorporation 
of ‘polluter pays principle’,137 ‘precautionary principle’,138 provisions on remedying 
of environmental damages and individual obligations on citizens to prevent 
environmental harm and protect the environment for future generations.139 
Nevertheless, the charter is noticeably silent on nature’s rights despite 
acknowledging in the preamble that ‘natural resources and equilibriums have 
conditioned the emergence of mankind’ and that ‘the future and very existence of 
mankind are inextricably linked with its natural environment’. This omission of an 
important pillar of environmental rights in the Charter prevents the addressing of 
environmental challenges from a holistic perspective where nature’s rights and 
interests are granted similar constitutional status as the environmental rights of 
humans in view of the inextricable link between these two subjects as 
acknowledged in the Charter’s preamble.  
Adopting a coalesced anthropocentrism approach as an environmental rights 
paradigm helps to ensure that environmental legal instruments incorporate the 
three key pillars of environmental rights and environmental challenges are 
addressed from a broader, inclusive perspective with the inclusion of nature’s 
rights in environmental considerations. This leads to a consideration of the 
importance of adopting a rights’ approach to environmental protection considering 
the extent to which contemporary environmental legal instruments regulate 
activities which affect the environment and provide for governance and regulatory 
                                                          
135 C. Dadomo, ‘The Greening of the French Constitution – The Constitutional Act of 1 March 
2005 on the 2004 Environmental Charter’ (2005) 6 Env. Liability 175-186. 
136 To attain constitutional status, the Charter had to be incorporated into the French Constitution 
by means of loi constitutionnelle - an Act of constitutional amendment which must be adopted 
according to a special procedure under Article 89 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Act 
on the environmental Charter was adopted by the Congress on 1 March 2005, thus elevating 
the provisions of the charter into constitutional status. 
137 Art 4. 
138 Art 5. 
139 Art 3. 
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tools which, to a large extent, ensure the environment is protected for present and 
future generations.  
In canvassing for the adoption of a coalesced anthropocentrism model to 
environmental rights, this thesis is not unmindful of alternative philosophical 
theorisations of nature’s role in environmental protection from the natural law 
perspective as propounded by reknowned philosophers like Finnis and Davidson. 
Finnis’ conception of the natural law concept of rights and how it applies to the 
natural order140 formed the basis for Davidson’s141  postulation that the theory of 
natural law and natural rights can be developed into an environmental ethic that 
generates human obligations to non-human animals, plants, and perhaps even 
eco- systems. French relied on Finnis’ conceptualisation of natural law rights to 
argue in favour of imposing ecological responsibilities on humans drawing validity 
from natural conception of the rights of the ecosystem which imposes obligations 
on humans to ensure their protection.142   
While useful from a philosophical standpoint in explaining the origin and possible 
foundation of nature’s intrinsic worth to be protected by rights, the natural law 
approach is largely abstract, devoid of actual normative contents and not likely to 
improve the framework of rights around which the protection of nature’s 
environmental interests can be structured. 
In addition, the concept of structuration developed by Giddens143 examines the 
relationship between agency and culture in that they cannot be understood 
separate from each other as they are intertwined and cannot be developed and 
progressed without the other.144 In an environmental context, Buhr has attempted 
to link the structured organisation of environmental regulatory systems under a 
structuration concept with improved environmental outcomes.145 However, this 
still relies on environmental regulatory frameworks for environmental protection 
with its attendant shortcomings which are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In 
                                                          
140 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980). 
141S Davison, ‘A Natural Law Based Environmental Ethic’ (2009) 14(1) Ethics and the 
Environment 1,13. 
142 W French, ‘Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility: Drawing on the Thomistic Tradition’ 
(2008) 5(1) University of St. Thomas Law Journal 12. 
143 A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (Basic Books, 1976). 
144 A. Giddens, ‘Structuration Theory: Past, Present and Future’ in C. Bryant, D. Jary (Eds.), 
Giddens’ Theory of Structuration: A Critical Appreciation (Routledge, 1991) 201-221. 
145 N Buhr, ‘Structuration View on the initiation of Environmental Reports’ (2002) 13 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 17–38.  
135 
 
effect, the shift towards a normative incorporation of coalesced anthropocentrism 
in protecting environmental rights presents a more assured structure under which 
the tripod of environmental interests can be effectively protected and guaranteed 
by legal and constitutional instruments.   
    
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the jurisprudential and theoretical basis of environmental 
rights and argued in favour of a shift from an anthropocentric view of 
environmental rights to a liberal, more inclusive approach which accommodates 
nature’s intrinsic interests. This liberal approach, encapsulated in the coalesced 
anthropocentric concept, ensures that efforts to entrench environmental rights in 
statutory and constitutional instruments are comprehensive and tolerant of the 
rights of non-sentient components of the ecosystem which are often neglected in 
legal and judicial considerations of environmental issues. The coalesced 
anthropocentrism approach exposes the shortcomings of current environmental 
legal instruments around the world which are generally considered advancements 
on environmental rights despite being lopsided in favour of the rights of humans 
to a clean environment. 
Having conceptualised environmental rights, it becomes necessary to examine 
the importance of adopting a rights’ approach to environmental protection 
particularly considering that regulatory and judicial mechanisms have always 
been utilised for environmental protection. The focus in chapter 3 will, therefore, 
be on establishing the benefits of adopting an environmental rights approach over 
the regulatory and private law/civil liability approach which has for decades been 
the dominant forms of regulating environmental concerns in jurisdictions across 
the globe. While the regulatory and civil liability approaches are indispensable 
forms of protecting the environment, the chapter examines their critical 
shortcomings which makes the rights’ approach a more effective approach to 




UTILIZING RIGHTS’ BASED APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
    3.1 Introduction 
As the example of the French Charter of the Environment shows, contemporary 
environmental legal instruments tend to incorporate regulatory tools designed to 
protect the environment through the adoption of the polluter pays principle, 
precautionary principle, preventive principle. In addition, private law remedies are 
also available for redressing environmental pollution in the form of property law 
liabilities arising from torts law, nuisance law and other strict liability negligence 
claims for activities impacting the environment.  
While these approaches to environmental protection have their shortcomings, 
they generally provide a reasonable environmental protection framework across 
jurisdictions. This has led to questions over the necessity of incorporating a rights’ 
model into environmental protection, in an area of law which may be considered 
to be highly technical, relativist and difficult for standardisation.  
This chapter examines the importance of rights’ based approach to environmental 
protection and why it trumps the regulatory and civil liability approaches in 
effectiveness as an environmental protection framework. The chapter argues that 
a rights’ based approach elevates environmental concerns above mere policy 
objectives of governments which can be traded off for developmental and other 
economic pursuits. By embedding rights in environmental concerns, individuals 
are empowered to push back on regulatory laxity and environmentally injurious 
regulatory policies of governments. Also, rights’ based approach shifts focus from 
the monetisation of environmental problems which the civil liability approach tends 
to do by allowing individuals to focus on the potential windfalls to be gotten from 







3.2 Environmental Rights Model Vs Regulatory Approach 
The focus on rights’ language in environmental discourse in recent times has 
tended to overshadow the conventional governance approach (also known as the 
regulatory approach) of imposing regulatory standards on activities which impact 
the environment. The primary obligation for protecting the environment, 
prevention of pollution and improvement of the safety of the air, water and other 
parts of the ecosystem rests essentially on the state and its agencies. This 
obligation is generally discharged by the imposition of environmental standards, 
controlling of polluting activities, issuance and revocation of licences subject to 
pollution control conditions and the imposition of penalties for activities which 
violate the environmental integrity of an ecosystem. In most countries, different 
governmental regulations through statutes and secondary legislation are in place 
to guide environmental conducts and state resources are allocated towards 
restoring faltering ecosystems.1 There is also a significant amount of soft law 
regulatory policies in the form of policy guidelines, master plans, and code of 
conducts etc. which are utilized at the domestic levels as environmental 
governance tools to protect the environment. Governments are regularly held 
accountable through administrative reviews for environmental governance 
actions which fall short of required standard in protecting the environment through 
adequate regulations.2    
Environmental governance is a regulatory approach to environmental protection 
as it relies on regulatory actions by governments and other state actors at various 
levels to govern activities impacting the environment through statutory 
regulations, orders, licensing regimes, imposition of procedural requirements 
such as environmental impact assessments,3 and even contractual regulations 
included in most production sharing contracts between governments and oil 
exploration companies. These regulations are supplemented by environmental 
principles developed over time at the international and domestic levels such as 
the precautionary principle, polluter pays principle and preventive principle 
                                                          
1 M. Thorne, ‘Establishing environment as a human right’ (1991) 19 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 301-342. 
2A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (Yale 
University Press 2010) 245. 
3See for instance - the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 of Nigeria; the Environment 
Protection Act 1986 of India; the National Environmental Policy Act, 1969 of the US; and the 
Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 of the UK. 
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intended to guide governmental actions in respect of the environment.4These 
international environmental law principles are regularly applied by the courts in 
resolving environmental disputes relating to the failure of governmental 
regulations in respect of the environment. In Vellore Citizens Welfare Reform v. 
The Union of India,5 where a district authority in India had failed to properly 
regulate an industry which was discharging contaminants into the water used for 
drinking by the populace, the Indian Supreme Court invoked the precautionary 
principle and polluter pays principle to hold the district and polluting industry liable 
for environmental damage. The Court, applying the precautionary principle, stated 
that the Indian state must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of 
environmental degradation; also, the lack of scientific certainty should not be used 
as a reason for postponing measures to prevent pollution in that district. Applying 
the polluter-pays principle, the court held the polluting industries strictly liable to 
compensate for the harm caused by them to villagers in the affected area, to the 
soil and to the underground water and stated that this liability for harm extends 
also to the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. 
In addition, international environmental governance also developed other non-
statutory regulatory instruments which are market-based instruments for 
promoting environmental protection by incentivizing participation in environmental 
protection activities with the prospects of economic benefits. In essence, these 
instruments are targeted at attracting investments in environmental protection 
projects with the allure of reaping financial benefits in the process. They include 
carbon-trading schemes such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)6 and 
other financial mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol7 - such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism - in response to the growing environmental challenge 
of climate change and global warming. There has also been a suggestion for 
creating ‘surrogate regulation’ of environment-impacting activities by requiring 
companies in environment-impacting industries to obtain financial guarantees 
                                                          
4C. Miller, ‘Environmental Rights: European fact or English fiction? (1995) 22(3) Journal of Law 
and Society 374-97. 
51996 A.I.R. (S.C.) 2715 (1996); See also Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, Human Rights Case No. 15-K 
of 1992, P.L.D. 1994 Supreme Court 693 (1992). 
6 The EU ETS was established under Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC; amended in 2004, 2008, 2009 and 2014.  
7 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in 
Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> accessed 17 June 2016. 
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such as insurance, bonds or guarantees, to cover their environmental liabilities 
and it offers considerable regulatory potential to restrict the incentives for 
environmental irresponsibility created by the doctrine of limited liability of these 
operators. This is intended to make insurance companies and other third-party 
financiers surrogate regulators of the operator’s activities, thereby augmenting the 
monitoring and enforcement capabilities of public regulators and creating a more 
robust regulatory regime 8 
Despite these elaborate regulatory mechanisms in environmental governance 
around the globe, environmental degradation has continued unabated as various 
factors impede the effectiveness of using regulatory tools to curb pollution and 
degradation. Various reasons have been advanced for the failure of 
environmental governance systems and its regulatory approach around the globe. 
One of the reasons advanced for this failure is the inability of a regulatory 
approach to influence behaviour in such a way as to avoid the causes of pollution. 
Young9 postulates that ‘[A]n effective governance system is one that channels 
behaviour in such a way as to eliminate or substantially to ameliorate the problem 
that led to its creation. A governance system that has little behavioural impact, by 
contrast, is ineffective’. In essence, while the regulatory approach dictates the way 
and manner individuals or corporations act in relation to the environment, it mostly 
achieves functional compliance with the regulatory requirements without any 
sustainable behavioural change in the environmental ethics of the individuals or 
corporations. Consequently, loopholes in regulatory standards are maximally 
exploited to the detriment of the environment and this undermines the effective 
protection of the environment.  
Kysar,10 on his part, attributes the major failure of global environmental 
governance to a myriad of factors including – the lack of compliance with 
environmental laws, norms and standards, weak enforcement mechanisms, the 
continued prevalence of environmental injustice, difficulties of holding private 
entities such as transnational corporations to account for their environmental 
                                                          
8 C. Mackie, ‘The Regulatory Potential of Financial Security to Reduce Environmental Risk’ (2014) 
26 Journal of Environmental Law 189-214. 
9 O. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell 
University Press, 1994) 3. 
10 A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere, supra (n 2) 241. 
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wrongs and democratic deficits in decision-making structures.11 While non-
compliance with environmental norms and standards is generally accepted as a 
leading cause of failure of environmental governance, Boyle12 denounces the 
suggestion that democratic deficit in environmental decision-making is a factor in 
the failure of environmental governance. He opined that- 
“Democracies are entirely capable of environmental destruction, and 
may even be structurally predisposed to unfettered consumption. 
Indeed the industrial democracies of the North, with their liberal rights-
based legal systems, are disproportionately responsible for much 
environmental damage, including the consumption of finite resources 
and the emission of greenhouse gases. The point is that procedures 
alone cannot guarantee environmental protection.” 
Boyle’s analysis of the failure of environmental governance points to a central 
theme underlying regulatory approach- it is based on institutionalizing procedures 
for dealing with the environment and regulating how this dealing with the 
environment is done. It is a top-down approach which relies on the imposition of 
rules, guidelines, procedures, protocols and other mandatory steps aimed at 
protecting the environment. This top-down approach, however, falls short of 
instilling environmental ethics in the subjects and functional compliance with 
regulatory standards results in minimal progress on environmental protection 
objectives.  
An important cause of failure of the regulatory approach is the role other socio-
political factors play in the subjugation of environmental protection and the 
subservient position of environmental objectives as regulatory goals viz-a-viz 
other socio-political objectives such as property rights and economic 
development. The pre-eminence accorded to property rights over environmental 
objectives is one of the biggest hurdles most governments face in tackling 
environmental concerns.13 Property rights are accorded statutory and 
constitutional protection in many countries while environmental protection is 
largely governed by regulatory mechanisms without legal or constitutional 
                                                          
11 ibid. 
12 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, 
<http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/0_1221_humanrightsorenvironmentalrig
htsareasses.pdf> accessed 2 December, 2015. 
13 J. Nickel, ‘The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope 
and Justification’, (1993) 18 YALE J INT’L L 281–8523. 
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protection. More importantly, many governments - especially governments of 
developing nations - generally accord priority to the pursuit of economic 
developments over environmental protection. These governments consider global 
environmental norms and standards as a form of economic colonialism and they 
view the emphasis on environmental ethics by the developed nations as an 
attempt by these nations to unduly restrict the growth of Third World nations. This 
is more so considering that these industrialized nations attained industrialization 
through the wanton exploitation of natural resources without environmental 
considerations in the pre-1990 era.14  
The pursuit of development as a social objective is often considered an important 
right of people and in the developing world, development objectives are often 
pursued exclusively of environmental considerations.15 The exploitation and 
utilization of natural resources for development purposes often conflicts with 
environmental objectives and resolving the conflict between these two important 
social objectives is often a difficult task16. An illustration of this developmental 
leanings of many developing countries can be found in the decision of a provincial 
court in Ecuador in Viteri y otros v. Ecuacorriete S.A., Ministerio de Recursos 
Naturales, Procurador General del Estado17 where a challenge was made to 
some energy infrastructures sought to be constructed by the government. 
Rejecting the claim, the court declared that-  
- “the development of the project represented the public interest in that it 
was necessary to achieve the state’s sustainable economic development 
and to enable the state to achieve its social development aims.”18 
Since the promulgation of the Rio Declaration in 1992, the rights to development 
and environmental protection have become largely interwoven within the concept 
of sustainable development. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states that ‘in order 
                                                          
14 P. Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Right: A New Dynamic in International 
Law? ‘(1998) 10 Georgetown Environmental Law Review 309, 311.  
15 P. Andrade, ‘The Government of Nature: Post-Neoliberal Environmental Governance in Bolivia 
and Ecuador’, in F. de Castro, B. Hogenboom & M. Baud (eds), Environmental Governance in 
Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 113–36, at 121–5.  
16 L Kotzé and P Calzadilla, ‘Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental Constitutionalism 
and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador’, (2017) 6(3) Transnational Environmental Law 401–433. 
17Judgment, Provincial Court of Pichincha, Case No. 17111-2013-0317, available at: 
<http://consultas.funcionjudicial.gob.ec/informacionjudicial/public/informacion.jsf> accessed 08 March 
2019. 
18 Ibid, 52. 
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to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation 
from it.’ Seeking to integrate environmental protection into development efforts 
requires restraining development activities which impact negatively on the 
environment. By introducing the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility in Principle 7, the Rio Declaration sought to impose greater 
obligations on developed countries for achieving sustainable development 
relative to their contributions to global environmental degradation.19 However, the 
conceptual difficulties surrounding the implementation of this concept have often 
led to the absence of any definite responsibility and watered down obligations on 
both the developing and developed nations.  
Consequently, developing countries generally focus on development objectives 
and sacrifice environmental objectives in the process, considering it as an 
unnecessary restraint on rapid industrialization as experienced in the developed 
countries. UNEP’s First Global Report on Environmental Rule of Law 2019 
reiterated this problem, stressing that many developing countries prioritize 
macroeconomic development when allocating government funds and setting 
priorities. This results in environment ministries that are under resourced and 
politically weak in comparison to ministries for economic and natural resource 
development.20 This is often based on a perception that environmental rules will 
slow down or impede development.21 This creates a problem for the regulatory 
approach, as the government, which ought to implement the regulatory standards 
and policies, is willing to relax these standards and guidelines or deliberately 
refuse to enforce environmental regulations where doing so will restrict 
development activities or efforts. This situation is at the heart of the failure of 
environmental governance in most developing countries around the globe 
because the regulatory approach is dependent on government policies and 
decisions. As a result, environmental objectives are traded off for development 
policies and other socio-political gains.  
 
                                                          
19 See also Art 3(1) and 4(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
1992.  
20 UNEP First Global Report on Environmental Rule of Law, January 2019. 
21 UNEP International Advisory Council for Environmental Justice 2015. “Environmental Rule of 
Law: Critical to Sustainable Development.” Issue Brief. May 2015. 
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3.2.1 Trump of Environmental Rights over Policy Objectives and 
Regulatory Procedures 
A key impact of the rights’ approach to environmental protection is its ability to 
trump socio-political objectives and constitute environmental protection as a non-
derogatory interest protected by law which is given special weight or preference 
over other socio-political objectives. Following on from Dworkin’s ‘trump theory’ of 
rights, adopting a rights’ model for environmental protection accords special 
weight to the environmental interests of humans and nature and elevates these 
interests beyond mere objectives susceptible to trade-offs in favour of other socio-
political objectives and rights such as property rights and development rights.  
Granted that property rights and the right to development are often existing rights 
within a legal system, clothing environmental protection with the rights’ apparel 
places it within the ‘marketplace of rights’ and its placement as a competing right 
with these other rights grants it stronger stake than where it exists as a mere 
socio-political objective governed by regulatory mechanisms. As a competing 
right, judicial measures can be sought to protect it from trade-offs in favour of 
other socio-political objectives and this presents a unique potential for shifting the 
balance of power from the hands of the government and other property rights 
holders and spreading it more evenly across the populace with environmental 
protection accorded a prime status. Determining which right should prevail 
amongst these competing rights – property rights, development rights and 
environmental rights - becomes the domain of the courts taking into consideration 
all relevant factors and the need to protect the environment for future generations. 
Exclusive reliance will no longer be placed on the regulatory state to put out 
suitable policy documents and extensive regulatory standards for effective 
environmental protection, as the citizens are now conferred with legally 
recognized rights to compel government actions to protect the environment and 
compel discontinuance of acts which threaten the environment even where such 
acts are vital to the economic development of the country (such as important oil 
and gas exploratory licences). In a nutshell, a rights’ model shifts environmental 
protection from the exclusive domain of the regulatory state in a top-down 
approach, to a citizen-led domain in a bottom-up approach. It, therefore, promotes 
144 
 
civic environmentalism and ensures environmental stewardship and 
accountability of the government in environmental protection matters. 
Three instances from Latin America and one from the Philippines illustrate this 
point. In the Chilean case of Pablo Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA,22 the 
Supreme Court of Chile ordered a halt to the construction of six hydroelectric 
dams on the Bio-Bio River in view of the threat to the ecosystem and the 
environmental rights of the indigenes in that region. This was despite the immense 
socio-economic and development benefits that construction of these hydro dams 
portends for the country and its people. The decision of the Chile Supreme Court 
was predicated on the basis of Article 19(8) of the Chilean Constitution which 
provides that ‘citizens have the right to live in a pollution-free environment’ and 
‘the state, through legislation, must protect this right and ensure the conservation 
of nature.’ The provision of environmental rights in Chile’s constitution enabled 
the citizens, through the courts, to prevent the Chilean government trading off 
environmental considerations for development objectives. In the absence of an 
environmental right in this instance, the dam projects would have easily sailed 
through under a regulatory/governance model set out under the Chilean Law 
19,300 (Environmental Law) even with the necessary environmental impact 
assessment and other democratization and procedural requirements in the 
decision-making process relative to the projects.  
Similarly, in Costa Rica, the Supreme Court in M.M Levy y Asociacion Ecologista 
Limonense v Ministerio del Ambiente y Energia23 struck down a lucrative oil and 
gas exploration deal between the government and oil companies which 
threatened the environmental integrity of the affected ecosystems and rights of 
the indigenous people of the communities. Although the necessary environmental 
impact assessments and other regulatory protocols regarding environmental 
management for the affected areas were carried out and deemed satisfactory by 
the government, the Supreme Court intervened to override this regulatory 
approval on the basis of the protected right of the people of the affected area to 
the integrity of their environment. This decision of the court was based on the 
                                                          
22 Pablo Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA Supreme Court of Chile 5th August 1993. 




constitutionally protected environmental right of the people enshrined in Article 50 
of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 1949 which stipulates that- 
“Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment, being therefore entitled to denounce any act that may 
infringe said right and claim redress for the damage caused. The state 
shall guarantee, defend and preserve that right. The Law shall establish 
the appropriate responsibilities and penalties”. (italics added for 
emphasis) 
The italicized words in Article 50 is the fulcrum of the role and importance of a 
rights’ approach to environmental protection. It confers on citizens the power to 
denounce any act, whether government initiated or approved, that threatens the 
environment. In essence, a rights’ approach to environmental protection ensures 
that environmental concerns trump environmental regulatory compliance and 
other socio-economic and political objectives pursued by the government, state 
agents or government’s commercial partners. Environmental degradation and 
destruction can be achieved even while complying with regulatory protocols, 
procedures and standards imposed by governments and policymakers, either due 
to weak regulatory standards or the inability of regulatory instruments to cover the 
different facets of the threat facing the environment from a particular subject. 
Boyle’s statement that ‘democracies are entirely capable of environmental 
destruction’24 reflects the susceptibility of regulatory instruments instituted 
through democratic processes to permit environmental destructions slipping 
through several cracks in the instruments. A rights’ approach to environmental 
protection addresses this problem by empowering the ordinary citizens directly 
affected by the potential environmental impact to protect their interests through 
judicial means rather than rely on the government and its regulatory protocols. 
Moreover, in cases where the government (and its agents) is the source of the 
environmental destruction, such as in the Pablo Orrego Silva case, the 
environment is better protected through enshrined rights enforceable against the 
government, as regulatory instruments will be conveniently brushed aside by the 
government in pursuit of its objectives.    
                                                          
24 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, n 12, 10. 
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In the Venezuelan case of Donato Furio Giordano v. Ministry of Environment and 
Natural resources,25 the Supreme Court of Venezuela ordered the destruction of 
septic tanks on private property which threatened the integrity of the surrounding 
environment. The court held that this infringes on the constitutional right to a clean 
environment guaranteed under Chapter IX, Article 127 of the Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 199926which stipulates that- 
“Everyone has the right, individually and collectively, to enjoy life and a 
safe, healthy and ecologically balanced environment. The State shall 
protect the environment, biodiversity, genetics, ecological processes, 
national parks and natural monuments and other areas of special 
ecological importance” 
An important factor, in this case, is the fact that efforts to have the septic tanks 
removed under various regulatory processes regarding waste management and 
environmental protection had failed, resulting in the ventilation of the right to a 
clean environment as the basis for demanding their removal.   
In the Philippines, the Supreme Court, on application to it by aggrieved inhabitants 
of the Manilla Bay in MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,27ordered the 
creation of a Manila Bay Advisory Committee to replace the government 
committees set up to clean up the bay, in view of the failure of the government’s 
regulatory standards and policies put in place. In essence, seeing the failure of 
the Philippine government’s regulatory institutions to address the pollution of the 
Manilla Bay, the Supreme Court intervened to protect the environmental right of 
the inhabitants to a clean environment, thereby safeguarding the Manilla Bay from 
continued despoliation for the interest of the inhabitants.  
These cases reveal the important role of environmental rights as a safeguard 
against environmental despoliation in the event of failure of 
governance/regulatory processes to preserve environmental integrity. While 
governmental intervention in environmental management and regulation is 
indispensable, the above cases illustrate that the gradual shift from an entirely 
regulatory approach to a rights-based approach is engendered by the need to 
                                                          
25 Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela, 21.9.1999. 101. 3.  
26Published in Official Gazette on Thursday, December 30, 1999 , No. 36860. 
27 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, December 
18, 2008, GR No. 171947-48.  
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elevate environmental concerns to a higher pedestal where it is not subject to 
unrestrained policy trade-offs and bureaucratic laxity. As highlighted in the 
Stockholm Declaration, a clean environment is vital to the enjoyment of human 
rights of people, even the right to life itself,28 and it is therefore important that 
safeguards, in the form of environmental rights, be instituted to protect the 
environment from the failings of government environmental regulations. A rights’ 
approach, therefore, acts as a safety net for environmental concerns that fall 
through cracks in the net of environmental regulations/governance approach.  
 
3.2.2 Environmental Rights’ Model Supplementing Regulatory 
Approach 
A rights’-based approach to environmental protection is, in some sense, inevitable 
given the global recognition of the need for a cleaner and safer environment for 
humans to thrive and, for ecocentrists, the recognition of the intrinsic values of the 
natural environment. Nevertheless, a rights’ based approach does not dispense 
with the need for a regulatory approach to environmental protection which entails 
administrative controls and institutional regulation of environmental matters. 
Rather, environmental rights’ model works better as a supplement to the 
regulatory approach, because government intervention in environmental 
regulation is an indispensable part of environmental management around the 
globe.     
The indispensability of government involvement in environmental management 
through regulatory controls is based on three pillars- firstly; the primary obligation 
to protect the environment rests on the government as an exercise of public 
authority over the environment within its jurisdiction. Discharging this obligation 
requires the imposition of environmental regulatory controls by the relevant public 
authority subject to administrative review under public law doctrines.  
Many constitutions around the globe with environmental provisions emphasize 
the fundamental role of governmental regulations for environmental protection 
even while stipulating the individual rights of the citizens to a clean environment. 
Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution, for instance, while stipulating the right of 
                                                          
28 Principle 1 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, June 1972.  
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citizens to ‘an ecologically balanced environment’, highlighted the seven key 
obligations of the government with respect to protecting the environment. Article 
24 of the South African Constitution, while stipulating the right of citizens to ‘an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being,’ obliges the 
government to institute legislative measures to protect the environment by 
preventing pollution and ecological degradation and securing ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources. Section 20 of the Nigerian 
Constitution29 mandates the state to ‘protect and improve the environment and 
safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria’ while articles 5 
and 6 of France’s Environmental Charter 2005 obliges the relevant public 
authorities to institute public policies to promote sustainable development and 
institutionalize risk assessment policies for protecting and guaranteeing the 
sanctity of the environment. Failure to institute regulatory controls will, therefore, 
tantamount to a dereliction of governmental obligation to protect the environment.   
Secondly, a regulatory approach is indispensable for giving effect to the 
enforcement of environmental rights. A rights’ approach will be ineffective without 
appropriate regulatory systems, principles and policies to give effect to the 
application of the rights. This is because the mechanisms, framework, institutions 
and policies set up under a regulatory system is important in setting up procedural 
and institutional frameworks for ventilating a right to a clean environment, in 
whatever form or manner it is expressed. Paragraph I, Article 225 of the Brazilian 
Constitution which follows the conferment of a right to an ecologically balanced 
environment in Article 225(1), states that- 
“in order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is 
incumbent upon the Government to (i) preserve and restore 
the essential ecological processes and provide for the 
ecological treatment of species and ecosystems…”  
This evinces the reliance on regulatory controls for the effectiveness of 
environmental rights, particularly in relation to standardization of environmental 
rules as a way of enforcing the right to a clean environment. This reliance 
becomes even more relevant when environmental rights are considered from a 
‘coalesced anthropocentric’ view where nature’s rights are considered an integral 
aspect of environmental rights. Protecting the intrinsic rights of nature requires 
                                                          
29 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 
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the incorporation of environmental standards and rules for nature’s benefits by 
the government in all regulatory controls in environment-impacting industries.  
Regulatory mechanisms are also relevant for enforcing environmental rights 
because they institute standards, guidelines and enforcement systems which are 
utilized for the ventilation of environmental rights within a jurisdiction. In the Manila 
Bay’s case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered the government to set 
up a regulatory committee and institute other regulatory measures for the 
protection of the right of the Manilla Bay residents to an environment free from 
pollution. This shows that regulatory mechanisms are indispensable in enforcing 
environmental rights. Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the environmental 
rights’ approach by scholars is the seemingly science-based nature of 
environmental protection which, they argue, makes environmental protection 
more suited to regulatory approach than a rights’ based approach. Tarlock30 
maintains that environmental management must remain science based in view of 
the technical standards of environmental issues requiring routine scientific 
reviews. Anderson,31on his part, argues that precise qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions of environmental protection are not readily translated into legal terms 
and technical measures of environmental quality are more easily incorporated 
within regulatory instruments than in a human rights provision of general 
application. However, Tarlock and Anderson’s views overlook the inter-
relationship and inter-dependency between regulatory approach and the rights’ 
based approach whereby regulatory instruments addressing the science-based, 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions of environmental protection are utilized 
more as a means of enforcing the underlying and fundamental right to a clean 
environment. The rights’ based approach is, therefore, merely the legal basis of 
the regulatory instruments which address the scientific aspects of environmental 
protection. Therefore, rather than being a weakness, this shows that the rights’ 
based approach is best viewed as supplementary to the regulatory approach by 
constituting the legal basis for the latter and also, as discussed earlier, acting as 
                                                          
30 A. Tarlock, ‘Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?’ (1996) 7 Duke Environmental Law & Policy 
Forum 193–223. 
31 M. Anderson, ‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview’ in Alan 
Boyle and Michael Anderson (Eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(OUP 1996), 14. 
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a safety net for environmental concerns that slip through the cracks of the 
regulatory approach. 
A third pillar of the indispensability of the regulatory approach is the public 
law/private law dichotomy between the regulatory and rights’-based approach. 
Regulatory systems and environmental governance policies are governed by 
public law as it deals with governmental actions, policies and administrative 
instruments in relation to the environment. Public law mechanisms such as judicial 
reviews of administrative actions and other judicial mechanisms such as 
mandamus and prohibition are available remedies within the regulatory systems. 
A rights’ based approach, on the other hand, largely deals with the private law 
rights of citizens and individuals to a clean and habitable environment. 
Nevertheless, the subject of both regulatory approach and rights’ based approach 
– the environment- largely falls within the public law sphere because the 
environment belongs to all citizens/individuals in common and equal measure and 
is, therefore, largely governed by public law.  
In this respect, the tort of nuisance, for instance, seeks to protect the entitlement 
of individuals to peaceful enjoyment of their private land (private nuisance) while 
protecting the larger public’s entitlement to freedom from interference with the 
environment (public nuisance).32 However, while a single act of nuisance may 
individually affect different landowners, it is classified as a public nuisance since 
it affects more than one person and, therefore, falls within the sphere of public law 
which is enforceable by the government through regulatory mechanisms.33 
In addition, nature’s rights within a coalesced anthropocentrism paradigm fall 
within the public law sphere as the natural environment is a public good and, 
therefore,not subject to private expropriation. Because the environment and 
nature’s interests are subjects of public law, regulatory systems and controls will 
inevitably be required to manage, protect and preserve the environment for the 
common use and benefit of all persons. Thus, while the individual rights of citizens 
to a clean environment is a vital aspect of environmental protection, government 
                                                          
32 Victor Schwartz and Phil Goldberg, ‘The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational 
Boundaries on a Rational Tort’ (2006) 45 Washburn L.J. 541.  
33 D Gifford, ‘Public Nuisance as a Mas Products Liability Tort’, (2003) 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741. 
151 
 
intervention through regulatory controls and systems is indispensable in other to 
preserve and protect the environment for all persons within the jurisdiction.  
Flowing from the above, it is apparent that adopting a rights’ based approach 
should not be viewed as discarding the regulatory approach, but rather as a 
supplementary system of environmental protection predicated on the private law 
right of individuals to a clean environment. Ideally, environmental legislation 
should incorporate both regulatory controls and environmental rights in a mutually 
dependent normative structure, whereby each system is separately enforceable 
but inextricably linked to each other. The French Environmental Charter of 2005 
is an illustrative case of an environmental legislation that incorporates both rights’ 
based and regulatory systems within a single document in an inextricably linked 
structure.34 Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter provide substantive and procedural 
environmental rights to a clean environment and access to information and 
participation in environmental decision making, while article 4, 5 and 6 entrench 
environmental regulatory systems with incorporation of polluter pays principle, 
precautionary principle and obliging the public authorities to adopt policies to 
promote sustainable development. The provisions of the Charter are inextricably 
linked and not isolated provisions to be separately considered. In this way, the 
environmental rights provisions supplement the regulatory provisions and can be 
relied upon in cases of regulatory failure. This was the situation in the 2008 
landmark case on the Statute on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘the Law on 
Genetically Modified Organisms’).35 The French Constitutional Council had to 
consider if the statute on GMOs passed by the government conformed to the 
Charter as enshrined in the Constitution. The Court held the statute to be in non-
conformity with the environmental rights in the charter which were held to have 
constitutional force.   
This reliance on environmental rights to challenge regulatory statutes/policies 
makes the Charter a ‘good, if not the only, example of a legal text which intersects 
                                                          
34See D. Marrani, ‘Human Rights and Environmental Protection: The Pressure of the Charter for 
the Environment on the French Administrative Courts’, (2010) 10 Sustainable Development Law 
& Policy 1 at 52–57. 
35 Décision 2009-599 DC 29 December 2009, JORF 31 December 2009. See 
<www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision//decisions-depuis-1959/2009/2009-599-dc/decision-
n-2009-599-dc-du-29-decembre-2009.46804.html> accessed 20 April 2017. 
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the constitution, human rights and the environment’36 in such a way as to preserve 
the preeminent position of government as the protector of the public interests in 
the environment while guaranteeing the environmental rights of individuals as a 
supplementary protection against regulatory excesses or insufficiency.  
 
3.3 Environmental Rights’ Model Vs Civil Liability 
Approach 
There is a seemingly close relationship between the environmental rights’ model 
and the civil liability approach. They are both rights’ based approaches which 
confer legal entitlements on the rights’ holders for protection of their varying 
interests, and they both rely significantly on judicial enforcement mechanisms for 
their viability. However, this is as far as the semblance goes, for the nature of both 
rights are not only structurally diverse and import different considerations, but they 
are also largely conflicting in most situations.  
The right which is enforced in civil liability approach to environmental protection 
is not a right to the environment itself, but either a property right or a right derivable 
from the law of torts under the doctrine of nuisance. The ventilation of this property 
or tortious right results in the protection of the environment from which these rights 
are derived. The civil liability approach protects private rights in properties 
involving environmental goods and is generally actualized through tortious claims 
in court for trespass to land (property right), nuisance and the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher37 involving strict liability for objects brought unto the land which causes 
damage to neighbouring properties.  
The civil liability approach depends on the institution of civil suits by an aggrieved 
party seeking compensation or an injunction against another party for damages 
done to his property and environment by the negligent or wrongful act of the other. 
It generally requires proof of causation, foreseeability and damage by the 
claimant.38 In the event of success in the suit, the claimant is compensated for 
                                                          
36 D. Marrani, ‘The Intersection between Constitution, Human Rights and the Environment The 
French Charter for the environment and the new ex post constitutional control in France’ 
(2014)16 Envtl. L. Rev. 108. 
37Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1; In its application to environmental law, it imposes a strict 
liability on a  person for environmental damage done to the property (land) of a neighbour if 
noxious or other harmful chemicals escapes from his land into the neighbouring property. See 
Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather (1994) 2 AC 264. 
38 Vivienne Harpwood, Principles of Tort Law (Cavendish publishers, 2000) 52. 
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foreseeable damage without taking into cognizance the long-lasting impact on the 
integrity of the environment and other ecosystems. Essentially, in civil liability 
approach, the claimant is not asserting a right to a clean environment and is thus 
not protecting the environment per se but is rather extending some form of 
‘surrogate protection’39 for the environment by establishing his claim to property 
or other environmental goods which entitles him to a peaceful enjoyment of such 
property including the environment on which the property is based.  
In many communities affected by environmental pollution in developing countries, 
such as Nigeria and a number of Latin American countries, the civil liability 
approach constitutes the major form of protection from wanton pollution by 
instituting suits against the multinational oil companies (MNCs) seeking significant 
compensations against them for damages done to their environment.40 Indeed, 
huge sums of money have been awarded against several MNCs by courts in 
various jurisdictions41 for environmental degradations and there are a plethora of 
such cases still pending in various courts across the globe especially in third world 
countries.42 In Dr Pere Ajuwa v. Shell Petroleum,43 the trial court awarded US$1.5 
billion to the Appellants as compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
pollution and destruction of their farmlands and contamination of their streams by 
oil leakage from the Respondent’s facilities. The Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision, faulting the basis of the trial court’s decision and the case is currently 
pending at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. In Ecuador, there is a pending litigation 
against Chevron brought on behalf of 30,000 Ecuadoreans seeking damages 
totalling $18.2bn (£11.5bn) from Chevron over Amazon oil pollution.44    
Despite the potential for civil liability approach to generate huge finances in terms 
of compensations for environmental wrongs, this approach falls short of an 
                                                          
39 P. Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Right’, supra, n 14, 351.  
40 A. Shinsato, ‘Increasing the Accountability of Transactional Corporations for Environmental 
Harms: The Petroleum Industry in Nigeria’ (2005) 4 Nw.J Int'l Hum Rts 186. 
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol4/iss1/14> (accessed 04 April 2015). 
41R. Meeran, ‘Liability of Multinational Corporations: A Critical Stage’ 
<http://www.labournet.net/images/cape/campanal.html> (accessed 08 February 2016).  
42See ‘Royal Dutch Shell braced for flood of Nigeria compensation claims after court tells it to 
hand over oil spill evidence’ 
<http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-3366548/Shell-faces-Nigeria-oil-spill-
compensation-claims-judges-order-company-hand-documents.html > accessed 13 December 
2016.  
43 Dr Pere Ajuwa v Shell Petroleum (2011) 11 SC 207. 
44 ‘US court rules against Chevron in Ecuador oil case’, (BBC, 20 September 2011), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14983123> accessed 15 June 2017.  
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effective protection for the environment. Fundamentally, it does not address the 
causes of pollution of the environment nor seek to prevent its re-occurrence, but 
is mainly reactive, compensatory and externalizes the cost of environmental 
pollution for the major polluters. In a sense, it is a monetization of environmental 
degradation akin to government fines on polluting activities which can be 
considered as pollution taxes as they mostly succeed in raising finances from the 
polluters rather than halt pollution. This is because the basic remedy available for 
suits against polluters for damages to the environment is the award of damages 
in the form of monetary compensations to the claimant for the assessed injury, as 
determined by the court. In Ajuwa’s case discussed above, compensations to the 
tune of billions of dollars were awarded to the claimants by the court for property 
damage resulting from environmental pollution. This monetary award to private 
individuals will not be used to clean up the environment but will rather go into 
private pockets and allocated to address other personal socio-economic concerns 
while the environment continues to suffer the consequences of the pollution.  
Although the polluters are often ordered by the court to clean up the polluted 
environment, this is rarely enforced and is difficult to monitor in most cases.45 
Even where the clean-up order is enforced, this is merely reactive in nature as it 
only comes into play when the environment has been polluted and the polluted 
environment often struggles to recover and may never be the same again. The 
reactive nature of civil liability approach to environmental protection is an 
unavoidable element of the approach as the right to sue only arises after the 
environmental damage has been done or is imminently threatened, for it is only 
then that an enforceable cause of action arises. Civil liability approach is, 
therefore, incapable of ensuring a proactive, preventive approach to 
environmental protection neither is it able to incorporate important environmental 
governance principles such as the precautionary principle. In the same vein, when 
governments penalize polluters by imposing fines for the act of pollution, the 
financial cost of pollution, therefore, becomes a negative externality which 
polluters can account for in monetary terms and the raising of funds from such 
pollution activities then constitute a form of tax on pollution, which does nothing 
to address the root cause of pollution nor deter its re-occurrence.  
                                                          
45 A. Shinsato, supra, n 40, 187. 
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While imposing huge financial penalties on polluters in the form of compensations 
by the courts can potentially act as a deterrent to future pollutions, in reality, such 
awards do little to discourage polluting activities, especially by MNCs with huge 
financial war chests. The decision to invest in facilities that reduce the prospect 
of resulting pollution is usually an economic decision based on the comparative 
cost of such investment versus the potential financial liability for pollution. As proof 
of this, the major oil and gas corporations in Nigeria regularly set aside huge 
shares of their annual budgets to settle compensation claims that may arise in the 
course of their activities, while relatively little capital allocation is made for 
investing in improving their aging oil facilities which usually cause pollution. For 
instance, Shell’s 2017 Annual Report disclosed that the company had set aside 
$2.5 billion for settlement of compensation claims arising from pollution incidents 
while only $15 million was set aside for investing in replacement of aging pipeline 
facilities in the same fiscal year.46 This shows that these corporations are 
financially prepared for substantial awards against them for environmental 
pollution and such punitive awards do little to deter continuous pollutions as the 
MNCs invest more in preparing for such awards than they invest in improving their 
facilities to reduce pollution incidents. 
In relation to gas flaring, a form of environmental pollution of the atmosphere by 
burning of associated gas derived from oil exploration, the Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction Partnership (GGFR) stated that ‘in theory, the economics of associated 
gas dictates that operators will reduce flaring and venting until the marginal costs 
of gas utilization in a field exceed the marginal benefits’.47 In essence, where the 
cost of investing in facilities and programmes to prevent pollution exceeds the 
potential liability for pollution, then pollution becomes an economically viable 
option for the MNCs. Although this is not put forward as a policy direction by MNCs 
operating in developing countries, it is evident in the response of the MNCs to 
repeated complains of pollution and other environmental degradation.  
In some jurisdictions with significant environmental pollution arising from oil and 
gas exploration activities, such as Nigeria, civil liability suits against the MOCs are 
almost always in the form of tortious and property rights claims for 
                                                          
46Shell’s Annual Report 2017 <https://reports.shell.com/annual-report/2017/> accessed 07 May 
2019. 
47 GGFR 2004, ‘Regulation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A Global Overview and 
Lessons from International Experience’, Report Number 3 - World Bank Group pg. 25. 
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damages/compensations. Ladan48 examined the cases on environmental 
protection in Nigeria from 1960 to 2015 and found that almost all suits relating to 
environmental issues have been based on tortious claims (nuisance and 
negligence) and property rights claims (trespass to land) seeking 
damages/compensations for pollution of the environment49 and noise from 
exploration activities.50 Consequently, the nexus between the overwhelming 
reliance on civil liability approach to environmental pollution and the continued 
pollution of the environment in Nigeria is difficult to overlook.  
Okonmah51 highlights the major drawbacks in civil liability approach as including 
the onerous burden of proof placed on the claimants regarding causation and 
damages under the common law, and the fact that injuries arising from denial of 
peaceable enjoyment of property and family life, social and cultural life, diminution 
of economic well-being, threat to life and damage to the environment are hardly 
taken into consideration in assessing damages to be awarded to such claimants. 
In the Nigerian case of Seismograph Services (Nigeria) Ltd v. R.K. Ogbeni,52 the 
claimant’s action for compensation for extensive damage to his buildings caused 
by the shooting operations carried out by the defendants while prospecting for oil 
failed due to his inability to prove the negligence of the defendants while 
conducting the exploration. In Ikpede v. Shell-BP53 where the claimant’s action 
was against the environmental impact caused by the Defendant’s laying of 
pipeline on properties belonging to the claimant, the claim failed as the Defendant 
was held to have a government license to carry out such activity and was thus 
covered by statutory authority. Ikpede’s case would have had a different outcome 
under an environmental rights’ approach as the holding of government’s license 
(regulatory approval) would not be a justification for infringing on a right to a clean 
environment, as seen in M.M Levy’s case54where the Costa Rican Supreme Court 
                                                          
48 M. Ladan, ‘Materials and Cases on Environmental Law and Policy (Econet Publishers, 2004), 
117-244.  
49 Shell petroleum development (Nigeria) Ltd v. HRH Chief GBA Tiebo VII & Ors(1976) 4 NWLR 
(pt 445) 657. 
50 Adediran & Anor v. Interland and Transport Limited (1991) 9 NWLR (PT 241) 155. 
51 Patrick  D. Okonmah, ‘Right to a Clean Environment: a Case for the People of Oil-Producing 
Communities in the Nigerian Delta’ (1997) 41(1) Journal of African Law 43-67. 
52 (1976) 4 SC 85. 53; See also Chinda and Ors v. Shell-BP (1974) 2 RSLR 1. 
53 (1973) MWSJ 61. 




held that regulatory approval for an environmentally injurious activity was no 
defence to its infringement on a citizen’s right to a clean environment.  
Another major drawback in the utilisation of civil liability approach is the vagaries 
of uncertainty usually associated with tortious claims and liabilities. There are a 
number of technical hurdles, hitches and restrictions55 which apply at different 
stages of a civil suit which hampers its efficacy as an environmental protection 
tool. In countries with conservative judiciaries, this problem assumes even bigger 
proportions as the reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with government’s social 
development objectives will hinder its willingness to penalize the MNCs’ activities 
given their importance to the economic development of the country. In Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Abel Isaiah & 2 Others,56 
an old tree fell on the appellant’s oil pipeline and indented it, thereby obstructing 
the free flow of crude oil.  The oil pipeline was owned and controlled by the 
appellant and ran across the respondents’ swamp land and surrounding 
farmlands.  The appellant engaged the services of a contractor to repair the 
dented pipeline.  In the cause of the repairs, crude oil freely spilled onto the 
respondents’ swampland.  The spillage quickly spread over the respondents’ 
communally owned swampland and polluted the surrounding farmlands, streams 
and fishponds. The Respondents sued claiming compensation for pollution of 
their land which was granted by the trial court and upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
However, on final appeal to the Supreme Court, the Appellant raised the issue of 
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court under the Petroleum Act 1961 and section 230 
of the 1979 Constitution which was in force at the time of the accrual of the cause 
of action. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdictional challenge, holding that the 
trial court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the claim and, therefore, its 
proceedings and judgments are null and void. The Respondents consequently 
lost their claim for compensation, not based on the lack of evidence of the pollution 
damage caused by the Appellant, but on technical jurisdictional principles.   
In addition, the civil liability approach raises the important issue of locus standi 
(the right or capacity to bring an action to court)57 which is the bane of most public 
                                                          
55 These include the locus standi issue, proof of causation, limitation of actions, statutory defences 
and pre-action requirements under the civil procedure rules. See the discussion on this point in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
56 See Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd v. Abel Isaiah (2001) 5SC (pt 11) 1.  
57 This subject is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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interest litigations in common law jurisdictions, especially related to environmental 
claims.58 In the Nigerian case of Oronto Douglas v Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Limited,59 the Claimant’s suit to compel the Defendant to carry out an 
environmental impact assessment before commencement of oil drilling activities 
was dismissed on the basis that the Claimant would not be directly affected by 
the activities of the Defendant and thus lacked the locus standi to bring the suit. 
Although the locus standi rule has been watered down in several jurisdictions 
across the globe by statutes60 and judicial decisions,61 echoes of its application 
still reverberate in several civil liability suits relating to environmental protection.62   
 
3.3.1 Civil Liability Approach in Transnational Environmental 
Litigation 
The shortcomings of the civil liability approach extend beyond environmental 
litigations within national jurisdictions and are equally reflected in transnational 
civil liability claims related to environmental protection cases. When aggrieved 
claimants have sought to bring transnational suits against major polluters for 
environmental pollution in jurisdictions outside the country where the pollution 
occurs, such efforts are besieged by procedural jurisdictional hurdles.  
Transnational environmental litigations arising from pollution are usually filed in 
courts in developed countries such as the US, UK and Netherlands by claimants 
                                                          
58 M.O Makoloo et al, ‘Public Interest Environmental Litigation in Kenya: Prospects and 
Challenges’ (2007) ILEG 29. 
59 (1998) LPELR-CA/L/143/97. 
60 See Section 32(1)(e) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) of 
South Africa, Section 3(4) of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) 
No. 18 of 1999 of Kenya and the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules (FREPR) 
2009 of Nigeria. 
61 See for example the Kenyan case of Albert Ruturi and Another v Minister for Finance and 
Others (Albert Ruturi) [2002] 1 KLR 51 at 54, where the court stated that “as part of the 
reasonable, fair and just procedure to uphold constitutional guarantees, the right of access to 
justice entails a liberal approach to the question of locus standi.” In the UK case of R v 
Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p Greenpeace (No. 2) [1994] All ER 329, the Court of Appeal 
applied a liberal interpretation of the locus standi principle in environmental rights cases, 
stating that ‘a responsible body with a bona fide concern about the subject matter of the 
proceedings may be regarded as being more than a mere ‘busy body.’ This decision was 
applied in the more recent UK case of Cherkley Campaign Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) 
v Longshot Cherkley Court Ltd [2013] EWHC 2582.  
62 See P. Kameri-Mbote, ‘Kenya’ in L.J Kotzé and A.R Paterson (eds.), ‘The Role of the Judiciary 




from developing countries such as Nigeria,63 and Zambia.64 These cases usually 
canvass the lack of access to justice within national jurisdictions as the reason for 
seeking remedy in foreign courts where the defendant has a corporate base or its 
parent company is based. However, a major procedural hurdle such transnational 
environmental litigations face is the reluctance of foreign courts to get 
unnecessarily involved in domestic disputes within another sovereign country 
encapsulated in the forum non-conveniens doctrine laid down by the UK House 
of Lords in the landmark case of Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex.65 Under this 
doctrine, courts in foreign jurisdictions will often decline jurisdiction where it is 
shown that there is a court in another jurisdiction which is clearly a more suitable 
forum for the trial of the action, in the interests of all the parties and the justice of 
the case. In the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme 
Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,66 the reluctance of foreign courts 
to entertain extra-territorial claim is to prevent the danger of judicial interference 
in foreign policy.   
In the recent 2017 decision of the English Court in Okpabi and Others v. Royal 
Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) 
Ltd,67 the court declined jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s suit arising from 
environmental pollution occurring in Nigeria by a Nigerian company (SPDC) even 
though the parent company (Royal Dutch Shell) based in the UK was joined as a 
defendant in the suit. Although the claimant averred that they could not receive 
justice in Nigerian courts, the English court reasoned that a foreign court has to 
be very careful before passing qualitative judgments on the legal systems of other 
sovereign nations. The same approach was adopted by the US Supreme Court 
in Kiobel’s case above and this reveals an important procedural hurdle facing civil 
liability approach to environmental protection at the transnational level.  
However, this procedural jurisdictional hurdle is not a blanket restriction on 
transnational environmental litigations as the attitude of the court on this principle 
                                                          
63 See Ken Saro Wiwa et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co et al (2008) No. 96 Civ 8386 (KMW) and 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (2013)133 S.Ct. 1659.  
64 Lungowe & others v Vedanta Resources PLC and Konkola Copper Mines PLC [2016] EWHC 
975. 
65 [1987] AC 460. 
66 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., supra, n 63.  
67 This case was jointly filed with Lucky Alame and Others v Royal Dutch Shell plc, The Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC).   
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varies across jurisdictions and is also influenced by existing international and 
regional legal instruments on jurisdiction and conflict of laws. Even within the UK, 
for instance, there is a conflicting judicial opinion on the application of the forum 
non-conveniens principle to transnational environmental suits. In the 2016 case 
of Lungowe & others v Vedanta Resources PLC and Konkola Copper Mines Plc,68 
the English Court entertained a transnational environmental claim by claimants 
from Zambia relating to environmental pollution occurring in Zambia, against a 
mining company operating in Zambia with a parent company based in the UK. 
The court reached a different conclusion from the Okpabi’s case and held that the 
claimants are entitled to seek justice in foreign courts if they are convinced they 
would not secure justice in their home jurisdictions. Existing international and 
regional legal instruments such as the Brussels Convention,69 Brussels 
Regulation of the European Union,70 and the Lugano Convention71 on jurisdiction 
in civil and commercial matters also favour the grant of access to foreign courts 
for redressing transnational environmental wrongs. These instruments are, 
however, limited in application to EU countries that are signatories to them and 
other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In Owusu v 
Jackson,72 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the applicability of the 
provisions of the Brussels Convention and Brussels Regulation to transnational 
environmental claims by declaring that the claimant could file a claim in English 
courts against defendants based in Jamaica for tortious actions which occurred 
in Jamaica. The ECJ further declared that the doctrine of forum non-conveniens 
is incompatible with article 4 of the Brussels Regulation and therefore is 
inapplicable to transnational claims arising from tortious and environmental 
claims.73 This decision was further applied in two other recent ECJ decisions74 
                                                          
68 Lungowe & others v Vedanta Resources PLC and Konkola Copper Mines Plc, supra, n 58.  
69 Article 5(3) & (5) and Article 6(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the 
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and appear to have settled the position as far as the EU is concerned, although 
English courts still appear to adopt a contrary position as evinced by the recent 
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Okpabi’s case.  
In the Netherlands, the decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal in A.F. Akpan v. 
Royal Dutch Shell, Plc & SPDC75 affirmed the position of Dutch law to allow 
transnational environmental claims for pollution occurring in other countries. This 
decision has made the Netherlands a focus of most transnational environmental 
suits by litigants from oil-producing developing countries, such as Nigeria, against 
Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational oil corporations.76 
Notwithstanding the disparity between the treatment of transnational 
environmental litigations in the EU and other jurisdictions, the civil liability 
approach on a transnational level has the potential to generate huge financial 
rewards for claimants even in countries where the judicial system is unfavourable 
to such transnational claims. In the US, although Kiobel’s case failed, an earlier 
case filed against Royal Dutch Shell was settled out of court with the defendant 
paying significant sums of money as compensation to the claimant for 
environmental pollution and other human rights infringement.77 In the UK, an 
earlier case filed against Royal Dutch Shell was also settled out of court with the 
defendant paying £55 million pounds to compensate the claimant for 
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta.78  
While payment of compensations may be regarded as a successful outcome of 
an environmental claim within national or transnational civil liability regimes, this 
reactive, compensatory remedy under civil liability approach does not provide a 
sustainable, long-term framework for protecting the environment. An 
environmental rights’ model approach outweighs the civil liability approach as it is 
focused on the qualitative state of the environment and provides a proactive, 
fundamental platform for addressing environmental concerns. 
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3.3.2 Trump of Rights’ Model over Civil Liability Approach 
An environmental rights’ approach is not entirely immune to some of the 
challenges facing civil liability approach to environmental protection discussed 
above. As rights’ based approach also depends on judicial mechanisms for 
enforcement of environmental rights, procedural jurisdictional hurdles and other 
legalistic challenges associated with the judicial process may impact on the 
ventilation of environmental rights. Also, a conservative judiciary may restrict the 
extent to which environmental rights can be exploited by citizens.79  
Nevertheless, three key advantages of a rights’ approach over civil liability 
approach stand out - the displacement of the burden of proof; the availability of 
protection of the environment for future generations; and the potential for the 
ecocentric protection of the intrinsic value of the environment. A rights-based 
approach displaces the difficult burden of proof associated with a civil liability 
approach especially in the area of causation and damage. As argued by 
Klipsch,80- 
“Pollution is a complicated function of population, urbanization, 
industrialization and technology and some of the difficulties associated with 
proving causation of pollution includes the fact that environmental hazards 
sometimes develop so slowly that the harm may be far removed from the 
cause. The delicate nature of the balance in the ecosystem, and the systemic 
nature of the environment often means that solving one pollution problem 
often leads to or causes other forms of pollution.”  
In civil liability environmental claims, both under national and transnational 
regimes, the claimant is faced with the difficult task of proving the direct causation 
link between the actions of the defendant and the actual damage that was suffered 
by the claimant. This often requires utilizing expert witnesses and other highly 
advanced forms of proof to show this direct causation and failure to do so results 
in failure of the claim regardless of the extent of damage done to the environment. 
In Akpan’s case discussed above, although the claimants succeeded in scaling 
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the procedural jurisdictional hurdle before the Dutch court, three out of the four 
claimants had their substantive cases dismissed for lack of sufficient proof of the 
causation link between the pollution and the defendant’s acts. Thus, for a litigant 
in a civil liability suit, proving claims of environmental pollution against a polluter 
is a herculean task with often little rewards. This difficulty associated with utilising 
liability mechanisms to address environmental concerns is acknowledged in 
Paragraph 13 of the EU Environmental Liability Directive which states that- 
“Not all forms of environmental damage can be remedied by means of the 
liability mechanism. For the latter to be effective, there need to be one or 
more identifiable polluters, the damage should be concrete and quantifiable, 
and a causal link should be established between the damage and the 
identified polluter(s). Liability is, therefore, not a suitable instrument for 
dealing with pollution of a widespread, diffuse character, where it is 
impossible to link the negative environmental effects with acts or failure to act 
of certain individual actors.”81 
The complications involved in dealing with widespread pollution across a wide 
expanse of an environment with possible mixed sources creates immense 
difficulties in establishing liability for the pollution and this leaves room for the 
environment to go un-remediated flowing from the inability to ascribe liability to 
specific actors. A rights’ based approach displaces this burdensome requirement 
of proof as it is predicated on a violation of the rights-holders’ entitlement to a 
clean environment and can be proactively and pre-emptively utilized to defend the 
sanctity of the environment even without proof of actual harm on the basis of the 
precautionary and preventive principles of environmental law.  
More importantly, the rights’ holder does not need to identify the specific actor 
responsible for the pollution or disturbance to environmental sanctity, as the 
conferment of this right in a statute or constitution entitles the right-holder to 
proceed against the government or relevant local authority for failure to protect 
the environment through appropriate regulations.  The burden then rests on the 
relevant governmental authority to identify the polluters/cause of pollution and 
proceed against such entities using relevant regulatory tools. This is a more 
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suitable approach for the citizens as against being required to slug it out against 
polluters through difficult and uncertain civil trials in court.  
In civil liability approach, an unfavourable outcome could result in the polluted 
environment being left in its state in the event of lack of proof linking the defendant 
to the pollution (as in Kiobel and Okpabi’s cases and a long line of other 
unsuccessful cases against oil polluters in Nigeria).82 However, in a rights’ based 
approach, once pollution or other environmental disturbance is identified or is 
determined as likely to occur, the outcome will always result in orders being made 
to remediate or restore the environment or prevent the disturbance, as the focus 
of the suit is not the liability or otherwise of a specific entity/defendant, but the 
protection of the environment from deterioration or potential disturbance. This shift 
in focus is essential as it underpins the fundamental advantage of a rights’ 
approach to civil liability approach and is better reflective of contemporary 
environmental management focus around the globe.      
Another important advantage of the rights approach is its utilization to protect the 
intrinsic value of the environment. A civil liability approach depends on a claim by 
property rights’ holder and the benefits of the claim accrue to the rights holder 
even though it is the environment that bears the direct consequences of the harm. 
A rights’ approach encompasses claims made on behalf of inanimate parts of the 
ecosystem uninhabited by humans and the protection of the interests of such 
components of the ecosystem are not based on their instrumental values to 
humans. This was the basis for Stone’s clamour for rights for the natural 
environment as he decried the benefits of remedies for environmental harms 
accruing to humans when the environment is the actual ‘victim’. 83 Protection of 
nature’s intrinsic value is, therefore, better achieved under a rights’ approach.  
In addition, a rights based approach is capable of protecting the environmental 
interests of future generations. As argued by Hiskes,84 environmental rights are 
the only human rights that are intrinsically tied to the welfare and interests of future 
generations and that provide reciprocal benefits for present generations in arguing 
for beneficial environmental policies. It is difficult to bring civil liability actions 
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seeking damages for tortious acts committed against future generations or other 
property rights of future generations that are still lost in some distant future. 
However, as seen in the Philippines’ case of Juan Antonio Oposa v. Fulgencio S. 
Factoran, Jr,85 rights’ based claims to the environment can be brought to restrict 
activities that are environmentally harmful in order to protect the environment for 
future generations.  
The rights of future generations can be protected under the environmental rights 
paradigm in either of two ways- 1) the explicit statutory establishment of 
appropriate bodies/commissions to protect and advance the interests of future 
generations; or 2) the explicit conferment of rights on future generations under 
relevant statutory provisions with standing granted to present humans to bring 
relevant proceedings to protect these rights of future generations. The first form 
usually takes the shape of statutory establishments of an ombudsman or 
commission exclusively dedicated to issues relating to future generations. The 
Israeli Commission for Future Generations86and the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Future Generations established by the Hungarian Parliament in November 
200787 are examples of Ombudsmen system for protecting the interests of future 
generations pursuant to explicit recognition of the environmental rights of future 
generations protected by the present generation.88   
The second form takes the shape of explicit conferment of environmental rights 
on future generations in statutory or constitutional provisions with individuals or 
civil society groups entitled to bring actions to enforce these rights on behalf of 
future generations. For example, section 24 of South African Constitution and 
article 225 of Brazil’s constitution  explicit provide for the right to a clean and 
ecologically sound environment for the present and future generations, mandating 
the government to take legislative and other administrative steps to enforce and 
protect these rights. Based on these provisions, individuals and civil society 
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groups can institute suits seeking to halt any environmental activities that have 
the potential to harm the right of future generations to a clean environment.89   
In addition, relevant rights’ based environmental instruments incorporate the 
protection of the interests of present and future generations as a cardinal 
principle. For instance, the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(Aarhus Convention)90 highlights this basic principle in article 1 by reiterating its 
main objective as being “to contribute to the protection of the right of every person 
of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being…” The Aarhus Convention further exemplifies the 
importance of a rights’ based approach by providing extensive rights to accessing 
justice and information in environmental matters and participation in 
environmental decision making of present and future generations. This right, 
which is not available in a civil liability approach, expands the scope of 
environmental protection through the ‘proceduralisation’ of environmental 
concerns and the introduction of democratic principles into environmental 
management systems. The incorporation of procedural environmental rights 
(alongside substantive environmental rights) is a driving force for environmental 
democracy91 and leads to a strengthening of participation procedures.92A rights’ 
based approach, therefore, allows for a comprehensive approach to 
environmental protection both from a substantive and procedural perspective and 
allows for greater involvement of the citizens in environmental protection.93   
In summary, a rights’ approach to environmental protection ensures an equitable 
distribution of the benefits of environmental protection between the present and 
future generation of humans and incorporates protection of the intrinsic value of 
the environment itself. It also obviates the major technical hurdles faced in the 
                                                          
89 P Lawrence, Justice for Future Generations: Climate Change and International Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2014) 3.  
90 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998. 
91 J Wates, ‘The Aarhus Convention: a Driving Force for Environmental Democracy’ (2005) 2(1) 
Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 2 – 11.  
92 N Hartley & Christopher Wood, ‘Public participation in environmental impact assessment—
implementing the Aarhus Convention’, (2005) 25(4) Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review 319-340. 
93 J. Palerm, ‘Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making: Examining the Aarhus 
Convention’ (1999) J. Env. Assmt. Pol. Mgmt., 229.  
167 
 
ventilation of private property rights’ civil liability claims related to environmental 
issues.  
The effectiveness of a rights’ approach depends largely on the extent to which a 
country’s legal system is developed to incorporate the rule of law and respect for 
rights as integral aspects of the legal framework. Environmental constitutionalism 
and the role of the judiciary in environmental governance, therefore, becomes a 
vital part of the implementation of environmental rights and influences the 
enforcement of these rights to a great extent. The extent to which environmental 
constitutionalism influences the effectiveness of a rights’ based approach to 
environmental protection is discussed next. 
 
 3.4 Environmental Constitutionalism and the Judiciary 
The concept of environmental constitutionalism in environmental discourse is one 
which is beset with uncertainty, ambiguity and is generally avoided by available 
literature in the field in discussions relating to environmental rights and protection. 
Yet it lies at the heart of legal efforts directed at enshrining environmental 
protection at various levels in the society. Kotze94 stated that ‘the concept of 
environmental constitutionalism remains ambiguous as there is a dearth of 
literature on the subject and therefore the exact theoretical content and extent of 
environmental constitutionalism remains insufficiently determined’. 
Most of the confusion associated with the concept lies in its incorporation of 
several similar themes with slightly distinct meanings and importance. It is so 
easy, for instance, to confuse or equate environmental constitutionalism with 
environmentalism or with constitutionalization of environmental rights. While 
these latter subjects are closely related to and derivable from environmental 
constitutionalism in different contexts, they connote different meanings and have 
varying degrees of importance. Environmentalism ‘is narrowly concerned with 
environmental preservation, species conservation or combating climate 
change’95and refers to activism on the part of concerned groups and NGOs 
towards ensuring better environmental protection through different means which 
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can include political pressures, lobbying and other socio-economic mechanisms. 
Environmentalism is therefore not synonymous with environmental 
constitutionalism which connotes constitutional protection of environmental 
values and is thus premised on legal mechanisms. Where the constitutional legal 
order in a given jurisdiction is supportive of environmentalism and creates a 
framework for espousing the ideals of environmental activists, it is referred to as 
constitutional environmentalism.  
Similarly, environmental constitutionalism differs from constitutionalization of 
environmental rights in the sense that while the latter is a major component of the 
former, it is not the defining characteristic as there can be environmental 
constitutionalism in the absence of express constitutionalization of environmental 
rights.96 In some jurisdictions, such as India, the decisions of the courts on 
environmental matters have been reflective of environmental constitutionalism 
even though there is an absence of explicit environmental rights in its constitution. 
In the Indian case of Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,97 the Indian Supreme 
Court extended the constitutional protection of the right to life under article 21 of 
the Indian Constitution to apply to environmental preservation and in the process 
upheld environmental constitutionalism in India even though no express provision 
on substantive environmental rights is found in the Constitution.98  
Environmental constitutionalism is made up of three key integrated and 
interrelated components – constitution, constitutionalism and constitutionalization 
of environmental rights. The terms ‘constitution’, ‘constitutionalism’ and 
‘constitutionalization’ are all ‘evaluative-descriptive terms’99 and when placed in 
an environmental context, they describe a state of constitutionalized 
environmental protection or ecosystem protection couched in a constitutionalist 
language and legal context. 
A constitution is the basic fundamental legal document in a state which delineates 
political powers, sets out duties and responsibilities of organs of government and 
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enumerates the rights and privileges of citizens in the state. Boyd100 states that ‘a 
constitution represents the highest or supreme law in a nation, establishing the 
formal rules that direct and constrain government powers, defining the 
relationship between government institutions, and protecting individual rights.’ 
Finer101 defines it as ‘codes of norms which aspire to regulate the allocation of 
powers, functions, and duties among the various agencies and officers of 
government, and to define the relationship between these and the public.’  
A constitution can be analysed from a ‘thin’ or a ‘thick’ sense102 and this has 
significance in the context of the present discussion. A constitution in the ‘thin’ 
sense refers to the actual document itself which sets out the legal order in a state 
and delineates political powers, functions, rights and duties within the state. This 
invariably requires a restrictive and narrow view of a constitution as merely a legal 
document, albeit constituting the fundamental basis upon which the organs of 
state are founded. A constitution in the ‘thick’ sense, however, connotes a wider 
interpretation of the term which transcends merely the constitutional document 
itself but considers the constitutional features of being constitutive, mostly written 
or codified, justiciable, entrenched, superior and expressing a common 
ideology.103 In other words, a constitution in the ‘thick’ sense looks at a broader 
perspective of constitutional features of legitimacy of the constitutional document, 
its compliance with acceptable basic standards, recognition and respect for basic 
rights in the constitutional document, its superiority and primacy over 
governmental actions and control, access to justice and enforceability of rights 
and duties spelt therein. In this context, constitutional principles can be derived 
from countries without a written constitution, such as the United Kingdom. This is 
because a constitution in this thick sense does not focus on the existence of a 
constitutional document but on the features and attributes of basic, foundational 
constitutional principles within a country’s legal system and these principles can 
be derived from a series of legislation or other legal documents.   
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The idea of constitutionalism is closely associated with a constitution in the thick 
sense as it looks beyond the mere presence of a constitutional document in a 
state, but evaluates the legitimacy of such constitution, its compliance with basic 
acceptable human rights and standards, respect for its provisions by organs of 
state and enforceability of the rights and duties spelt therein. Quite importantly 
also, it looks at access to justice therein and presence of a strong and virile 
judiciary capable of protecting the inalienable rights of the citizens.104 Where 
these features are absent in a state, the state may have a constitution but lacks 
constitutionalism. As stated by Bodansky,105 ‘it would be possible to have ‘either 
constitutions without constitutionalism ... or constitutionalism without a 
constitution.’ The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), for 
instance, has a Constitution106 which spells out basic human rights and limits 
governmental powers. Article 4 of the Constitution stipulate that “the sovereignty 
of the DPRK resides in the workers, peasants, working intellectuals and all other 
working people.” However, the constitution is a mere paper tiger as human rights 
abuses are rampant in the country owing to the absence of any institutional 
framework that restrains the exercise of executive powers.107 It thus has a 
constitution but lacks constitutionalism. On the other hand, the United Kingdom 
does not have a codified document that can be referred to as a ‘Constitution’ in 
the thin sense,108 but the legal framework within the country provides restraints 
on the exercise of governmental powers, respects for human rights and a strong 
and virile judiciary – all features of constitutionalism.  
Kotze109 points out that constitutionalism is a vague concept and difficult to cast 
accurately in a clear descriptive mould but stated that ‘constitutionalism arguably 
refers not only to “a constitution” but importantly also to a specific type of 
constitution – that is, a legitimate one universally accepted by society’. The idea 
of constitutionalism, therefore, is not related to the codification or non-codification 
of fundamental rules in a state but refers to the presence of a ‘superior law which, 
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because of its universality, is respected and revered by society as such’. It thus 
‘entails conceptions of fairness, justice and legitimacy and it strives to improve 
legal stability and predictability’.110  
The third component of constitutionalism- constitutionalization of rights- refers to 
the normative inclusion of specific rights in a given constitution for the purpose of 
elevating such rights to a higher pedestal on account of their fundamental 
importance to the state and with a view to placing such rights above the 
vicissitudes of political horse-trading, manoeuvrings and rollbacks.111 While the 
constitutionalization of specific rights cannot be considered a ‘magic cure’ for the 
ills which such rights seek to prevent, there is no doubt that protecting important 
rights through a constitutionalized legal order is preferable and more acceptable 
than mere statutory or other non-constitutionalized means. This is due to the 
supremacy of constitutional rights and protections over other statutory and non-
constitutional provisions. Therefore, protecting important rights through 
constitutional means ensure they are not easily eroded by the multitude of 
potentially restrictive statutory and other legal drawbacks within the legal system.  
 
3.4.1 Environmental Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law 
Environmental constitutionalism is, therefore, the concept whereby ecosystem 
protection, environmental values and policies and the needs of present and future 
generations are given foundational legal importance by their inclusion in a 
constitutionalized legal order. It is the junction where constitutionalism meets 
ecosystem protection i.e. where environmental protection is made a vital part of 
the practice of constitutionalism within a given jurisdiction. Boyd112 opines that 
‘environmental protection is one of the most pressing concerns of the modern era 
and there is little doubt that it deserves protection at the constitutional level. It 
should be elevated from an ‘ordinary’ legal level to the ‘higher’, more enduring, 
constitutional level’. This practice of elevating environmental protection to a 
constitutional level through means such as constitutionalization of environmental 
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rights, reforming the organs of government to embed ecosystem protection in 
governmental policies and ‘greening’ the judiciary portends a more enduring way 
of enshrining environmental protection in a given jurisdiction. Some of the key 
characteristics of environmental constitutionalism include constitutional 
provisions of environmental rights, embedding of environmental justice in the 
constitutional legal order, constitutional environmental obligations on government 
and private actors and judicial control of governmental functions in relation to the 
environment through judicial review mechanisms.113  
According to UNEP, environmental constitutionalism examines the development, 
implementation and effectiveness of incorporating environmental rights, 
procedures, and policies into constitutions around the globe.114 One of the 
hallmarks of environmental constitutionalism is that it has always been part of a 
transnational conversation – countries look to each other in developing their 
constitutional texts and as their courts seek to interpret and apply them.115 
The significance of environmental constitutionalism, also commonly referred to as 
‘Green Constitutionalism’, is linked to the importance of the constitution to the 
political structure of any state and its potential to positively affect the core 
workings of a state and policy direction in favour of environmental protection. 
Barry116 stated that ‘the greening of the constitution is a potentially powerful 
mechanism for any transition away from unsustainability. Hence, any change in 
the constitution in a green or sustainable direction could signal a profound shift in 
the political order’.  
Environmental constitutionalism focuses on the broader issues of implementation, 
environmental governance, institutions and policies involved in the 
implementation of constitutional protection of the environment.117 Also, the 
increasing interdependence of nation states has created a certain  
“constitutionalization  of  international  organizations”  and  a  degree  of  uniform  
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constitutionalist  principles  such  as  human  rights,  state  responsibility,  and jus 
cogens or erga omnes norms.118  
Thus, beyond merely constitutionalising environmental rights, the status of the 
implementation institutions, the legal and regulatory frameworks relating to the 
enforcement of these rights, the compliance of these rights with minimum 
acceptable international standards relevant for protecting the environment and 
the extent to which judicial mechanisms are available for the enforcement of these 
rights fall within the broad scope of environmental constitutionalism concept.119  
Environmental constitutionalism is an enduring way of institutionalizing 
environmental protection in a country and can be achieved in different forms.120 
The most popular means is by constitutionalization of environmental rights as 
justiciable socio-economic rights or as a basic human right of the citizens under 
the bill of rights in the constitution. Different theories exist on the rationale behind 
constitutionalization of rights in a democratic setting121 and there is literature 
devoted to a discussion of the need for, ways to, and effect of constitutionalization 
of environmental rights in contemporary democratic settings.122 It is, however, 
clear that the inclusion of environmental rights in a constitution confers it with a 
universal and binding character on all organs of government in a state and is the 
most effective means of securing the regulation of economic actors such as MNCs 
which hold significant influence on governments and are often the largest 
producers of environmental polluting substances.123   
Because environmental constitutionalism focuses on broader issues of 
implementation of constitutional environmental rights, institutions, frameworks 
and enforcement issues, it is interdependent with the concept of environmental 
rule of law. Environmental rule of law is the result of a dynamic and iterative 
process that relies on monitoring and evaluation, revision, and indicators to track 
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progress in the implementation, enforcement and promotion of environmental 
rights and the guarantees of effective environmental protection.  
Environmental rule of law looks beyond the theoretical presence of environmental 
rights in the legal framework or within legal instruments, but focuses on the 
implementation of these rights and the challenges, hurdles and opportunities that 
abound for the effective implementation and enforcement of these environmental 
rights. The concept of environmental rule of law was espoused because, 
according to UNEP, ‘while environmental laws have become commonplace 
across the globe, too often they exist mostly on paper because government 
implementation and enforcement is irregular, incomplete, and inefective. In many 
instances, the laws that have been enacted are lacking in ways that impede 
effective implementation (for example, by lacking clear standards or the 
necessary mandates)’.124Therefore, as stated by UNEP, environmental rule of law 
offers a framework for addressing the gap between environmental laws on the 
books and in practice and is key to achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals.125 
While drawing on broader rule of law principles, environmental rule of law is 
unique in its context, principally because it governs the vital link between humans 
and the environment that supports human life and society, as well as life on the 
planet. Environmental rule of law focuses on ensuring compliance with and 
enforcement of environmental laws. Environmental governance comprises a 
broader set of objectives and approaches related to making and implementing 
decisions related to the environment—with environmental rule of law speaking 
particularly to the implementation.126 While enforcing existing laws is critical, the 
ultimate goal of environmental rule of law is to change behavior onto a course 
toward sustainability by creating an expectation of compliance with environmental 
law coordinated between government, industry, and civil society. 
The concept of environmental rule of law has been growing steadily at the global 
stage, beginning from 2013 when the UN Environment Governing Council 
Decision 27/9 became the first inter-governmentally-negotiated document to 
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establish the term environmental rule of law.127 Since Since Rio+20, there has 
been growing interest in and attention to the environmental rule of law as other 
international environmental forums have also adopted the concept of 
environmental rule of law including the UNEP International Advisory Council for 
Environmental Justice 2015128 and the first United Nations Environment Assembly 
in 2014 which adopted resolution 1/13, calling upon countries “to work for the 
strengthening of environmental rule of law at the international, regional and 
national levels.”129  
In 2016, the First World Environmental Law Congress, co-sponsored by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and UN Environment, adopted the 
‘IUCN World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law’ which outlines 13 
principles underpinning the effective practice of environmental rule of law. It 
declared that ‘environmental rule of law should thus serve as the legal foundation 
for promoting environmental ethics and achieving environmental justice, global 
ecological integrity, and a sustainable future for all, including for future 
generations, at local, national, sub-national, regional, and international levels’.130 
Akin to the general concept of the rule of law, environmental rule of law is 
underpinned by three critical components – environmental laws should be 
consistent with fundamental rights; environmental laws should be inclusively 
developed and fairly implemented; environmental laws should enshrine 
accountability not just on paper but in actual practice, such that the law becomes 
operative through observance of and compliance with the law.131 The component 




                                                          
12727th Session of UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, February 
2013.  
128 UNEP International Advisory Council for Environmental Justice 2015. “Environmental Rule of 
Law: Critical to Sustainable Development.” Issue Brief. May.  
129 Summary of the First UN Environment Assembly of the UN Environment Programme, Volume 
16 Number 122 - Monday, 30 June 2014. 
130 IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law. 2016. “IUCN World Declaration on the 
Environmental Rule of Law.” April 29. 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/fles/content/documents/english_world_declaration_on_the_ 
environmental_rule_of_law_fnal.pdf> accessed 08 April 2019.  
131 UNGA (United Nations General Assembly), ‘Strengthening and Coordinating UN Rule of Law 
Activities’, Report of the Secretary-General 2014 A/69/181. undocs.org/A/69/181. 
176 
 
Figure 7: Components of Environmental Rule of Law 
                                 
                             Source: UNGA 2014 
These three components are interdependent in their nature, impact and 
dimensions. Environmental laws that are consistent with fundamental rights are 
required to be inclusively promulgated by involving relevant stakeholders in the 
form of public participation in law making and integrating concerns of 
environmentally marginalised groups in the society. These laws are then required 
to be even-handedly and effectively implemented, resulting in the laws being  
respected and observed by the afected community. Therefore, each component 
of environmental rule of law extends into the other component and they 
cumulative result in environmental laws that are legitimate, representative of the 
various interests in the society and command respect by public bodies and 
individuals/corporations in the society. 
Because these principles form the core of the general principles of the rule of law, 
it is obvious that environmental rule of law derive these components from the 
general principles of the rule of law and applies them in the environmental context. 
As such, environmental rule of law holds all entities equally accountable to 
publicly promulgated, independently adjudicated laws that are consistent with 
international norms and standards for sustaining the planet. By doing so, 
environmental rule of law integrates critical environmental needs with the 
elements of rule of law, thus creating a foundation for environmental governance 
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that protects rights and enforces fundamental obligations.132 Confirming the link 
between environmental rule of law and effective environmental governance, 
UNEP states that ‘with environmental rule of law, well-designed laws are 
implemented by capable government institutions that are held accountable by an 
informed and engaged public lead to a culture of compliance that embraces 
environmental and social values.133 (See Figure 8 below). 
Figure 8: Environmental Rule of Law Paradigm 
                                    
                Source: UNEP First Global Report 2019 
Weak enforcement of environmental laws is a global trend that is exacerbating 
environmental threats, despite prolific growth in environmental laws and agencies 
worldwide over the last four decades.134This situation persists even within 
developed regions like the European Union (EU) and the United States. A 2017 
EU study on the state of environmental rule of law within the EU found many 
implementation gaps in the enforcement of environmental laws in many EU 
countries and made recommendations for improvements.135Similarly, in the US, 
a study conducted on the environmental laws within the various states and at the 
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federal level found several loopholes that hamper the effective enforcement of 
these laws.136 The UNEP report on environmental rule of law identified multiple 
factors contributing to poor enforcement of environmental rule of law, including 
poor coordination across government agencies, weak institutional capacity, lack 
of access to information, corruption and stifled civic engagement.137 
Two pernicious threats to the effectiveness of implementing environmental rule of 
law are the the criminalization and increasing attacks on environment defenders 
and the increasing backlash against environmental civil society organisations and 
the restriction of their activities in various countries including Russia, China, 
Turkey, Viet Nam, Cambodia, and many other countries.138 UNEP’s report found 
that ‘between 2002 and 2013, 908 people — including forest rangers, government 
inspectors, and local activists – were killed in 35 countries, and in 2017 alone, 197 
environmental defenders were murdered’139 These continuous attacks on 
environmental defenders and restriction of environmental civil societies reduce 
the potential for the robust practice of environmental rule of law, the engagement 
of individuals and civil societies in ensuring accountability of government/public 
bodies in implementation of environmental laws and the inclusion of 
environmental minorities in implementation process of environmental laws, thus 
weakening environmental rule of law.  
Environemntal rule of law is central to the concept of environmental 
constitutionalism because it focuses on ways of achieving effective 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and constitutional 
protection of environmental rights. Effective implementation of these laws and 
constitutional protections of the environment aids in achieving the sustainable 
development goals (SDGs), as the SDGs are not achieved merely by having 
sound environmental laws on the books or strong constitutional protection of the 
environment but through positive environmental outcomes from the 
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implementation of these laws and constitutional protections. Thus, environmental 
rule of law is central to the achievement of the SDGs.  
An important means of enshrining environmental constitutionalism and 
environmental rule of law is the constitutional setting of minimum thresholds, 
broad parameters and minimum constitutional requirements to which substantive 
contents of environmental regulations/legislation must adhere.140 This aims to 
prevent rollbacks in environmental regulations by the legislature or political class 
arising from the pressure of socio-economic factors dictating the lowering of 
environmental standards in a bid to foster development at the expense of 
environmental integrity. This situation which is common in third world developing 
countries represents one vital area where a constitutionalized environmental legal 
order acts as a bulwark against the subjugation of ecosystem protection in favour 
of other important competing socio-economic rights such as the right to economic 
development. In Nigeria, the legislature passed the Associated Gas Re-injection 
Act of 1979 to legalize the continuous flaring of gas despite its obvious adverse 
environmental effects due to the need to promote increased oil and gas 
exploration unrestrained by environmental considerations seeing that oil revenue 
is vital to the country’s economic growth and development. However, the Nigerian 
judiciary in Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited 
and Others141 struck down the Act for violating the citizen’s right to life under 
section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution142 which includes right to a safe 
environment free from noxious pollution by gaseous substances. This is an 
example of environmental constitutionalism even in the absence of 
constitutionalization of environmental rights, as the Nigerian constitution does not 
provide for environmental rights but the judiciary utilized existing constitutional 
rights to protect environmental rights against erosion by socio-economic 
considerations.  
As evident from the Nigerian example above, environmental constitutionalism 
relies critically on the instrumental and interpretative works of the judiciary within 
a state in respect of environmental rights sought to be enforced by citizens 
through the court systems. Environmental constitutionalism is based on the rule 
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of law which is dependent on the judiciary.143 One of the cardinal principles of the 
rule of law is the reliance on and respect for the decisions of an impartial and 
independent judiciary as it espouses, delineates and protects the rights and 
obligations of the citizens. In this light, therefore, the decisions, orders and 
declarations of the judiciary in respect of suits relating to environmental concerns 
play a vital role in enshrining environmental constitutionalism within a jurisdiction.  
 
3.4.2 Judiciary’s Role in Environmental Constitutionalism 
The function of the judiciary in environmental constitutionalism is vital as 
environmental rights and other constitutional environmental obligations will be 
mere paper tigers in the absence of access to courts to seek redress for 
environmental wrongs and the availability of constitutional powers of the judiciary 
to review government’s administrative activities related to the environment. In 
essence, the presence of strong and virile judicial review power of the courts is a 
vital aspect of environmental constitutionalism without which there could be 
constitutional environmental rights without environmental constitutionalism in a 
jurisdiction. For instance, article 42 of the Russian Constitution144 provides explicit 
constitutional environmental rights by stipulating that ‘everyone shall have the 
right to a favourable environment, reliable information about its state and for a 
restitution of damage inflicted on his health and property by ecological 
transgressions’. However, owing to the question marks over the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary in the country,145 there can hardly be said to be 
environmental constitutionalism in Russia and there are no reported cases of the 
judiciary intervening to protect the environment from despoliation by the Russian 
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government or its agencies. Conversely, as seen from the examples of India146 
and Pakistan,147 the judiciary can ensure environmental constitutionalism in a 
state even in the absence of explicit constitutional environmental rights and 
obligations. 
Flowing from the above, there are three primary important roles the judiciary plays 
in environmental constitutionalism. Firstly, by interpreting and clarifying existing 
environmental laws, regulations and principles and proactively applying such laws 
towards ensuring adequate protection of the environment. In some jurisdictions, 
environmental protection is plagued, not by the absence of environmental statutes 
and regulations, but by the abundance and multiplicity of such regulations. 
Verschuuren, studying the role of the judiciary in environmental governance in the 
Netherlands, found that ‘Dutch environmental legislation has for a long time been 
dominated by “sectoral” acts: one act for every kind of pollution (i.e., one for noise, 
one for air pollution, one for pollution by waste and another for pollution by 
chemical waste etc.)’.148This creates a problem for the judiciary navigating its way 
through duplicative, and sometimes inconsistent, regulations on environmental 
issues. Although the enactment of the Dutch Environmental Management Act was 
intended to harmonise the various Dutch environmental legislation, it did not result 
in the total integration of environmental legislation and only added to the bulk of 
legislation on the subject.  
The judiciary also plays an important role in interpreting environmental legislation 
in the context of wider legal, political and constitutional complexities. For instance, 
in countries with a federal system of governance, the courts are often tasked with 
clarifying the uncertainties that cooperative federalism creates. In this sense, 
courts often must determine which statute, federal or state, applies when there is 
a conflict and simultaneous enforcement of both laws is impossible. In this 
context, the courts have to determine whether federal or state environmental 
laws/regulations or both govern in a particular situation, and may also have to 
decide which agency -federal or state -has the authority to enforce the particular 
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laws.149 The judiciary is, therefore, tasked with the responsibility of interpreting, 
clarifying and applying the various environmental standards and guidelines found 
in environmental legislation, particularly where a breach occurs by the 
government or its agencies.  
In countries with constitutional environmental rights provision, the responsibility 
for interpreting and enforcing respect for this right by the government and its 
agencies rests on the judiciary. In interpreting and enforcing this right, the judiciary 
is enthroning environmental constitutionalism within that jurisdiction and where 
the judiciary is institutionally suppressed by the government, such constitutional 
environmental rights become mere paper tigers. Environmental constitutionalism 
exists, therefore, not when environmental rights are constitutionally prescribed, 
but only when the legal system provides a framework that allows for the effective 
application and enforcement of environmental rights by the judiciary.150  
The second role the judiciary plays in environmental constitutionalism is by 
extending existing human rights to protect the environment in the absence of clear 
and direct statutory or constitutional provisions on the subject. This is known as a 
human rights approach to environmental protection and is done by re-interpreting 
existing substantive human rights, particularly the right to life, as extending to 
environmental concerns which threaten the health and basic well-being of 
humans. This approach has been adopted by the judiciary in several domestic, 
regional and international judicial forum.151  
This human rights approach to environmental protection as espoused above is 
generally referred to as the ‘greening of human rights’ and is also commonly 
referred to as ‘green constitutionalism’ whereby the concept of constitutionalism 
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is utilised in environmental contexts to equate environmental concerns with basic 
human rights concerns, particularly the right to life. Barry152 considers green 
constitutionalism as vital to the achievement of the ‘triple bottom line’ of 
sustainability—that is, achieving economic, environmental, and social objectives. 
In this context, ‘green constitutionalism’ is a subset of environmental 
constitutionalism, as while the former refers specifically to judicial re-interpretation 
of human rights to cover environmental concerns, the latter applies to a much 
wider sphere of environmental rights protection within constitutional structures of 
a country’s legal system. 
The ‘greening of human rights’ has also been applied by regional and international 
judicial bodies. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Yanomami 
v. Brazil153 held that environmental degradation of Yanomami lands violated the 
right to life and other human rights guaranteed under the American Convention 
on Human Rights. Similarly, the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Right held, in Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria,154 that the constant pollution of the environment in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in the course of oil exploration constitutes an 
infringement on the right to life of the people of the region under article 4 of the 
African Charter on Humans and Peoples Right 1979. At the international level, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in EHP v. Canada155 observed that 
the claim of some Canadian residents regarding radioactive wastes in their 
environment raises issues of the government’s obligation to protect the right to 
life of the residents.  
The third role of the judiciary in environmental constitutionalism relates to the 
balancing of rights between environmental protection and other legally protected 
interests, notably property rights and development rights. The conflict between 
environmental rights and other private rights remains a major area of uncertainty 
regarding judicial intervention in environmental constitutionalism, especially 
considering these other private rights, like property rights, are often 
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constitutionally protected. Thus, even where environmental rights are embedded 
in the constitution, it still rests on the judiciary to balance the need for 
environmental protection against the rights of private persons to unfettered 
property rights and the economic growth and development of the country.156 It 
cannot be assumed that the judiciary will always lean in favour of environmental 
protection, seeing its significance to a wider portion of the public, over private 
property rights or other economic considerations. A lot depends on the general 
attitude and specific ideological leanings of the judiciary in a particular jurisdiction. 
For instance, in countries with dogmatic respect for property rights, environmental 
rights can be curtailed in favour of the former. In the United States, a study 
conducted on the attitude of the judiciary to environmental matters found that the 
strong jurisprudential leanings in favour of the constitutional protection of property 
rights by the judiciary have curbed judicial recognition of environmental rights, at 
least at the Federal level.157 Generally, in developing countries, the judiciary often 
lean in favour of prioritising economic rights and developments over 
environmental rights. In Ecuador, in Viteri y otros v. Ecuacorriete S.A., Ministerio 
de Recursos Naturales, the court expressly ruled in favour of social and 
development goals in a case challenging the environmental impacts of proposed 
oil and gas infrastructures.158 Also, in Bolivia, the courts generally defer to 
economic and developmental interests in cases concerning environmental rights 
despite the incorporation of environmental rights for humans and nature in 
Bolivia’s constitution.159 In Nigeria, Ebeku160 argues that the pro-economic 
attitude of the Nigerian judiciary is responsible for the relegation of environmental 
considerations to the background in Nigeria and this is reflected in the low success 
rates of environmental litigations in the country, with a further consequence been 
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the resort to transnational environmental litigations by aggrieved persons from 
Nigeria against major polluters.161  
Regardless of the ideological leanings of the judiciary in a particular jurisdiction, 
the judiciary is central to the resolution of the conflicts between environmental 
rights and other private and economic rights. This importance is underscored by 
the setting up, in several jurisdictions, of specialised environmental courts to 
handle matters raising environmental concerns within that jurisdiction.162 In New 
Zealand, a special environmental court was set up to adjudicate exclusively on 
environmental matters,163 while several states in Australia have equally set up 
environmental courts.164 The National Green Tribunal in India is also an example 
of a specialised court set up to adjudicate on environmental matters165while the 
Environment and Land Court of Kenya is an example of a specialised 
environmental court in Africa.166 In recent times, there has been a rapid growth in 
the establishment of environmental courts around the globe spurred on by the 
increasing recognition of the benefits of specialised adjudication of environmental 
matters.167 UNEP’s First Global report on Environmental Rule of Law 2019 
indicates that over 350 environmental courts and tribunals have been established 
in over 50 countries between 2012 and 2018.168 In addition, the role and scope of 
authority of specialised environmental courts and tribunals around the globe are 
rapidly changing, with greater powers being conferred on them, wider scope of 
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matters and less restrictive access to these courts increasingly being introduced 
in countries around the globe.169  
The discussions above establishes that environmental constitutionalism is vital to 
the effectiveness of environmental rights in any jurisdiction. Kotze170 noted that 
‘constitutionalism is important for environmental protection because it provides 
the means to defend (environmental) rights and interests, to restrict authority and 
private encroachment on these rights and interests, and to compel the state and 
even non-state actors to act affirmatively’. Indeed, constitutionalism elevates 
environmental protection to a higher legal standard thereby prioritising 
environmental care, and also acts as checks and balances for the creation of 
legislation and the exercise of executive environmental governance functions. 
From the foregoing, environmental constitutionalism represents an important 
watermark for the elevation of ecosystem protection to a fundamental level within 
the state where it guides major governmental actions and decisions. 
Environmental constitutionalism provides a platform for the judiciary to entrench 
environmental values in the legal framework of the state through its interpretative 
functions while scrutinizing and applying existing legislation or by extending the 
scope of human rights protections to environmental concerns.   
 
3.5 Conclusions 
A rights’ based approach does not supplant or discard a regulatory approach but 
primarily acts as a supplementary protection mechanism to the latter and is aimed 
at catching claims that fall through the cracks of the regulatory approach. While 
civil liability approach tends to address the private legal interests of litigants and 
utilise liability mechanisms to penalise polluters, the inability of liability 
mechanisms to address complex cases of pollution or institute proactive 
measures of environmental protection makes the rights’ approach more suitable 
to effective environmental protection.  
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The merits of the rights’ model over the regulatory and civil liability approaches 
derive essentially from its ‘bottom-up’ approach compared to the ‘top-down’ 
approach of the regulatory model; and the preventive scope of the rights’ 
approach compared to the civil liability approach which is largely a monetization 
of environmental problems and an externalization of environmental concerns 
rather than addressing their root causes.  
The judiciary plays an essential role in enshrining environmental values in a 
state’s legal system through the interpretative functions of the courts. While 
instituting environmental rights in a constitutional form is a step in the direction of 
environmental constitutionalism, it is not a conclusive step, as the absence of a 
credible legal framework for enforcing these rights and, more importantly, the 
absence of an independent and impartial judiciary can result in constitutional 
environmental rights without environmental constitutionalism.  
Even though the mere presence of constitutional environmental rights does not 
automatically translate to environmental constitutionalism, it is the most assured 
way of achieving this. Chapter 4, therefore, analyses the process of 
constitutionalising environmental rights, the theories behind constitutionalization 
and the global trend in favour of it. The chapter also examines how the coalesced 
anthropocentrism model can be incorporated within the normative contents of 









“…any state which is constitutionally committed to the implementation and 
protection of human rights ought to constitutionalize a right to an adequate 
environment.” - Tim Hayward1  
The inextricable link between human rights and a clean environment has led to 
an increasing push for the incorporation of environmental rights in constitutional 
documents as an extension of the protection of human rights. As argued by 
Hayward, since human rights are constitutionally protected as fundamental, the 
right to a clean and safe environment, being a human right, ought to be equally 
protected by explicit constitutional provisions. This view has its root in the human 
rights approaches to environmental protection as espoused by the courts in a 
plethora of judicial decisions2 and is generally supported by the literature on the 
subject.3 
One drawback of this argument is its undiluted anthropocentric approach to 
constitutional environmental rights, hinging the case for constitutional protection 
of environmental rights exclusively on its necessity for protecting the rights of 
humans to a clean environment. When environmental rights are viewed from a 
broader, more inclusive context of coalesced anthropocentrism, as canvassed in 
this thesis, the reliance on the human rights’ argument for constitutionalising 
environmental rights becomes insufficient and inherently tenuous. The 
recognition of the fundamental nature of environmental rights and the case for its 
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Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (OUP 1996).  
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constitutionalization should, therefore, not be tied to its instrumental value to 
humans but should be hinged on the importance of the environment as a complex, 
but fundamental, life-sustaining system made up of different inter-dependent 
components of which humans are but a part, albeit the alpha environmental entity.  
This chapter examines the global trend of constitutionalising environmental rights 
and its normative contents. The chapter analyses the theoretical basis for 
constitutionalising rights and argues that the case for constitutionalising 
environmental rights should be non-anthropocentric, hinged on the inherent 
fundamental nature of the environment as a life-sustaining system and not merely 
from the perspective that humans have a fundamental right to a clean 
environment. While the human rights argument builds a strong case for 
constitutionalization (and portends greater chance of success in getting states to 
constitutionalise environmental rights), it alienates nature’s environmental rights 
and relegates other important aspects of environmental rights, such as the rights 
of future generations, to the background. Therefore, success in constitutionalising 
environmental rights on an anthropocentric platform will only result in creating 
another set of problems to be solved. Also, it will fall short of instituting a legal 
framework that will adequately address the key challenges facing the protection 
of environmental rights in many jurisdictions. 
 
4.2 Scope of Constitutionalization of Environmental 
Rights 
Constitutions4 are codifications of the most cherished values in a given state 
which are considered fundamental and inviolable and are thus positively 
entrenched in explicit terms in a foundational legal document. Although various 
legal rights are codified in different legal instruments within a country’s legal 
system, it is only the most fundamental and cherished legal rights deemed 
inviolable that are embodied in constitutional documents to entrench them in the 
society’s legal order.5 
                                                          
4 ‘Constitution’ in this Chapter is used in the ‘thin’ sense – referring to actual codified, written 
constitutions. See the discussions in Chapter 3.4 on constitutions and environmental 
constitutionalism. 




A constitution does more than just entrench rights, privileges and governmental 
duties to citizens. It acts as a fundamental regulatory tool within a given society, 
instituting foundational frameworks and structure of governance while delineating 
the scope of powers, functions and duties of the various arms, organs and 
agencies of the government within a state.6 Constitutions further institute 
procedural rules, policies and principles according to which a state is to be 
governed.7 On a whole, a constitution is the most important legal instrument within 
a state’s corpus juris8 and its provisions generally prevail over all other legal rules, 
provisions and principles within that state.  
In view of the pre-eminent role of a constitution in a political order, most nations 
of the world incorporate protection of the human rights of citizens in their 
constitution as a way of enshrining their inviolability and elevating these rights 
beyond legislative and political manoeuvrings. One of the earliest declaratory 
charter of constitutional significance, the English Magna Carta of 1215, was 
conceived as a way of enshrining the inviolable rights of the people against the 
English Monarchy9 and many constitutions around the globe have human rights 
enshrined in them. The practice of entrenching normative rights in a constitution 
is referred to as ‘Constitutionalization of Rights’ and it is the process whereby 
certain legal rights are functionally separated from other rights and positively 
incorporated into a country’s constitution because these rights are deemed to be 
fundamental rights which should act as a platform/bulwark from which the 
expression and vindication of other rights can be founded.  Constitutionalization 
of rights has the practical effect of separating fundamental rights from other socio-
economic rights which, though cherished and recognized as protectable interests 
within the legal system, are not deemed vital enough to entail constitutional 
protection.  
Constitutionalization of rights takes Dworkin’s ‘trump’ theory of rights10 a step 
further by pre-determining the prevalence of certain rights over other rights and 
asserting the trump of rights included in the constitution over non-constitutional 
                                                          
6 C Sunstein, ‘Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do’ (OUP 2002) 3.   
7 W Brennan, Jr, ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (1977) 90(3) Harvard 
Law Review 489-504. 
8 Literally translated as ‘body of laws’.  
9 See P Linebaugh, ‘The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All’ (University of 
California Press, 2009) 2.  
10 See Chapter 2.2 of this thesis. 
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rights. Hirschl11 considers constitutionalization of rights as ‘power-diffusing 
measures commonly associated with liberal or egalitarian values’. It accomplishes 
some form of social re-ordering of rights by identifying rights which occupy 
elevated positions over other non-constitutional rights and effectively pre-judges 
which rights are to prevail and which are to be sacrificed when different rights 
come into conflict. It also re-shapes the socio-political landscape and public 
opinion by identifying to the populace, the government and the judiciary which 
rights are to be accorded pre-eminence in the social order within the society. In 
addition, it serves as an empowerment of the judiciary to protect specific rights 
against encroachment by the government and legislature through judicial review 
and to establish an ordering of rights to be utilized by the judiciary in the 
adjudication of competing rights of citizens.  
 
 
4.2.1 Theories of Constitutionalization of Rights 
A wave of constitutionalization of rights began building up in the post-World War 
II era as the world moved towards preventing the horrors witnessed during war. 
As a result, countries sought to empower citizens to better protect their human 
rights by enshrining inviolable rights in constitutions while expanding the judicial 
domain to enforcement of these rights through the power of judicial review. As 
Hirschl12 stated, ‘this global trend toward the expansion of the judicial domain is 
arguably one of the most significant developments in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century government’.  
Despite the increasing interest in constitutionalization of rights, academic 
discussions on the theories of constitutionalization of rights are scanty and difficult 
to come by. Hirschl13 considers this a ‘scholastic lacuna’ and states that ‘most of 
the assumptions regarding the predominantly benign and progressive origins of 
constitutionalization remain for the most part untested and abstract’. Hirschl 
proposes four theories to explain the current trend in favour of constitutionalization 
of rights in many constitutions of the world. These theories are - the democratic 
                                                          
11 R Hirschl., ‘The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism’ (2004) 11(1) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 71-108 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/GLS.2004.11.1.71> 
accessed 08 April 2015. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid.  
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proliferation theory, evolutionist theory, functionalist theory and the institutional 
economics theory- and the key points in each theory will be briefly highlighted 
below. 
The democratic proliferation theory is hinged on the premise that the trend 
towards constitutionalization of rights is correlatively linked to the worldwide 
expansion of democratic practice to most nations of the world. Arising from the 
ashes of tyrannical rule and authoritarian monarchy which characterized most 
nations prior to World War II, this theory posits that there has been a worldwide 
shift towards democratic governance in all continents of the world.  Democracies, 
to a large extent, cannot function without constitutions and the 
constitutionalization of rights is a fundamental aspect of every constitution. Thus, 
the proliferation of democracies around the world is inversely linked to the 
increasing constitutionalization of rights witnessed around the globe. This theory 
can be supported with examples from countries such as Nigeria where 
constitutional developments have always been tied with the democratic transition 
from years of military rules E.g the Nigerian 197914 and 1999 Constitutions15 
which were products of a democratic transition period from military regimes. 
Hirschl, however, acknowledged the flaw of this theory in that ‘the “expansion of 
democracy” thesis does not provide an adequate explanation for the “no apparent 
transition” constitutionalization scenario, in which constitutional reforms have 
neither been accompanied by, nor resulted from, any apparent fundamental 
changes in political or economic regimes’.16 In this sense, constitutional reforms 
in countries like Sweden (1979), Egypt (1980), Mexico (1994) and Thailand (1997) 
were not premised on any democratic revolution.  
The evolutionist theory links constitutionalization of rights to the natural evolution 
of societies from one socio-economic stage to another.  According to this theory, 
democracies around the globe evolved to the point of realization that the concept 
of democracy is not synonymous with majority rule and, therefore, minorities 
should possess legal protections in the form of a written constitution 
                                                          
14 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 
<http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html
> accessed 14 November 2017.   
15 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) <http://www.nigeria-




unchangeable even by an elected parliament.17 The key hypothesis in this theory 
is that constitutionalization of rights acts as a form of ‘counter-majoritarian policy’ 
whereby rights are entrenched in the constitution to protect special interest groups 
by restricting manoeuvring of policymakers and limit the power of majorities in 
legislatures.18  This theory finds expression in countries with unique minority 
population requiring constitutional protection such as the case of the Indians, 
Métis and Inuits in Canada. The theory can, therefore, be used to explain the 
constitutionalization of the rights of these minority people by section 35 of the 
Constitution Act 1982 of Canada which entrenched the existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal people in Canada.19 
The functionalist theory is similar to the evolutionist theory as it views 
constitutionalization of rights as ‘an organic response to pressures within the 
political system itself’.20 Thus, under this theory, constitutionalization is seen as 
the best possible way of  ensuring the unity and “normal” functioning of such 
political systems.21 This theory aptly explains the various amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States of America which has been largely ‘needs-
based’, responding to pressures within the political system and constitutionalizing 
rights necessary to address peculiar socio-political issues. For instance, the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the US Constitution was a response to 
the changing view in political circles about racial inequalities, equal protection of 
all persons before the law and the need to constitutionalize equal civil rights for 
blacks and other minorities;22 while the nineteenth amendment which 
constitutionalised the right of women to vote in the US was a ‘needs-based’ 
                                                          
17 J Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’ (1995) 45 Duke L J 
364, 377–79. 
18 G Tsebelis, ‘Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism’ (1995) 25 British J Pol Sci 289, 323. 
19 See Canada's Constitution of 1867 with Amendments through 2011, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011.pdf?lang=en> accessed 10 
December 2017.  
20 R Hirschl., ‘The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism’, supra, n 11, 12.  
21 Ibid, 78; Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’, supra, n 17, 
371.   
22 C Warren, ‘The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1926) 39(4) Harvard Law 
Review 431-465; Charles Fairman, ‘Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights? The Original Understanding’ (1949) 2(1) Stanford Law Review 5-139.  
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response to political pressure to recognise gender equality in the political 
process.23 
The institutional economics theory is an egalitarian approach which analyses 
constitutionalization of rights from an economic perspective and sees the growing 
trend of constitutionalization of rights as mechanisms to mitigate systemic 
collective concerns such as commitment, enforcement, and information 
problems.24 According to this theory, constitutionalization of rights is viewed as a 
means of promoting ‘predictability’ within the polity which is key to economic 
prosperity.25 Webber26 noted that the fundamental building-block of every 
successful capitalist market is a secure “predictability interest” and without this, 
potential investors lack the incentive to invest.27 Consequently, politicians and 
stakeholders in a given polity are encouraged by this economic incentive to 
pursue a constitutionalization of rights as a means of ensuring long-term 
economic growth.  
A critical review of the above theories reveals that no single theory encapsulates 
or properly explains the current trend towards constitutionalization of rights as a 
myriad of socio-political factors unique to different jurisdictions accounts for the 
move towards constitutionalized rights at a given point in a nation’s existence. For 
instance, the growing trend in constitutionalization of environmental rights arose 
from the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Brundtland Report of 1987 which 
drew global attention to the link between human rights and environmental 
protection, leading to the constitutionalization of environmental rights in many 
jurisdictions – Panama 1972,28 Greece 1975,29 Papua New Guinea 1975,30 
                                                          
23 R Siegel, ‘She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family’ (2002) 115(4) Harvard Law Review 947-1046; Jennifer K. Brown, ‘The Nineteenth 
Amendment and Women's Equality’ (1993) 102(8) Yale Law Journal 2175-2204. 
24 R Hirschl, supra, n 11, 82. 
25 ibid. 
26 Max Weber, ‘Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology’ (1922) 161–62 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., University of California Press re-issue 1978).  
27 ibid. 
28Articles 118-121 of Panama's Constitution of 1972 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004.pdf?lang=en> accessed 12 
June 2017.  
29 Article 24 of the Constitution of Greece, 1975 
<http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl25.html#A24> accessed 12 June 2017. 
30 Article 4, Constitution of Papua New Guinea, 1975 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=199188> accessed 12 November 2017.   
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Portugal 197631 - in the immediate aftermath of these international instruments as 
a means of incorporating this emergent aspect of human rights. 
Also, the theories overlook the influence of globalization on the increasing trend 
of constitutionalization of rights. Countries are influenced by occurrences in other 
jurisdictions and often adopt similar systems in their domestic arena. Thus, the 
growing constitutionalization of rights across the global arena has been influenced 
by transplantation, harmonization, convergence and integration of legal systems 
between countries at the global level and this is particularly true in the case of 
global environmental law and constitutionalism.32 From a theoretical perspective, 
the growing trend of constitutionalising environmental rights across the globe is 
based on the idea that granting constitutional protection to environmental rights is 
the most effective way of protecting the human right to a clean environment from 
political manoeuvrings and to enshrine the right as a bulwark of public policy in a 
constitutionalist form.  
 
4.2.2 Global Constitutionalization of Environmental Rights 
Over the past three decades, a new constitutional phenomenon has been 
blossoming in countries across the globe and across all the continents in the 
world. From Argentina in the Western hemisphere to the Philippines in the 
Eastern hemisphere, the constitutional right to live in a healthy environment has 
taken its root in constitutional documents across the globe at the national, sub-
national and supra-national levels of an overwhelming majority of countries in the 
world. From the earlier constitutions of Panama33 to the more recent constitutions 
of Jamaica34 and South Sudan,35 nations have been amending their constitutions 
to provide for constitutionalization of environmental rights in different forms.  
                                                          
31 Article 66, Constitution of Portugal, 1976 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.pdf> accessed 12 October 
2017.   
32 See D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 3.  
33 Panama's Constitution of 1972, supra, n 28. 
34 Section 13(3)(l) Constitution of Jamaica 1962 as amended in 2011 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2011.pdf?lang=en> accessed 25 
November 2017.   
35 Section 41, Constitution of South Sudan 2011 




Currently, the constitutions of 150 out of the 196 countries in the world provide 
for environmental rights in different forms.36 Out of this figure, however, only 88 
countries have substantive environmental rights (predominantly in 
anthropocentric forms) explicitly provided in enforceable provisions in their 
constitution.37 The remaining 66 countries have environmental protection 
provided as governmental obligations in sections of their constitutions that are 
either explicitly non-justiciable or are non-executory, requiring legislative actions 
to render them enforceable.38  
Countries in the former category have environmental rights provided as 
declaratory governmental objectives under the section on fundamental principles 
of state policy which are mostly declared non-justiciable by the constitution or are 
regarded as such by the judiciary. The constitutions of countries like India,39 
Nigeria40 and Malawi41 provide for environmental rights under the ‘Directive 
Principles for State Policy’ which have been described as ‘worthless platitudes 
because of their inherently emasculated constitutional status’.42 In the latter 
category, environmental rights are incorporated in the constitutions in forms 
which are not self-executory (in the sense that citizens cannot seek to directly 
enforce them in courts) until legislative measures have been taken to make them 
judicially enforceable. This is often the result of counter-provisions in the 
constitutions that declare the relevant portions containing environmental rights 
non-executory without necessary legislative actions. Thus, constitutional 
                                                          
36 UNEP First Global Report on Environmental Rule of Law,  January 2019. See also the tabulated 
list of countries with constitutional environmental rights in David Boyd, The Environmental Rights 
Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment, supra, n 32, 
57-59 and B Gareau, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2013) B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 
403-404  
37 See Appendix 1 for a comprehensive breakdown of constitutional environmental rights across 
all 193 countries in the world. 
38 See the Appendix. 
39 Article 48A, Constitution of India 1949, <http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-
4March2016.pdf> accessed 18 June, 2017.  
40 Section 20, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). 
41 Section 13, Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994, 
<http://www.malawi.gov.mw/images/Publications/act/Constitution%20of%20Malawi.pdf> 
accessed 01 October 2017.  
42 D. Olowu, ‘Human Rights and the Avoidance of Domestic Implementation: The Phenomenon 
of Non-Justiciable Constitutional Guarantees’ (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law Review 39-78.   
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environmental rights provisions in countries like Spain,43 South Korea,44 
Mexico,45 Czech Republic46 and Paraguay47 are rendered non-executory by other 
provisions of the Constitution and are as a result not directly enforceable. A 
typical example of a counter-provision rendering constitutional environmental 
rights non-enforceable can be found in section 53(3) of Spain’s Constitution which 
regulates the enforcement of rights in the constitution. The section stipulates that-   
“Recognition, respect and protection of the principles recognised in Chapter 
3 (where the right to a clean environment is provided) shall guide legislation, 
judicial practice and actions by the public authorities. They may only be 
invoked before the ordinary courts in accordance with the legal provisions 
implementing them.”48 
Apart from the express constitutional curtailment of environmental rights as seen 
in the above, the constitutions of other countries express environmental rights in 
a manner which require their progressive implementation and are, therefore, not 
directly enforceable. For instance, Chapter III, article 65 of Turkey’s Constitution 
provides for progressive implementation of the constitutional environmental right, 
amongst other rights, provided in article 56 by stipulating that – 
“The State shall fulfil its duties as laid down in the Constitution in the social 
and economic fields within the capacity of its financial resources, taking into 
consideration the priorities appropriate with the aims of these duties”.49  
Such self-restricting constitutional provisions raise important question marks 
over the constitutionalization of environmental rights in these jurisdictions. 
Also, the courts in Netherlands, Switzerland and Greece have refused to 
                                                          
43 Section 45, Constitution of Spain, 1978 
<http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_es
pa_texto_ingles_0.pdf> accessed 06 December, 2017.     
44 Article 35, Constitution of Republic of South Korea 1948, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987.pdf?lang=en> 
accessed 18 October 2017.  
45 Article 4, Constitution of Mexico, 1917 (as amended in 2015), 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015.pdf?lang=en> accessed 08 June, 
2017.  
46 Article 35, Constitution of Czech Republic 1993, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2002.pdf> accessed 08 June, 
2017. 
47 Article 7, Constitution of Paraguay, 1993 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011.pdf> accessed 09 July 2017.  
48 Italics and underlining supplied for explanation and emphasis.  
49 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982 <http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_ii_3> 
accessed 01 January 2017.   
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directly enforce constitutional environmental rights which are considered as 
requiring progressive implementation.50 As a result, only 88 countries in the 
world can be said to have truly constitutionalized environmental rights within 
the context of such rights being directly available and enforceable to the 
citizens. This is captured in the global study conducted by this thesis in the 
Appendix and graphically represented in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 9: Global Constitutionalization of Environmental Rights  
 
 
For many of the 88 countries with enforceable constitutional environmental rights, 
these rights are included in the section on bill of rights alongside other 
fundamental human rights such as the right to life, right to liberty and freedom of 
expression. The importance of including constitutional environmental rights under 
the bill of rights in a constitution cannot be overemphasized as it guarantees the 
inviolability of such right akin to the other fundamental human rights within the Bill 
of Rights. It can also be argued that such rights trump competing constitutional 
rights in the grand scheme of judicial adjudication of rights.51 This is as a result 
of the sacrosanct nature of rights included in the Bill of Rights of many 
constitutions which are expressly declared inviolable and, in some jurisdictions, 
                                                          
50 See J Buchanan, ‘Why Do Constitutions Matter?’ in Niclas Berggren et al. (eds.), Why 
Constitutions Matter (Transaction Publishers, 2002) 12.  
51 Nur Kayacan, Derya, ‘How to resolve Conflicts between Fundamental Constitutional Rights’, 
(2016) Saar Blueprints, 02/2016 DE <http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/?page_id=67> accessed 12 
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amending the portion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution require more rigid 
procedures.52 For instance, in Nigeria’s Constitution, amending Chapter IV which 
contains the Bill of Rights require a four-fifths majority of both houses of 
Parliament, as opposed to the two-thirds majority needed to amend other portions 
of the constitution.53  
Notwithstanding the global spread of constitutional environmental rights, statistics 
alone do not tell the whole story in this scenario. A deeper study of other variables 
involved reveal that global constitutional environmental rights is more ubiquitous 
than the statistics suggests. This is due to the existence of regional and 
supranational environmental rights instruments applicable within the national 
jurisdictions of countries without explicit constitutional environmental rights 
provisions. These instruments, though not in the form of national constitutions, 
influence the domestic environmental policies of the affected jurisdictions and 
operate as a form of overarching environmental rights framework from which 
normative environmental principles can be derived within the jurisdictions. They 
include the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 1981,54 the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights 200455 and the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador”.56  
Within Europe, although there is an absence of explicit substantive environmental 
rights provisions in any of the European Union’s (EU) treaties, decisions of the 
                                                          
52 E. Bomhoff, ‘The Rights and Freedom of Others: The ECHR and Its Peculiar Category of 
Conflicts between Individual Fundamental Rights’ in Eva Brems (ed), Conflict between 
Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2008) 3.  
53 Section 9(3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).  
54 Art. 24 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), Adopted 27 June 1981, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. The 
ACHPR has been signed and ratified by 53 out of the 54 African states. South Sudan is the 
only African nation yet to sign and ratify the charter. 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf> accessed 03 January 2017.  
55Art 38, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum Rts Rep 893 
(2005), entered into force March 15, 2008, 
<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html> accessed 08 May 2017. As at August 
2017, the Arab Charter had been signed by 17 nations but ratified by only 13 – Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt (Signed, not ratified), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco (signed, not ratified), 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (signed, not ratified), Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia 
(signed, not ratified), United Arab Emirates and Yemen, 
<http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/las.html> accessed 12 September 2017. 
56 Article 11 of the San Salvador Protocol, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-
52.html> accessed 09 June 2017; The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights has been 
ratified by 23 of the 35 countries in the Organization of American States (OAS) while the San 
Salvador Protocol has been ratified by 16 OAS states.  
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European Court of Human Rights have re-interpreted the human rights provisions 
on right to life and right to private and family life in articles 2 and 8 of the EU 
Convention on Human Rights57 to include the right to a clean environment.58 In 
addition, the Aarhus Convention59 provides procedural environmental rights 
related to environmental matters for countries within the EU. The ECHR decisions 
and Aarhus convention, therefore, constitute a supranational framework for 
environmental rights applicable to EU countries, albeit a majority of EU countries 
already have explicit constitutional environmental rights. For countries such as 
the United Kingdom which has no written constitution (and thus no constitutional 
environmental rights), its membership of the EU ensures that ECHR’s decisions 
and Aarhus Convention provide an overarching environmental rights framework 
applicable within its jurisdiction. However, with the recent decision of the UK to 
rescind its EU membership, there will be the need to institute a domestic 
environmental rights framework, possibly by reviving the proposed UK Bill of 
Rights which was introduced at a 2008 joint committee of the House of Commons 
and House of Lords as part of a wider programme of constitutional reform.60 The 
UK government’s desire for a Bill of Rights was predicated on the growing 
disaffection with the EU Convention on Human Rights and its undesired impact 
on the UK’s Human Rights Act (HRA) which informed the government’s intention 
to resile from the former.61 The proposed Bill of Rights, which was intended to 
replace the HRA, has not come to fruition owing to distractions by the focus on 
negotiations over the terms of UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Indeed, the UK 
leaving the EU will potentially invigorate the reintroduction of the Bill of Rights as 
the EU convention on Human Rights will no longer be applicable to the UK. 
                                                          
57EU Convention on Human Rights <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> 
accessed 07 June 2016.   
58 See López Ostra vs. Spain, ECHR Judgment of December 9, 1994, Case No. 
41/1993/436/515.T 
59 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998 
<https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2016.   
60 Joint Committee on Human Rights; House of Commons and House of Lords, “A Bill of Rights 
for the UK?”, Twenty–ninth Report of Session 2007–08, Published on 10 August 2008, available 
at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/165/165i.pdf> accessed 
08 January 2016. 
61See for instance R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17 where 
the UK Supreme Court declared provisions of the HRA inconsistent with provisions of the EU 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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Flowing from the above discussions, it is clear that constitutional environmental 
rights are more prevalent around the globe than Figure 9 suggests. For a number 
of countries not covered by national or international instruments with a right to a 
clean environment, such as India, Nepal and Pakistan, extant constitutional 
provisions on right to life and health have been interpreted by the judiciary in 
these countries to import a constitutional right to a clean environment.62 Indeed, 
there are only 15 countries around the world that have no form of fundamental 
environmental rights provision either at the national, regional or supranational 
levels applicable within their jurisdictions and lack judicial recognition of such right 
flowing from the ancillary constitutional bill of rights.63 This is reflected in Figure 
10 below. 
Figure 10: Global Spread of Constitutional Environmental Rights 
            
              Source: UNEP First Global Report 201964
       
                                                          
62 See for instance the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 
supra, n 87, 424. See also similar decisions along this line of reasoning in Suray Prasad Sharma 
Dhungel v. Godavari Marble Industries and Others, WP 35/1991 (Supreme Court of Nepal, 
1995); and Asghar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 25501/2015) (Pakistan). See G 
Gitanjali, ‘Human Rights and the Environment in India: Access through Public Interest Litigation’ 
(2012) 14(3) Environmental Law Review 200-218.  
63 The countries are - Afghanistan, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cambodia, China, 
Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Myammar, New Zealand, North Korea, United States of America 
and Oman; See D Boyd , The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 32, 92.  
64UNEP First Global Report on Environmental Rule of Law, January 2019.  
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In essence, constitutionalization of environmental rights has become 
overwhelmingly globalized and, as surmised by Boyd,65 ‘almost 92 percent of 
national jurisdictions around the world recognizes the right to a healthy 
environment’. 66 Even amongst the 15 countries without any form of constitutional 
environmental right, some sub-national governments within these jurisdictions 
recognize the right to a healthy environment, including six American states, five 
Canadian provinces or territories, and a growing number of cities.67 The presence 
of constitutionalized environmental rights within sub-national jurisdictions is 
evidence of the recognition of the right to a clean environment in these 
jurisdictions and can potentially influence the treatment of environmental 
concerns even at the national level.68  
On the evidence above, it can be argued, as posited by Boyd, that ‘the right to a 
healthy environment is very close to becoming, if not already, a general principle 
of international law’.69 Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice70 acknowledges the importance of ‘general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations’ in shaping the international legal system and forming a 
distinct source of international law. Bassiouni opines that this provision 
incorporates two elements, viz - ‘general principles’ and ‘civilised 
nations’.71Accepting Bassiouni’s view that all nations in the post-UN Charter era 
are presumed to be civilised nations, ‘general principles of international law’ can, 
therefore, be said to derive from expressions of national legal systems around 
the globe, where these expressions are commonly shared by a majority of the 
domestic jurisdictions and there are no significant objections to the applicability 
                                                          
65 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra (n 32) 92.  
66ibid.   
67In the US, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island all have 
explicit constitutional environmental provisions in their state constitutions. The Canadian 
provinces and territories are Ontario, Quebec, the Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest 
Territories. Cities include Pittsburgh, Santa Monica, and Montreal. 
68 B Wilson, ‘State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky 
Falling?’ (2004) 53(2) Emory Law Journal 627 – 656. 
69 D Boyd , The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 32, 92.  
70 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Entry into Force Date 24th October 
1945,<http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute> accessed 15 September, 2017.  
71 B Cherif, ‘A Functional Approach to general Principles of International Law’ (1990) 11 Mich. J. 
Int'l L 768.  
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of these principles even amongst the few domestic jurisdictions where these 
expressions are not positively grounded.72  
The right to a healthy environment, as a legal entitlement of citizens, is found in 
various forms within domestic jurisdictions of over 92% of states around the 
globe. Even within the jurisdictions without explicit legislative/constitutional 
recognition of this right or judicial application of this right from other human rights, 
there is no overt denunciation of the entitlement of citizens to a clean 
environment. The United States and Canada, two significant states without any 
explicit recognition of this right at the national or supra-national level, have sub-
national units within them recognizing this right in constitutional forms. In this light, 
there is room to argue that the right to a clean environment has attained such 
widespread global recognition and acceptance that is sufficient to constitute the 
right as a general principle of international law.  
Notwithstanding the global recognition of the right to a healthy environment, there 
are significant differences in the manner of protection accorded to the expression 
of the right to a clean environment across the globe. While there is a current trend 
across many jurisdictions to accord constitutional protection to this right or to ratify 
regional instruments providing fundamental protection of this right, the normative 
contents and forms of these constitutional or regional protections vary and this 
often results in unequal protection status for environmental rights across the 
globe.     
 
4.3 Formulating Normative Constitutional Environmental 
Right 
Although many countries recognise the right to a healthy environment, different 
approaches are adopted in seeking to protect and promote this right. The most 
common means of protection is the incorporation of this right in a constitutional 
form in order to accord it enhanced protection and elevate it above ordinary 
statutory rights. Nevertheless, the manner this constitutional protection is 
normatively formulated has a significant impact on the effectiveness of protection 
                                                          
72Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP Oxford, 2007) 3; Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon Press 1973) 2.  
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that ensues. It is, therefore, not sufficient to merely analyse the existence of 
environmental rights in a constitutional form within a jurisdiction, as deeper 
analysis is required to reveal the extent to which the constitutionalised right 
imports legal protection, if any. Some constitutional environmental rights are 
normatively couched in forms that render them legally ineffectual and merely 
platitudes or declaratory aspirations for governments while others are couched in 
strongly worded legally binding rights within the general bill of rights (or outside 
of it but with equal strength).73  
Existing literature on the subject of constitutional environmental rights focus 
majorly on the presence of environmental rights in national constitutions and 
devote little time to the normative contents or framing of such right in 
constitutions. Thus, major proponents of constitutional environmental rights 
including Hayward,74 Brooks75 and Boyd76 argue in favour of incorporating 
environmental rights in the constitution without examining the normative framing 
or contents of such right. Cognisant of the fact that mere presence of such right 
in national constitutions is not constitutive of fundamental protection for the 
environment, it is pertinent to propose and analyse the key normative pillars of a 
constitutional environmental right which, to a large extent, are determinative of 
the existence of a fundamental protection framework for the environment.  
Securing fundamental protection for the environment through a constitutional 
right hinges on the presence of three vital pillars that should be embedded in the 
normative framing of such right. These pillars are- 
i. The provision of a substantive and self-executory constitutional right to 
a clean environment;  
ii. The incorporation of fundamental principles of environmental 
protection (such as polluter pays principle, precautionary principle and 
preventive principle) and procedural environmental rights including 
access to justice, information and participation in environmental 
decision making; and  
                                                          
73 D Shelton, ‘Developing Substantive Environmental Rights’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 89- 120. 
74 Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (OUP 2005) 3.  
75 R Brooks, ‘A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment’ (1992) 16 VT L REV 1063,1109. 
76 David Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 32, 92.  
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iii. The incorporation of coalesced anthropocentrism approach in the 
framing of the right.    
 
4.3.1 Substantive Constitutional Environmental Right 
Incorporating substantive environmental rights in constitutions is important 
because it enshrines the protection of the individual’s entitlement to a clean 
environment globally recognised as a fundamental right of all persons. As Kofi 
Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations states- 
‘a rights’-based approach to environmental protection is 
important because it describes situations not simply in terms of 
human needs, or of development requirements, but in terms of 
society’s obligations to respond to the inalienable rights of 
individuals.’77 
In addition, UNEP advocates for increasing constitutionalization of substantive 
environmental rights because it helps to enshrine environmental rule of law within 
the country. UNEP argues that ‘taking a rights-based approach to improving 
environmental rule of law provides a strong impetus and means for implementing 
and enforcing environmental protections’.78 Consequently, incorporating 
substantive environmental rights in constitutional documents is the hallmark of 
advancing the rule of law and guaranteeing effective protection of the 
environment. 
The first step in constitutionalising environmental right is the inclusion of a clearly 
worded substantive right to a clean environment in the constitution in clear, direct 
and enforceable language devoid of equivocation. This is usually couched using 
various ‘evaluative-descriptive’ terms including ‘ecologically sound’, ‘habitable’, 
‘conducive’, ‘viable’, ‘decent’ or simply ‘safe’ environment. The Constitution of 
Colombia79 stipulates that ‘every individual has the right to enjoy a healthy 
                                                          
77Annan, Kofi, ‘Partnerships for Global Community: Annual Report on the Work of the 
Organization’ (1998) New York: United Nations.  
78 UNEP First Global Report on the Rule of Law, January 2019, 13.  
79 Article 79, Constitution of Colombia 1991 (as amended in 2005) 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf> accessed 12 August 
2017.   
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environment’; Kenya’s Constitution80 provides that ‘every person has the right to 
a clean and healthy environment’ while Ecuador’s Constitution81 uses the phrase 
‘ecologically balanced environment’ in conferring a substantive constitutional 
environmental right. 
The nomenclature employed matters less than the general framing of the 
substantive clause, as the framing of the right in a manner that imports 
progressive implementation by the government or is subjected to legislative 
implementation can potentially reduce such right to a socio-economic aspirational 
obligation of government rather than a self-executory right of citizens. This is 
notwithstanding the use of the term ‘right’ in the clause. For example, article 35 
of South Korea’s Constitution82 provides that ‘all citizens shall have the right to a 
healthy and pleasant environment’ but includes in a sub-clause that ‘the 
substance of the environmental right shall be determined by law’; Article 56 of 
Turkey’s Constitution83 confers ‘a right to live in a healthy and balanced 
environment’ but subsequently conditions the right on the availability of sufficient 
resources by the government to advance environmental protection. In both 
cases, what appears on the surface as substantive constitutional environmental 
rights are no more than expressions of socio-economic aspirations dependent on 
the government for fulfilment within the limits of legislative or executive resources.  
Turkey and South Korea above are, however, exceptional cases as the national 
constitutions in many jurisdictions generally provide for a right to a safe (or any 
other descriptive nomenclature) environment without any restriction, qualification 
or conditions and do not subject such right to progressive implementation by the 
legislative or executive arms of government. Nevertheless, the mere presence of 
unqualified substantive rights in constitutions is just one aspect of the normative 
framing of a substantive right. Other substantive issues for consideration include 
the provision of corollary governmental duties with respect to the environment, 
                                                          
80 Article 42, Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
<https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf> accessed 12 
August 2017. 
81 Article 14, Constitution of Ecuador 2008, 
<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html> accessed 12 August 
2017.   
82Constitution of the Republic of Korea of 1948 with Amendments through 1987, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987.pdf?lang=en> 
accessed 08 April 2017.   
83 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, 
<https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf> accessed 09 April 2017.  
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conferment of individual responsibilities to protect the environment and, perhaps 
most importantly, the location of the substantive right within the constitution. 
These are important factors which influence the effectiveness of a substantive 
constitutional environmental right.    
The imposition of a constitutional obligation on the government with respect to 
environmental protection is an important aspect of securing the effectiveness of a 
substantive environmental right. As Taylor argues, ‘responsibilities are, of course, 
the corollary of rights and vice-versa, so that rights give rise to responsibilities and 
responsibilities to rights’84 Environmental rights, like every other right, imposes 
several layers of duties on the state in respect of their protection and 
advancement. Kotze85 identifies the four levels of duties and responsibilities for a 
state in respect of rights – duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil – and the 
enforcement of rights come in varying forms depending on which of these duties 
is invoked by a particular right. Explicitly imposing a constitutional obligation on 
the government with respect to protecting the environment fulfils these four co-
dependent levels of duties and responsibilities on the state with respect to 
constitutional environmental rights. Such provisions ensure that not only are the 
citizens’ rights to a safe environment guaranteed, but the government is tasked 
with the responsibility to promote and fulfil these rights. In essence, such 
provisions institute a positive obligation on the government to shore up the 
negative substantive right to a clean environment.  
Negative rights are restrictive rights in nature, prohibiting actions by the 
government from infringing on them but not requiring any affirmative steps or 
actions by the government for their fulfilment.86 They are generally based on, and 
couched in the form of, the concept of liberty (freedom) of citizens to pursue 
entrenched values which rightfully belong to them unrestrained by governmental 
interventions. One critical element of negative rights is that they are 
                                                          
84P Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Right’ (1998) 10 Georgetown 
Environmental Law Review 309, 311.  
85L Kotze ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence in 
South Africa’ (2010) 3 Journal of Court Innovation 157.  
86B Wilson, ‘State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky 
Falling?’ (2004) 53(2) Emory Law Journal 627 – 656. 
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implementable immediately87 and, to a large extent, do not require any 
commitment of resources by the government for their actualization.  
Positive rights on their part are mostly social, economic and cultural rights which 
require affirmative steps to be taken by governments in ‘granting to the people 
something they do not already have’.88 They are rights based on the welfare of 
the citizens and require actions on the part of the government to actualize. While 
negative rights import an obligation on the government to ‘respect and protect’ the 
rights, positive rights import obligations of states to ‘promote and fulfil’ and often 
involve resource allocations. The substantive right to a clean environment is 
generally couched in the form of a negative right as it includes the right to freedom 
from pollution, contamination of the environment (air, land and water) and non-
interference with the bio-diversity of ecosystems which generally requires 
restraints on governmental actions capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a 
clean environment. Nevertheless, other aspects of the substantive environmental 
right require affirmative actions by the government towards their actualization. 
The provision of clean air, safe water and healthy ecosystems require affirmative 
actions by the government for their actualization. Moreover, as Robert Lee89 
points out, ‘arguments about the environment (whether about inputs from or 
outputs to) will involve resource questions’. Thus, seeing that aspects of 
environmental rights generally raise resource allocation issues and require 
progressive implementation, it is possible to consider environmental rights as 
positive rights in some sense.   
Cognisant of the fact that substantive environmental rights straddle the realm of 
positive and negative rights, it is important to couch the right in a form that does 
not import progressive implementation, in which case it may not be considered 
self-executory but merely declaratory, as in the constitutions of Turkey and South 
Korea. At the same time, it is important to also emphasise the role of the 
government in actualising the protection of this right through allocating relevant 
resources towards its fulfilment. Imposing an enforceable governmental obligation 
                                                          
87 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment, supra, n 32, 8. 
88 B. Wilson, ‘State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism’, supra, n 82, 628. 
89R Lee, ‘Resources, Rights, and Environmental Regulation: The Human Rights Act: A Success 




to protect the environment, when incorporated alongside a substantive 
environmental right, therefore, achieves this dual purpose as it imposes the four 
levels of duties on the government in respect of this right- duty to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil. The approach of the Brazilian Constitution to incorporating 
environmental rights is a model exemplar which epitomises this point. Article 225 
of Brazil’s Constitution begins by conferring a substantive environmental right 
thus- 
“Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is 
a public good for the people's use and is essential for a healthy life”  
Article 225 then proceeds to state in sub-paragraph 1 that- 
“To assure the effectiveness of this right, it is the responsibility of the 
Government to:  
I. preserve and restore essential ecological processes and provide for ecological 
management of species and ecosystems…” 
Effectively, sub-paragraph 1 backs up the substantive environmental right with a 
positive constitutional obligation on government, highlighting seven specific areas 
of the fulfilment of this right which is mandated on the government and ensures 
the substantive right is fully secured. A similar approach is adopted in article 66 
of Portugal’s Constitution.90   
The second aspect of a substantive environmental right in constitutions is the 
conferment of individual responsibilities with respect to the environment. 
Following Taylor’s position that ‘rights give rise to responsibilities and 
responsibilities to rights’, the conferment of a substantive right to a clean 
environment should be accompanied by corresponding responsibilities towards 
the environment. In this regard, citizens are individually mandated to take steps 
towards protecting the environment and preventing any action which may 
negatively impact the environment. The placement of this provision alongside a 
substantive environmental right in a constitution is instructive as it renders this 
provision enforceable against individuals rather than being mere lofty renditions 
of non-enforceable civic duties of citizens, as found in the ‘Fundamental Principles 
                                                          
90Constitution of Portugal, 1976 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.pdf> accessed 26 June 2016.  
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and Directive State Policies’ of the constitutions of many countries.91 An 
illustrative example of this approach can be found in France’s Environmental 
Charter of 2005 which provides, in articles 2 to 4, that- 
Article 2- “every person has the duty to take part in the preservation 
and the improvement of the environment. 
Article 3- Every person must, in the conditions defined by law, 
prevent or, at a minimum, limit the harm that it is 
susceptible to bring on the environment”.92  
Article 4   Everyone shall be required, in the conditions provided for 
by law, to contribute to the making good of any damage 
he or she may have caused to the environment.” 
Constitutional obligations on individuals in the format above create horizontal 
rights enforceable against individuals and private entities and is a deviation from 
the usual focus of constitutional provisions on creating vertical rights enforceable 
against governments and its agencies. Where, however, it is not the intention of 
the constitution to render this obligation enforceable, it can be expressly declared 
as such in the constitution, as in the case of section 220 of Gambia’s Constitution 
which, after imposing a constitutional obligation on citizens to protect and 
conserve the environment in section 220(1) (j), proceeds to state in section 220(2) 
that ‘such duties shall not, of themselves, render any person liable to proceedings 
of any kind in any court’.93 
Constitutional obligations on citizens with respect to the environment is an 
important aspect of securing citizen participation in environmental preservation 
and should an integral part of a substantive environmental right in every 
constitution. Boyd, however, downplays the importance of such provisions in 
constitutions stating that-  
“it is unclear what legal purpose is served by the 
constitutionalization of individual environmental duties. These 
provisions appear to be symbolic, hortatory, and educational, 
                                                          
91 See for instance Part IV of Constitution of India and Chapter II of the Constitution of Nigeria.  
92Environmental Charter of France, 2005 
<http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/english/constitution/charter-for-the-
environment.103658.html> accessed 09 August 2017.  
93 Section 220, Constitution of the Republic of Gambia 1997, 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=221243> accessed 05 November 2017.   
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confirming that everyone has a part to play in protecting the 
environment from human-imposed damage and degradation.”94 
However, rather than being ‘symbolic, hortatory and educational’ as suggested by 
Boyd, such provisions are part of the environmental rights revolution canvassed 
by Boyd which has evolved to the point of conferment of horizontal environmental 
rights on citizens against fellow individuals.95 The constitutional civic obligation to 
protect the environment is an enforceable duty which confers a correlative right 
on citizens to enforce the environmental obligation against fellow citizens as 
against the conventional theory of environmental obligations being enforceable 
against governments alone.96 Indeed, as indicated by Boyd, individual 
responsibility for protecting the environment is no longer a novel concept as it is 
currently provided in 83 constitutions around the world and this signifies a 
constitutional environmental rights revolution targeted at improving environmental 
stewardship of the citizens. As Orhan97 stated, civic environmentalism is vital to 
the achievement of environmental protection goals as ‘the environment is not "a 
special realm” reserved for experts and professional activists, but an essential 
aspect of public life - a place for citizens’. Constitutionalising an enforceable 
individual responsibility towards the environment is, therefore, a step towards 
promoting civic environmentalism and improving environmental stewardship of 
citizens. 
The third aspect of a substantive constitutional environmental right relates to the 
location of the right within a constitution. Generally, national constitutions across 
the globe do not follow a defined pattern in their arrangement and some 
constitutions do not confer differing legal status on different segments of the 
document. In such cases, the location of the substantive environmental right 
within a specific segment of the constitution is of no relevance, as it does not 
affect its status and enforceability. For instance, the Constitutions of Colombia98 
                                                          
94D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra (n 32), 68; See pages 53 to 57 of Boyd’s 
work for a detailed enumeration of countries with individual environmental responsibilities 
enshrined in their constitutions. 
95D Anton, and D Shelton, ‘Problems in Environmental Protection and Human Rights: A Human 
Right to the Environment’ (2011 GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works 1048. 
96 Environmental Law Institute Research Report, ‘Constitutional Environmental Law’, 2016.  
97Ö Orhan, ‘The Civic Environmental Approach’ (2008) 17(2) The Good Society 38, 43  
98Constitution of Colombia, 2005,  
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf> accessed 08 May, 2016.  
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and Ecuador99 do not confer differing legal status to rights conferred in specific 
segments of the Constitution and as such the location of the substantive 
environmental rights in these constitutions are not important, although in both 
cases the substantive environmental rights are included under the general 
segments of ‘fundamental rights’.100  
Nevertheless, the location of substantive environmental rights matters in countries 
where the constitutional document confer different legal status to the various 
segments in the constitution.101 This is usually the case where a specific segment 
of the constitution, usually the ‘Directive Principles of State Policies’, is declared 
non-enforceable (as in the case of India and Nigeria’s constitutions)102 or where 
the rights conferred in a segment are declared to be only subject to progressive 
implementation (as in Turkey’s Constitution). In such cases, it is important that 
substantive environmental rights are located in segments of the constitution not 
affected by the constitutional limitation. In Turkey’s case, the Constitution 
partitions ‘social, economic rights and duties’ from ‘political and civic rights and 
duties’ and declares the former partition an area of progressive implementation 
by the government and not enforceable.103 The inclusion of substantive 
environmental rights in the former partition, therefore, immobilises its 
effectiveness.  
Ideally, a substantive environmental right, being a fundamental right, should be 
located amongst the Bill of Rights in a constitution for ease of reference and in 
alignment with the general notion of an environmental right being an inviolable 
civic right. However, there is a practical side to the argument for the inclusion of 
substantive environmental right amongst the bill of rights and this relates to the 
immutability or difficulty of instituting drawbacks on such constitutional right where 
                                                          
99 Constitution of Ecuador, 2008, 
<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html> accessed 08 May, 2016.  
100 See Article 79 of Colombia’s Constitution which places environmental rights under the segment 
on ‘Rights, Guarantees and Duties’; and Article 14 of Ecuador’s Constitution which places 
environmental rights under the segment on ‘Rights’.   
101 OHCHR (UN Human Rights Council) (2015) Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of 
Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox—Compilation of Good Practices. A/HRC/28/61 (3 
February 2015) 
102 See section 37 and Part IV of India’s Constitution & Section 6(6)(c) and Chapter II of Nigeria’s 
Constitution.  
103See Chapters 3 and 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982 
<https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf> accessed 07 April, 2017.  
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it forms a part of the bill of rights. In some national constitutions, there are different 
(usually more stringent) requirements for amending the segment of the 
constitution incorporating the Bill of Rights and this helps to guarantee the 
protection of this right from drawbacks by the legislature or constitution amending 
body. In Nigeria, Section 9 of the Constitution imposes a more stringent 
requirement for amending Chapter IV relating to fundamental rights, requiring a 
four-fifths majority of both Houses of Parliament as opposed to the two-thirds 
majority required for other constitutional amendments; Article 225 of Kenya’s 
Constitution requires any amendment affecting the Bill of Rights to be ratified by 
a referendum held throughout the country, as against the simple legislative 
procedure for amending other segments of the Constitution. In Ecuador, Articles 
441 and 442 of the Constitution appear to confer immutability on the Bill of Rights 
provisions in the sense that it excludes the Bill of Rights from any amendment that 
set constraints on the rights and guarantees. In essence, while an amendment 
can be made to add to the Bill of Rights, no amendment can be made to curtail, 
remove or impair any of the rights in any form whatsoever.104  In this regard, 
substantive environmental rights are better protected when incorporated in the 
segment on Bill of Rights within constitutions.   
There is a wide range of practice in respect of the location of substantive 
environmental rights in constitutions. In Africa, 32 of the 54 countries have 
constitutional environmental rights105 with the earliest countries being Guinea,106 
Sao Tome & Principle,107 Benin108 and Mozambique109 between 1975 to 1990 
                                                          
104 For instance, an amendment was made in 2008 to add the rights of Mother Nature to the Bill 
of Rights. See ‘Rights of Nature Articles in Ecuador’s Constitution’, 2008 
<https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Rights-for-Nature-Articles-in-Ecuadors-
Constitution.pdf> accessed 19 June, 2016.    
105 Y. K. Brian Sang, ‘Tending Towards Greater Eco-Protection in Kenya: Public Interest 
Environmental Litigation and its Prospects within the New Constitutional Order’ (2013) 57(1) 
Journal of African Law 29-56.  
106 Article 16, Constitution of Guinea, 1990 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf > accessed 08 July, 2016.   
107 Article 48, Constitution of Sao Tome 1975, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_1990.pdf?lang=en> 
accessed 08 July, 2016.    
108 Article 27, Constitution of the Republic of Benin, 1990, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990.pdf?lang=en> accessed 08 July, 
2016.    
109 Article 90, Constitution of Mozambique, 1990 
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Constitution_(in_force_21_01_05)(English)-
Mozlegal.pdf> accessed 08 July, 2016.    
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and the latest been Kenya (2010), South Sudan110 and Morocco111 (2011). 
However, out of these 32 African countries, 11 of them – Angola,112Cameroon,113 
Mali,114Seychelles,115Cape Verde,116 Chad,117Congo,118 Kenya, Mozambique, 
South Africa119 and Uganda120- have the constitutional environmental right 
included in the chapter on ‘Fundamental Rights and Responsibilities’ while 4 of 
them - Nigeria, Eritrea,121 Ghana,122 and Zambia123 - have constitutional 
environmental provisions in their ‘Directive Principles of State Policies’ which are 
non-enforceable. These two extreme positions - Constitutional environmental 
rights as fundamental rights on the one hand and as mere directive principles of 
state policy on the other hand – in Africa alone shows how constitutionalization 
of environmental rights vacillates between countries and why analysing 
constitutionalization of rights merely from the standpoint of constitutional 
inclusion of environmental concerns is too simplistic and inherently misleading.  
                                                          
110 Section 41, Constitution of South Sudan, 2011 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf> accessed 08 July, 
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July, 2016.    
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In Africa, South Africa, Kenya, Cape Verde and Burkina Faso124 have the most 
comprehensive constitutional provisions on environmental rights as their 
constitutions encapsulate the three key ideals of a substantive environmental 
right- explicit right to a clean environment as a fundamental right; enforceable 
duty on the government to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights; and 
enforceable duties on individuals within the state to protect the environment 
thereby entitling citizens to enforce the constitutional environmental right against 
each other and not just against the government. 
In other parts of the world, France, Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador are notable 
countries with comprehensive constitutional environmental rights and detailed 
provisions covering all relevant aspects of the substantive environmental right. 
Colombia’s Constitution contains 34 provisions exclusively dedicated to 
environmental protection125 while Brazil’s Constitution provides for the 
environmental right of citizens to an ‘ecologically balanced environment’,126 
imposes duty on the government and citizens to protect the environment for 
present and future generations and proceed to elaborate, in several paragraphs, 
the duties of government in relation to environmental protection. France’s 
Environmental Charter of 2005127 stands out amongst European nations as it 
contains elaborate rights of citizens to a clean environment, incorporate relevant 
international environmental law principles like the precautionary and preventive 
principles and imposes duties on not just the government, but also the citizens to 
protect the environment.   
 
4.3.2 Incorporating Environmental Principles and Procedural 
Rights 
Environmental rights provisions in constitutions are better formulated in 
normative terms which recognise the important role that basic principles of 
environmental governance and procedural processes play in the ventilation of a 
right to a clean environment. Substantive constitutional environmental rights 
                                                          
124 Article 29, Constitution of Burkina Faso, 1991 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2012.pdf> accessed 08 July, 
2016. 
125 Colombia's Constitution of 1991 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf> accessed 08 July, 2016. 
126 Article 225, Brazil’s Constitution.  
127 Environmental Charter of France, 2005. 
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should, therefore, not be stand-alone provisions (as is overwhelmingly found in 
many constitutions around the globe) but should be framed as a bouquet of 
environmental rights’ provisions which incorporate the various norms necessary 
for instituting a fundamental environmental rights framework.  The focus has to 
be on instituting an environmental rights framework rather than merely providing 
a solitary right to a clean environment.  
Basic environmental law principles developed over time for securing effective 
protection and management of the environment are useful tools for creating a 
sustainable environmental legal framework within a jurisdiction.128 Their inclusion 
in constitutionalising environmental rights will, therefore, serve to elevate these 
principles to fundamental constitutional principles in their own right which will 
guide and govern governmental actions with respect to environmental matters. 
Global environmental principles including the polluter pay principle, precautionary 
principle, preventive principle and sustainable development principle have been 
developed over the years as guiding environmental principles which help to direct 
government’s actions and policies along pathways consistent with sound 
environmental management.  
In addition, procedural rights forming part of the environmental law framework are 
vital for the protection and ventilation of the right to a clean environment. Issues 
relating to procedural rights such as access to environmental information, access 
to justice in environmental matters and public participation in decision-making 
processes likely to affect the environment are central to the ventilation of any 
substantive environmental right and should ideally be incorporated alongside the 
substantive rights. The importance of procedural environmental rights is 
underscored by its expression in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration129 which 
states that – 
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level.  At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities 
                                                          
128 L Kotze, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’, (2012) 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law, 199-233. 
129Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio De Janeiro, 
3-14 June 1992). 
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in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes” 
 
This principle was reiterated and expanded in the Aarhus Convention130which 
recognised that to be able to assert the right to a clean environment, citizens must 
have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have 
access to justice in environmental matters. Seeing the importance of these 
procedural rights, they should not be confined to mere statutory expressions as 
though they were of less significance than the substantive rights but should be 
incorporated alongside the latter as a holistic environmental rights framework in 
constitutions. France’s Environmental Rights Charter of 2005 exemplifies this 
approach as articles 3 (prevention principle), 4 (polluter pays principle), 5 
(precautionary principle) and 7 (access to information and public participation in 
environmental decision making) incorporate basic environmental principles and 
procedural environmental rights alongside the substantive right to a clean 
environment in article 1. Article 225, paragraph 2 of Brazil’s Constitution 
incorporates the polluter pays principle alongside the substantive environmental 
right while article 70 of Kenya’s Constitution institutes a dedicated fast-track 
procedural access to justice in respect of environmental issues to supplement the 
substantive environmental right provided in article 42.  
In incorporating these principles and procedures into the constitution, it is not 
necessary to adopt elaborate provisions to achieve this purpose, as in France’s 
Environmental Charter, neither is it necessary to dedicate several paragraphs to 
this purpose, as in Brazil’s Constitution. A single clause in the constitution is 
sufficient to incorporate these principles with a general, but summarised, 
provision referring to internationally accepted environmental principles and basic 
procedural rights necessary to ventilate the substantive right to a healthy 
environment. This will obviate any opposition to this approach on account of its 
introduction of potentially bulky provisions into the constitution. 
 
 
                                                          
130 Articles 4 – 9 of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-




4.3.3 Incorporating Coalesced Anthropocentrism Approach  
The Coalesced anthropocentrism paradigm proposed and developed in this 
thesis focuses on the comprehensive protection of the interests of the tripod 
rights’ holders in the environment - humans, future generations and nature. It is 
essential that the interests of these rights holders are recognised and 
incorporated in the normative framing of environmental rights provisions in legal 
instruments, not least in a constitutional document which is the pre-eminent legal 
framework for the protection of rights in domestic jurisdictions. Consequently, the 
test of an effective constitutionalised environmental right should be measured by 
the extent to which it recognises and incorporates the substantive rights of 
present humans, future generations and Mother Nature in a holistic and 
unequivocally enforceable manner.  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the environment is a life-sustaining system for 
different components of the ecosystem which includes present humans, albeit 
humans are the alpha environmental entity. Implicit in this statement is a 
recognition of the vital role that nature and other non-human components of the 
ecosystem play in the complex interaction in the environment which sustains 
human life. Article 1(2) of the Draft Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother 
Earth (UDRME) 2010 encapsulates this reality thus- 
“Mother Earth is a unique, indivisible, self-regulating community of 
interrelated beings that sustains, contains and reproduces all beings” 
Limiting constitutional protection of environmental rights strictly to the protection 
of human interests in the environment constitutes an unjustifiable and myopic 
exclusion of the interests of vital non-human components of the ecosystem and 
can be counterproductive in the long term. A counter-productive outcome result 
from the pursuit of humans’ right to a clean environment to the detriment of nature 
which sustains humans, leading to the potential despoliation of natural habitats 
to fulfil human needs which in the process undermines any effort to guarantee a 
clean environment for humans. In essence, a clean environment can only be 
secured by protecting the important components of the ecosystem which are 
necessary for its sanctity, as it is the actions of humans despoiling the natural 
habitat that is responsible for most of the environmental concerns facing the world 
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today. This paradox of counter-productive pursuit is recognised in Paragraph 3 
of the UDRME thus- 
“Recognising that the capitalist system and all forms of depredation, 
exploitation, abuse and contamination have caused great destruction, 
degradation and disruption of Mother Earth, putting life as we know it 
today at risk through phenomena such as climate change”.  
Recognising a substantive right of humans to a clean environment is, therefore, 
without much benefit if there is no correlative effort to protect the fundamental 
basis on which the sustenance of humans in the environment is derived - the 
natural habitat. Although legal efforts are routinely put in place within many 
jurisdictions to protect the natural habitat, restricting such protections to statutory 
levels while elevating the human aspect to a constitutional level is an unjustifiable 
bifurcation and segregation of environmental interests. Such segregation 
reinforces and entrenches the anthropocentric chauvinism enjoyed by humans in 
respect to environmental matters which is ‘the root of all environmental 
problems’131 because it detracts from a more extensive ecological view of 
environmental rights.  
This anthropocentric chauvinism is reflected in the equating of environmental 
rights with environmental human rights in environmental literature, as though the 
two terms are synonymous or interchangeable. The view that the right to a clean 
environment is inherently a ‘human’ right forms the basis of the strong clamour 
for constitutionalising environmental rights by its most vocal advocates like Tim 
Hayward and Richard Brooks. Hayward argues in favour of constitutionalising 
environmental rights on the following premise- 
“all human rights ought to be constitutionalized; the right to an adequate 
environment is a human right; therefore, the right to an adequate 
environment ought to be constitutionalised.”132 
This argument presupposes that the only relevance of a constitutional 
environmental right is its protection of the human aspects of environmental 
                                                          
131 A Shinsato, ‘Increasing the Accountability of Transactional Corporations for Environmental 
Harms: The Petroleum Industry in Nigeria’ (2005) 4 Nw J Int'l Hum Rts 186, 189.  
132 T Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (OUP 2005)12. 
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concerns and, therefore, disregards the wider considerations of other non-human 
environmental interests. Backing this view, Brooks argues that – 
‘the fundamental purpose of a constitutional right to a healthful 
environment is to frame the description of the pollution event in terms of a 
public assault upon an individual's substantive right to life and health’133 
Regarding humans’ right to life and health as the ‘fundamental purpose’ of a 
constitutional environmental right is the peak of anthropocentric chauvinism as it 
is dismissive of the importance of nature and non-human environmental interests. 
Importantly, the right to a clean environment, it can be argued, is not innate in 
humans but is attached to humans in order to enable humans to fulfil other innate 
rights such as the right to life and health. As Gibson posits, the right to a clean 
environment is an extraneous right not directly linked to the state of being human 
but arising because of human interactions with other sentient and non-sentient 
beings in an environmental context. She argues that- 
"... to have a clean environment is not necessarily to be human. A clean 
environment is not a 'right' because we are members of the human race. It 
is a right because we are within an ecology."134  
Gibson’s view represents an acceptable basis for formulating a right to a clean 
environment, for it is widely recognised that this right is not one that humans are 
born with or is inalienably linked to the state of being human, such as the right to 
life and health. It is a right that is necessary for improving the quality of life and 
the enjoyment of other innate human rights that are inalienable to human 
existence. In this regard, the right to a clean environment operates in the same 
way as the right to education, which is not innately tied to human existence but is 
necessary for improving the quality of human life and existence.  
Understanding this fundamental distinction, therefore, it can be argued that 
constitutional environmental rights should be expansively formulated to include 
all aspects of environmental features that are necessary to improve the quality of 
human life and existence, including nature’s intrinsic gifts and features. This view 
                                                          
133 R Brooks, ‘A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment’ (1992) 16 VT L REV 1063, 1109.  
134 N Gibson, ‘The Right to a Clean Environment’ (1990) 54 SASK L Rev 5, 15.  
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is supported by the reasoning in T. Damodhar Rao v. Municipal Corp., Hyderabad 
where the court reasoned that- 
“……..Art. 21 [right to life provision] embraces the protection and preservation 
of nature’s gifts without which life cannot be enjoyed.”135    
This reasoning of India’s Supreme Court was espoused while expanding the 
scope of the constitutional right to life to cover environmental protection and 
although the court explicitly declared the right to life to include ‘protection and 
preservation of ‘nature’s gifts’, this decision has been restrictively interpreted 
within the context of humans’ right to a clean environment. However, ‘nature’s 
gifts’ includes all aspects of the natural habitat and ecology with which the 
environment is bestowed as human environmental interests are not the sole 
reflection of ‘nature’s gifts’.  
Consequently, if the enjoyment of the inalienable right to life and health requires 
the protection and preservation of the natural habitat and ecology as a whole, the 
human rights argument is an insufficient premise for canvassing the 
constitutionalization of environmental rights as it is not representative of the whole 
spectrum of environmental protection. Constitutionalising environmental rights 
should, therefore, not be restrictively viewed from the human rights angle but from 
a wider perspective which is accommodative of the general importance of the 
ecosystem and ecological features which makes the environment a crucial life-
sustaining element. Hayward’s argument for constitutionalising environmental 
rights can, therefore, be reconstructed using different premises in the following 
way- 
 ‘The environment is a crucial life-sustaining system and the protection of 
the vital components of the ecosystem on which humans depend is crucial 
for the enjoyment of the inalienable rights of humans; constitutional 
protections are granted to fundamental rights necessary for the 
improvement of the quality of life and existence of humans and the 
protection of vital interests in a society; therefore, the protection of 
environmental rights ought to be constitutionalized.’  
This argument for constitutionalization of environmental rights recognises the 
fundamental role that the environment as a whole plays in sustaining humans 
                                                          
135 1987 A.I.R. (A.P.) 171; italics supplied for explanation and emphasis.  
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and argues for the constitutional protection of environmental rights in the broad 
sense, distinct from the right to a clean environment, which is a narrower focus 
on humans. Viewed from this perspective, an ensuing constitutional 
environmental right will incorporate coalesced anthropocentrism as a means of 
ensuring the broader constitutional protection of all environmental interests within 
the ecosystem. 
A crucial point to clarify is that the constitutionalization of nature’s environmental 
rights really matters and is not just based on lofty ideological foundations of 
grandeur environmental sanctity. One of the most important implications of such 
constitutional recognition is that it would enable legal systems to maintain vital 
ecological balances by balancing human rights, as enshrined in the constitution, 
against the rights of other components of the ecosystem. Presently, many 
environmentally harmful human activities are completely lawful because they are 
recognised by the Constitution and statutes as permissible expressions of 
humans’ property rights and interests. Most legal systems define everything that 
is not a human being or a corporation, as a property (including natural habitat and 
vital components of the ecosystem). In this sense –  
‘just as slave laws which turned humans into property entrenched an 
exploitative relationship between the two, our legal systems have 
entrenched an exploitative and inherently damaging relationship 
between ourselves and Mother Earth. Even most environmental laws do 
little more than regulate the rate at which environmental destruction may 
take place.’136 
By constitutionalising nature’s environmental rights, this exploitative utilisation of 
nature’s vital components by humans will be significantly reduced as nature’s 
rights will have an equal constitutional protection as the right of humans to 
property and natural resources which are often used to exploit nature’s fragile 
gifts. Environmental contamination and destruction permitted and regulated by 
statutes will lose their legal validity as the rights of nature to sanctity will 
constitutionally trump statutory permissions and regulation of environmental 
destructions. Courts and tribunals could deal with the fundamental issues of 
                                                          
136A Martin, ‘The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth’, <http://www.collective-
evolution.com/2014/08/24/the-universal-declaration-of-the-rights-of-mother-earth/> accessed 
09 November 2017.  
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environmental contamination by balancing the constitutional rights of humans 
and nature rather than being bogged down in the technical details of interpreting 
permitted pollutants and emissions. As an illustration, a constitutional rights-
based approach could evaluate whether the rights of humans to clear tropical 
forests for beef ranching or to drill for oil in the Arctic or other environmentally 
sensitive locations should trump the right of species in those forests or sensitive 
ecosystem to continue to exist. Thus, rather than devising ever more complex 
schemes to authorize environmental damage and to trade in the right to pollute, 
states would focus on how best to maintain the quality of the relationship between 
ourselves and Mother Earth.137 
The proclamation of the UDRME set the stage for broader recognition of the 
fundamental rights of Mother Nature. The UDRME is intended to act as the 
equivalent of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, albeit for Mother 
Nature and its components. Although the draft is yet to gain significant state 
recognition around the globe, its principles have found expressions in Bolivia’s 
statute books. The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth was passed by Bolivia's 
Plurinational Legislative Assembly in December 2010 to confer legal rights on 
Mother Nature and allow for citizens to sue individuals and groups as part of 
‘Mother Earth’ in response to real and alleged infringements of its integrity. 
However, this law only has statutory force as Bolivia’s Constitution of 2009 does 
not contain provisions relating to Mother Nature in its entirety but restricts its 
protection to ‘living beings’ in the environment. This is most likely because the 
Constitution was last amended in 2009 prior to the adoption of the UDRME in 
2010.  
Ecuador’s constitution stands out as the first and, so far, the only state 
constitution to recognise and incorporate the rights of nature as a constitutional 
environmental right. The Constitution of Ecuador 2008138 makes express 
provisions conferring enforceable rights on Mother Nature and imposing 
obligations on humans in relation to nature. Ecuador’s constitution incorporates 
nature’s rights in two formats. Firstly, it includes nature’s right in article 10 dealing 
                                                          
137 ibid.  
138Constitution of Ecuador, 2008 
<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html> accessed 01 December 
2017.  Bolivia’s Constitution attempts to constitutionalize Nature’s environmental rights but 
limits it to ‘living things’ in the ecosystem, thus excluding non-living components of nature 
like rocks, trees etc.  
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with fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution. It stipulates that 
‘Nature shall be the subject of those rights that the Constitution recognizes for it.’ 
The idea here is to ensure that nature’s rights are an integral part of the 
fundamental bill of rights recognised by the constitution which, by articles 441 
and 442, cannot be prejudicially altered by any constitutional amendment 
procedure. The constitution then proceeds to dedicate Chapter 7, articles 71 to 
74 to articulating nature’s inviolable rights guaranteed under the constitution.  
Article 71 encapsulates nature’s rights thus- 
“Art. 71. Nature [or Pachamama], where life is reproduced and exists, has 
the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, 
functions and its processes in evolution. Every person, people, community 
or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of rights for nature 
before the public organisms. The application and interpretation of these 
rights will follow the related principles established in the Constitution.” 
This format of incorporating nature’s rights in a constitutional form is reflective of 
the coalesced anthropocentrism approach canvassed in this thesis as Ecuador’s 
Constitution also confers substantive environmental human rights in article 14 
recognising the human right to a clean environment. The absence of the rights of 
future generations in Ecuador’s constitution is, however, noticeable and 
constitutes an omission by a constitution that comes closest to encapsulating the 
full spectrum of coalesced anthropocentrism approach to constitutionalising 
environmental rights. 
The importance of incorporating a substantive environmental right for future 
generations should not be understated as it ensures sustainable development 
and utilisation of the environment in such a way that does not undermine the 
ability of the future generations to meet their own environmental needs. As 
discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, the problematic nature of ascertaining the 
environmental needs of future generations can be obviated by ensuring the 
protection of the environment to meet the basic biophysical needs of humans 
which it can be assumed will be also essential for future generations. A number 
of state constitutions that provide constitutional environmental rights recognise 
the environmental rights of future generations. For instance, article 33 of Bolivia’s 
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Constitution,139 article 42(a) of Kenya’s Constitution and article 24(b) of South 
Africa’s Constitution all recognise the protection of the right to a clean 
environment for present and future generations. Article 127 of Venezuela’s 
Constitution140 encapsulates the environmental rights of future generations by 
stating that ‘it is the right and duty of each generation to protect and maintain the 
environment for its own benefit and that of the world of the future’. This should be 
a standard provision in every constitutional expression of environmental rights.  
The detailed analysis of the three key pillars of a constitutional environmental 
right can be represented in the diagrammatic form below. 
 




It should not be assumed that the incorporation of a constitutional environmental 
right with all three elements in the diagram above will require bulky, elaborate 
provisions in the constitution to actualise. On the contrary, this can be achieved 
with minimal elaboration, focusing on a brief and succinct expression of each 
element in a constitutional clause. The IUCN Draft Global Pact for the 
                                                          
139 Constitution of Bolivia, 2009 <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf> 
accessed 18 June, 2016.  
140 Article 127, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999 
<http://www.venezuelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf> accessed 08 
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Environment 2017 attempts to put together a succinct exposition of how 
constitutional environmental rights can be framed to cover relevant areas of 
environmental protection.141 As a result, only three major clauses (with necessary 
sub-clauses) may be needed to incorporate a constitutional environmental right 





















                                                          
141 IUCN Draft Global Pact for the Environment, Paris, 2017.  
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Figure 12: Sample Draft of Constitutional Environmental Right Clauses 
 
Acknowledging the growing threats to the environment and the need to act in an ambitious and 
concerted manner within the country to better ensure the protection of the environment; 
 
Reaffirming the need to ensure, while utilizing the coutnry’s abundant natural resources, that its 
ecosystems are resilient and continue to provide essential services, thereby preserving the 
diversity of life, and contribute to human well-being and the eradication of poverty in the country; 
 
Determined to promote a sustainable development that allows each generation to satisfy its needs 
without compromising the capability of future generation to meet theirs, while respecting the 
balance and integrity of the country's ecosystem; 
 
Recognizing that nature and the country’s abundant ecosystem has intrinsic value worthy of 
constitutional protection and is interdependent with the enjoyment of environmental rights by 
present and future generations of humans; 
 
Cognizant of the need to incorporate vital principles of environmental governance for the 
management of the environment including the precautionary principle; preventive principle and 
polluter pays principle; easy access to courts and access to information and participation in 
environmental decision making; 
 
Hereby declare as follows -   
  
1. Everyone has the right to a healthy, safe, and ecologically balanced environment and to 
have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations. 
 
a. Everyone is under a duty to participate in preserving and enhancing the 
environment. 
 
b. The government shall preserve and restore the essential ecological processes and 
shall take all legislative measures and necessary steps to protect, preserve and 
promote the sanctity of the environment;  
 
c. In furtherance of this duty, the State shall take a precautionary approach to the 
use of natural resources and the development and proliferation of new 
technologies. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to have access to information pertaining to the environment in the 
possession of public bodies and to participate in the public decision-taking process likely 
to affect the environment. 
 
a. Everyone has the right to easy access to the courts for the ventilation of 
environmental rights and concerns and an applicant does not have to demonstrate 
that any person has incurred loss or suffered injury. 
 
b. General principles of international environmental law recognised by the 
community of nations shall be applicable to redressing environmental concerns 
and environmental management procedures.  
 
3. Nature and the essential components of ecosystems has the right to exist, persist, maintain 
and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. Every 
person, people or community shall be able to demand the recognitions of rights for nature 
before the public organs. 
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The above is merely a sample draft and is not inflexible nor a definitive guide as 
the vagaries of national circumstances may dictate different approaches to the 
drafting of constitutional clauses. What is, however, important is the incorporation 
of the three pillars of a constitutional environmental right discussed in this thesis. 
Equally important, also, is the need to keep the clauses realistic in their 
expressions and avoid grandiose lofty clauses that are practically difficult to 
implement, especially in relation to incorporating nature’s rights (in clause 3). As 
seen from the sample draft, the approach of the UDRME in providing rights for 
nature was avoided as it is majorly grandiose and lofty in its expressions but likely 
to create practical difficulty in implementation. Rather, the approach used in 
Ecuador’s constitution was adopted as it reflects a more realistic expression of 
nature’s rights which can be balanced with human environmental interests 
without undermining the need to utilise environmental goods in satisfying human 
needs. 
Norway’s Constitution of 1814 (as amended in 2014) is a good practice example 
of drafting a constitutional environmental right to encompass a coalesced 
anthropocentrism approach. Although it does not elaborate on the three distinct 
aspects of the coalesced anthropocentrism model, it is couched in a way that 
allows for the constitutional protection of the rights of future generations and 
nature. Article 112 of Norway’s constitution provides as follows- 
“Every person has a right to an environment that is conducive to health and 
to natural surroundings whose productivity and diversity are preserved. 
Natural resources should be made use of on the basis of comprehensive 
long-term considerations whereby this right will be safeguarded for future 
generations as well.  
In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, 
citizens are entitled to be informed of the state of the natural environment 
and of the effects of any encroachments on nature that are planned or 
commenced.  
The State authorities shall issue further provisions for the implementation of 
these principles.”  
Even though short on providing explicit right for nature, the constitutional 
provision that ‘natural resources should be made use of on the basis of 
comprehensive long-term considerations’ and citizens’ right to be ‘informed of the 
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state of the natural environment and of the effects of any encroachments on 
nature that are planned or commenced’ are potent tools that can be used in 
protecting the intrinsic value of nature through constitutional mechanisms. 
In the Appendix, a global study has been conducted of the national constitutions 
of all 193 countries in the world with written constitutions to determine the extent 
to which they meet the three essential pillars of constitutional environmental rights 
in their constitution. The study finds that although no country’s constitution 
successfully ticks all three boxes, a number of countries fulfil two out of the three 
criteria (including Ecuador, Bolivia, Kenya, Brazil etc.) while the majority of 
countries only tick one box (the substantive environmental rights box). Over 100 
countries, including the United States, Canada and Australia fail to tick any of the 
boxes and are pariahs as far as substantive constitutional environmental rights 
are concerned.  
Figure 13142 
           
 
This global study, therefore, reveals that while the clamour for constitutional 
environmental rights has been gaining momentum, no country has yet attained 
the gold quality standard in this regard, even amongst countries that recently 
                                                          
142 See the Appendix for a comprehensive breakdown of the state of environmental rights in the 
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amended their constitution to incorporate environmental rights (e.g. France, 
Ecuador, Kenya, Jamaica and Morocco).  Understanding the necessity of 
achieving constitutional protection for the environment will aid in highlighting the 
impact it has on environmental concerns in domestic jurisdictions and makes a 
strong case for advocating that countries should be more proactive in 
constitutionalising environmental rights. 
 
4.4 Conclusions   
The recognition of the right to a healthy environment is pervasive in many 
constitutions and this recognition has become so widespread that the right to a 
clean environment can arguably be said to have become a general principle of 
international law and an integral part of customary international law, as far as 
international environmental law is concerned. 
In making a case for adopting constitutional environmental rights, the human 
rights’ argument relied upon by proponents is flawed as it overlooks the 
fundamental importance of the environment as a life-sustaining system worthy of 
constitutional protection and only focuses on the instrumental value of the 
environment to humans. Only by framing the discussion in the broader context of 
guaranteeing fundamental protection of all the inter-dependent and inter-related 
components of the ecosystem which sustains humans can a comprehensive 
constitutional right that protects the interests of the three vital rights’ holders in the 
environment – humans, nature and future generations- be efficiently instituted.  
Consequently, in formulating a normative constitutional environmental right, it is 
not sufficient to simply express the right of humans to a clean environment, as 
that would be anthropocentric chauvinism. There are three key pillars of a 
constitutional environmental right which should be represented in any normative 
expression of environmental rights in a constitutional form. First, there should be 
a substantive environmental right which explicitly confers an enforceable right to 
a clean environment without any pre-conditions or drawbacks and which 
incorporates express obligations on individuals and government to protect, 
promote and defend the environment. Second, the normative framework should 
also provide for procedural rights related to environmental matters including 
access to justice, access to environmental information and participation in 
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environmental decision making, as well as incorporate general principles of 
international environmental law such as polluter pays, preventive principle and 
sustainable development principle. Third, the rights of Mother Earth and future 
generations should be incorporated into the normative framework in an 
enforceable manner.  
Preferably, the normative framework should be included amongst the bill of rights 
provisions in the constitution to evince its inviolability and, depending on the 
peculiarity of the state constitution, render it less susceptible than other 
constitutional provisions to alteration through constitutional amendment 
procedures. 
Having established the basis for constitutionalising environmental rights and its 
normative structure, chapter 5 examines the impacts of constitutionalization on 
ecosystem protection, looking at both its legal and extra-legal effects on the 
environmental protection frameworks in countries that have introduced 






IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION ON ECOSYSTEM 
PROTECTION 
5.1 Introduction 
With the growing global trend in favour of constitutionalising environmental rights, 
it is pertinent to understand in what ways elevating environmental rights to 
constitutional platforms can impact the manner of protection that ensues. For 
countries with widespread environmental problems, the shift towards 
constitutional environmental rights is often intended as a seismic move towards 
better environmental protection, but the absence of methodological means of 
establishing a causal link between constitutionalization and ecosystem protection 
often raises doubt on whether constitutionalization makes any significant 
difference. 
This chapter examines the practical impacts of constitutional environmental rights 
on ecosystem protection from two perspectives- legal and extra-legal. It argues 
that the legal effects can be felt in the area of environmental legislation and 
litigation while the extra-legal effects can be established from analysing the 
ecological footprints of countries with constitutional environmental rights 
compared to countries without it.   
The chapter also argues that while there are no definite methodological means of 
establishing a direct link between constitutionalising environmental rights and an 
improvement in environmental protection, the available evidence from a study of 
environmental legislation and litigation post-constitutionalization supports the 
view that constitutionalising environmental rights is a landmark step in the 
direction of improved ecosystem protection within a jurisdiction.  
 
5.2 Benefits of Constitutionalizing Environmental Rights 
Constitutionalization of rights has become an important format for guaranteeing 
the protection of rights and acting as an ultimate safety net for preventing political 
rollbacks on crucial civil and social rights which are essential in every democratic 
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society. The increasing reliance on constitutionalization has permeated the 
environmental rights field and has led to the increasing clamour for 
constitutionalising environmental rights as a way of guaranteeing such rights and 
elevating it above socio-political manoeuvrings and other developmental pursuits. 
The basis for the clamour is the belief that environmental protection is one of the 
important global concerns of recent times and it thus deserves protection at the 
constitutional level by elevating environmental rights to a superior, fundamental 
status within the polity in the form of constitutional rights. Hayward,1 one of the 
leading proponents of constitutionalization of environmental rights, framed the 
argument thus- 
“The most general rationale for taking a constitutional approach to 
environmental protection, therefore, is that the seriousness, 
extensiveness, and complexity of environmental problems are such 
as to prompt a need for concerted, coordinated political action aimed 
at protecting all members of populations on an enduring basis.” 
Hayward’s view reflects the growing concern that the myriad of serious 
environmental problems which many countries face require a more fundamental 
approach to tackling them through the institutionalisation of environmental rights 
in the basic legal framework of the country. A constitution is a codification of the 
most important values and most cherished rights within a given state. By 
constitutionalising environmental rights, therefore, a country is conveying the 
impression that it attaches immense significance to environmental issues and is 
resolutely committed to guaranteeing the rights of the citizens to enjoy an 
environment free of pollution and other environmental despoliation.   
The importance of this clamour for constitutionalization of environmental rights 
lies in the fact that environmental rights are generally perceived as positive rights 
which often involve allocation of resources by governments to accomplish. Even 
though, as discussed earlier, the right to a clean environment in many 
jurisdictions, in its normative form, is presented as a negative right which restricts 
government’s interference, environmental rights are generally classed under 
socio-economic rights which are mostly capable of progressive implementation 
as resources become available.  
                                                          
1 T Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (OUP 2005) 3, 12. 
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Further, and perhaps more importantly, environmental rights often conflict with 
property rights (which is a constitutional right) and other socio-economic rights 
such as the right to development which is often accorded preference, particularly 
in third world countries in keeping with the ‘full-belly’ syndrome.2 Thus, 
environmental interests are often sacrificed at the altar of other rights and are 
subjugated to these rights to the detriment of environmental protection. 
Constitutionalizing environmental rights is, therefore, seen as a means of levelling 
the playing field with property rights and other economic and social considerations 
which often trump environmental concerns and ensuring that environmental rights 
are accorded priority considerations in national policies.  
Nevertheless, Hayward3 cautions that the clamour for constitutionalizing 
environmental rights should not be considered as the ultimate protection measure 
for the environment as constitutionalization is ‘just one approach to solving 
environmental concerns, by establishing the basic right from which practical 
jurisprudence and wider social norms will develop progressively to support more 
ambitious aims’. The significance of this caution is based on the fact that 
constitutionalization of environmental rights cannot act as a guarantee of 
environmental sanctity as constitutional provisions merely offer broad and 
powerful normative tools for protecting the environment but require effective 
utilisation by the judiciary and the populace for practical effects to be felt in real 
environmental terms. Kotze4 studied the constitutionalization of environmental 
rights in the South African Constitution of 1996 and found that more than 15 years 
thereafter, environmental protection in the country had not significantly improved 
from its pre-constitutionalized situation as the South African judiciary had failed to 
capitalise on the momentum generated by the constitutionalization to 
revolutionize environmental protection in the country.  
As a result, the growing global support for constitutionalization of environmental 
rights has not tapered the criticisms which such efforts have continued to face 
from different quarters and it is imperative to discuss and dispel these criticisms 
before examining the benefits of constitutionalising environmental rights. The 
                                                          
2 See the discussions on the ‘full-belly’ syndrome in chapter 1.4.5 of this thesis. 
3T Hayward, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Case for Political Analysis’ (2000) 48 Political 
Studies 559. 
4 L Kotze, ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence in 
South Africa’ (2010) 3 Journal of Court Innovation 157. 
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criticisms of constitutionalising environmental rights generally derive from 
criticisms of the rights-based approach to environmental protection as there are 
still debates whether the concept of environmental rights is an appropriate 
mechanism towards addressing environmental concerns in view of the many 
drawbacks involved.  
Some of the criticisms include the fact that environmental rights are vague, 
redundant, undemocratic, inherently anthropocentric, capable of opening the 
floodgates to litigation, unenforceable and capable of generating false hopes. 
Constitutionalization of environmental rights has also been condemned as being 
‘largely symbolic exercises’, ‘legalistic window dressing’.5 With regards to the 
supposed vagueness, it is argued that the exact scope and normative contents 
of the purported right are unclear, indeterminate and ambiguous. This criticism 
arises mostly from the uncertainty regarding the threshold for environmental harm 
that an environmental right imposes, as different terms are constantly being used 
to describe the right- clean, healthy, decent, habitable etc. - and an indeterminate 
right is not capable of effective enforcement. Boyd asserts that this generally 
creates reluctance in regarding substantive environmental rights as anything 
other than policy declarations of government’s objectives for a clean environment 
without any judicially enforceable potential.6 In response, it must be noted, as 
argued by O’Gorman, that rights are generally broad normative standards 
imposed by law to be interpreted and applied in varying legal contexts by the 
courts and regulated by administrative policies as necessary.7 Further, human 
rights are generally dynamic and evolve with human values; thus it is the function 
of the courts to interpret this right to suit the particular context in which it is 
ventilated and legislation can be enacted by governments to give clearer 
meanings to this right and impose operable standards, not below the 
constitutional standard, as necessary.8 Therefore, the accusation of the 
                                                          
5 D Kysar, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Getting There from Here’ (2012) 
Transnational Environmental Law 83, 87. 
6 D Boyd, ‘The Effectiveness of Constitutional Rights’ Yale UNITAR Workshop. 
<https://environment.yale.edu/content/documents/00003438/Boyd-Eectiveness-of-
Constitutional- Environmental-Rights.docx?1389969747> accessed 19 May 2019.  
7 R O’Gorman, ‘Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study’ (2017) Transnational 
Environmental Law 435-462. 




vagueness of environmental right cannot be a ground for denying environmental 
rights a constitutional status.9  
Also, it is contended that a constitutional environmental right is redundant and 
unnecessary seeing that other constitutional human rights like the right to life and 
privacy can be used to ventilate this right and tort law already provides sufficient 
civil liability remedies for environmental harms.10 While it is true that other human 
rights can be ‘greened’ to protect the environment, there is a limit to judicial 
creativity and activism as these rights cannot be applied by the judiciary in 
contexts where environmental protection is invoked without a corollary link to 
actual harm to humans. Also, the greening of human rights is inherently 
anthropocentric without any protection for other non-human life forms in the 
environment and is therefore insufficiently extensive to accord effective protection 
for environmental interests in its broader context. Further, greening human rights 
leaves no room for important environmental law principles such as preventive 
and precautionary policies which are vital to effective environmental 
management. As stated by Boyd,11 these ‘international environmental principles 
cannot be shoe-horned comfortably into existing human rights’ and therefore 
require express substantive constitutional rights that incorporate them.  
In relation to the contention that constitutionalizing environmental rights is 
undemocratic as it usurps the powers of the executive and legislature in 
determining appropriate environmental standards, it is often argued that ‘majority 
approval is necessary for a proper decision on policy or allocation of resources’12 
and vesting such powers on the judiciary is a ‘judicialisation’ of political and 
administrative decisions. In response, it should be noted that one of the key 
features of a constitution is its counter-majoritarian purpose in a bid to protect 
minority interests and this is done through the recognition of rights which protect 
basic interests of all persons in the society regardless of their belonging to a 
majority or minority group. As stated by Dershowitz13 ‘rights serve as a check on 
democracy, and democracy serves as a check on rights’ and thus constitutional 
                                                          
9 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 235. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 Regina v. British Broadcasting Corporation ex parte Prolife Alliance [2003] 2 All E.R 977, para 
76 (Hoffman LJ). 
13 A. Dershowitz, ‘Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights’ (New York 
Basic Books 2004) 31, 35.  
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environmental rights act as a check on the infringement of the environmental 
rights of the minority against the majority, often referred to as ‘ecological 
imperialism’.14  
Finally, on the scepticism over the inherent anthropocentric nature of a 
constitutional environmental right, earlier discussions in chapter 4 have shown 
ways that a constitutional environmental right can be formulated to incorporate 
the essential environmental interests including the interests of nature and other 
non-human components of the ecosystem. Therefore, a properly formulated 
constitutional environmental right will not be purely anthropocentric but will 
guarantee environmental rights in a broader context. As the examples of 
Ecuador15 and Bolivia16 have shown, countries are beginning to recognize the 
intrinsic value of the environment and according increasing protection to it. Thus, 
constitutional environmental rights can be couched in a normative form which 
embraces coalesced anthropocentrism as its ideological platform. 
Nevertheless, it is imperative to point out that the constitutionalization of nature’s 
environmental rights in Ecuador and Bolivia are not exactly perfect examples of 
incorporating nature’s interests as the legalistic incorporation of these rights have 
not overcome the democratic deficit and absence of environmental rule of law 
within these countries.  
Several studies conducted in Ecuador and Bolivia since the constitutionalization 
of nature’s rights in 2008 and 2010 have reported poor implementation and 
enforcement of these rights. Reagrding Ecuador’s constitutional incorporation of 
nature’s rights, Kotze brands it a ‘window-dressing exercise’ done merely to 
accommodate the animistic cultural worldviews of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples 
in the hope of strengthening political support;17Fitz-Henry called it a ‘beautiful 
rhetoric’ with no enforcement significance18 while Magril brands it a constitutional 
‘green-washing’ of nature’s rights to cosmetically put forward a show of nature 
                                                          
14 This is discussed in fuller details in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
15 See article 10 and articles 74 - 77 of Ecuador’s Constitution 2008. 
16 See Bolivia’s Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, 2010.   
17L Kotzé and P Calzadilla, ‘Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental 
Constitutionalism and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador’, (2017) 6(3) Transnational Environmental 
Law 401–433, 426. 
18 F Fitz-Henry, ‘Decolonizing Personhood’, in M. Maloney & P. Burdon (eds), Wild Law: In 
Practice (Routledge, 2014) 19–30. 
238 
 
friendliness.19  The problem with Ecuador’s constitutional incorporation of 
nature’s rights is that, as Kotze pointed out, ‘the Constitution is a conflicted text 
that seems to be at odds with itself in a struggle between ecocentric rights of 
nature and directly opposing anthropocentric claims that are similarly 
constitutionally entrenched and legitimized’20 and as a result, ‘when read in the 
broader context of the Ecuadorian Constitution, the environment and the rights of 
nature are in some instances subordinate to other concerns’.21  
Interestingly, this criticism is not peculiar to nature’s rights in Ecuador’s 
constitution but is symbolic of the internal contradiction and self-limiting 
provisions scattered throughout the constitution. For instance, while article 11 
proclaims equality of all persons irrespective of sexual orientation, at the same 
time, it actively discriminates against homosexuals by denying them the right to 
marriage - ‘marriage is the union of man and woman’ (article 67); and adoption 
of children- ‘adoption shall only be permitted for different-gender couples’ (article 
68).  
Ecuador’s constitution, therefore, appears to be largely a symbolic exercise by 
the drafters who are over-eager to drum support from native communities and the 
international community for their commitment to nature’s protection.22 Kotze 
argues that this over-eagerness by the drafters is displayed in the over-elaborate 
way the provisions for nature’s rights were drafted as the wordiness of the clause 
undermines clarity and implementation potentials since it begins to looks more 
like declaratory principles than substantive rights. In Kotze’s view, ‘while there is 
no generally accepted or evident trend, it is arguably more common for 
constitutions to provide condensed but broadly formulated provisions of a more 
general and abstract nature that are then subsequently refined through detailed 
statutory provisions’.23 
                                                          
19 M. Margil, ‘Building an International Movement for Rights of Nature’, in Maloney & P. Burdon 
(eds), Wild Law: In Practice (Routledge, 2014)153–6. 
20 L Kotzé and P Calzadilla, ‘Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality’, supra, n 17, 425. 
21 Ibid, 426.  
22 C. Kauffman & P. Martin, ‘Testing Ecuador’s Rights of Nature: Why Some Lawsuits Succeed 
and Others Fail’, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 
Atlanta, GA (US), 18 Mar. 2016, p. 9, available at:  
<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/Papers/Testing%20Ecua
dor%E2%80%99s%20RoN_16_04_20.pdf> accessed 09 April 2019.  
23 L Kotzé and P Calzadilla, ‘Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality’, supra, n 17, 427. 
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Kotze’s criticism is justified as the absence of environmental rule of law in 
Ecuador has resulted in the government’s disregard for the constitutional 
protection of nature and promulgation of statutory instruments, such as the Mining 
Law, Official Registry No. 517, 29 Jan. 2009, under which authority the 
government in March 2012 signed the first large-scale open-pit mining contract 
in the country’s history, the so-called Mirador project, which is located in an 
indigenous territory that is also rich in biodiversity. This mining project threatens 
the fragile ecosystem in this indigenous project and opponents of the projects 
have faced government’s oppression including killing of some of its leaders.24 
Even the judiciary in Ecuador have not been helpful in protecting nature’s 
constitutional right as a provincial court in Wheeler v. Director de la Procuraduría 
General del Estado en Loja25 declined environmental activists’ suit seeking to 
protect nature’s vital ecosystem from government encroachment for mining 
purposes.  
In Bolivia, despite relevant laws26 enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate 
for nature’s protection in the Bolivian Constitution, pre-existing statutes adopted 
prior to the Bolivian Constitution which authorise government’s encroachment on 
nature’s fragile ecosystem such as Environmental Law 1333 of 1992 is still in 
force. Also, Supreme Decree 2366, enacted in May 2015 (after the promulgation 
of Bolivia’s Constitution) legalizes exploratory drilling in more than 60 of Bolivia’s 
protected areas and in its 22 national parks, thus undermining the essence of the 
constitutional protection of nature in the constitution.27  
Nevertheless, despite some scepticism and shortcomings, constitutional 
environmental rights possesses great potentials for revolutionising the treatment 
of environmental concerns in domestic jurisdictions. The growing adoption of 
constitutional environmental rights in several countries is a testament to the 
acceptance by nations of the need to elevate environmental care to the higher, 
fundamental constitutional level. In the US, for instance, over 24 cities have 
                                                          
24 D. Collyns, ‘Was This Indigenous Leader Killed Because He Fought to Save Ecuador’s Land?’, 
(The Guardian, 2 June 2015), available at:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/02/ecuadormurder-jose-tendetza-el-mirador-
mine-project> accessed 28 March 2019.  
25 Judgment, Provincial Court of Loja, Case No. 11121-2011-0010. 
26 Law No. 071 on the Rights of Mother Earth and Framework Act No. 300 of Mother Earth and 
the Integral Development of Good Living.  
27 P Calzadilla and L Kotzé, ‘Living in Harmony with Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the R ights of 
Mother Earth in Bolivia’ (2018) 7(3) Transnational Environmental Law 397–424. 
240 
 
enshrined the rights of nature to exist and instituted policies to protect the intrinsic 
value of the natural ecosystem.28 This is borne out by the fact that almost all 
constitutions enacted or amended since the early 1990s provide for environmental 
protection in different forms.29  
Having disposed of the criticisms and scepticism, it is pertinent to analyse the 
potential benefits of constitutionalising environmental rights which have been 
canvassed and debated. Bruch et al30 posit that constitutionalizing environmental 
rights will enable it to be used both defensively/restrictively to protect against 
government actions infringing on environmental integrity and also 
affirmatively/offensively to compel governments to undertake certain acts such as 
shutting down a polluting industry. They also argue that it can provide a safety net 
for inadequate or insufficient environmental protection systems especially in 
countries that are still in the process of developing environmental laws and 
regulations and prevent the easy manipulation of environmental legislation by 
Parliament, as constitutional provisions are generally more rigid to amend than 
ordinary statutes. Feris31 argues that the insertion of an environmental right into 
a constitution elevates the importance of environmental protection and 
conservation and places it on a par with other constitutionally-protected rights 
such as equality, dignity and the right to life. Daly32 asserts that constitutionally 
enshrined environmental rights may provide the last clear chance for people to 
vindicate their human rights to a healthy environment.  
Analysing these views of the benefits of constitutional environmental rights, it is 
clear that the evidential benefits can be categorised in three distinct levels: in 
relation to the government; in relation to extant environmental protection 
framework; and in relation to competing socio-economic rights. The first level 
focuses on the impact that constitutional environmental rights have on 
                                                          
28J Tuholske, ‘U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental Protection: Diamonds in the Rough’ 21 
Widener Law Review 239-255 <http://widenerlawreview.org/ les/2008/10/13-Tuholske.pdf> 
accessed 17 May 2019; N. Rhüs & A. Jones, ‘The Implementation of Earth Jurisprudence 
through Substantive Constitutional Rights of Nature’ (2016) 8(174) Sustainability 1–19. 
29D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 235; Tim Hayward, Constitutional 
Environmental Rights, supra, n 1.  
30 Carl Bruch, Wole Coker, and Chris VanArsdale, ‘Breathing Life into Fundamental Principles: 
Implementing Constitutional Environmental Protections in Africa’ (2001) Environmental 
Governance in Africa, Working Papers: WP#2.  
31 L. Feris, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: An under-utilized resource’ (2008) 24(1) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 29-49. 
32 E. Daly and J.R. May, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights and Liabilities’ (2012) 20(3) 
Environmental Liability 75. 
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governmental obligations with respect to environmental protection. Because 
substantive constitutional environmental rights can be framed as both a negative 
and positive right, it can have dual purpose effect on the discharge of 
government’s environmental obligation. As a negative right, it can be relied upon 
to resist, challenge and nullify any government effort, activity or policy that 
infringes or threatens to disrupt environmental sanctity or create unfavourable 
environmental conditions negatively affecting the enjoyment of the inhabitants of 
such environment. This was done in the Chilean case of Pablo Orrego Silva v. 
Empressa Pange SA,33 where the Supreme Court of Chile ordered a halt to the 
construction of six hydroelectric dams on the Bio-Bio River in view of its threat to 
the ecosystem and the environmental rights of the indigenes in that region. On 
the other hand, as a positive right, it can be relied upon to compel governments 
to take steps involving allocation of resources towards addressing areas of 
environmental concerns where government’s intervention is necessary to obviate 
environmental destruction. In this case, it is not a government decision or activity 
that is sought to be restricted, rather, it is a step towards moving an inactive 
government in a specific direction as is necessary for fulfilling environmental 
protection. Because the basis for such claim is a constitutionally protected right, 
the government cannot rely on statutory exemptions or absence of resources to 
defeat the claim.  
The second level relates to the impact of constitutional environmental rights on 
reforming and revitalising the environmental law framework within a country. 
Often, constitutionalising a right provides the much-needed boost to ailing legal 
frameworks related to such right within a country. By incorporating a constitutional 
environmental right, the legislature and other public bodies become under a 
constitutional obligation to update the environmental laws and legal framework 
within a jurisdiction to meet up with the constitutional standard. This obligation is 
either implicitly conveyed in the constitutional provision or is expressly stipulated 
in the relevant constitutional provisions. For instance, section 24 of South Africa’s 
Constitution explicitly obliges the government to take legislative steps to protect, 
promote and fulfil the right of citizens to a clean environment while article 225 of 
                                                          
33 Pablo Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA Supreme Court of Chile 5th August 1993. 
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Brazil’s constitution obliges the government to take relevant policy steps to 
institute a credible framework for advancing environmental protection.  
Under the third level, constitutional environmental rights are analysed through the 
prism of its interaction with other competing socio-economic rights which 
previously had precedence over environmental concerns in the grand scheme of 
national policymaking. By constitutionalising environmental rights, they gain equal 
strength with other fundamental rights such as the right to life and liberty and are 
no longer subjugated to other socio-economic objectives. Importantly, the 
constant struggle to balance property rights with environmental interests assumes 
a different dimension as the focus becomes one of reconciling conflicting 
constitutionally protected interests rather than looking for space within property 
rights to accommodate environmental considerations.  
Expanding on the above analysis, the three criteria identified by Boyd34 for 
assessing the benefits of constitutionalization of environmental rights are 
discussed below: 
 
5.2.1 Impact on Environmental Laws and Enforcement 
Constitutionalization of environmental rights sets a minimum threshold for 
environmental laws and regulations within the country. The executive and 
legislative arms are, therefore, under a constitutional obligation not only to pass 
legislation/regulations enhancing this constitutional right but are also restrained 
from settings standards below the minimum thresholds determined in the 
constitutional right. This results in the enactment and enforcement of stronger 
and more comprehensive environmental laws within the state.  It thus provides 
an impetus for stronger environmental laws. For instance, section 24(2) of the 
South African Constitution35 imposes an obligation on the government to adopt 
‘reasonable legislative and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; promote conservation, and secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development.’ This means that the government must adopt legislative 
measures to promote environmental protection (particularly useful in countries 
                                                          
34 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 235. 
35 See also Article 66(2) of the Constitution of Portugal 1976.  
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where there is an absence of relevant environmental laws) and the standards in 
such legislation and regulations must achieve the constitutionally set thresholds 
and objectives.  
This constitutional foundation for environmental legislation also helps to improve 
enforcement of environmental laws within the state as it “acts as a powerful 
catalyst stimulating the more effective enforcement of existing environmental 
protection laws’36 and ‘equivocation is no longer an option’.37 
In addition, constitutionalizing environmental rights implements the ‘standstill 
doctrine’ in environmental protection by preventing rollbacks of environmental 
standards since the constitutional right stipulates the minimum thresholds that 
must be maintained at all times and environmental legislation cannot go below 
the thresholds.38 Boyd39 further argues that it provides a safety net by helping to 
address gaps in legislation, regulations, policies, and implementation. 
 
5.2.2 Impact on Environmental Rights Vis-a-Vis other Socio-
Economic Rights 
Constitutionalizing environmental rights has the effect of levelling the playing field 
for environmental rights vis-a-vis other rights involving economic and social 
considerations which often trump environmental protection. As Kotze40 stated, 
one of the obstacles to recognition and enforcement of environmental rights is 
that environmental regulation, in general, comes at the expense of other 
important societal goals such as development and industrialisation, which are the 
primary interests of most societies, especially developing countries. 
Constitutionalising environmental rights will, therefore, save the state from itself 
by ensuring that social and economic considerations such as development goals 
do not trump environmental concerns which are more enduring than the short-
term needs for economic development. The Constitutional Court in South Africa, 
while adjudicating on the constitutional right to a healthy environment in the South 
                                                          
36 C. P. Stevenson, ‘A New Perspective on Environmental Rights after the Charter’, (1983) 21 
OSGOODE Hall Law Journal 390. 
37 N. De Sadeleer, ‘Environmental principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules’ (OUP 2002) 
21. 
38 David Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 235. 
39 ibid. 
40Louitz Kotze, ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence 
in South Africa’, supra, n 4. 
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African Constitution in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v. MEC for Agriculture, 
Conservation and Land Affairs BP,41stated that- 
Pure economic principles will no longer determine, in an unbridled 
fashion, whether a development is acceptable. Development, 
which may be regarded as economically and financially sound, 
will, in future, be balanced by its environmental impact, taking 
coherent cognisance of the principle of intergenerational equity 
and sustainable use of resources in order to arrive at an 
integrated management of the environment, sustainable 
development and socio-economic concerns. 
This decision provides judicial recognition of the impact that constitutional 
environmental rights have on economic and social objectives. By stating that 
developmental plans shall be balanced by its environmental impact, the court 
was, in effect, affirming that environmental considerations propelled by the 
constitutional environmental right trumps any developmental objective sought by 
the government regardless of its economic or financial benefits to the country. In 
this sense, therefore, constitutionalizing environmental rights will foster greater 
government and corporate accountability as it will ensure that the decision on 
what socio-economic objectives and developmental projects should be pursued 
is removed from being an exclusive government preserve. Citizens will now be 
constitutionally conferred with a right to restrain developments and other socio-
economic objectives which infringe on the sanctity of the environment and 
ecosystem. This will result in increased citizen participation in decisions and 
actions to protect the environment.    
 
5.2.3  Impact on Environmental Justice and Protection of 
Vulnerable Groups 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the burden of environmental pollution and 
degradation is disproportionately borne by the weak and vulnerable groups in the 
society and minority peoples.42 Even in advanced democracies, vulnerable 
groups and minorities require constitutional protection of their basic rights from 
                                                          
41 2004 (5) SA 124 (WLD) < http://www.saflii.org/ za/cases/ZACC/2007/25.html> accessed 08 
April 2015.  
42 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 235. 
245 
 
infringement by the majority. As seen in the discussion on theories of 
constitutionalization of rights, constitutionalising rights can be used as a counter-
majoritarian policy for vulnerable and minority groups. As Bryner43 stated, ‘at the 
heart of constitutional law is the idea of protecting minorities from majoritarian 
actions, protecting the weak from the strong’. In this sense, constitutionalization 
of environmental rights acts as a protection for vulnerable groups that currently 
shoulder a disproportionate burden of environmental harms.  
In addition, environmental constitutionalism can be useful for vulnerable groups 
and environmental minorities  in the context of involuntary resettlement and 
displacement through loss of sense of place. Feris argues that such involuntary 
resettlement through loss of sense of place constitutes constructive displacement 
under international environmental law. She asserts that ‘constructive 
displacement’ occurs when- 
“communities have no choice but to live within a natural environment that 
has been severely degraded and polluted as a result of newly developed 
roads, coal-fired power plant, mines etc. They bear the brunt of 
environmental degradation and pollution. As a result, their lived 
experience and relationship with the environment changes and their 
sense of place is altered - to the point where they feel displaced.”44 
Because this form of displacement infringes upon environmental rights, there is 
room for an environmental rights approach to address it and the impact of 
constitutional environmental rights on constructive displacement can be felt in 
three material ways. First, by enshrining important procedural rights in the 
constitution that guarantees their access to information and participation in 
environmental decision making, as guaranteed under Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration.45 The idea is that if principles of democratic governance such as 
openness, accountability and civic participation are adhered to, then 
environmental standards will be maintained, or at least improved.46 Once these 
                                                          
43 G Bryner, ‘Constitutionalism and the Politics of Rights’ in G. C. Bryner and N. B. Reynolds 
(eds.) Constitutionalism and Rights (New York State University Press 1987) 21. 
44L Feris, ‘Loss of Sense of Place as Displacement – New Frontiers for Environmental Rights’ in 
UN Environment, ‘New Frontiers In Environmental Constitutionalism’ 2017, 126.  
45Rio Declaration on Environment and Development UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, vol.I, 1992, 31 ILM 
874. 
46UN Environment, ‘New Frontiers In Environmental Constitutionalism’ 2017 
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246 
 
environmental standards are adhered to, then there will not be room for the 
constructive displacement of these vulnerable groups from their environment 
through pollution of their environment, and they will not suffer loss of sense of 
pride. Second, constitutional environmental rights influences the making and 
implementation of policies which will safeguard their environment and prevent 
their displacement and loss of sense of place. Third, constitutional environmental 
rights provides a potent tool for litigating government’s activities that threatens to 
result in constructive displacement of these vulnerable groups and the loss of 
their sense of place.47 
In communities like the Niger Delta in Nigeria and many indigenous communities 
in Latin America where substantial oil and gas exploration takes place, the 
majority of the country’s population often reside far from the environment where 
oil exploration takes place and are thus unaffected by the consequential pollution 
that results. This majority are usually in favour of the continuation of such 
exploration regardless of the environmental consequences in view of the 
economic benefits therefrom.48 In the absence of constitutional environmental 
rights, the environmental plight of these minority communities will continue to be 
subjugated to the economic wishes of the majority expressed through majority-
supported government legislation and regulations enacted to foster continued 
exploration with minimal environmental considerations. Thus, constitutional 
environmental rights strengthen environmental justice within a state and help to 
ensure that the environmental interests of all groups are protected. 
 
5.3 Practical Impacts of Constitutional Environmental 
Rights on Ecosystem Protection 
The generality of the debates surrounding constitutionalising environmental rights 
is premised on its necessity for improving environmental protection across 
countries. However, in the course of these debates, very little focus has been 
placed on a discussion of the actual, verifiable and empirical impact of 
constitutionalization on environmental protection or whether constitutionalization 
really matters in the improvement of environmental protection. While it is easy to 
                                                          
47 L Feris, ‘Loss of Sense of Place as Displacement’, supra, n 44.  




hypothesise on potential impacts of constitutionalising environmental rights by 
analysing relevant concepts and proposing how, theoretically, the relationship 
between these concepts and constitutional environmental rights will improve 
ecosystem protection, it is difficult to actually prove in empirical terms that these 
potential impacts actually occur. Somehow, proponents of constitutional 
environmental rights ‘hope’ ‘assume’ or ‘expect’ that constitutionalising 
environmental rights will improve environmental protection ‘in some ways’ without 
any articulation of how, when and to what extent this positive outcome can be 
derived.  
Nevertheless, assessing the practical impacts of constitutionalization of 
environmental rights is difficult owing to methodological challenges of gauging a 
causal link between constitutional environmental rights and a positive 
environmental outcome. As Boyd stated – 
“There are difficulties in establishing a cause-and-effect 
relationship between a constitutional provision, such as the right 
to a healthy environment, and an environmental outcome (e.g. 
improved air quality). Among the key challenges is the lengthy 
chain of events between the establishment of constitutional 
provisions and the environmental outcomes, with each step 
characterized by myriad causal influences and pervasive 
uncertainty.” 49   
Boyd’s view is shared by Hayward50who argues that establishing a causal link 
between a constitutional concept and an environmental outcome is outside the 
realm of scientific proof and thus cannot be conclusively ascertained. Indeed, 
Boyd’s view reflects the practical challenge in determining whether a particular 
environmental outcome is a direct result of a constitutional right or is influenced 
by a myriad of other extraneous, non-legal factors prevalent within a society 
which favours environmental sanctity. Although one of the aims of 
constitutionalising rights is to positively influence societal values, norms and 
behaviours, other socio-economic and cultural circumstances present within a 
society have a similar impact on societal values and a positive environmental 
outcome may equally be attributed to societal values favouring environmental 
                                                          
49 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 117.   
50 T Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights, supra, n 1. 
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protection. For instance, indigenous Amazonian tribes in the heartlands of Latin 
America have a strong cultural affinity for protecting their ancestral lands and 
environment. In this instance, although constitutionalising environmental rights in 
countries like Ecuador, Peru and Colombia with significant indigenous 
Amazonian population may be viewed as creating a legal framework for 
protecting their environment, it cannot be conclusively argued that these 
environments will not be protected without a constitutional environmental right, 
seeing the strong cultural affinity of these people in preserving their environment.   
This difficulty of establishing empirical impacts is not peculiar to constitutional 
environmental rights, however, as it is generally difficult to prove a causal link 
between constitutionalization of rights and improvement in the subject-matter of 
such rights, often leading to conflicting empirical findings. For instance, Arthurs 
and Arnold51 investigated the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
entrenched in the Canadian constitution52 on the interests of women and 
aboriginal groups and found that more than two decades after, there has been 
little positive improvement in the status quo. On the other hand, Carlson53 
investigated the same subject and found that positive changes have occurred in 
the status of aboriginal rights arising from the incorporation of the Charter into 
Canada’s constitution. Thus, owing to lack of fixed methodological parameters 
for gauging a causal link between constitutionalization of rights and the desired 
outcome, the result of any study will essentially depend on which perspective the 
study approaches the subject from and this results in varying and often conflicting 
outcomes as shown above.  
Notwithstanding these methodological difficulties, attempts must still be made to 
investigate a causal link between constitutional environmental rights and 
improved ecosystem protection for the purpose of assessing the justification of 
clamouring for the constitutionalization of environmental rights. Generally, this 
can be assessed from two angles - legal and extra-legal effects. Legal effects 
investigate the impact that constitutionalization has on the environmental legal 
framework within a country. It accomplishes this by studying two standpoints of 
                                                          
51 H. Arthurs and B. Arnold, ‘Does the Charter Matter?’ [2005] Review of Constitutional Studies 
11.  
52Part 1 of the Constitution Act of Canada, 1982 <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-
15.html> accessed 09 January 2017.    
53 K Carlson, ‘Does Constitutional Change Matter? Canada’s Recognition of Aboriginal Title’ 
(2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 449.  
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the environmental legal framework in a country – environmental legislation and 
environmental litigation. The choice of these standpoints stems from the fact that 
these are the two glaring ways of deciphering how a legal framework is 
responding to changes within a country’s legal system as they are the key pillars 
and pressure-points of the legal framework of any subject matter. Any changes 
to the fundamental framework in respect of a subject within a country will first be 
felt in the resultant legislation that ensues from the legislative body and also the 
way and manner the judiciary interprets the new framework in ensuing litigation.  
Extra-legal effects, on the other hand, analyses the impacts that 
constitutionalization of environmental rights has on the socio-political, economic 
and scientific aspects of environmental protection within the society. It measures 
how constitutionalization influences public opinion, values and attitudes towards 
environmental issues.54In this regard, the focus is on the extent to which the 
constitutional changes influence societal values and behaviours and how it 
impacts on specific areas of scientific measurements on environmental issues 
such as air pollution, waste management and climate change concerns. 
 
5.3.1 Legal Impacts of Constitutionalization 
Boyd55 asserts that analysing the impact of constitutionalization on environmental 
legislation and environmental litigation represents verifiable ways of gauging its 
potential impact on environmental outcomes. In respect of the impact of 
constitutionalization on environmental legislation, this can be analysed by looking 
at the sub-level effects that the presence of a constitutional right will have on 
legislation and other statutory instruments that will be subsequently enacted by 
the appropriate body to comply with the constitutional provision. Bearing in mind 
that a constitutional right to a clean environment implicitly creates an obligation 
on the government to take relevant steps to protect and fulfil these rights, it is a 
reasonable expectation that such steps will include introducing legislation, 
regulations, governmental policies and other statutory standards to guide against 
environmental degradation in all its various forms. The impact of 
constitutionalization on legislation can, therefore, be traced through the trickle-
down effect of the ensuing constitutional obligation on all sub-levels of legislation 
                                                          




and regulations up to the point where it results in increased compliance and 
respect for the environment by corporate bodies, individuals and all manners of 
persons interacting with the environment.  
In this way, the aftermath of constitutionalising environmental rights will see the 
government become obliged to institute legislation that protects the environment 
(in countries where no such legislation exists) or improve, upgrade and tighten 
existing environmental legislation to ensure they proscribe all activities that 
impinge on the environment. Flowing from such legislation, all regulations, orders 
and bye-laws on environmental matters will need to become improved, upgraded 
and the standards tightened to meet up to the new legislative standards. 
Administrative agencies charged with implementing environmental standards will 
consequently be required to be more proactive, resolute and stricter in 
enforcement in order to comply with the improved standards in the 
legislation/regulations and will also need to amend their practices, policies, 
procedures and decision-making processes to fulfil their new statutory obligations. 
The resulting improved implementation of environmental standards will positively 
change societal behaviours which will ultimately result in positive environmental 
outcomes.  
Boyd encapsulates this trickle-down process in the chart below- 
 Constitutionalization 
 
         Legislation 
 
          Regulations 
 
          Administrative 
 
    Policies/Practices/Procedures/Programmes/Decisions 
    Implementation 
Changes in Societal Behaviours 
      
     Positive Environmental Outcomes  
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                                Source: David Boyd56 
Boyd’s framework chart above attempts to show how the constitutionalization of 
environmental rights in a country trickles down through several causal links to the 
positive environmental outcome at the end. He argues that constitutionalization 
achieves this objective by influencing societal behaviours of individuals, 
governments, corporations, NGOs through a complex blend of legislation and 
regulations derived from stronger environmental laws pursuant to the 
constitutional environmental right.  
Although Boyd’s chart establishes a reasonable causal link between 
constitutionalised environmental rights and positive environmental outcome, one 
relevant adjustment to be made to the chart relates to the ‘changes in societal 
behaviours’ at the penultimate bottom level of the chart. While it can be argued 
that changes in societal behaviour result in positive environmental outcomes, 
there is no proven way of determining this causal link and it may not be necessary 
in this context. What is relevant is that government agencies, corporations and 
individuals engaged in environmental impacting activities are compelled, through 
the effective implementation of legislation/regulations/policies, to channel their 
activities in line with pathways consistent with environmental sanctity. It does not 
matter if there is an actual change in societal behaviour in favour of environmental 
sanctity, but that the improved legislation/regulation makes it legally unattractive 
for anyone to act in ways that prejudicially affects the environment.  
As an analogy, if a government introduces stiffer sanctions for driving above the 
speed limit, for instance, the potentially reduced incidences of people driving 
above the speed limit may not necessarily be due to a change in societal 
behaviour, but because it becomes legally unattractive to do otherwise.  The same 
goes for environmental protection. It is not a precondition that societal behaviour 
changes positively towards environmental protection (although that is imminently 
more desirable), but that environmental standards are stringently enforced and 
people are legally compelled to act in an environmentally responsible manner.  
Also, from a methodological standpoint, it is difficult to prove an actual change in 
societal behaviour in favour of environmental protection, as that will require 
                                                          
56 ibid 118. 
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sociological studies to gauge public perception towards environmental issues, the 
result of which can be interpreted in various ways. However, it is easier to prove 
actual compliance with regulations/orders by analysing the various environmental 
protection parameters and standards instituted in legislation/regulations/bye-laws 
and gauging the extent to which individuals/corporations comply with such 
standards as available from records held by the relevant public bodies. Such 
increased levels of compliance can then be causally linked to improved 
environmental outcomes in that jurisdiction. Therefore, the penultimate tier in 
Boyd’s chart should be replaced with ‘increased compliance with environmental 
standards’ as the final thread leading to positive environmental outcomes.   
The above analysis is a theoretical exposition of ways that constitutionalization 
can have an empirical impact on environmental legislation, but it is pertinent to 
examine if this actually works in practice. An empirical study of countries around 
the globe reveals that an improvement in environmental legislation is one 
verifiable area of positive impacts of constitutionalization of environmental rights. 
Boyd57 studied the environmental legislation of all 92 countries with express 
constitutional environmental right and found that environmental legislation has 
been improved in 78 of those countries in the aftermath of the constitutionalization 
of environmental rights.58  In Africa, environmental legislation was strengthened 
in 23 of the 32 countries with constitutional environmental rights in the aftermath 
of such constitutionalization.59  In Latin America, Bolivia60 and Venezuela61 both 
enacted far-reaching environmental legislation in the aftermath of the 
constitutionalization of rights in both countries. In Venezuela, for instance, the 
Environmental Criminal Law of 2012 was enacted specifying and sanctioning all 
crimes that adversely affect the environment and natural resources. The law, 
which is applicable to individuals and legal persons, provides for different 
sanctions depending on whether the crimes against the environment are 
committed by natural or legal persons. Introducing a criminal aspect to 
                                                          
57 ibid 232.  
58 ibid 233.  
59 ibid 233.  
60 The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth passed by Bolivia's Plurinational Legislative Assembly 
in December 2010. 
61 Environmental Criminal Law of Venezuela 2012; Waste Management Law of Venezuela, 2010 
were passed to strengthen environmental protection in the aftermath of the introduction of 
constitutional environmental rights in 1999.  
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environmental degradation is a stringent way of implementing the constitutional 
protection afforded to the environment. 
This has led to the conclusion that ‘it is by contributing to stronger environmental 
legislation that constitutional environmental rights have their greatest impact’.62 
Bogart63 posits that despite the major focus of literature been on the outcome of 
environmental litigation, environmental legislation is more effective in achieving 
better environmental protection than litigation. Bogart’s attempt to compare the 
relative impact of legislation and litigation on environmental protection may not be 
helpful in the context of the present discussion, as they are intricately inter-related 
and inter-dependent in their impact and it is often difficult to separate the individual 
impact they have. Suffice to state, however, that the impact of constitutionalization 
on environmental legislation is strong proof of the positive influence 
constitutionalization has on environmental protection.  
In relation to environmental litigation, several factors outside of mere 
constitutionalization of environmental rights are responsible for determining its 
impact on environmental protection. These factors include the normative contents 
of the constitutional environmental right, respect for the rule of law in the country, 
litigation culture, the responsiveness of the judiciary (whether a conservative or 
activist judiciary) and other socio-economic considerations operating within the 
society.64 A study of environmental litigation in countries with constitutional 
environmental right reveals that it has not really sparked a revolution in 
environmental practices within such jurisdictions. Ihovbenre65 and Amaechi66 
studied the constitutionalization of environmental rights in Africa and concluded 
that despite the provision of constitutional environmental rights in at least 32 
African countries, the courts in Africa are not activist in nature and this severely 
dampens the short-term prospects for recognition and fulfilment of the right to live 
                                                          
62 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 235.  
63  W Bogart, Consequences: The Impact of Law and its Complexity (University of Toronto 
Press, 2002) 1. 
64C. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective (University of Chicago Press 1998) 12. 
65 J Ihonvbere, ‘Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa’ in O. Ukaga and O.G. Afoaku (eds.) 
Sustainable Development in Africa: A Multifaceted Challenge (Africa World Press 2005). 
66 E Amaechi, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection and Socio-Economic Development in Africa: 
A Fresh Look at the Right to a General Satisfactory Environment under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2009) 5 Law Environment and Development Journal 58-72.  
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in a healthy environment in Africa. Kotze67 also points out that the courts in South 
Africa have not utilised the opportunity presented by the constitutionalization of 
environmental rights in the country since 1996. He argued that there has not been 
significant improvements in environmental protection in the country more than two 
decades after its constitutionalization despite the South African Constitutional 
Court declaring in Fuel Retailers’ case that it is the duty of the court to ensure that 
the environmental obligations of the present generation to future generation is 
carried out.68 Similar situations can be found in Latin America where widespread 
constitutionalization of rights have not resulted in concomitant improvement in 
environmental protection as the judiciary has been largely conservative except for 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica and Colombia where the judiciary has 
been activist on environmental issues.69 
Notwithstanding this gloomy outlook, Boyd charts a possible course for the 
potential impact of constitutionalization on environmental litigation thus- 
Constitutionalization 
 





Final Determination of the Case 
 
Implementation of Court Order 
 
Changes in Societal Behaviours 
Positive Environmental Outcome 
         Source: David Boyd70 
                                                          
67 L Kotze, ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence in 
South Africa’, supra, n 4. 
68 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v. Director General Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalange Province (2007) (6) 
SA 4 (CC) para 102.  
69 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 117.  
70 ibid 118. 
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The potential trickle-down effect of constitutionalising environmental rights on 
litigation relies significantly on the presence of environmental constitutionalism 
within a country, as respect for the rule of law and reliable enforcement of judicial 
orders is the benchmark of any positive environmental outcome resulting at the 
end of the process. In countries where judicial orders are flagrantly flouted, 
ignored or overlooked by the government and its agencies without any 
consequences, environmental litigation will have minimal impacts on 
environmental outcomes as the non-implementation of favourable court orders 
will mean there are no changes to environmentally prejudicial activities by the 
governments or corporate bodies. This potentially explains the lack of impact of 
constitutionalization on environmental litigation in African countries as found by 
Ihovbenre71 and Amaechi.72Many African countries struggle with implementing 
the rule of law, protecting the independence of the judiciary and obedience to 
judicial orders.73 As a result, there is little implementation of court orders on 
environmental matters and this affects the possibility of achieving any positive 
environmental outcome.  
An illustrative instance is found in the Nigerian case of Gbemre v. Shell 
Petroleum74where a private citizen challenged the continued practice of gas 
flaring by oil companies in the Niger Delta region. The Federal High Court in 
Nigeria held the practice to violate the citizen’s fundamental right to life under the 
constitution and ordered for its immediate cessation, directing the government to 
ensure compliance. Unsurprisingly, the government and oil companies ignored 
the court order and more than 13 years after that court order, gas flaring still 
continues unabated. In essence, it is the extent to which judicial orders are obeyed 
and implemented that is the dispositive factor of whether environmental litigation 
has any impact on positive environmental outcomes.75 
                                                          
71 J Ihonvbere, ‘Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa’, supra, n 46. 
72 E Amaechi, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection and Socio-Economic Development’, supra, n 
47.  
73 See M Mutua, ‘Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya’ 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 96-118; Gretchen Helmke and Frances Rosenbluth, 
‘Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 12 
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74 Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and Others (2005) AHRLR 
151.  
75 I Worika, ‘Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human Rights 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta?’ (2001) 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1. 
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In countries where environmental constitutionalism is ingrained in the legal 
system, Boyd’s chart represents the potential flow of any trickle-down effects of 
constitutionalization through litigation. However, as discussed under the 
legislation chart, it is important that the ‘changes in societal behaviours’ in the 
penultimate tier of the chart is replaced with ‘increased compliance with court-
imposed environmental objectives’ for the reasons discussed previously. In this 
instance, the implementation of court orders will result in increased cases of 
government/corporations/individuals complying with environmental objectives 
which fulfils the constitutional right because failure to do so will render them liable 
to judicial sanctions. While there is the potential for this to influence societal 
behaviours in favour of positive environmental outcomes in the long run, there are 
no methodological means of proving such causal link. It, therefore, suffices to 
assert that the increased compliance will result in better environmental protection      
 
5.3.2 Extra-Legal Impacts of Constitutionalization  
Besides the legal impacts of constitutionalization of environmental rights, some 
areas of extra-legal effects, especially in the scientific and technical fields, are 
also worth noting. A study conducted by the Global Footprint Network in 2008 
compared the ecological footprints of 150 nations vis-a-vis the 
constitutionalization of rights in these nations. The study found that nations 
without any constitutional environmental protection provisions, on average, had a 
larger ecological footprint (averaging 3.58 hectares per capita) than nations with 
environmental protection provisions in their constitution which had a lesser 
ecological footprint (averaging 2.36 hectares per capita).76 This can logically be 
attributed to the unwillingness of states that systematically over-exploit their 
environmental resources to incorporate constitutional environmental rights, 
seeing that doing so will restrict their ability to continually indulge in such practice. 
What this reveals, therefore, is that constitutionalization of environmental rights 
can act as a potentially powerful tool to regulate, control and minimise the 
ecological footprints of states and, as a result, lead to better environmental 
management. This is achieved through constitutionally restricting activities with 
                                                          
76 Global Footprint Network ‘The Ecological Footprint Atlas 2008’  




ecological impacts and forcing the government to find alternative energy sources 
with minimal ecological impacts. The absence of constitutional environmental 
right leaves such decision at the discretion of the government, influenced by 
prevailing political and economic exigencies.   
In this light, it is unsurprising to find that there is no constitutional environmental 
right in China, a country with a large ecological footprint. World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) study found that –  
“the per capita Ecological Footprint in China was 2.1 gha or 80% of the 
global average. However, this has already exceeded the global 
sustainability threshold and is over two times the available per capita bio-
capacity in China. In view of its huge population, the total Ecological 
Footprint of China is the largest in the world.”77  
Although the ecological footprint of China cannot be directly attributed to its lack 
of a constitutional environmental right, it can be argued that a constitutional 
environmental right would present a powerful tool to regulate energy and 
environmental issues and restrict government’s policies which are prejudicial to 
environmental protection. For instance, China remains the largest producer and 
consumer of coal in the world and is the largest user of coal-derived electricity, 
relying on coal for 62% of its energy supply.78 A constitutional environmental right 
could be relied upon to challenge the Chinese government’s investments in coal 
infrastructure, for instance, akin to the constitutional challenge of the Chilean 
government’s attempt to build six hydro-electric plants on the Bio-Bio River in 
Pablo Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA.79Replicating such approach in China 
requires a constitutional environmental right which grants the fundamental 
platform for such milestone challenge to an important government-planned 
infrastructure.  
In addition, a judicial declaration could be obtained that the continued investments 
in heavy polluting energy sources in China violate the constitutional right to a 
                                                          
77 World Wildlife Fund, ‘China Ecological Footprint Report 2012 Consumption, Production and 
Sustainable Development’ (2012) 
<https://www.footprintnetwork.org/content/images/article_uploads/China_Ecological_Footpri
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78 World Resources Institute (WRI), ‘China’s Decline in Coal Consumption Drives Global 
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clean environment. This could compel the government to shift its policy focus to 
cleaner energy sources and in the process reduce its ecological footprints. 
Rather, international pressure from environmental groups and from its ratification 
of international instruments such as the Paris Climate Change Agreement 2015 
remains the major sources of pressure on the government of China to pursue 
positive environmental outcomes. It is arguable that a domestic constitutional 
environmental right could achieve better environmental outcomes. 
China is not alone in this predicament as it is not the only country without a 
constitutional environmental right which has a high ecological footprint. Instead, 
the 2017 global ecological footprint map produced by Footprint Network 
establishes a potential correlation between constitutional environmental right and 
a country’s ecological footprint, as seen in Figure 14 below: 
Figure 14: Global Ecological Footprint Map 
 
            
        Source: Footprint Network 201780 
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per_capita.html> accessed 25 November 2017.  
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Figure 12 reveals that seven – Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, China, New 
Zealand, United States and Saudi Arabia - of the nine countries with the highest 
ecological footprints are countries without constitutional environmental rights in 
their domestic jurisdictions. Although Russia has a constitutional environmental 
right, this right is largely symbolic owing to the weakened state of the judiciary in 
the country.81  
As a disclaimer, it is pertinent to state that the relationship between constitutional 
environmental right and ecological footprint from Figure 12 is a tenuous one owing 
to a range of factors that are at play including urbanisation, industrialisation, 
population density and other domestic factors which may account for the high 
ecological footprints.  Therefore, the analysis above does not attempt to rely on 
Figure 12 as definite proof of a direct correlation between the two subjects, but 
rather to indicate that there is a correlation between them requiring further 
analysis. From the current analysis, it is likely that either countries with high 
ecological footprints are reluctant to constitutionalise environmental rights 
because it would affect their over-exploitation of the environment or the absence 
of a constitutional environmental right allows these countries to over-exploit their 
environment without any legal repercussions or judicial sanctions. In either case, 
the introduction of constitutional environmental right may have an impact on the 
ecological footprints of such countries. While there are no methodological means 
of proving this assertion, this is certainly a subject requiring in-depth focus and 
research.     
Other areas of extra-legal impacts can be examined according to different sectors 
of environmental concerns. Boyd82conducted an extensive study of various 
contemporary environmental concerns such as air pollution, climate change, 
nitrogen oxide emissions, sulphur dioxide emissions and greenhouse gas 
emissions in nations with constitutional environmental rights and those without 
such rights. He found that a correlation exists between constitutionalization of 
environmental rights and progress in addressing these environmental concerns 
in countries. He, therefore, concluded that, with few notable exceptions (such as 
Belgium and Denmark), nations with constitutional environmental rights generally 
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82 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 6, 240-252.  
260 
 
tend to have smaller ecological footprint, rank higher on comprehensive indices 
of environmental indicators, are more likely to ratify international environmental 
agreements, and made faster progress in reducing emissions of sulphur dioxides, 
nitrogen oxides and greenhouse gases than nations without such provisions.83  
Boyd’s finding is a confirmation of the earlier analysis linking constitutional 
environmental rights with ecological footprints and when examined in specific 
sectors of environmental concerns, it is apparent that the same analysis applies 
by extension to the various specific sectors of environmental concerns.   
Flowing from the above analysis, it can be asserted that while there are no 
scientific or other cast-iron methodological means of proving a causal link 
between constitutionalization of environmental rights and improved ecosystem 
protection, the available evidence suggests a strong case can be made in support 
of the view that constitutionalization of environmental rights impacts positively and 
significantly on ecosystem protection. The incorporation of constitutional 
environmental rights within domestic jurisdictions is, therefore, a definite step in 
the right direction and a positive move towards the pursuit of more ambitious 
environmental objectives.  
 
5.4   Conclusions 
Constitutionalising environmental rights is not the panacea to all environmental 
ills in a jurisdiction, but it has potentially significant legal and extra-legal impacts 
on environmental protection in countries adopting it. It has the potential to bring 
about robust environmental legislation, improve the environmental legal 
framework and make for better environmental litigation within a country. Also, the 
trickle down effects ultimately leads to positive environmental outcomes by 
making government agencies, corporations and individuals act in a more 
environmentally responsible manner. Its impact on environmental litigation is, 
however, less noticeable as any potential impact is conditioned on the presence 
of environmental constitutionalism and a respectable judiciary within a jurisdiction.  
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Regarding its extra-legal effects, constitutionalising environmental rights have 
been shown to influence a country’s environmental outlook in various sectors of 
environmental concerns including air pollution, ecological footprint and the 
emission of noxious gases within a country. With a few exceptions, there is a 
correlation between the presence of constitutional environmental rights and a 
country’s ecological footprint. While this is not definitive proof of a causal link 
between the two subjects, it certainly shows a connection between them sufficient 
to postulate that constitutional environmental rights is an important factor in a 
country’s environmental protection outlook. This justifies the increased clamour 
for constitutionalization of environmental rights in countries that have yet to join 
the global trend.  
With the potential impacts of constitutionalising environmental rights discussed in 
this chapter, it becomes imperative to analyse the prospects for such impacts in 
Nigeria to alleviate the environmental challenges in the Niger Delta. 
Consequently, chapter 6 will apply the discussions to Nigeria and analyse how 
implementing constitutional environmental protection can address the seemingly 
intractable environmental situation in the Niger Delta region.  
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CHAPTER SIX      
 
IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION IN NIGERIA 
6.1 Introduction 
“By their very nature, these assaults on the environment were not 
caused by any one political group or any one generation. 
Intrinsically, they are transnational, trans-generational and trans-
ideological. So are all conceivable solutions.” 
–Spiritual Leaders of All Faiths from 83 Countries (Moscow, January 1, 
1990)1 
Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta is a multifaceted problem which is 
indeed trans-generational and trans-ideological. It straddles different generations 
of the populace living in the region and has proven intractable to several 
ideological and political attempts at solving it. The assaults on the Niger Delta 
environment have resulted in widespread degradation of the ecosystem in the 
region over the course of the last 60 years. During this time, different ideological 
approaches to solving the problem have been pursued including environmental 
militancy by groups in the region seeking to expel the oil companies operating in 
the region, since they are seen as the source of the problem; resource control 
advocacy seeking greater share of the oil resources to be utilised and invested in 
environmental management; political secession from the rest of the country as a 
way of determining the region’s environmental future; environmental activism by 
civic groups and prominent leaders in the region for better regulatory controls to 
be instituted by the government to tackle environmental degradation; and the use 
of prescriptive, command and control legislative mechanisms by government to 
compel oil companies operating in the region to tackle environmental issues and 
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invest in environmental management as part of their corporate social 
responsibility in the communities.2   
Evidently, these ideological approaches have repeatedly failed because they 
focused on the symptoms of the problem rather than the cause; they were 
reactive to the problem rather than pro-active to prevent the problem by instituting 
preventive mechanisms. Protecting the environment extends beyond merely 
cleaning up the environment when it is polluted or compensating the people 
affected by the pollution; it should have as its fundamental basis the prevention 
of actions and activities that lead to the pollution. This can be addressed from a 
fundamental legal position which obliges governments, corporations and all 
individuals concerned to take necessary pro-active steps in favour of 
environmental sanctity.  
This chapter applies the theoretical discussions in the preceding chapters to the 
Niger Delta environmental challenges and argues in favour of incorporating 
constitutional environmental rights in Nigeria’s legal framework as a way of 
instituting foundational and comprehensive environmental protection framework 
capable of solving the environmental conundrum.  
The absence of an environmental rights framework in Nigeria makes the Niger 
Delta susceptible to environmental despoliation that has repeatedly been 
exploited by oil companies in the country to perpetuate environmental pollution 
with impunity. While people in the region have continued to clamour for increased 
governmental responses to this problem without success, a constitutional 
environmental rights platform creates a legal tool that can be utilised by 
individuals to achieve environmental protection without depending on the 
government to act against the polluters. Rather, individuals will be empowered to 
act directly against the polluters and even against the government itself for 
regulatory failures allowing for the environmental despoliation. Constitutionalising 
environmental rights will, therefore, create a foundational legal platform for 
environmental accountability by governments and its agencies, corporations and 
all bodies involved in environmental impacting activities in the region.  
                                                          
2 See U Orji, ‘Right to a Clean Environment: Some Reflections’ (2012) 42 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 285, 
286; I Worika, ‘Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human 
Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta?’ (2001) 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1  
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This chapter also argues that for constitutional environmental rights to be 
effective in Nigeria, it must go beyond the current anthropocentric brand of 
environmental rights incorporated in the constitutions of many countries around 
the globe. The adoption of coalesced anthropocentrism as the ideological 
framework for incorporating environmental rights in Nigeria’s constitution will 
institute a sustainable trans-generational protection of the environment as well as 
the preservation of the intrinsic value of the natural ecosystem in the region.  
 
6.2 Legal Framework for Environmental Protection in 
Nigeria    
Understanding the undeveloped state of environmental protection legal 
framework in Nigeria is necessary to appreciate the potential impact of 
constitutional environmental rights in the country.  In respect of the analysis in 
this chapter, a distinction must be drawn between an environmental regulatory 
framework and an environmental rights framework. The former deals with the 
myriad of regulatory instruments (statutory and subsidiary instruments) instituted 
by the government to regulate environmental matters in the country. These 
instruments basically target the reduction of environmental pollution through a 
command and control mechanism instituted in all industries impacting the 
environment, particularly the oil and gas industry. The latter deals with embedded 
rights in individuals to challenge environmentally injurious activities independent 
of, and sometimes against, government’s regulatory intervention. This is based 
on the right to a clean environment vested in the individuals (and, as canvassed 
in this thesis, on Mother Nature and its component systems also). 
 
6.2.1 Environmental Regulatory Framework  
Several statutes3 and subsidiary regulatory instruments4 evincing regulatory 
attempts by the government to ensure environmental protection exist in Nigeria. 
The most comprehensive of these regulatory instruments in relation to the oil and 
                                                          
3 Such as the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) 2007, National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) 2006, the 
Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act, 2007, Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act, (AGRA) 1979 and the Effluent Limitation Regulations of 1991. 




gas industry is the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 1991 (revised in 2002) promulgated by the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) pursuant to section 8(i)b (iii) of the 
Petroleum Act 1969 which empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to 
make regulations for the prevention of pollution of watercourses and the 
atmosphere.  
EGASPIN contains some of the most elaborate environmental guidelines of any 
industry around the world and was intended to ensure comprehensive protection 
of the Niger Delta environment in the course of oil and gas exploration. Coupled 
with other statutory instruments on environmental protection such as the National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) 2007 
and the Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, there is an elaborate 
environmental regulatory framework in Nigeria to engender environmental 
sanctity throughout the country and particularly in the Niger Delta. 
Notwithstanding this, environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has continued 
unabated and the manner that the oil and gas companies carry out pollution with 
impunity undermine any semblance of an effective regulatory framework in the 
country. This is primarily because the environmental regulatory framework in 
Nigeria is largely unenforced by the government and appropriate regulatory 
bodies. As Worika argues, neither the abundance of guidelines and standards 
nor the proliferation of regulatory instruments on environmental matters is the 
dispositive factor determining how protective a nation’s environmental law regime 
is. Rather, it is the manner in which those standards are enforced that controls 
the end result.5  
Two key interlinked factors explain the inability of the Nigerian government to 
enforce these environmental guidelines. First, environmental regulatory 
mechanisms in Nigeria are targeted at ‘controlling’ or ‘mitigating’ the extent of 
pollution that occur in the course of oil and gas exploration and ensuring the oil 
companies promptly clean up such pollution; it is not aimed at preventing pollution 
as it is deemed impractical and economically inefficient to target the complete 
eradication of pollution from oil and gas production since the oil companies allege 
                                                          
5 I Worika, ‘Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human Rights in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta?’ supra, n 2, 15.  
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that this will affect their oil and gas production output.6 This policy ideology runs 
through the breadth of most environmental regulatory mechanisms in the country. 
For instance, EGASPIN does not prohibit oil and gas companies from releasing 
effluents into the environment or water bodies during exploration, but rather 
‘limits’ the extent of effluents that can be released by them. Further, where the oil 
companies deem it necessary, they can obtain a licence from the Minister or the 
appropriate regulator to release more than the statutorily prescribed maximum.7 
Similarly, although the Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA), on the face of 
it, appear to prohibit gas flaring (a very harmful environmental practice of 
releasing burnt gases from oil production into the atmosphere),8 the Act merely 
institutionalises state-sanctioned flaring by empowering the Minister of Petroleum 
to designate the permissible amount of flared gas for each company. Section 
3(2)(a) & (b) of the Act permits the Minister to, at his discretion, issue a certificate 
permitting a company to continue to flare gas in a particular field(s) if the company pays 
such sum as the Minister may from time to time prescribe. 
The imposition of payments on the oil companies for flared gas is a monetisation 
of environmental degradation aimed at raising revenue for the government rather 
than preventing this harmful environmental practice. Aware that the oil companies 
are not willing to end flaring and are happy to pay for the amount of gas they flare 
(seeing it as being more economically attractive than investing in gas utilisation 
facilities to end flaring), the Nigerian government, through such regulatory 
instrument, turns an environmentally harmful practice into a ‘cash cow’, milking 
the oil companies to increase the government’s revenue stream to the detriment 
of the environment, as the payments are equated to royalties to the government 
by companies engaged in oil and gas production.9 This is borne out by the 
                                                          
6 See Shell’s Annual Revenue Statement 2006, <https://reports.shell.com/annual-report/2006/> 
accessed 08 January 2017.    
7 See Paragraph C of EGASPIN Revised edition 2002.  
8 See O. Saheed Ismail, G. Ezaina Umukoro, ‘Global Impact of Gas Flaring’, (2012) 4 Energy and 
Power Engineering, 290-302. The study sums up the effects of gas flaring thus- “A large number 
of hydrocarbons are produced when waste oil-gas and oil-gas-water solutions are flared. Flaring 
is inefficient with combustion being most affected by ambient winds and heating value of the 
fuel… Flaring releases methane, a greenhouse gas that, when released directly into the air, 
traps heat in the atmosphere. The process of flaring contributes directly to global warming. 
Flaring has a substantial impact on the health and environment of landowners who live near a 
flared well. The methane release is smelly, noisy, and, according to the Natural Institute of 
Health, exposure causes “headache, dizziness, weakness, nausea, vomiting, and loss of 
coordination” in people and animals. It creates a 24×7 bright light, blocking out the night sky.”  
9 The proviso to Section 3 states that “any payment due under this paragraph shall be made in 
the same manner and be subject to the same procedure as for the payment of royalties to the 
Federal Government by companies engaged in the production of oil”.   
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significant revenue the Nigerian government obtains from the penalties imposed 
on oil and gas companies that flare gas in the country. The fine for flaring gas 
increased from $0.03(3 cents) per 1000 ft3 in 1984 when it was first introduced 
to $0.07(7 cents) per 1000 ft3 in 1988.10 This fine continued to increase 
geometrically over the years and by 2015, the fine on defaulting companies had 
reached $3.50 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) of flared gas (a 4,900 percent 
increase in 27 years).11 Considering that Nigeria flares, on average, over 17.2 
billion m3 per year,12 studies have shown that the Federal Government receives 
over $25 billion in annual revenue from the proceeds of fines imposed on oil and 
gas companies for gas flaring.13 This significant revenue derived by the 
government from penalties for gas flaring is one of the main reasons behind the 
reluctance of the government to clamp down hard on flaring, in order not to shut 
this lucrative income source despite the adverse effects of the activity on the 
environment and people of Nigeria.14 
The ‘limited’ or ‘controlled’ pollution permitted by the regulatory instruments 
accumulate over time and severely degrade the environment, in addition to 
deliberate or negligent pollution of the environment by the oil companies in the 
course of their exploration and production activities.15 This has resulted in the 
present predicament of the Niger Delta environment.     
The second factor behind the weak environmental regulatory system is the 
incapacity of the government to enforce environmental standards owing to the 
undue economic dependence of Nigeria on oil and gas revenue, resulting in the 
oil companies holding the government hostage whenever attempts are made to 
enforce these standards. Nigeria’s economy is largely oil-dependent, as 
revenues from oil and gas production constitute over 76% of the country’s 
earnings and foreign reserves.16 This makes the country susceptible to any 
                                                          
10Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2015’, Abjua. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Department of Petroleum Resources Statistics Bulletin, 2017.  
13 N Nelson, ‘National Energy Policy and Gas Flaring In Nigeria’ (2015) 5(14) Journal of 
Environment and Earth Science 2; N Yunusa, I Idris, A Zango, M Kibiya, ‘Gas Flaring Effects 
and Revenue Made from Crude Oil in Nigeria’ (2016) 6(3) International Journal of Energy 
Economics and Policy 617-620. 
14 Ojide M et al, ‘Impact of Gas Industry on Sustainable Economy in Nigeria: Further estimations 
through Eview’ (2012) Journal of Applied Sciences, 12: 2244-2251. 
15 O. Saheed Ismail, G. Ezaina Umukoro, ‘Global Impact of Gas Flaring’, supra, n 8.  
16 According to the CEIC, “the proceeds from Nigeria’s oil and gas industry comprised 38.77% of 
its nominal GDP and generated 76.26% of the country’s overall government revenues in the first 
quarter of 2013”. See ‘Oil Dependence Hindering Nigeria’s Emerging Economy’, CEIC Data 
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changes in oil production outputs or drops in oil prices17 and this vulnerability is 
easily exploited by oil and gas companies with threats to pull out of the country 
or reduce their oil outputs whenever policies they consider unfavourable are 
touted by the government.  
Considering that the Nigerian environmental regulatory system does not seek to 
prevent or prohibit pollution but merely to ‘control’ or ‘limit’ it, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the government to enforce these boundaries of pollution 
when they are crossed by the oil companies. It is easier to set boundaries when 
a door is shut completely than when it is left slightly open and the struggle is to 
ensure that the door is not opened far wider than intended. More strength will be 
required to maintain the boundaries in the latter case than in the former. 
Unfortunately, Nigeria’s environmental regulatory system is built on the latter 
ideology and considering the weak enforcement capacity of the government, it is 
not surprising that, over time, the door has become completely ajar and the focus 
has turned to seeking compensation for persons affected by pollution and, 
recently (and half-heartedly), moves to clean up the polluted environment.  
This top-down regulatory system has unwittingly created a dual caste structure in 
the enforcement of environmental obligations in Nigeria. At the upper caste is the 
government and its regulatory agencies with the exclusive responsibility of 
monitoring the environmental activities of companies and other institutions 
engaged in environmentally impacting activities. Where the upper caste fails in 
its responsibility, the lower caste, consisting of the citizens and individuals 
dwelling in the environment impacted by these activities, is then expected to pick 
up the task of seeking compensation from the companies for the injuries they 
have suffered as a result of the companies’ activities and the regulatory failure of 
the upper caste. The strict caste demarcation ensures that members of the lower 
caste are not able to seek enforcement of the environmental obligations of the 
companies directly but are confined to compensations for injuries and loss.  
                                                          
Company Ltd, 03 June 2013, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/blog/oil-dependence-hindering-
nigerias-emerging-economy> accessed 07 November 2017.   
17 A Sotunde, ‘Nigeria's oil-dependent economy plagued by plunging crude prices’ The Global 
Mail, 25 March, 2017 <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-
business/nigerias-capital-feels-the-pinch-from-the-plunge-in-oil-prices/article22847527/> 
accessed 20 December, 2017. 
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Even though individuals have a legal right to sue the companies for 
environmentally injurious acts arising from their activities and seek a halt to such 
activities, the regulatory approach restricts this option because these injurious 
acts are often state-sanctioned activities e.g. gas flaring sanctioned under the 
AGRA or release of effluents sanctioned under EGASPIN. The companies can, 
therefore, waive statutory authority as a defence to such suits, leaving the litigant 
with the only option of seeking compensation for loss suffered while the activity 
in question continues unabated. In Okpala v. Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC),18a Nigerian Federal High Court refused the claimant’s prayer 
to restrict seismic and other pre-exploratory activities of the defendant which 
affected the claimant’s environmental sanctity. The court upheld the defendant’s 
claim of statutory authority based on an exploratory licence granted it by the 
government which empowered the defendant to carry out those activities. It was 
irrelevant that this activity had negative environmental consequences, provided, 
as in this case, the defendant convinced the court that an environmental impact 
assessment was carried out and approved by the regulatory body. The regulatory 
approval was sufficient to confine the claimant to compensatory claims only.   
 
6.2.2 Environmental Rights Framework 
To defeat the statutory authority defence, an embedded right in the individual to 
a clean environment is required to override any permission to pollute deemed 
necessary by the government. In this sense, an environmental rights framework 
introduces a bottom-up approach which allows individuals to by-pass and nullify 
regulatory permissions by governments that are detrimental to the environment. 
This can be achieved through conventional environmental litigation (through a 
writ of summons or originating summons) challenging the legality of a regulatory 
approval issued by government or, more appropriately, judicial review 
applications seeking an order of certiorari quashing the regulatory decisions 
made by government officials approving activities that prejudicially impacts or has 
the potential to prejudicially impact the environment.  For instance, in Minors 
Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,19 
the Philippines’ Supreme Court, on an application for judicial review, nullified 
                                                          
18 (2006) Suit No. FHC/PHC/C5/518/2006 of 29 September 2006.  
19 (1994) 33 ILM 173.  
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timber licenses granted by the government to companies on the basis of their 
infringement on the environmental rights of the inhabitants.  In Gbemre v Shell 
Petroleum,20 the only recorded case in Nigeria where the courts denounced a 
regulatory approval of an environmentally injurious activity, the court, based on 
an originating summons, derived an environmental right from the constitutional 
right to life in section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution and relied on it to nullify 
regulatory approvals for gas flaring issued to companies by the Nigerian 
government for violating the right to life of the inhabitants.21    
In this respect, an environmental rights framework focuses on embedding rights 
in individuals, breaking the strict caste demarcation and empowering individuals 
to directly regulate and restrict the activities of corporations which impact on their 
environment, through litigation, without relying on the government. In Nigeria, 
while the environmental regulatory framework is significantly developed, even if 
largely cosmetic and unenforced, the environmental rights framework is a 
sparsely developed, un-structured and largely hollow set of isolated legal 
instruments without any impact on environmental protection in the country.  
Currently, there are only two pieces of isolated legal instruments relating to 
environmental rights in Nigeria- the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right 
(ratification and enforcement) Act 1990 (ACHPR) and the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act 1992. The former deals with the substantive environmental right 
while the latter focuses on procedural environmental rights.  Even though section 
20 of the Nigerian Constitution is often regarded as providing for environmental 
right in Nigeria, the section does no more than stipulate a lofty governmental 
aspiration of protecting the environment. The section provides that- 
“The State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the 
water, air and land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria.” 
Two key limitations of this provision make this section unsuitable as an 
environmental right platform. First, it refers to the regulatory imperative of the 
government to protect the environment and is, therefore, a constitutional platform 
for instituting regulatory protections and instruments to protect the environment. 
It does not, in any sense, refer to any individual right to a clean environment. Even 
                                                          
20Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria, Federal High Court of 
Nigeria, Benin Division, Judgment of 14 November 2005, Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05.   
21 Section 33, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).  
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though it can be jurisprudentially argued that rights are the corollary of 
responsibilities, and an individual right to a protected environment may be 
implicitly derived from such constitutional conferment of responsibility on the 
government, deriving rights through reverse analogy such as this is inherently 
tenuous and fraught with difficulties. This provision, at best, serves as a 
constitutional conferment of power on the state to enact and enforce 
environmental legislation and regulation in order to ‘protect and improve’ the 
environment.22  
Second, and perhaps more important in this context, section 20 is explicitly 
declared non-justiciable and unenforceable by section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution, 
rendering it merely platitudinous and hollow. A right loses its relevance if it is 
expressly unenforceable, as enforceable legal protection of an interest is the 
cornerstone of such interest being regarded a ‘right’.23 In addition, the potential of 
utilising a fundamental directive of state policy provision in the constitution, such 
as section 20, to enforce a governmental obligation to protect the environment as 
was done by the Supreme Court of India24 has been unequivocally denounced by 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria in NNPC v Fawehinmi 25where it held that the 
provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution are wholly unenforceable under any 
guise whatsoever and remain mere governmental aspirations.  In this sense, 
section 20 cannot be regarded as a constitutional conferment of environmental 
rights in Nigeria and the inclusion of Nigeria in the list of countries with 
constitutional environmental rights on the basis of section 20 in some literature26 
is erroneous and misleading.   
 
 
                                                          
22 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney 
General of the Federation (2003) 15 NWLR PT 833 pg. 113. 
23 See the jurisprudential discussion on ‘rights’ in chapter 2.1 of this thesis.  
24 Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.  
25 NNPC v Fawehinmi (1998)7 NWLR pt. 559. See various literature in Nigeria arguing for a 
reversal of this approach by the Nigerian Supreme Court- Ogugua Ikpeze, ‘Non-Justiciability of 
Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution as an Impediment to Economic Rights and Development’ 
(2015) 5(18) Developing Country Studies 3; Duru Onyekachi, ‘The Justiciability of the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under Nigerian Law’ (2012) 
available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2140361> accessed 09 October 2017.   
26 See for instance, D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 3. 
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 6.2.2.1 The African Charter and Substantive Environmental 
Rights in Nigeria 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Right (ratification and enforcement 
Act) (ACHPR Act or ‘the Act’) is, in effect, the only extant legislative provision 
containing any semblance of a substantive environmental right in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, its application in Nigeria has been fraught with fundamental legal 
and constitutional hurdles to the extent it has become almost dormant in effect. 
To understand the role of the Act in this context, a brief background is imperative. 
The Act is a domestication of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right 
(the Charter) signed by African countries under the umbrella of the then 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1979. The charter was effectively a 
regional rendition of fundamental human rights principles propounded in relevant 
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.27 
It contains provisions covering major aspects of human rights including the right 
to life, dignity, freedom of movement, equality and labour rights  
The charter was signed by Nigeria in 1982 and ratified in 1983.28 However, in line 
with Section 12 of the then 1979 Constitution of Nigeria (which is framed the same 
way as Section 12 of the current 1999 Constitution), the ratification of the charter 
did not make it immediately applicable in Nigeria until it was domesticated through 
an Act of parliament. The Nigerian parliament, therefore, took the additional step 
of domesticating the charter through the passage of the ACHPR (ratification and 
enforcement) Act 1990 whereupon it became enforceable in Nigeria.    
Article 24 of the Act which is the only provision touching on environmental rights 
provides a concise exposition of the right in the following words- 
“24. All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.”  
Illustratively, this article is the shortest of all the articles espousing human rights 
and duties in the Act (as in the charter from which it derives) and its brevity and 
                                                          
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 
entry into force 23 March 1976. 
28See ‘Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights’ available at 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/> accessed 09 June 2017.  
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absence of particulars of the right has become one of its greatest undoings.29 
There are question marks over the import and qualitative meaning of ‘general 
satisfactory environment’: whether this implies an environment conducive to 
health or merely ‘satisfactory from an objective standpoint’. Also, the ascription of 
‘development’ criteria in judging a satisfactory environment further creates doubt 
on the normative definition of a clean environment as envisaged by the charter. 
Developmental questions are often difficult to cast in clear descriptive mounds, 
especially in the context of African countries with poor developmental indices. To 
link the right to a clean environment to its favourableness to the development of 
a people that are historically underdeveloped may result in a lower standard of 
satisfactory environment than in more developed jurisdictions. Linking such right 
to health would have presented a more objective criterion from which a 
satisfactory environment can be judged as the conditions necessary for 
safeguarding human health are essentially the same regardless of location, stage 
of infrastructural or socio-economic development.   
Moreover, linking the right to its favourableness to development may unwittingly 
be counter-productive as it implies the pre-eminence of developmental 
considerations over environmental considerations. So long as the current state of 
the environment is satisfactory to allow a people to develop (i.e. socio-economic 
development), then the right can be said to have been fulfilled even where the 
environment is not in its best optimal shape.30 In addition, there is debate 
regarding the meaning of ‘people’ in the provision which suggest a group-
collective right rather than an individual right31 enforceable by private persons for 
protection of their individual environmental interests.   
The above shortcomings of article 24 do not derogate from its role as an 
environmental rights platform in Nigeria. Upon its domestication in 1990, it 
became an enforceable environmental rights provision available to all citizens of 
Nigeria in protecting their environmental interests. Nevertheless, more than two 
decades after its coming into force in Nigeria, it has been largely ignored and has 
been generally dormant. The reason for its inefficacy lies in some fundamental 
                                                          
29 U Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1983) 77(4) American 
Journal of International Law 902-912.  
30 R Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 
Virginia Journal of International Law 5.  
31 R Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(1988) 82(1) American Journal of International Law 80-101.  
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legal and constitutional hurdles within Nigeria’s legal system which renders its 
application untenable. This is asides the ambiguous nature of its provision which 
has been largely untested in the Nigerian courts in view of its dormancy.  
There are two issues beleaguering the application of the Act under Nigeria’s legal 
system. The first, and most fundamental, arises from questions over the 
constitutionality of its application to the states in view of the constitutional division 
of powers between the Federal and State governments in Nigeria.  Nigeria 
operates a federal system of governance and the 1999 Constitution delineates 
the legislative powers between the Federal and State legislature and strictly 
circumscribes each tier to legislate only within the ambits of powers granted to 
it.32 This constitutional principle applies with equal force to the domestication of 
international instruments by parliament, as section 12 of the Constitution restricts 
the federal parliament to the domestication of treaties in respect of subjects over 
which it has exclusive legislative powers. Where a treaty covers a subject outside 
of the Federal parliament’s legislative powers, an Act of parliament to domesticate 
such treaty cannot become law until it has been ratified by a majority of the 
Houses of Assembly of the states.33  
The ACHPR covers several issues outside of the exclusive legislative powers of 
the Federal Parliament such as property rights, health and education rights. 
Particularly, ‘environment’ which is the focus of article 24 is a subject outside the 
exclusive legislative powers of the Federal Parliament. It is not listed in the 
exclusive legislative list neither is it explicitly included in the concurrent legislative 
list shared between the federal and state legislature. Ordinarily, therefore, it 
should fall within a ‘residual’ list which is exclusively reserved for the state 
legislature. This principle has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 
Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the Federation34 where it 
upheld the constitutional restriction on the National Assembly to legislate on 
matters on the ‘residual list’, holding that any item in a federal statute on such 
subject will be excised and expunged by the courts.  
Although ‘environment’ is not an item expressly within the federal legislature’s 
constitutional competence, there is room to argue that this power can be inferred 
                                                          
32 Section 4 and Part I, Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. 
33 Section 12(3) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).  
34 (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222. 
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from the ‘Trade and Commerce clause’ in item 62 of the Exclusive Legislative List 
in the Nigerian constitution, akin to the manner the power of the United States’ 
Congress to legislate on environmental matters was derived from the commerce 
clause in the US Constitution35 as upheld by the US Supreme Court on the basis 
of Article 1 Section 8 Clause 3 of the US Constitution.36 This has been used by 
Congress to enact the Clean Water Act 197237 and other federal environmental 
legislation.38  
While it is tempting to apply the US situation to environmental protection in 
Nigeria, the marked difference between the trade and commerce clauses in both 
constitutions and relevant judicial decisions in Nigeria makes this prospect 
unworkable. While Article 1 Section 8 Clause 3 of the US Constitution simply 
empowers Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes”, item 62, Part I of the Second Schedule 
to the Nigerian Constitution is elaborate in its description of the commerce powers 
of the federal parliament and provides specific delineation of the extent of such 
powers covering inter-state commerce, international commerce, standards of 
goods and prices of essential goods and commodities. It is untenable to conceive 
any inference of a power to legislate on environmental issues from such provision. 
In Attorney General of Ogun State v. Aberuagba,39 the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
interpreted the Trade and Commerce clause in item 62 as one of limited scope 
covering international commerce, intra-state commerce and the matters specified 
thereunder. A power to legislate on environmental matters cannot, therefore, be 
derived from this clause.  
Nevertheless, this does not connote an absence of a federal power to legislate on 
environmental matters under Nigeria’s Constitution as the Supreme Court has 
drawn such power from section 20 of the Constitution. The court, however, held 
such power to be a concurrent power, thus empowering the Federal and State 
Parliaments to legislate on environmental matters. This decision arose from the 
landmark case of Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the 
                                                          
35 K Sullivan, G Gunther, Constitutional law. (14th ed. Foundation Press, 2001) 12. 
36 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, (1935) 295 U.S. 495.  
37 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (1972). 
38 Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970), the Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. ch. 35 
§ 1531 (1973). 
39 (1985) NWLR (Pt.3) 395.   
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Federation.40 In this case, the Lagos State Government challenged the 
constitutionality of the Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Authority Decree, 
No. 88 of 1992, a federal statute regulating environmental issues and urban and 
regional planning throughout the federation and under which licenses and other 
environmental permits were issued to local businesses within the states. The 
Claimant sought an order that the federal legislation usurped the power of states 
to legislate on environmental matters and urban and regional planning within their 
jurisdictions. It argued that these matters are residual matters within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the states. Seeing the constitutional importance of the 
suit and its potential impact on the legislative division of powers throughout the 
federation, the Supreme Court ordered all other 35 states in the country to be 
joined to the suit.  
The Federal Government opposed the claim, contending that section 20 of the 
Constitution empowered it to exclusively legislate on environmental matters in 
order to ‘protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and 
land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria’. Majority of the other states joined to the suit 
sided with Lagos State in seeking a nullification of the federal legislation.  
In a split decision of 4 to 3 Justices, the Supreme Court agreed partly with both 
the Claimant and the Respondent, adopting a middle ground solution in the 
constitutional battle for legislative supremacy.  The apex court first drew a 
distinction between ‘environmental’ matters and ‘urban and regional planning’ 
matters under the Constitution. It held that while section 20 covers environmental 
matters, it does not extend to urban and regional planning matters. Consequently, 
in the absence of any reference in the constitution to urban and regional planning, 
it is a residual matter within the exclusive legislative competence of the states. To 
this end, the court nullified Decree, No. 88 of 1992 to the extent it regulated urban 
and regional planning.   
On environmental matters, however, the court held that section 20 is a 
constitutional conferment of power on ‘the state’ to legislate on environmental 
matters. It adopted the definition of ‘state’ in section 318 of the Constitution which 
includes the federal and state governments and declared that both the federal and 
state governments are empowered to protect the environment under the 
                                                          
40 (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt.833) 113, 175. 
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constitution and can, therefore, both concurrently legislate on environmental 
matters. Aware of the potential conflict from this pronouncement, the court went 
further to declare that the Federal Parliament can only legislate on environmental 
matters within the Federal Capital Territory or inter-state environmental issues 
such as federal air quality measures and environmental issues on interstate 
waterways. This removes the potential applicability of the doctrine of covering the 
field, as federal power in this respect is confined to a narrow field and cannot 
override state legislation on similar subjects within state jurisdictions. In respect 
of federal lands within states, it declared that the Federal legislation can only 
regulate the immediate environment within such lands and no more, as ownership 
or possession of lands cannot be utilised as a cover to usurp state legislative 
regulation.  
Although this decision answered a burning question of legislative powers on 
environmental matters under the Nigerian Constitution, it still left some grey areas. 
For instance, while declaring that environmental legislative power under section 
20 is a concurrent power, the court did not clarify whether federal legislation will 
apply to states that have not enacted state environmental legislation to protect the 
environment. Even though the claimant in this case, Lagos State, had enacted a 
number of environmental and regional planning legislation, most of the other 35 
states do not have state legislation protecting the environment. It becomes 
unclear whether federal environmental legislation such as the Federal 
Environmental Protection Act 1992 and the ACHPR Act will apply to such states 
until when such states enact legislation on the subject in other to avoid a vacuum 
of environmental protection. Although it is logical to assume affirmatively, the 
declaration by the court that federal legislation only applies to ‘inter-state 
environmental matters’ may lead to the conclusion that it does not apply within 
the states to fill any vacuum. This is an area of marked distinction from the federal 
environmental power in the US under which federal legislation regulates 
environmental matters within all the states in the US. The difference in both cases 
is that while the federal environmental power in the US derives from a provision 
conferring exclusive federal power (the commerce clause), in Nigeria, the power 
derives from a provision interpreted by the court as conferring concurrent power 
on the federal and state legislature. Each tier, therefore, is required to operate 
strictly within its boundaries.   
278 
 
To buttress this point, an analogy can be drawn with the Child Rights’ Act 2003 
(CRA), a federal legislation which implements section 17(3)(f) of the Nigerian 
Constitution obliging the state to protect and promote the rights of children. The 
CRA is also a domestication of an international instrument – the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989- similar to the ACHPR. Notwithstanding, because the 
legislative power on child rights derives from the fundamental directive of state 
policies which the Supreme Court has declared to confer concurrent legislative 
powers on the Federal and State parliament, domesticating the Convention in 
Nigeria required the ratification of the State Houses of Assembly before the Act 
can apply to the states. Since this was not done, the Act only applies within the 
Federal Capital Territory even though a majority of states lack similar legislation 
protecting children and young persons within their jurisdictions in breach of the 
constitutional obligation in section 17.  Since 2003, several states have enacted 
different versions of Child Rights laws within their jurisdictions while other states 
predominantly in the Northern region have vehemently opposed any idea of such 
legislation on account of their strict adherence to Sharia law which they consider 
inconsistent with the idea of women and children rights.41 Such vacuum in 
protecting child rights within these states has not resulted in the application of the 
Child’s Rights Act within these states as these states continue to apply various 
versions of Sharia Codes that are prejudicial to women and children rights. It is 
doubtful if there is any constitutional principle under which a legislative vacuum 
can be used to justify federal legislative usurpation of a state’s constitutional 
power.   
Applying these discussions to the ACHPR Act, although the Act domesticated the 
ACHPR charter at a time when Nigeria was under military rule and the 1999 
constitution was not in force, its current status as a federal legislation 
domesticating a treaty without ratification by the states in compliance with section 
12(3) of the 1999 Constitution renders it inapplicable to the states under the 
current Constitution. The sum effect, therefore, is that the environmental right 
under article 24 of the Act, being a subject outside of exclusive federal 
competence, is not applicable to the states in the absence of the ratification of its 
provisions by majority of the Houses of Assembly of the States in line with section 
                                                          
41 D Loteta, ‘The Role and Place of Women in Sub-Saharan African Societies’ (2004) Global 
Action on Aging, <http://www.globalaging.org/elderrights/world/2004/subsaharan.htm> 
accessed 09 June 2017.   
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12(3) of the Nigerian Constitution. As stated earlier, a similar situation occurred in 
respect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 which only applies 
within the Federal Capital Territory with the states individually entitled to pass their 
versions of the Act for application within their jurisdictions. Although the 
constitutionality of the ACHPR’s application to the states has not been judicially 
tested, seeing its largely dormant nature, article 24 has, in practice, never been a 
factor in environmental issues within the states.  
Stripping article 24 of the ACHPR Act of its applicability to environmental 
protection in the states in Nigeria deals a debilitating blow to the environmental 
rights framework in Nigeria as it implies that only residents of the Federal Capital 
Territory or occupants of federal lands throughout the country can resort to article 
24. Fortunately, it can be argued that article 24 applies to lands affected by 
environmental pollution from oil and gas production as oil and gas matter is a 
subject within federal exclusive legislative powers and pollution can be considered 
incidental or ancillary to oil and gas production under item 68 of the legislative list 
in the Constitution. This explains why the only recorded suit utilising article 24 
arose from a claim against Shell for environmental pollution arising from oil 
production activities affecting a group of communities in the Niger Delta region.42  
Although this may appear to work in favour of relying on article 24 to protect the 
Niger Delta environment which is generally afflicted by pollution from oil and gas 
activities, there is a potential conflict with Section 1 of the Land Use Act 1978 
which vests all lands within a state on the state government. In effect, under the 
Land Use Act, except for lands specifically designated as Federal Lands, all other 
lands and surrounding ecosystems are vested in the state government. In the 
Niger Delta context, therefore, only lands specifically allocated to the oil 
companies by the Federal Government for oil exploration can be considered 
federal lands and, therefore, subject to federal environmental regulation and the 
application of article 24. This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court in AG 
Lagos v Ag Federation43where the court held that ownership of federal lands 
cannot be used as a disguise to usurp state legislative powers over surrounding 
environment. This raises serious legal questions regarding the extent to which 
article 24 can be applied to the Niger Delta environmental situation seeing that a 
                                                          
42 Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria, supra, n 15.   
43 Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation, supra, n 35.  
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large part of the pollution across the region occur outside the immediate 
environment utilised for oil activities (federal lands) and the states within the Niger 
Delta region do not have individual environmental rights statutes of any kind. Most 
pollution is widely felt in the farmlands, rivers, creeks, streams and swamplands 
covered by private property claims outside of Federal regulation.44   
In the absence of state environmental rights’ laws in these Niger Delta states, the 
residents are confined to tortious claims seeking compensation for these 
environmental pollution as the only available judicial remedy. As a result, aside 
from Gbemre’s case, all other environmental litigation in the region have been 
based on tortious claims against the multinational oil companies for compensation 
without any hope of effectively stopping the state-sanctioned pollution activities of 
the companies.45 
The second issue beleaguering the application of the ACHPR Act is the existence 
of several legislation in Nigeria’s legal system with conflicting and contradictory 
provisions to the guarantee of the right to a clean environment in article 24. 
Though the ACHPR Act derives from a regional charter, its domestication 
transforms it into a regular statute in the hierarchy of laws in Nigeria’s legal system 
and it operates as such. Article 24, therefore, does not override conflicting 
provisions in other statutes which contain several state sanctions of polluting 
activities such as the Associated Gas Reinjection Act (AGRA) and EGASPIN. 
While article 24 guarantees the right to a clean environment, section 3 of AGRA 
empowers the Minister of Petroleum to grant a license to an oil company to flare 
gas which threatens a clean environment while EGASPIN empowers the Minister 
to grant a license to release effluent into the environment. This undermines the 
effectiveness of article 24 as it is an isolated provision in favour of environmental 
protection in the midst of a host of other statutory provisions which undermine 
environmental protection. The courts cannot nullify the latter provisions on the 
basis of the former, as it requires a provision with a higher, more fundamental 
status to override these latter statutory provisions.  
                                                          
44 See J Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 
and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment,’(1997) 15 Boston University International Law 
Journal 261-571. 
45 See the discussion on environmental litigation and judicial attitude in Nigeria in M. Ladan, 
‘Nigeria’ in L Kotzé, A Paterson, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Governance: 
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 215. 
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Although the constitutional protection of the right to life in Section 33 of the 
Nigerian Constitution can be utilised to nullify these statutory provisions, as was 
done by the Supreme Court of India46 and in Gbemre, the general conservative 
nature of the Nigerian judiciary has seen the courts shy away from attempts to 
stretch constitutional provisions beyond a strict narrow scope. An illustrative 
example of the conservative judicial attitude in Nigeria can be gleaned from the 
decision of the Federal High Court in Okpala v. Shell Petroleum Development 
Company47 where the Applicant filed a fundamental human rights claim 
challenging the continued environmental pollution in some communities in the 
Niger Delta by the Respondent, arguing that it violates his fundamental right to 
life and dignity under sections 33 and 35 of the Constitution and article 24 of the 
ACHPR Act.  
This case presented an opportunity for the court to invoke constitutional human 
rights to nullify environmentally injurious activities and toe the line adopted by the 
same Federal High Court in Gbemre decided just a year earlier. However, the 
court declined to pronounce on the question of whether there is a right to a clean 
environment under the constitutional right to life and dignity, instead deciding that 
the Applicants could not sue on behalf of the community or in a representative 
capacity, restricting standing in fundamental rights cases to individuals bringing 
suits on their own behalf. The reliance on technical principles to dismiss a serious 
environmental issue, in this case, is symptomatic of the general attitude of the 
Nigerian judiciary to environmental rights issues.  
Although section 33 of the Constitution was utilised in Gbemre to nullify state 
sanction of gas flaring in section 3 of the AGRA, the Court of Appeal has put on 
hold the decision pending an appeal by Shell Petroleum and the Federal 
Government of Nigeria. This has allowed the oil companies to continue flaring gas 
and the Nigerian government to continue issuing flaring licenses for the past 12 
years since the 2005 decision in Gbemre while the appeal stalls in the slow judicial 
process in Nigeria.48 The Court of Appeal granted a stay of execution of the 
decision in Gbemre only because it felt there was an arguable point in the appeal 
                                                          
46 Bharati v state of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225. 
47 Okpala v. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), No. FHC/PHC/C5/518/2006 of 29 
September 2006. 
48See K Ebeku, ‘Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell Revisited’ (2007) 16(3) Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 312–320. 
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by Shell challenging the reliance on what it considered an unrelated fundamental 
right not inferring environmental protection rights. In Nigerian civil jurisprudence, 
the decision of a lower court on a point of law is only suspended by an appellate 
court pending appeal where the appellant shows an arguable point of law and the 
possibility of succeeding in the appeal, as confirmed by the Nigerian Supreme 
Court in a plethora of decided cases.49 The Court of Appeal’s decision to suspend 
the enforcement of the judgment is, therefore, an indication that the court agrees 
with the respondents that the decision to infer a constitutional right to a clean 
environment from the right to life and dignity provisions in the constitution is of 
doubtful validity and would require further judicial scrutiny by the appellate courts. 
An explicit constitutional right to a clean environment will present a straightforward 
right not subject to interpretative deductions by the courts and will, therefore, not 
present an arguable point on appeal allowing the oil companies to put a decision 
on hold while it continues its adverse environmental practice.  
An attempt was made by the Chief Justice of Nigeria to give impetus to the 
ACHPR Act and creatively elevate the rights contained therein beyond ordinary 
statutory provisions, but this was technically shot down by the courts. In 2009, the 
Chief Justice of Nigeria promulgated the Fundamental Rights Enforcement 
Procedure Rules (FREPR) in pursuant of the power under Section 46(3) of the 
Constitution. The FREPR 2009 is intended to institutionalise abridged procedures 
for enforcing fundamental rights under the Constitution by bypassing most of the 
technical requirements, procedures and principles inherent in general civil 
litigation and ensuring that claimants have easy and quick access to courts to 
redress infringement of their fundamental rights in a fraction of the time it takes to 
conclude general civil cases.50 Most importantly, the FREPR remove the locus 
standi requirement which is the bane of civil litigation in Nigerian civil 
jurisprudence. Order XIII of the Rules entitles any ‘concerned’ person to bring an 
application under the Rules whether or not he/she has a personal interest in the 
matter thus entitling NGOs, advocacy groups and other activist bodies to file 
claims on behalf of individuals or to advocate matters of general welfare concerns.  
                                                          
49 Integration (Nig.) Ltd. v. Zumafon (Nig.) Ltd. (2014) NWLR (Pt. 1398) 479 SC; Ajuwa v. S. P. 
D. C. N. Ltd. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 797 S. C. 
50 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009. 
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Importantly, Order II of the Rules explicitly includes human rights under the 
ACHPR Act amongst the fundamental rights that can be enforced pursuant to the 
rules. As a result, article 24 of the ACHPR could be summarily enforced through 
the FREPR without hindrance from the locus standi principle and, being enforced 
alongside constitutional human rights, there is the possibility of relying on it to 
override adverse provisions in other statutes such as AGRA and EGASPIN. The 
applicant in The Reg. Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability 
Project v Attorney General of the Federation51 sought to take advantage of this 
provision by including provisions of the ACHPR in its fundamental right claim 
before the Federal High Court challenging adverse practices by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria. However, the court relied on a technical, restrictive 
interpretation of section 46 of the Constitution and nullified the inclusion of the 
ACHPR Act rights in the FREPR, holding that section 46 should be strictly 
interpreted to cover only the fundamental rights in Chapter III of the Constitution. 
Section 46(1) of the Constitution which provides for the promulgation of the 
FREPR stipulates that –  
“Any person who alleges that any of the provision of this Chapter has been, 
is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him may apply 
to a High Court in that state for redress.”  
Technically, therefore, the court cannot be faulted for interpreting the FREPR as 
restricted to only fundamental rights in Chapter III of the constitution. However, a 
more liberal and expansive interpretation could have expanded the provision to 
cover other basic fundamental rights in human rights instruments that are 
essential to the protection of the rights of citizens in the country, such as the 
ACHPR. This was the interpretation given to the provision by the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria leading to the inclusion of the ACHPR rights in the FREPR. An activist 
judiciary could have upheld such inclusion in the overriding interest of ensuring 
better protection of human rights which section 46 and Chapter III sought to 
achieve, as there is no word in section 46(1) which imply that the rights in Chapter 
III are the only rights that can be enforced through the summary procedure it 
sought to institute. Even though the provision states ‘this chapter’, the 
specification does not necessarily imply exclusion, as the absence of a word of 
                                                          




exclusion of other human rights can be relied upon to allow the inclusion of human 
rights in other instruments. As it stands, the ACHPR Act cannot be enforced 
through the FREPR and must be interpreted alongside other statutory provisions, 
some of which undermine environmental rights in the country. Furthermore, the 
inability to enforce the ACHPR through the FREPR means that any attempt to 
enforce environmental protection through the Act must go through the slow and 
cumbersome civil litigation process in Nigeria, where it can take years or decades 
to conclude a civil suit, as currently witnessed in Gbemre.   
Consequently, in the absence of an explicit constitutional right to a clean 
environment, the Nigerian courts remain reluctant to extrapolate such right from 
basic human rights under the constitution, preferring to hide behind technical 
obstructionist doctrines such as the locus standi doctrine and strict technical 
restrictive interpretations. A constitutional environmental right will obviate any 
interpretative equivocation about the scope of environmental protection 
recognised by the constitution and, more importantly, will allow for the summary 
enforcement of such environmental right through the FREPR 2009. This will 
strengthen environmental protection in the country.  
 
6.2.2.2 EIA Act and Procedural Environmental Rights in Nigeria 
Environmental legislation in Nigeria is predominantly regulatory in nature, 
evincing the government’s intention to use command and control mechanisms to 
monitor and direct the activities of environment-impacting industries. While the 
ACHPR Act exists as the only legislation with any form of substantive 
environmental right in the country, the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 
1992 (‘The Act’) operates as the only instrument providing for procedural rights of 
the citizens with respect to environmental activities. The Act is intended to 
incorporate basic participatory rights in environmental decision-making process 
including access to environmental information, public participation concerning 
plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment and access to justice 
in environmental matters.   
To this end, section 1 of the Act states the objective to include encouraging “the 
development of procedures for information exchange, notification and 
consultation between organs and persons when proposed activities are likely to 
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have significant environmental effects”. Procedural environmental rights are vital 
for ensuring adequate protection for the environment as improved access to 
information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and 
the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental 
issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public 
authorities to take due account of such concerns. They also allow for citizens to 
assert their substantive environmental right and observe their duties to the 
environment. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration52 and paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
Preamble to the Aarhus Convention53 emphasize the importance of instituting 
procedural rights for citizens with respect to environmental matters in a country. 
Adopting legislative protection of these procedural rights is, therefore, imperative 
and a hallmark of a sustainable environmental rights framework within a 
jurisdiction.  
The Act attempts to institute procedural environmental rights in Nigeria by 
mandating public consultation prior to conducting any environment-impacting 
activities. It goes further to explicitly make provisions for access to relevant 
information relating to all nature of environmental activities by establishing a 
public registry where all documents relating to environmental activities should be 
deposited and openly accessible to the public at no fee.54 It further subjects the 
approval of any environment-impacting activities to public control through an 
elaborate environment impact assessment procedure instituted in the Act which 
includes review panels, public hearings and submission of memorandum by 
potentially affected individuals. Essentially, this procedure is targeted at ensuring 
that an approval for any environment-impacting activity is only granted where it is 
proven, from the assessment, that it has minimal environmental impacts or 
significant environmental impacts that can be mitigated or justified in the 
circumstances.55  
While the Act has good intentions and, cosmetically, appears to be an elaborate 
procedural framework, it is undermined by three fundamental legal and 
                                                          
52 Report of The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 
3-14 June 1992) <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm> 
accessed 14 November 2017.  
53Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters Done at Aarhus, Denmark, On 25 June 1998. 
54 Section 57, EIA Act 1992. 
55 See Part II of the EIA Act 1992. 
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constitutional shortfalls which render it hollow, ineffectual and lacking any impact 
on environmental protection in the country. The first shortfall relates to the scope 
of its application to environments within the jurisdiction of states of the Federation 
under the current constitutional framework in the country. As discussed in the 
preceding section relating to the ACHPR Act, environmental protection as a 
subject is outside the exclusive legislative control of the Federal legislature. 
Consequently, federal enactments on the subject do not apply to environments 
within the states of the federation but only to environments in the Federal Capital 
Territory and other federal lands within the states of the federation. The Act, as a 
federal enactment, therefore, does not regulate procedural environmental issues 
within the states but only federal lands within these states. ‘Federal lands’ is 
defined by section 63 of the Act to mean lands that belong to the Federal 
Government of Nigeria in which Nigeria has a right thereon or has the power to 
dispose of and all waters on and airspace above those land. 
 
Although the Act does not explicitly restrict its application to only federal lands 
(and several sections in Part II refer to state and local government areas),56 any 
interpretation of its provisions as extending to environmental activities in the 
states and local governments will be unconstitutional. In reality, its application is 
restricted to the federal lands as defined in section 63. This is a significant blow 
to the environmental rights framework in the country as it leaves a gaping hole in 
respect of procedural environmental rights for activities within the states, where 
most degraded environments are found. This is further worsened by the fact that 
there are no statutes providing procedural environmental frameworks in any of 
the 36 states in the country.  
Notwithstanding this shortfall, the Act can largely be utilised for the Niger Delta 
environmental situation as it applies to lands used for oil and gas development 
(being federal lands) from which most of the environmental pollution activities in 
the region occur. Therefore, public participation of the inhabitants of the host 
                                                          
56 This is unsurprising considering that the Act was enacted as a Decree by the Military Regime 
in 1992, at a time when the Constitution was suspended and the country was effectively 
organised in a Unitary system of government with statutes from the Central government 
applicable throughout the component units in the country. However, with the transition to 
democratic governance under a federal system of governance in 1999 and the promulgation of 
the 1999 Constitution, the applicability of the Act must be judged based on the current 
constitutional delineation of legislative powers and any excess of legislative power excised from 
the Act.   
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communities in the approval of oil and gas fields development in the region is 
guaranteed under the Act. Even though the lands where the individuals in the 
region reside are state lands, the fact that they will be potentially affected by the 
proposed oil and gas activity on the federal land qualify them as ‘interested 
persons’ entitled to participate in the approval process for such activities. 
Consequently, while the Act falls short as a legal framework for environmental 
rights throughout the country, it has its relevance as a framework for procedural 
environmental rights for the Niger Delta region.  
Nevertheless, the relevance of the EIA Act in environmental matters in the Niger 
Delta is undermined by the second shortcoming of the Act relating to fundamental 
flaws in its provisions which render it ineffective and hollow as a procedural 
framework. The most important of this shortcoming is the conferment of overriding 
power on the President to exclude any proposed activity from the requirement of 
an environmental impact assessment. Section 15(1)(a) of the Act provides that 
an environmental impact assessment shall not be required to be carried out in 
respect of any proposed activity where “the project is in the list of projects which 
the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or the Council is of the 
opinion that the environmental effects of the project are likely to be minimal”.  
In other words, the President is empowered to arbitrarily highlight a list of projects 
for which an environmental impact assessment should not be required. The only 
condition imposed by the Act for including a project on the list is that, in the opinion 
of the President, the environmental effects of such projects are likely to be 
minimal. No statutory criteria are indicated for how the President can come about 
such a conclusion. The conclusion that a project is likely to have only minimal 
environmental effects can only be reached after an impact assessment has been 
done and not before, so it defies logic that the President is empowered to 
determine that minimal effects are likely to result before an impact assessment is 
done and use that as a basis for exempting an impact assessment on a project. 
A clear case of putting the cart before the horse.  
This power is also conferred on the Federal Environmental Protection Council 
(FEPC) by section 15 without any statutory criteria specified for such conclusion. 
Even if a criterion (or criteria) is specified, it will still defy logic that a conclusion 
which can only be reached after an impact assessment has been done can be 
used to exclude an impact assessment. Such inverse logic is detrimental to the 
288 
 
effectiveness of environmental impact assessment in Nigeria and is a pointer to 
the lopsided environmental regulatory framework in the country. What this means 
is that on the arbitrary determination of the President or the FEPC, citizens and 
individuals potentially affected by environment-impacting activities will be 
deprived of access to information regarding such projects and the opportunity to 
participate in the decision making regarding the approval of the project. 
Another regulatory shortcoming in the textual analysis of the Act stems from the 
approval process of a project after the conduct of an EIA. The essence of an EIA 
is to determine the potential impact of an activity on the environment and the 
treatment of the EIA report is central to the effectiveness of the process.57 Where 
the report indicates potentially significant adverse environmental effects, it is 
expected that the project will not be approved in other to protect the environment 
except where cogent and convincing measures are produced by the project 
sponsor to show how these effects can be satisfactorily mitigated or minimised. 
That is the whole essence of the EIA process.58  
In consonance with this practice, section 40 of the EIA Act mandates the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA)59 not to approve a project where it 
determines from the EIA report that the project is likely to cause significant 
adverse environmental effects unless the effects can be mitigated or justified. The 
exceptions allowed in section 40 for approving an environmentally adverse activity 
creates a problem in this instance. The term ‘justified’ is more worrisome as it 
implies that environmental pollution or degradation from proposed activities can 
somehow be rationalised as necessary or acceptable on some grounds. More so, 
it does not appear to connote that the project sponsor is required to take any steps 
to mitigate the adverse impacts provided these impacts are considered justified. 
The use of the disjunctive term ‘or’ in the provision indicates that they are 
alternative considerations by the regulators and a project with adverse 
environmental effects can be approved on any of the two criteria. 
                                                          
57 See Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ 2017 
<http://www.epa.ie/monitoringassessment/assessment/eia/> accessed 09 June 2017. 
58 David Lawrence, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ (2004) Encyclopaedia of Chemical 
Technology 12. 
59 This agency has been replaced by the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) established under the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 2007.  
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When placed in the context of oil and gas exploration in the Niger Delta, this 
provision is often used to approve oil and gas developments which impact the 
environment because these projects are necessary for the economic survival of 
the country and are, therefore, justified. For instance, in Gbemre, Nigeria’s 
Federal Government refused to implement the court’s order to end flaring and 
joined the appeal by Shell because it argued that completely ceasing flaring will 
significantly affect oil exploration owing to lack of gas utilisation activities which 
will effectively mean shutting down most oil facilities to comply with the decision. 
In effect, gas flaring is justified for the time being seeing that it is necessary for 
continued oil exploration pending when the companies acquire the necessary gas 
utilisation facilities. Since section 40 does not define the criteria for ascertaining 
when significant adverse environmental effects are justifiable, it is left for the 
government and regulators to do so and this often means approving projects 
which are important for the economy even if they negatively impact the 
environment. As a result, most of the oil and gas projects in the Niger Delta which 
carry out gas flaring are approved by the regulators despite the significant adverse 
environmental impact of such projects. 
Environmental pollution or degradation is never justifiable on socio-economic (or 
any other) grounds neither is it acceptable for the importance of a project to 
override the sanctity of the environment it impacts. The only acceptable solution 
for such projects is clear and convincing mitigation of the adverse environmental 
effects it is likely to create. Mitigation as a criteria for approving environmentally 
injurious activities under the EIA Act is also unsatisfactorily defined in section 63 
to mean “the elimination, reduction or control of the adverse environmental effects 
of the project, and includes restitution for any damage to the environment caused 
by such effects through replacement restoration, compensation or any other 
means”. The inclusion of ‘compensation or any other means’ as a form of 
restitution for any damage to the environment undermines the relevance of EIA in 
Nigeria. It implies that the regulator can (and they often do) approve 
environmentally adverse projects once the project sponsor shows a clear plan to 
compensate the affected individuals for the adverse effects or is willing to palliate 
their environmental sufferings through any other means.  
Thus, the major focus of the oil companies in the Niger Delta is ensuring effective 
compensation for the affected inhabitants for the environmental suffering brought 
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about by their exploration activities either through direct financial compensation 
or such diversionary measures like building hospitals, schools and roads so the 
people can overlook their environmental suffering.60 While the impoverished 
people of the Niger Delta region often view compensatory and other financial 
rewards as sufficient, environmentalist and other stakeholders consider such 
approach a catastrophe as it monetises a serious problem and its long-term 
effects on the environment are monumental.  
The only acceptable form of mitigation which should be sufficient is the elimination 
of the adverse environmental effects or the restitution of the affected 
environments. The EIA Act, through its provisions on the approval process of 
projects, creates a conducive environment for the Niger Delta inhabitants to sell 
their birth-rights (right to a clean and safe environment) for a pot of porridge 
(financial compensations or building of schools and hospitals). The essence of 
law is the protection of the vulnerable members of the society and not creating a 
framework for these members to be exploited by corporate behemoths with active 
government connivance and implicit support. Where statutory instruments such 
as the EIA Act institutionalises such practice, it becomes imperative for 
constitutional intervention to protect the vulnerable citizens and restore basic 
human rights to the inhabitants of the affected environments.     
The effect of the textual flaws in the EIA Act is that although most oil companies 
carry out environmental impact assessments prior to developments in the Niger 
Delta, they are mostly done to satisfy the dry letters of regulatory provisions for 
the purpose of obtaining operational permits.61 The genuine lack of desire by the 
regulatory bodies to enforce the EIA reports or even monitor the quality of the 
process is compounded by the permissiveness with which the Act treats projects 
with adverse environmental impacts. 
The third shortcoming of the EIA Act as an environmental rights framework stems 
from judicial attitude to its enforcement by citizens in Nigeria. The conservative 
Nigerian judiciary relies on restrictive legal principles such as the locus standi 
principle to defeat claims by concerned individuals and organisations seeking to 
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enforce quality EIA processes and this undermines any attempt to instil effective 
procedural environmental rights framework in the country. In Oronto Douglas v 
Shell Petroleum & Ors,62 the claimant was an activist in the protection of the 
environment actively involved in the protection of the environmental rights, 
promotion of waste management and generally safe and sustainable 
environment. The respondents were jointly engaged in a project for the production 
of liquefied natural gas in a community in the Niger Delta. For the project to take 
off the respondents were required to do preliminary studies on the impact of the 
project on the environment in compliance with the EIA Act. The claimant was not 
satisfied that the respondents had satisfactorily adhered to the provisions of the 
EIA Act in their impact assessment hence he took an action in the Federal High 
Court against the respondents and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
seeking to block the project until a valid EIA had been carried out by the 
respondents. However, this important challenge was thrown away by the courts 
on the ground that the claimant lacked sufficient locus standi to file the suit 
challenging the EIA process as he lacked personal interest in the affected lands.  
In Shell v Isaiah,63 the Nigerian Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the trial 
court which held the appellant liable for environmental pollution and ineffective 
impact assessment merely on technical grounds, holding that the suit was 
improperly filed by the claimant and thus liable to be dismissed without a 
consideration of the merits of the complaint. Access to justice in environmental 
matters is one of the pillars of procedural environmental rights and by restricting 
the citizens’ access to the courts to ventilate environmental concerns on technical 
grounds, these decisions render the environmental rights framework in the 
country ineffective. If citizens cannot challenge environmental decisions without 
facing these technical hurdles by the judiciary, then their environmental rights are 
left unprotected and exposed to governmental and corporate infringements in the 
course of oil and gas exploratory activities. In the Niger Delta, this is the common 
narrative that has led to the present widespread degraded state of the 
environment.  
                                                          
62 Oronto Douglas V. Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd. & Ors (1998) LPELR-
CA/L/143/97. 
63 Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723)168. 
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Constitutionalising environmental rights has the potential to address these 
challenges by removing the procedural and technical difficulties encountered in 
accessing environmental justice. For instance, a constitutional environmental 
right in Nigeria will allow a claimant to utilise the FREPR mechanism with its quick, 
truncated procedure to obtain environmental redress without facing technical 
hurdles including the locus standi principle which is inapplicable to FREPR 
proceedings. The simplified nature of pleadings and filing in FREPR proceedings 
also dispense with challenges in adopting the appropriate procedure for civil 
claims which undermines many environmental litigation in Nigeria. Even the often 
intricate jurisdictional issue of whether to institute a claim at the Federal High 
Court or State High Courts is obviated in FREPR suits as the Supreme Court has 
held that both courts have concurrent jurisdiction in fundamental rights cases and 
applicants can file a claim in either court of their choice.64 Thus, the claimant in 
Shell v Isaiah would not have been prejudiced by filing his environmental claim at 
the State High Court rather than the Federal High Court as decided by the 
Supreme Court leading to the dismissal of his claim.   
 
 
6.3 Constitutionalising Environmental Rights in Nigeria  
From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that the shortfalls of the 
environmental regulatory framework in Nigeria necessitate a paradigm shift 
towards an environmental rights framework to curb the state sanctioning of 
pollution and wilful governmental neglect pervasive under the regulatory 
approach. However, the present environmental rights framework in the country is 
grossly insufficient in protecting the environment from regulatory failures. To be 
effective, environmental rights should be elevated to a higher, fundamental 
platform through incorporation into the Nigerian constitution as a means of 
guaranteeing their inviolability and supremacy over statutory drawbacks.  
Not only that, constitutionalization places environmental rights in an elevated 
judicial position which trumps the various technical, restrictive principles and 
procedures bedevilling civil rights enforcement in Nigeria. It further creates a re-
ordering of social values by attaching fundamental importance to environmental 
                                                          
64 Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865)208 SC.  
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protection, sending a signal to individuals, corporations and the government to 
prioritise measures geared towards ensuring environmental sanctity over property 
interests (for individuals), economic incentives/short-term corporate goals (for 
corporations), and socio-development needs (for government bodies).  
To achieve these goals, the nature of the normative constitutional right and 
placement of the rights within the constitution is essential in determining the 
effective level of a constitutional environmental right in Nigeria.  
 
 
6.3.1 Normative Contents of the Constitutional Environmental 
Right  
Formulating the normative contents of constitutional environmental rights in 
Nigeria is the consummation of the arguments in this thesis as it brings to fruition 
the clamour for the elevation of environmental rights in Nigeria’s legal framework. 
The normative contents of rights in legal instruments, whether statutory or 
constitutional, play a major role in determining their legal enforceability. Framed 
tamely, improperly or with ambiguity and there is a risk of the right lacking legal 
bite and becoming redundant; framed too strongly or in utopian terms and there 
is a risk of the right conflicting with other important rights or being considered 
merely aspirational and subjected to a ‘progressive implementation’ interpretation 
by the courts, especially in countries with poor socio-economic development 
facing infrastructural challenges such as Nigeria. It is imperative, therefore, that 
the normative contents of the environmental right to be incorporated into the 
Nigerian constitution takes cognizance of the unique environmental 
circumstances in the country, particularly in the Niger Delta, and other 
surrounding circumstances necessary for making the right sufficiently enforceable 
and effective in curbing environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region.  
Quintessentially, constitutional environmental rights in Nigeria should be based 
on the coalesce anthropocentrism model developed in this thesis as this ensures 
that the right addresses the three important rights’ holders affected by 
environmental degradation – present humans, future generations and mother 
earth. As evidenced in the global constitution study in the Appendix, none of the 
81 countries with explicit constitutional environmental rights addresses all three 
pillars of coalesced anthropocentrism in their constitutions; rather these 
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constitutions address mostly the human aspect of environmental rights and, in 
rare instances, nature’s environmental interests (Ecuador and Bolivia’s 
constitutions). Ecuador’s Constitution which incorporates nature’s environmental 
rights omits recognition of the environmental rights of future generations. Bolivia’s 
Constitution comes closest to incorporating all three pillars of coalesced 
anthropocentrism as it incorporates the environmental rights of future generations 
and some aspects of nature’s environmental rights but restricts the latter to rights 
for ‘living things’ in the environment, thus adopting a biocentric view of nature’s 
environmental interests rather than an ecocentric view which covers the non-living 
components of the ecosystem such as rivers and lakes.65  
Considering that Nigeria has so far not incorporated any form of environmental 
rights in its constitution, taking such step at this point should not be based on the 
anthropocentric antecedents of other countries but should adopt and reflect 
contemporary understanding of the interconnection and interdependence of 
present humans, future generations and nature in environmental protection.  
The advancement of knowledge in environmental studies has presented an 
improved understanding of the need to shift the focus from environmental 
protection based on anthropocentric chauvinism to a broader view of 
environmental protection which is cross-species, trans-generational and centred 
around the pivotal role of the natural environment in sustaining all life species 
including humans and, therefore, worthy of legal protection of its intrinsic worth. 
This contemporary view of environmental protection should form the platform for 
greening Nigeria’s constitution. Apart from instituting a formidable platform for 
reforming environmental protection in Nigeria, adopting this approach will set the 
Nigerian Constitution apart as a model for other countries seeking to better reflect 
the growing recognition of the natural environment in their constitutional set up.  
Beyond the philosophical and ideological basis for canvassing the adoption of 
coalesced anthropocentric approach, there is also the practical impact of such 
constitutional reformatory approach particularly as it relates to addressing the 
environmental situation in the Niger Delta. The practical impacts will be analysed 
                                                          
65 Article 33 of Bolivia’s Constitution 2009 provides that “Everyone  has  the  right  to  a  healthy,  
protected,  and  balanced  environment.  The exercise  of  this  right  must  be  granted  to  
individuals  and  collectives  of  present  and future generations, as well as to other living things, 
so they may develop in a normal and permanent way.” 
295 
 
by highlighting the individual impact each of the three pillars of coalesce 
anthropocentrism can have in the Niger Delta context.  
 
6.3.1.1 Substantive Constitutional Environmental Rights in the 
Niger Delta   
The conferment of an enforceable right to a clean and habitable environment 
creates a legal bulwark that can be relied upon by inhabitants of the region to 
restrict or prohibit environmentally polluting activities in the region already ongoing 
or before they are even commenced by the oil companies. This right can be 
utilised to restrict or prohibit  oil and gas productions and developments approved 
by the government, asa constitutional right to a clean environment trumps 
economic considerations focused upon by the government in approving a majority 
of the oil prospecting activities in the region which pollute the environment.  
Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying the fact that this will present implementation 
difficulties considering the excessive reliance by the country on oil and gas 
revenue for economic sustenance. The implementation difficulty is further 
compounded by the challenges of immediately requiring oil and gas corporations 
to upgrade their production facilities within a short time frame, considering the 
intensive capital requirements involved. It can be argued that it will be unrealistic 
to expect an immediate halt to environmentally injurious activities by oil and gas 
corporations in the short term, considering decades of investments by these 
corporations on their production facilities within this region.  
In several cases, some of the oil and gas corporations have challenged statutory 
moves by the government to impose excessively strict environmental policies. In 
Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep Limited v. the Federal Republic of Nigeria,66 Shell 
claimed 180m$ from the Nigerian government at the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID)67 for revoking oil mining licences for 
non-compliance with environmental guidelines. In cases such as Interocean Oil 
                                                          
66ICSID Case No. ARB/07/18 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/07/18> accessed 
12 January 2017. 
67 Nigeria ratified the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Convention as far back as August 23 1965. The ICSID Convention has been implemented in 
Nigeria through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Enforcement of 
Awards) Act (Cap 120, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004). 
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Development Company and Interocean Oil Exploration Company v. The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria68and Guadalupe Gas Products Corporation v. The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria,69Nigeria was subjected to investor claims by foreign MNCs 
for regulatory activities which threatened their profits. The plight of the oil and gas 
corporations can be understood, as a shift in the nature of their production 
activities requires a gradual change, not just in the legal framework, but in 
associated subjects necessary to make this transition feasible, e.g. a reduction of 
gas flaring necessarily requires the opening up of the domestic gas market by the 
government to enable these oil companies market the associated gas 
domestically rather than flare it. Thus, the government cannot realistically leave 
the domestic gas market undeveloped in its current form and then mandate the 
oil companies to stop flaring gas but continuing oil production. It is an unrealistic 
expectation as there is no solution for the utilisation of the associated gas by the 
oil companies.   
There is, therefore, some merit in advocating for a gradual implementation of the 
constitutional environmental right in Nigeria in view of the deeply entrenched 
economic reliance on oil and gas production in the country and the challenges of 
requiring an immediate shift from these oil production activities or ordering an 
immediate halt to these activities as a result of the resultant flaring of gas or 
potential for pollution arising from their use of outdated equipment. Where such 
orders are made, the chances of their implementation are quite slim and they are 
likely to be ignored by the executive charged with enforcing these orders. In 
Gbemre v Shell70.the Federal High Court ordered an immediate halt to gas flaring 
by oil companies throughout the country. Considering that oil companies in the 
country flared more than 50 percent of their associated gas and to immediately 
halt flaring will mean halting oil production throughout the country entirely, this 
order was unrealistic leading to it being disregarded by the Federal Government 
and oil companies.  
                                                          
68 ICSID Case No. ARB/13/2013. 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/13/20> accessed 
01 May 2019. 
69ICSID ARB/78/1  
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/78/1> accessed 
01 May 2019. 
70 Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria, Federal High Court of 
Nigeria, Benin Division, Judgment of 14 November 2005, Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05. 
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It is likely that if constitutional environmental rights are stringently utilised in the 
short term to excessively restrict or prohibit environmentally polluting activities, it 
will create a vicious circle where these judicial orders are ignored by the 
government and oil corporations and each disregard increases the likelihood for 
more judicial attempts to clamp down on the polluting activities leading to even 
more stringent (and likely unrealistic) order which will then be ignored by the 
government (without repercussions). Consequently, constitutional environmental 
rights are better utilised as gradual tools to hold the government accountable for 
environmental management, press the government towards a holistic review of 
environmental management systems and the introduction of environmental 
protection mechanisms that incrementally reduces the avenues for pollution by 
the oil corporations.     
While it can be argued that participation in environmental decision making by the 
inhabitants as guaranteed under the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 
provides a pre-emptive tool for inhabitants to restrict potential polluting activities 
by submitting oppositions to such projects, this process significantly fails to protect 
the environmental interests of the inhabitants for two main reasons. First, the legal 
impediments embedded in the Act and constitutional limitations of its application 
discussed earlier in this chapter renders the process largely ineffective and mostly 
a mere administrative compliance mechanism without any impact. Second, the 
final decision on approving a project still rests with the government – the 
environmental regulator – and an approval for a project can be granted 
notwithstanding meritorious oppositions to the projects provided ‘due process’ in 
the EIA process was complied with. The inhabitants’ right to challenge the process 
largely rests on non-compliance issues with the procedure and not the substantive 
outcome of the decision to approve a project, which is statutorily conferred on the 
regulatory body, as the Nigerian courts have held that they cannot substitute the 
expert regulatory body’s assessment with that of the court.71  
Consequently, in the absence of a procedural flaw in the EIA procedure or process 
for grant of a regulatory license or approval, the Nigerian courts will not interfere 
with an environmental project notwithstanding its potential consequences on the 
environment.72 This principle which is the major flaw of the regulatory approach 
                                                          
71 Okpala v Shell, supra, n 13.  
72 ibid.  
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as an environmental protection framework is the primary reason why a 
substantive environmental right is required, as instituting democratic and other 
procedural processes for environmental decision making is not sufficient if the 
final outcome cannot be substantively impeached.  Boyle rightly asserted that- 
“Democracies are entirely capable of environmental destruction, and 
may even be structurally predisposed to unfettered 
consumption…The point is that procedures alone cannot guarantee 
environmental protection.”73    
Boyle’s assertion indicates the need to supplement procedural rights in 
environmental protection with significant substantive rights which can be utilised 
to nullify democratically approved environmentally injurious projects. In the Niger 
Delta, the EIA Act which has been implemented since its promulgation in 1992 
has not in any way changed the environmental pollution outlook in the region 
neither has it prevented the development of environmentally injurious oil projects 
in the region. Most of the recent cases of pollution in the region, such as the Bonga 
Oil Spill in 2011,74 arose from projects which were granted regulatory approval 
under the EIA process. The inability of the inhabitants to substantively challenge 
the regulatory approvals left them helpless to prevent the implementation of the 
projects.  
However, with a substantive constitutional environmental right, the inhabitants will 
be empowered to challenge the substance of these regulatory approvals even 
where they comply with the procedural steps. In such cases, the question before 
the court will no longer be on whether the procedure was complied with, but 
whether, despite the regulatory approval, the prospective project can potentially 
infringe on the claimant’s constitutional right to a clean environment. To support 
this, the claimant can bring expert evidence in with conflict the expert findings and 
conclusions of the regulatory body in its approval or grant of licence decision. The 
constitutional right will, therefore, become a protective tool against ‘democratic 
environmental destruction’ and regulatory approvals will no longer be the 
                                                          
73 A Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights?: A Reassessment’  
<http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/0_1221_humanrightsorenvironmentalrig
htsareasses.pdf > accessed 02 December 2015.  
74 A Omafuàire, ‘Bonga Oil Spill: Group drags Shell to UK Court over $4bn compensation’ 
Vanguard, 02 November 2017, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/11/bonga-oil-spill-group-
drags-shell-uk-court-4bn-compensation/> accessed 02 December 2017.   
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determinative factor in the commencement of prospective environmentally 
injurious projects in the Niger Delta.  
This is a potentially huge transformative step towards protecting the Niger Delta 
environment, as the ability to restrict oil and gas development activities from 
commencing until such projects have implemented all relevant steps to prevent 
environmental pollution to the court’s satisfaction becomes one of the criteria for 
oil companies to carry out activities in the region. Screening prospective energy 
production activities for environmental compliance will be a more effective tool in 
the short term than seeking an immediate halt to ongoing oil and gas production 
facilities which is best handled by obtaining judicial orders to compel tighter 
regulation of such activities to protect the environment. In this vein, the 
environmental regulator will no longer be able to grant exploratory and 
prospecting licenses/approvals to oil companies which have not instituted 
satisfactory plans and investments for gas utilisation to prevent gas flaring 
completely.  In addition, regulatory approvals/licenses granted under the AGRA 
to oil companies to flare gas during oil production and regulatory approvals 
granted for limited effluent release into the environment under EGASPIN can be 
challenged and quashed by the courts for infringing on the constitutional right to 
a clean environment.  
Further, government can be compelled through judicial orders to impose tighter 
environmental regulation of existing oil and gas production facilities which 
continue to produce gas flaring or release effluents into the environment. Through 
judicial enforcement of the constitutional environmental right, these corporations 
willhave their activities appropriately regulated, monitored and restricted to 
achieve a reduction of flaring or other forms of pollution by an order of court. The 
Nigerian government and environmental regulators have clearly shown an 
unwillingness to effectively regulate such activities, but rather grant regulatory 
approvals for their continuation. As a result, the inhabitants are left with only 
reactive compensatory reliefs when these facilities create the inevitable and 
foreseen environmental degradation. Substantive constitutional environmental 
rights remove the ‘inevitability’ about environmental pollution in the region by 
creating a preventive and proactive judicial platform for ensuring these facilities 
are rendered un-operational until they are satisfactorily shown not to possess any 
threat to the environment.   
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The efficacy of this substantive right in restricting environmentally polluting 
projects and shutting facilities creating pollution derive from its status as a 
constitutional right which prevails over every statutory regulatory process, rights, 
procedures, socio-economic considerations and developmental policies of the 
government. Thus, even though the potential closure of important oil and gas 
facilities on this basis may have significant economic impacts on the country’s 
revenue, the courts will be constitutionally obliged to protect the fundamental right 
to a clean environment over such considerations. The decisions of the Costa 
Rican Supreme Court in M.M Levy y Asociacion Ecologista Limonense v 
Ministerio del Ambiente y Energia75 and the Chilean Supreme Court in Pablo 
Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA76 are examples of how the courts accord 
constitutional environmental rights priority over developmental and economic 
considerations by respectively striking down an economically significant oil and 
gas deal entered into by the government and halting an important hydroelectric 
dam on environmental grounds. In these examples, the courts’ intervention were 
preventive – halting potentially environmentally injurious activities before they 
have even commenced – and did not target the shutting down of ongoing 
production activities, even though their orders will steer the government towards 
tighter regulation of these ongoing activities adversely impacting the environment. 
In this regard, constitutional environmental rights in the Niger Delta will be useful 
in screening prospective oil and gas projects for environmental compliance and 
judicial remedies will be available to halt or restrict any prospective project that 
has negative environmental impacts. Judicial remedies can also be obtained to 
compel tighter environmental regulation by the government of existing oil and gas 
activities to protect the environment.   
In effect, the primary impact of constitutionalising environmental rights in the Niger 
Delta goes beyond excessively seeking to restrict oil and gas production activities 
on account of environmental pollution, as this presents implementation 
challenges. Rather, it provides a platform for a more comprehensive approach to 
instituting mechanisms for protecting the environment by the courts while 
ventilating the right to a clean environment. This approach was adopted by the 
                                                          
75Supreme Court of Colombia Decision 2001-13295, Expediente 00-007280-0007-CO, 
21/12/2001. 
76 Pablo Orrego Silva v. Empressa Pange SA Supreme Court of Chile 5th August 1993. 
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Supreme Court of Argentina in 2008 in Beatriz Silvia Mendoza v. Argentina, M.77  
The court issued a comprehensive decision based on the constitutional right to a 
healthy environment in which it ordered - regular inspections of all polluting 
enterprises and implementation of wastewater treatment plans; closure of all 
illegal dumps, redevelopment of landfills, and cleanup of the riverbanks; 
improvement of the drinking water, sewage treatment, and storm-water discharge 
infrastructure in the river basin; and development of a regional environmental 
health plan, including contingencies for possible emergencies. Importantly, the 
court ordered that any violations of the timelines established by the Court would 
result in daily fines against responsible politicians.78  
Also, in the Peruvian case of Pablo Miguel Fabián Martínez and Others v. Minister 
of Health and Director General of Environmental Health,79 the Constitutional court, 
relying on the constitutional right to a clean environment, ordered the government 
to ensure that people in the Peruvian village of La Oroya finally received medical 
treatment for their long-term exposure to lead and other heavy metals emitted by 
a nearby smelter. 
 
6.3.1.2 Constitutional Rights of Future Generations in the Niger 
Delta 
The environmental challenge in the Niger Delta, as in every other environmental 
context, is trans-generational, affecting future generations of the inhabitants in the 
region. The problem began in the region shortly after the commencement of 
commercial exploitation of oil in the region in 1958 and since then, different 
generations of the inhabitants have had the same problem passed down to them 
by their parents. Protecting the environment for future generations of the region 
is, therefore, an important pillar of a potential constitutional environmental right 
encapsulated in coalesced anthropocentrism model. Weiss argues strongly in 
favour of incorporating intergenerational equity and protection of future 
generations in constitutional and legal instruments. She opined that- 
“Future generations really do have the right to be assured that we will not 
pollute groundwater, load lake bottoms with toxic wastes, extinguish 
                                                          
77 Beatriz Silvia Mendoza v. Argentina, M. 1569 (Supreme Court of Argentina, 2008). 
78 Ibid.  
79 Exp. No. 2002–2006-PC/TC (Constitutional Court, 2006). 
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habitats and species or change the world’s climate dramatically—all long-
term effects that are difficult or impossible to reverse—unless there are 
extremely compelling reasons to do so, reasons that go beyond mere 
profitability.”80 
Weiss’ argument, however, creates a little difficulty in reconciling the 
environmental interests of future generations with the environmental needs of 
present generations seeking to harness the benefits of the environment to satisfy 
current human needs. Although she proposed that future generations’ 
environmental interests can be sacrificed for ‘extremely compelling 
reasons…beyond mere profitability’, the ambiguity of this description does little to 
address this concern. In this regard, Skagen Ekeli’s proposition that the 
environmental interests of future generations should be restricted to ‘bio-physical 
needs’ essential to their survival creates a clearer evaluative criterion for 
protecting the interests of future generations as it is easier to determine the 
biological and physical (‘biophysical’) needs of future generations based on the 
essential characteristics and conditions necessary for human survival.81 Weiss 
conceded the need for a more restrictive view of the normative rights of future 
generations in order not to undermine the rights of the present generations, 
stating that- 
“[L]imitations [on the present generation] should be applied very 
narrowly, lest the rights of future generations develop into an all-
purpose club to beat down any and all proposals for change.”82 
Applying a narrow scope of future generations’ environmental rights is best 
achieved by adopting Skagen Ekeli’s proposal for restricting it to bio-physical 
needs. In this sense, the concern is not on aesthetics of the environment which 
present generations will leave to future generations but leaving an environment 
which is safe and healthy for future generations to live and thrive in. Therefore, a 
safe and healthful environment to meet the biophysical needs of future 
generations will focus on ensuring clean air, clean water (groundwater, rivers and 
lakes) and non-polluted soils which will enable future generations to easily obtain 
                                                          
80 E Weiss, ‘Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment’ (1990) 84 
Am. J. Int’l L. 206. 
81Kristian Skagen Ekeli, ‘Green Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Protection of Future 
Generations’ (2007) 20(3) Ratio Juris 378–401. 




basic environmental goods (farm produce, crops, fishes) for their sustenance and 
survival.   
The principle of sustainable development frequently referenced in international 
and domestic legal instruments exemplifies the consideration given to the needs 
of future generations by governments and policymakers around the globe. The 
Brundtland Report, which offers the most accepted definition of sustainable 
development, describes it as ‘development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’83 
and the Rio Declaration reinforced this concept of owing a duty to all people, both 
today and in the future, stating, ‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as 
to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.’84 The proclamation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
201585 is also geared at ensuring developments that protect the trans-
generational interests of humankind. 
Some binding international legal instruments also oblige signatories to protect the 
interests of future generations. The Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes provides that “water 
resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are met 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”86 
At the domestic levels, the Constitutions of several countries such as Bolivia,87 
Norway88 and South Africa89 provide enforceable environmental rights for future 
generations. 
Three different models of enshrining the environmental interests of future 
generations have been proposed and debated in the literature – the courts, 
                                                          
83Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, ch.2(1), U.N. 
DOC.A/42/427 (1987), available at <http://www.worldinbalance.net/agreements/1987-
brundtland.html> accessed 14 July, 2016. 
84 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio De Janeiro, 
3-14 June 1992). 
85 See UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goals 2015’, available at 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> accessed 14 
July, 2018. 
86Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 
art. 2(5)(c), Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312. 
87 Article 33, Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia 2009. 
88 Article 112, Constitution of Norway, 1814 as amended in 2014.  
89 Section 24, Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
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ombudsmen and guardianship (trustees) system.90 The courts act as a model for 
protecting the interests of future generations through its judicial orders and 
mechanisms which are deployed to restrict acts that impinge on the interests of 
future generations. In some countries, the courts have instituted measures 
permitting present generations to commence proceedings as representatives of 
the interests of future generations. In the 1994 case of Minors Oposa v. Secretary 
of the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources,91 the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines granted standing to 44 minors to sue on behalf of 
themselves and future generations because of concerns about unsustainable 
logging in the country which, it was claimed, could affect the ability of future 
generations to benefit from the natural resources of the vast forests in the 
country.92 In the United States, the 2015 decision of a US Federal District Court 
in Oregon to grant standing to a group of children to sue on behalf of the 
environmental interests of future generations in respect of climate change 
concerns in Juliana v United States93 has opened a new vista of litigation for future 
generations in the country. The court opined that climate change concerns affect 
the environmental interests of future generations and judicial mechanisms should 
be available for present generations to protect such interests.94  
The second model relies on the institution of an ombudsman by governments to 
represent the interests of future generations and ensure that regulatory policies 
and decisions do not infringe on such interests. These ombudsmen, sometimes 
                                                          
90 Science and Environmental Health Network, ‘Models for Protecting the Environment for 
Future Generations’ (2008) The International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp> accessed 08 November 2017.  
91 Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources 
(S.C., January 1994) (Phil.), 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994). 
92 In granting standing to sue, the court stated that ‘We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for 
themselves, for others of their generation and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their 
personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of 
intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is 
concerned. . . “. ibid, 835.   
93 United States District Court, D. Oregon, Eugene Division, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). 
Judge Aiken, delivering her ruling in the case stated that “Federal courts too often have been 
cautious and overly deferential in the arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered 
for it.”  
94 Similar litigation on behalf of future generations are also sprinting up in several places. For 
instance, Greenpeace and the Nature and Youth environmental group recently filed a lawsuit in 
November 2017 over Norway's failure to abide by its constitutional obligation to safeguard the 
environment for future generations. The lawsuit challenges 10 licenses issued by the Norwegian 
government for exploration in the Barents Sea and seek to nullify them in order to protect the 
interests of future generations. See David Leestma, ‘Groups Sue Norway Over Failure to Protect 
Environment for Future Generations’, Ecowatch, 17 November 2017 
<https://www.ecowatch.com/norway-climate-lawsuit-2510288916.html> accessed 08 
December 2017.  
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appointed as commissioners, serve as compliant mechanisms for redressing 
areas of concern for sustainable development issues and are other times a branch 
of the executive established for developing governmental policies that accord with 
sustainable development. They, therefore, come in different forms. The U.K. 
Sustainable Development Commission and the Israeli Commission for Future 
Generations95 are examples of executive commissions established to develop 
sustainable development policies that protect future generations. On the other 
hand, the Canadian Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations 
established by the Hungarian Parliament in November 200796 are examples of 
Ombudsmen system for protecting the interests of future generations using single 
commissioners rather than a government department or agency. In whatever form 
they take, the ombudsman system provides a layer of review to ensure that the 
executive and legislative branches take into account the interests of future 
generations in a healthy environment. 
The guardianship or trustee system utilises the appointment of specific guardians 
to act as representatives of future generations in different contexts and to 
propagate programmes or projects that ensure their interests are adequately 
protected. Guardianships require present generations (the guardians) to protect 
the best interests of future generations (the wards). Trusteeship is a concept 
similar to a guardianship but is governed by a fiduciary duty.97 Guardians or 
trustees usually accomplish their task through litigation on behalf of future 
generations as they are conferred with the legal personality, power and 
responsibility to institute proceedings on behalf of future generations.  
Ekeli proposes an additional model outside of the above three - the democratic 
representation model- whereby future generations will be reserved a fixed number 
of parliamentary seats in the federal and regional legislature to promote the 
passage of laws for the benefit of future generations.98 This model seeks to 
address concerns over the adverse impact that legislation passed by present 
                                                          
95 Commission for Future Generations operated pursuant to enabling legislation passed by the 
Knesset, Knesset Law (Amendment No. 14), 5761-2001. 
96 Law CXLV of 2007, § 10, 164/2007 Magyar Közlöny [MK.] 12426-12429 (Hung.) (amendment 
to Law LIX of 1993). 
97 ‘Models for Protecting the Environment for Future Generations’, supra, n 77, 9.  
98 K Ekeli, ‘Giving a Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future 
People’ (2005) 18 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 429–450. 
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generations affect the environmental interests of future generations. By having 
democratic representatives in legislative bodies, therefore, it is expected that such 
interests will be protected by such representatives in every legislative instrument. 
Challenges over the modalities for incorporating this model into current political 
electoral systems in most democracies is a likely obstacle to the implementation 
of this model which holds good prospects for protecting future generations’ 
environmental interests. Additionally, it is doubtful the impact that a few 
representatives in large legislative bodies can have in advancing environmental 
interests of future generations, seeing they can very easily be out-voted by the 
majority of present generations’ representatives who may, in all likelihood, 
consider their proposals as utopian, excessively idealistic and an unworkable 
restraint on the enjoyment of environmental goods by the present generation.    
In the Niger Delta context, enshrining the rights of future generations in a 
prospective constitutional environmental right will create a legal obligation on the 
executive and legislative bodies in the country to institute necessary measures to 
protect the environment for the future generations of the inhabitants of the region. 
These measures can include the adoption of any of the above-mentioned models 
for protecting the rights of future generations – particularly the ombudsman and 
guardianship models- and the incorporation of such considerations in 
environmental impact assessment criteria by the regulatory bodies.  Currently, 
environmental impact assessments for projects in Nigeria (majorly oil and gas 
development projects in the Niger Delta) do not include any consideration of the 
potential environmental impacts on future generations. There is no legal or 
constitutional obligation for such consideration to be included in EIA criteria. 
Constitutionalising the rights of future generations will create such legal obligation 
on the regulatory body and the relevant corporations executing environmental-
impacting projects which, if not fulfilled, can be compelled through the courts by 
individuals and concerned environmental groups. 
Further, all future environmental legislation will be constitutionally obliged to 
incorporate protective mechanisms for the rights of future generations. 
Importantly, legislation on different subjects which in any way undermine the 
sustainable development of the environment for future generations can be 
challenged on constitutional grounds and overturned to such an extent. The same 
result goes for any regulatory approvals/licenses/policies/projects which fail to 
307 
 
incorporate sustainable development principles as a means of preserving the 
environment for future generations. Seeing the inextricable links between the 
concept of sustainable development and the environmental rights of future 
generations, this will constitute a constitutionalization of the concept of 
sustainable development in the Niger Delta region and the rewards will be reaped 
by future generations through the actions of concerned persons in the present 
generation.  
Regarding the appropriate model to be adopted, the courts will remain the 
predominantly effective model for protecting such interests as the arbiter of the 
rights and liabilities of the present and future generations.99 As revealed in the 
discussions in this chapter, the Nigerian judiciary is conservative and generally 
adopts technical, restrictive doctrines, principles and interpretations with respect 
to environmental claims (as in other areas). Decisions such as Minor Oposa and 
Juliana v US cannot be expected of the Nigerian judiciary, as it difficult to see the 
courts granting standing to sue for the interests of an unascertainable future 
generation seeing how it even denies standing to living humans in the present 
generations to sue over environmental concerns.100 But with an explicit 
constitutional right for future generations, there is a clear enforceable right which 
can be enforced through the courts by concerned individuals and environmental 
groups acting on behalf of future generations. The problematic issue of standing 
is also consequently obviated by the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure 
Rules exclusively applicable to fundamental rights in the constitution which 
obliges the court to entertain suits from all concerned persons regardless of their 
interests or connection to the claimant. On this basis, environmental groups and 
individual activists can constitute themselves into guardians for the interests of 
future generations and embark on rigorous litigation to guard against any 
encroachment on such rights. The combination of the court and guardianship 
models to protect the rights of future generations creates an effective framework 
for guarding these rights. 
The ombudsman model is also another approach that can arise from the 
government’s discharge of an ensuing constitutional obligation to protect the 
                                                          
99 B Lewis, ‘The Rights of Future Generations within the Post-Paris Climate Regime’ (2018) 7(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 69-87. 
100 Oronto Douglas v Shell BP, supra, n 57.  
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environment for future generations. However, considering the regulatory nature 
of this model and the experience of poor regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria, its 
potential effectiveness is doubtful, particularly with the difficulty in reconciling its 
potential role alongside other existing regulatory bodies in the environmental 
sector in Nigeria. 
In summary, incorporating the rights of future generations as part of a prospective 
constitutional environmental right in Nigeria will ensure that future generations in 
the Niger Delta region have enforceable constitutional rights protectable in the 
present times by appropriate persons and organisations. Legal proceedings can 
be instituted by activists and environmental groups to compel the government to 
implement tighter regulatory controls of activities, especially in the oil and gas 
sector, which have the potential to affect the future environmental viability of the 
region even if not presently harmful to the present generation.101  
 
 
6.3.1.3 Constitutional Rights of Nature in the Niger Delta 
Nature and its complex, inter-woven ecosystems play an important role in 
sustaining all life forms within an environment. Protecting the environment, 
therefore, includes the recognition of the intrinsic rights of the natural 
environment102 and the incorporation of such rights in every legal expression of 
the environmental rights of humans. Constitutionalising environmental rights 
should, as a result, include the constitutional recognition of the rights of mother 
earth. In the Niger Delta context, protecting the natural environment through 
constitutional environmental rights is just as important as protecting the 
environmental rights of the human inhabitants.  
While attention is often focused on the human cost of environmental degradation 
in the Niger Delta, the natural ecosystem in the region and its sustainability is 
equally severely affected as entire swamps, mangrove forests and other naturally 
occurring features of the natural environment are constantly eroded by pollution 
in the region. The scale of the threat of environmental degradation to nature in the 
                                                          
101 Science and Environmental Health Network, ‘An Environmental Right for Future Generations: 
Model State Constitutional Provisions & Model Statute’ (2008) The International Human Rights 
Clinic at Harvard Law School <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp> accessed 08 
November 2017. 
102 The natural environment is referred to as ‘Mother Earth’ in legal instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010.  
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Delta region was brought to the fore by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Report on environmental assessment in the region 2009 - 
2011.103 The report highlighted the deleterious impacts of degradation in the 
region on two important components of nature- animals (fishes and wildlife); and 
bio-diversity including the delicate mangrove forests and ecosystem in the region. 
Recounting the destruction of wildlife by environmental degradation in the region, 
the report stated that- 
“Physical contact with oil destroys the insulation properties of fur and 
feathers, causing various effects in birds and fur-bearing mammals. 
Heavily oiled birds can also lose their ability to fly, as well as their 
buoyancy, causing drowning. In efforts to clean themselves, birds often 
ingest oil, which may have lethal or sub-lethal impacts through, for 
example, liver and kidney damage.”104  
Fishes and other sea-based creatures in the region are also destroyed by the 
severe pollution of the surface waters in the region, depriving them of their natural 
habitat and resulting in the depletion of their numbers and ability to reproduce and 
replenish their stock.  
Bio-diversity in the region is similarly affected by the degradation with swamps 
and mangrove forests often destroyed by pollution. These mangrove forests are 
an important aspect of the natural ecosystem and are crucial to the maintenance 
of biodiversity in the region. The UNEP report stated that- 
“Mangrove ecosystems, together with seagrasses and coral reefs, are 
among the world’s most productive natural 
ecosystems…Consequently, mangroves are not just ecologically 
significant but are critical to the livelihood and food security of the Delta 
community”.105  
The Niger Delta has the third largest mangrove forests in the world and the largest 
wetland ecosystem in Africa106 which are strategically important for sustaining 
                                                          
103 ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’, United Nations Environment Programme 2011, 
<https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA_ES.pdf> accessed 09 November 
2016.  
104 ibid, 39.  
105 ibid, 152.  
106 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Niger Delta Biodiversity Project’, 2007 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) The GEF’s Strategic Programme for West Africa (SPWA) – 
Sub-component Biodiversity, UNDP GEF PIMS no.: 2047 GEFSEC Project ID: 4090.  
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humans in the Delta region. Nevertheless, the constant environmental pollution in 
the region results in – 
“smothering of fringing mangroves, alteration of surface topography 
and hydrology, acidification, accumulation of heavy metals and water 
contamination, which together in the Niger Delta have resulted in 
damage to vegetation and killing of fish…Importantly, hydrological 
changes, such as increased salinity or lack of regular influx of 
freshwater to mangrove communities, may lead to degradation and 
ultimately destruction of the mangrove community”.107 
The impact of such degradation on nature’s delicate systems can be seen in 
photographic evidence recorded by the UNEP assessment team in Figures 15 
and 16 below- 
 
Figure 15- Destroyed portions of a mangrove forest by oil exploration 
activities 
       
Source: UNEP Ogoniland Report 2011 
 
                                                          
107 UNEP Report, supra, n 103, 153.  
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Figure 16: Destroyed portions of a swampy vegetation by oil exploration 
activities 
        
     Source: UNEP Ogoniland Report 2011 
The infringement on the sanctity of the natural environment in these forms can be 
unconnected with the infringement on the rights of the resident human population 
to a clean environment, as the affected mangrove forests and ecosystem are 
often remotely located away from human habitations. Additionally, the right of the 
wildlife (such as birds and fishes) in the region to survive and thrive in their natural 
habitat may not be adequately covered in an expression of the human right to a 
clean environment in a prospective constitutional environmental right. While a 
human right to a clean environment can be liberally interpreted to include the 
protection of other components of the ecosystem vital for human sustenance, 
such interpretation is unlikely to be made by the conservative Nigerian judiciary. 
Moreover, even where such interpretation is adopted, the anthropocentric nature 
of the right will only protect these aspects of the natural environment to the extent 
of their relevance to human satisfaction and not necessarily to the extent required 
for their own intrinsic sustenance. Yet, these essential components of the natural 
environment cannot be left fundamentally unprotected from the same source of 
environmental degradation as those suffered by humans, seeing the inter-
dependence of humans on them.  
In this regard, it is essential that a prospective constitutional environmental right 
should incorporate an explicit recognition of the rights of the natural environment 
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to sanctity, sustenance and protection from all forms of degradation from 
environment-impacting activities. Conferring such constitutional right on nature 
will empower environmental activists and non-governmental organisations to take 
up active roles in ensuring the protection of the natural ecosystem in the region 
primarily through litigation challenging regulatory licenses, approvals or oil field 
developments prejudicial to the natural environment.  
Additionally, nature’s intrinsic interests will become an integral criterion in every 
environmental impact assessment procedure for oil field developments. This will 
be achieved in either of two ways- the legislature amends the EIA Act 1992 to 
incorporate nature’s environmental interests as mandatory criteria to be 
considered by the regulatory body and oil companies in EIA procedures in 
compliance with the constitutional mandate on nature’s rights; or a court order is 
obtained through appropriate litigation declaring nature’s interests an inviolable 
consideration in every EIA procedure in compliance with the constitutional 
mandate on nature’s rights. In both instances, constitutionalising nature’s rights 
in Nigeria will open a new vista for the protection of the natural environment in the 
region from degradation arising from oil producing activities.  
Finally, the constitutional obligation on the government arising from nature’s 
constitutional rights can be used as a platform to compel the Nigerian government 
to establish institutional mechanisms for protecting the natural ecosystems in the 
Delta region. This institutional mechanism may include setting up a commission 
or government parastatal charged with the responsibility of overseeing the 
preservation of nature’s sanctity in the course of oil and gas exploration in the 
Niger Delta and elsewhere around the country. The government can be compelled 
to institute such mechanisms through legislative instruments implementing the 
new constitutional right or public interest litigation seeking such remedy from the 
courts. In MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay,108 the Supreme Court of 
the Philippines ordered the setting up of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee to 
oversee the environmental protection of the Manila Bay for the benefit of the 
residents around the bay. This decision demonstrates the use of judicial powers 
to compel regulatory reforms and institute regulatory mechanisms by the 
executive arm of government to protect, preserve and fulfil important 
                                                          
108 G.R.No. 171947-48, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 18 December 2008. 
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constitutional rights. Constitutionalising nature’s rights will enable the Nigerian 
courts to adopt the Manila Bay approach with respect to the protection of the 
natural environment as there will be an enforceable constitutional platform to base 
such judicial coercion of regulatory reforms by the government. 
 
 
6.3.2 Placement of the Constitutional Environmental Right   
The placement of a prospective constitutional environmental right within the 
constitutional document is equally as important as the normative contents of the 
rights in the Nigerian context. The Nigerian constitution is an amalgam of 
enforceable and non-enforceable rights and obligations with different chapters of 
the constitution carrying slightly different weights in relation to their justiciability 
before courts of law, the alteration process and enforcement 
mechanisms/procedures. As a result, deciding which chapter to place a 
prospective environmental right is an important task with bearings on its potential 
effectiveness and sustainability as an environmental rights framework in the 
country.  
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) comprises 
eight Chapters and seven Schedules. Essentially, seven of the eight chapters 
(Chapters I, III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII) provide substantive and enforceable 
provisions relating to governance, civil and political rights/procedures and judicial 
matters while one chapter (Chapter II) provides aspirational objectives and policy 
foundations for governance in the country which are explicitly declared non-
enforceable by the Constitution.109 Out of the seven enforceable chapters, only 
Chapter IV (sections 33-46) dealing with fundamental rights has an instituted fast-
track mechanism for judicial remedies for aggrieved persons110 while enforcement 
of the rights in the other chapters are subjected to the normal cumbersome civil 
litigation procedures in the country.111 As a result, only the rights in Chapter IV 
are capable of expeditious enforcement through the courts. 
                                                          
109 Section 6(6)(c). 
110 Section 46 of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 
(FREPR) 2009 made pursuant to section 46. 
111 Although Chapter VII provides for Election Petition Tribunals for election disputes distinct from 
the conventional civil litigation procedure, this process is technical and cumbersome in its own 
way, even though the constitution imposes strict timelines for resolution of the disputes. See 




In terms of alteration of the constitution, although the procedure is the same for 
all chapters in the constitution, there is a bifurcation of the approval threshold by 
parliament between Chapter IV and the other chapters. Section 9 of the 
constitution stipulates the procedure as requiring a bill for alteration to be passed 
by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of both houses 
of the National Assembly – the Senate and House of Representatives- and 
approved by resolutions of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of 
all the States.112  However, for an alteration of Chapter IV dealing with 
fundamental rights, the bill must be passed by the votes of not less than four-fifths 
majority of all the members of both houses of the National Assembly before 
ratification by a two-thirds majority of the Houses of Assembly of the States. 
Mathematically, this means that at least 85 of the 109 members of the Senate and 
288 of the 360 members of the House of Representatives must vote in support of 
an alteration to Chapter IV as against 72 and 240 votes respectively. The higher 
threshold of four-fifths majority for altering Chapter IV makes the rights engrained 
therein more secure and less susceptible to tinkering by the political elites through 
the legislature charged with constitutional alteration responsibilities.  
In deciding the chapter to place a prospective environmental right, the current 
framework of the Constitution narrows the options to only three chapters- 
Chapters II, III and IV- which are the only chapters dealing with civil, political and 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution. Chapter III focuses exclusively on 
citizenship acquisition, dual citizenship and denunciation of citizenship and is thus 
not suitable for placing environmental rights. Placing the rights in Chapter II will 
not be novel as the only reference to environmental matter in the Constitution is 
found in this chapter in section 20. Moreover, this chapter includes several 
extensive provisions on socio-economic rights and principles including freedom, 
equality and social justice;113 economic development;114 educational 
opportunities;115 non-discrimination and promotion of cultural rights and 
practices.116 Therefore, one option is to expand section 20 by incorporating 
explicit provisions relating to the right to a clean environment and the other 
elements of coalesced anthropocentric environmental rights. The major problem 
                                                          
112 Section 9(2).  
113 Section 17. 
114 Section 16. 
115 Section 18. 
116 Section 21. 
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with this option is that all the rights and duties in Chapter II are wholly 
unenforceable and are merely declaratory and environmental rights incorporated 
therein will become hortatory, symbolic and mostly irrelevant.117  
As a result, environmental rights are best placed amongst the fundamental rights 
provisions in Chapter IV of the Constitution for several reasons. Placing 
environmental rights amongst the other fundamental rights in Chapter IV evinces 
the high importance attached to the right and renders it equal in significance to 
the traditional fundamental rights in the constitution. In addition, it renders the right 
more secure and less susceptible to tinkering by the political elites when 
environmental rights become an obstacle to the unrestricted pillaging of the 
environment in the Niger Delta region to satisfy short-term economic and 
developmental goals. Further, and perhaps more importantly, inclusion in Chapter 
IV grants access to expeditious judicial relief for environmental concerns through 
the FREPR Rules and enables environmental matters to bypass the cumbersome 
civil litigation procedure that is the bane of rights enforcement in Nigeria.  
Importantly, also, there is the resultant judicial liberalism in interpreting 
environmental rights as part of the fundamental rights in the Constitution by the 
Nigerian courts. Although the Nigerian courts are generally conservative in 
interpreting civil rights, fundamental rights in Chapter IV constitute an exception 
to this approach as the courts adopt a liberal, generous and proactive approach 
in interpreting Chapter IV rights. This approach was reiterated by the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in the 2017 case of Nweke v State involving fundamental rights in 
Chapter IV, where the court stated that- 
“it is a formidable prescription that their provisions should not be 
subjected to ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism.’ On the contrary, they 
[their provisions] ...call for a generous interpretation ... suitable to give 
to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
referred to...,"118 
The ‘austerity of tabulated legalism’ refers to technical, restrictive legalistic 
principles that are unduly relied upon by the Nigerian courts to restrict many rights 
enforcement processes brought before them. While such austere ‘tabulated 
legalism’ continues to hold sway in regular civil proceedings, and even in the 
                                                          
117 Section 6 (6) (c). See NNPC v Fawehinmi (1998)7 NWLR pt. 559. 




enforcement of other constitutional rights,119 Chapter IV rights benefit from a 
break from this tradition in favour of more liberal interpretative stance by the 
courts. This is brought about partly by the liberal principles introduced by the 
FREPR Rules which enjoin the courts to expansively and liberally interpret and 
apply the fundamental rights with a view to advancing and realising the rights and 
freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them.120 
The FREPR Rules further calls for the court to proactively pursue enhanced 
access to justice for all classes of litigants, especially the poor, the illiterate, the 
uninformed, the vulnerable, the incarcerated, and the unrepresented.121 These 
principles have steered the courts towards a liberal approach to fundamental 
rights which constitutional environmental rights will benefit from. A liberal 
approach to interpreting constitutional environmental rights will see the court 
willing to liberally expand the right to cover every sinew of environmental 
preservation measures possible in interpreting the rights and in handing down 
orders and declarations upon suits brought to enforce these rights.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the environmental regulatory and environmental rights 
framework in Nigeria and made a case for the introduction of constitutional 
environmental rights in the country as a way of addressing the deep-rooted 
environmental issues in the Niger Delta region. The chapter argues that for 
constitutional environmental rights to be effective in solving the Niger Delta 
environmental challenges, they should be framed in the coalesced 
anthropocentrism model developed in this thesis. This will ensure that the 
constitutional right addresses the rights of present and future generations of 
people in the Niger Delta as well as recognise and protect nature’s intrinsic rights 
in the region covering the mangrove forests, swamps and other non-human 
habitations in the region.  
                                                          
119 See, for instance, the Supreme Court’s legalistic interpretation of Section 285(6) & (7) of the 
Constitution relating to the election petition rights of an aggrieved candidate in an election in 
PDP & Ors v Shettima & Ors (2012) 6 NWLR Pt 1232 pg. 15.  
120 Paragraph 3(a) FREPR Rules 2009.  
121 Paragraph 3(d).  
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The chapter also identified the implementation challenges facing the utilisation of 
constitutional environmental rights in enforcing environmental compliance, 
particularly in the oil and gas sector, considering its vital role in the economic 
sustenance of the country. The chapter, therefore, emphasises the capacity of 
constitutional environmental rights to be used as a tool for ensuring environmental 
accountability by screening prospective environment-impacting activities for 
compliance with environmental standards and compelling the government to 
impose tighter regulatory controls in the oil and gas sector in order to protect the 
environment.  
While environmental laws have become commonplace across the globe, too often 
they exist mostly on paper because implementation and enforcement is irregular, 
incomplete, and ineffective. In developing countries, this irregular and ineffective 
implementation and enforcement is mainly due to the prioritisation of economic 
and developmental needs over environmental protection. Attempting to use 
constitutional environmental rights in the Niger Delta to directly undermine 
economic development of the country through excessively restricting oil and gas 
production activities will be counter-productive as it will lead to even less 
implementation and enforcement of the constitutional environmental rights. To 
ensure effective implementation and enforcement, therefore, the constitutional 
environmental right should be utilised in such a way that it is compatible with 
economic development of the country while still promoting environmental 
accountability and protection. Seeking to use environmental constitutionalism to 
directly challenge economic development in a developing country is a counter-
productive strategy with very minimal chances of success.   
Having established a clear picture of how constitutional environmental rights can 
be implemented in Nigeria, including the normative contents and placement within 
the constitution, chapter 7 will narrow down the analysis to a discussion of how 
constitutional environmental rights can potentially address the specific 
fundamental environmental challenges in the Niger Delta discussed in Chapter 1. 
This will reveal how constitutionalization is an effective solution to the 
environmental degradation in the region as it provides cures for the root causes 
of the problem, rather than merely treating the symptoms, as other solutions tend 




CHAPTER SEVEN      
 
IMPACTS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION ON THE NIGER DELTA 
ISSUES 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, there is a link between 
constitutionalization of environmental rights and the ecological footprint of a 
country.1 While the environmental problems in the Niger Delta transcend 
concerns about Nigeria’s ecological footprints – Nigeria has a relatively low 
ecological footprint2- the unique environmental problems facing the region can be 
similarly impacted by constitutionalising environmental rights. Constitutionalising 
environmental rights has the potential to redress the fundamental causes behind 
the continued environmental despoliation in the region as identified and discussed 
in Chapter 1. This chapter analyses the nature of these impacts and how they 
contribute to redressing the environmental problems in the region. 
 
7.2 Impact on the Weak Environmental Legal Framework 
Nigeria’s environmental law framework is critically weak, disjointed and 
unsustainable as a protective framework for securing an ecologically balanced 
environment and this is one of the root causes why the environment in the Niger 
Delta is left largely unprotected. The absence of a concrete framework for 
regulating environment-impacting activities throughout the country is particularly 
felt in the Niger Delta where oil and gas activities are carried out, as few activities 
have a destructive environmental impact as much as oil and gas exploration. This 
shortfall in the environmental law framework has a constitutional root as the 
absence of any clear delineation of environmental powers between the federal 
and state governments creates several cracks through which environmental 
pollution activities continue to escape regulatory policing.  
                                                          
1 See the discussions in Chapter 5. 
2 Nigeria ranks 18th out of 140 countries in terms of countries with low ecological footprint. See 
the Happy Countries Index 2018, <http://happyplanetindex.org/countries/nigeria> accessed 06 
February 2018.   
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Faced with this critically weak legal framework, residents of affected communities, 
environmental activists and the judiciary have an uphill task holding the 
government environmentally accountable as they are handicapped by statutory 
bottlenecks/approval of these activities and an unenforceable constitutional 
obligation on the government to protect the environment in section 20 of the 
constitution. This leaves tort law litigation for resultant environmental damage or 
a resort to environmental violence3 by the inhabitants of the communities as the 
only options for addressing the problem.  
Constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria addresses this shortcoming by 
engendering stronger environmental laws, nullifying statutory/regulatory 
approvals of pollution in any form, instituting enforceable constitutional obligations 
on the government to protect the environment and creating a sustainable platform 
for citizens, environmental activists and the judiciary to hold the government and 
oil companies environmentally accountable for any activity that impinge on 
environmental sanctity. As Boyd argues, one of the greatest measurable impacts 
of constitutional environmental rights is in relation to stronger environmental laws 
that follow the introduction of environmental rights into the constitution.4 This is 
based on the resultant constitutional obligation on the government to take relevant 
steps to protect and fulfil these rights which require introducing, revising and 
upgrading legislation to tackle environmental degradation in its various forms. 
This outcome can be seen in several examples of countries where 
constitutionalising environmental rights has seen an immediate upgrade on the 
existing environmental legal frameworks. In South Africa (1996)5 and Kenya 
                                                          
3 A lot of violence has erupted in the Niger Delta region over the past decades spurred by the 
poor environmental situation in the region. The rise of various militant groups, the blowing up of 
oil pipelines and platforms and various ethnic revolutions have been witnessed in the region all 
protesting the environmental neglect of the region. Also, various human rights violations have 
resulted from the government and oil companies seeking to quell the environmental uprisings 
in the region such as the execution of Ken Saro wiwa and the 9 Ogoni environmental activists 
in the region in 1993. For an extensive discussion of the cycle of environmental violence in the 
region, see Joshua Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational 
Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment’ (1997) 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 261, 
297.  
4 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, 
and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 3. 
5 The immediate aftermath of the introduction of constitutional environmental rights by section 24 
of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 saw the enactment of the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) 107 of 1998. A flurry of other enhanced sector-specific legislation also 
followed the post-1996 constitutionalization of environmental rights in South Africa.  
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(2010),6 for instance, environmental legislation and regulations were enacted, 
revised and upgraded in the immediate aftermath of constitutionalising 
environmental rights.  
The examples of South Africa and Kenya show the potential impacts constitutional 
environmental rights have on strengthening the environmental legal frameworks 
in a country. This impact is not limited to these two countries as Boyd, who studied 
the environmental legislation of 92 countries with express constitutional 
environmental rights, found that environmental legislation has been improved in 
78 of those countries in the immediate aftermath of the constitutionalization of 
environmental rights.   In Africa, environmental legislation was strengthened in 23 
of the 32 countries with constitutional environmental rights in the aftermath of such 
constitutionalization.7 
Constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria will impose a constitutional 
mandate on the Nigerian government to repeal the AGRA and EGASPIN and 
replace them with statutes complying with the citizens’ right to a clean 
environment. It will also oblige the legislature to enact a comprehensive 
environmental statute that provides basic environmental rights for the citizens by 
expanding on the constitutional baselines and addressing other administrative 
protocols and procedural elements necessary for giving effect to the 
implementation and advancement of the substantive environmental rights.  
Although there is a flurry of environmental statutes in Nigeria, they are majorly 
regulatory mechanisms instituting procedures, standards and approval processes 
for oil and gas exploratory activities or procedure for compensations or cleaning 
up polluted environments resulting from the activities of oil companies in the Niger 
Delta region. None of them addresses the rights of the host communities in the 
Niger Delta to have a safe, clean, healthy and habitable environment for present 
and future generations akin to the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
1998 of South Africa or the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 
(EMCA) 2015 of Kenya.  
                                                          
6 The constitutionalization of environmental rights by the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 saw the 
revision of several environmental legislation in its immediate aftermath. These include the 
establishment of a specialised environmental court by the Environment and Land Court Act No. 
19 of 2011 and the Environmental Management and Co-Ordination Act (EMCA) (amendment) 
Act No. 5 of 2015 
7 D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution, supra, n 4.  
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In the aftermath of constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria, the 
government will be constitutionally obliged to act in favour of improved 
environmental legislation or be compelled through judicial orders to institute the 
necessary mechanisms for protecting environmental rights. It is by contributing to 
stronger environmental legislation and strengthening the legal framework that 
constitutional environmental rights will have their greatest impact in Nigeria and 
in the Niger Delta.  
 
7.3 Impact on Ecological Imperialism in the Niger Delta 
Ecological imperialism is a subtle form of environmental subjugation suffered by 
the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region. It is characterized by the inequitable 
placing of the environmental burdens and hazards from oil and gas exploitation 
on the people of the region for the benefits of people in other regions in the 
country.8 It manifests itself through the socio-political domination of the weaker 
ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region by the more powerful and dominant ethnic 
groups in the other regions in Nigeria mostly through democratic means permitted 
by a lopsided political structure in the country.  
The clearest manifestation of ecological imperialism in the Niger Delta is the 
enactment of legislation and regulations which consider the health and 
environmental well-being of the people of the region as viable trade-offs for 
resource exploitation.9 These legal instruments are enacted by the political elites 
from the other dominant ethnic groups and regions in the executive and legislative 
structures which are then imposed on the people of the Niger Delta region. The 
Niger Delta people are too weak politically and economically to resist the 
imposition of the legal instruments which are promulgated in accordance with the 
constitutional mandates for the executive and legislative powers and cannot, 
therefore, be legally impeached.  
The major environmental legislation with regulatory systems permissive of 
pollution such as EGASPIN, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response 
Agency Act (NOSDRA) and the Associated Re-Injection Gas Act 1984 were 
                                                          
8 The concept of ‘ecological imperialism’ in the Niger Delta context has been discussed 
extensively in Chapter 1. 
9 K. Higgins, ‘Regional inequality and the Niger Delta’ (2009) Policy Brief No. 5, Overseas 




promulgated by political elites from the dominant ethnic groups to perpetuate 
optimal oil exploitation from the Niger Delta region while imposing the resultant 
environmental burdens on the people of the region. Other statutes such as the 
Land Use Act 1978, the Petroleum Act 1969 and the National Environmental 
Standards and Regulatory Agency Act 2005 (NESREA) which appropriate the oil 
and gas resources of the region for the benefit of the other regions or, in 
NESREA’s case, exempt environmental issues arising from oil and gas 
exploitation from regulatory supervision by the major environmental regulator in 
Nigeria, continue to be perpetuated because the environmental burdens are felt 
exclusively in the Niger Delta region, distantly removed from the cities and villages 
of the dominant ethnic groups.  
It is, therefore, convenient for the political elites to turn deaf ears to the cries of 
the Niger Delta inhabitants regarding the severe environmental consequences 
because they do not feel the consequences in their immediate communities. It is 
arguable that the AGRA which permits gas flaring when it is convenient for optimal 
oil exploitation or EGASPIN which permits some release of effluents into the 
environment will not remain in the statute books if the real-life environmental 
hazards suffered from it were not felt in Bayelsa, Rivers or Delta (major Niger 
Delta states) for instance, but in Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi or Lagos (major states in 
the other regions of the country). For instance, the Federal Government recently 
ordered an immediate halt to mining actviities in Zamfara state, in Northern 
Nigeria (part of the dominant geographic zone) due to the adverse health effects 
and associated violent conflicts that have erupted in the region recently despite 
the huge financial potentials from the discovery of gold in commercial quantity in 
the region.10 However, in the Niger Delta, despite the extreme adverse health 
effects from pollution and the violent conflicts and countless deathst that has 
resulted from energy exploitation, little has been done to curb oil and gas 
production or even impose stricter environmental regulations to protect the people 
of the region.   
The Land Use Act 1978, for instance, has been criticised for its perpetuation of 
environmental injustice on people of the Niger Delta as it appropriates ownership 
                                                          
10 ‘Nigeria bans mining activities in the northern state of Zamfara’ (CGTN Africa, 8 April 2019) 
<https://africa.cgtn.com/2019/04/08/nigeria-bans-mining-activities-in-the-northern-state-of-
zamfara/> accessed 09 May 2019.  
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of land from the citizens and vests same on the government.11 Despite the 
adverse impacts of the Act on the Niger Delta region, it has remained untouched 
since 1978 and was even inserted in the 1999 constitution as a means of 
perpetuating its continued existence by making its alteration process the same 
with the constitution amendment procedure.12  
To understand the lopsided socio-political structure which places the Niger Delta 
at a disadvantage in relation to environmental laws, it is imperative to analyse the 
political representation system in Nigeria’s constitutional framework. Currently, 
the bicameral National Assembly at the federal level consists of 109 members of 
the Senate (the Upper House) - three from each of the 36 states and one from the 
Federal Capital Territory-13 and 360 members of the House of Representatives 
(the Lower House) based on federal constituencies of fairly equal sizes.14 Laws 
are passed by each house by a simple majority of votes15and this results in the 
passage of laws based on the interests of the regions that collectively muster a 
majority of representatives in the legislature. Based on this setting, the nine states 
of the Niger Delta collectively produce 27/109 Senators16 and 82/360 members of 
the House of Representatives17 representing 25percent and 22percent of the 
members of each house respectively.   
This share of representation in the legislature gives the region insufficient voice 
or control over resultant legislation affecting the region as the representatives 
from the other dominant regions easily pass through legislation prejudicial to the 
environmental interests of the region without significant opposition from the Niger 
Delta representatives. Equally, this results in the inability to repeal or amend 
environmentally prejudicial statutes like AGRA, the Petroleum Act 1969 and the 
                                                          
11 See R Ako., ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice’ (2009) 53(2) 
Journal of African Law 289-304; K. Ebeku ‘Oil and the Niger Delta people: The injustice of the 
Land Use Act’ (2001) 9 (14) CEPMLP Internet Journal < http: 
www.dundee.ac.ukcepmlpjournal> accessed 09 May 2017.  
12 Section 315(5) of the Constitution inserts the Land Use Act, along with three other Acts, in the 
Constitution and make their alteration process the same with the constitution alteration 
process, thus enshrining their existence. 
13 Section 48 of the 1999 Constitution. 
14 Section 49. 
15 Section 58. 
16 There are 9 Niger Delta states (9 x 3 = 27 Senators).  
17 There are 36 states in Nigeria with each state having between 8 – 10 Federal Constituencies 
as determined by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). There are currently 
82 federal constituencies from the 9 Niger Delta states based on the current delineation of 
federal constituencies by INEC. See <https://nass.gov.ng/mp/house> accessed 19 July 2018.     
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EIA Act or enact statutes creating an effective environmental regulatory 
framework for managing the environmental issues in the Niger Delta.  
A clear illustration of ecological imperialism through democratic legislative 
domination in the Niger Delta can be derived from the failure of the Petroleum 
Industry Bill (PIB)18 which has set the record as the longest bill to be debated 
before the Nigerian legislature. The bill, which was first introduced in the federal 
legislature in 2000, has continued to be debated, defeated, reintroduced and 
regurgitated in various fragmented forms over the past 18 years without any 
significant progress made on its passage. The key sticking point with the bill is 
that it seeks to reform the environmental regulation of oil and gas exploitation in 
the Niger Delta and institute better control and prevention of environmental 
degradation by the oil companies operating in the region.19 Most importantly, the 
PIB seeks to specifically repeal prejudicial legislation affecting environmental 
matters in the Niger Delta, notably the AGRA and the Petroleum Act 1969. Section 
354(1) of the PIB specifically itemizes the AGRA and a host of other obsolete 
legislation prejudicial to the environmental interests of the Niger Delta for repeal 
and replacement with the provisions of the bill. Fearing that the passage of the 
PIB would affect optimal oil exploration in the Niger Delta, the bill has been 
opposed and shot down by representatives from the other dominant regions for 
over 17 years,20 preferring to stick to the status quo and institute palliative 
measures to compensate people of the region for the adverse environmental 
consequences suffered.21 Such palliative measures come in the form of 
compensatory institutional arrangements established through legislative 
instruments such as the enactment of the Nigerian Local Content Act 201022 to 
provide more jobs for inhabitants of the region by compelling the oil companies to 
preferentially engage local staff and indigenous services in their exploration 
activities.  
                                                          
18 Detailed information and draft of the PIB can be found on 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/> accessed 02 May 2018.  
19 O Ogri, ‘A Review of the Nigerian petroleum industry and the associated environmental 
problems’ (2001) 21(1) Environmentalist 11–21. 
20 S Obasi, ‘PIB: A game of numbers, interests’ Vanguard, 05 February 2013.  
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/pib-a-game-of-numbers-interests/> accessed 07 
December 2017. 
21 PIB: Trudging through legislative tunnel, Business Day, 16 December 2013 
<https://www.businessdayonline.com/opinion/analysis/features/article/pib-trudging-through-
legislative-tunnel/> accessed 07 June 2016.  
22 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010. 
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Other legislative measures include the establishment of a commission 
responsible for ensuring environmental clean-up arising from oil spills- the 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) and the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to institute 
projects to improve the social and infrastructural needs of the Niger Delta 
inhabitants. While these measures help to alleviate the sufferings of the region by 
improving their economic power, providing jobs and infrastructural facilities, it is 
diversionary as it fails to institute measures to prevent pollution, ensure better 
environmental practices by the oil companies and stop government from issuing 
regulatory approvals to oil companies to pollute or flare gas in the region.23  
Following intense pressure from the Niger Delta representatives in the legislature 
and other local and international environmental activists, the Nigerian legislature 
finally bowed to the passage of the PIB in 2017 in a fragmented form with the 
omission of vital provisions for environmental protection in the region. The new 
bill, now known as the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) 2017,24 omits 
the repeal of the AGRA and Petroleum Act which are the key legislation 
prejudicially affecting environmental matters in the region. It also omits the subject 
of environmental regulation in the region but focuses on governance issues 
relating to the management of oil contracts, production and pricing of oil by the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Petroleum Products 
Pricing and Regulatory Authority (PPPRA).25 Thus, despite the passage of the 
PIGB, the environmental situation in the Niger Delta is unaffected by the new 
legislation but remains in its pre-2000 state before the PIB was first introduced.  
Ecological imperialism in the Niger Delta, therefore, results in the domination and 
control of the environmental future and fortunes of the various ethnic groups in 
the Niger Delta by politically stronger ‘foreigners’ – i.e. ethnic groups outside of 
the region. While imperialism generally features the political control of the affairs 
                                                          
23 O Iledare, ‘Evaluating the Impact of Fiscal Provisions in the Draft Petroleum Industry Bill on 
Offshore E&P Economics and Take Statistics in Nigeria’ (2010) Nigeria Annual International 
Conference and Exhibition, 31 July - 7 August, Tinapa - Calabar, Nigeria. 
24 The Bill is not yet an Act as it is yet to receive presidential assent. In recent developments, the 
President has refused assent to the Bill claiming that it ‘whittles down his powers’. See Adeoye 
Adefulu, ‘PIGB Assent: What has Happened Since?’ 04 September, 2018 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/2018/09/04/pigb-assent-what-has-happened-
since/#more-1074>  
25See Section 87 of the PIGB 2017, available at <http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/final-copy-of-petroleum-industry-governance-bill-2017-May-15.pdf> 
accessed 07 November 2017.  
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of a people by stronger foreign powers, usually from a different country, ecological 
imperialism features the environmental control of the affairs, impacts and future 
of the Niger Delta people by stronger ethnic groups within the same country but 
from different geographical settings unaffected by the environmental situation 
created in the Niger Delta. While political imperialism is usually orchestrated 
through military or other forms of non-consensual political power imposed on the 
colonised people, ecological imperialism is orchestrated through democratic and 
generally constitutional means within a legal framework which allows for such 
subtle domination. This buttresses Boyle’s argument that democracies are 
entirely capable of environmental destruction.26Left unchecked, the cardinal 
principles of democratic governance can be utilised to environmentally subjugate 
a people in a prejudicial way through ‘tyranny of the majority’ as witnessed in the 
Niger Delta.     
It is easy to understand the perpetuation of ecological imperialism through 
democratic means as the Niger Delta region is responsible for over 80% of 
Nigeria’s revenue source through oil and gas reserves27 but only has 25% or less 
representatives at the democratic structure responsible for decision making for 
the whole country. In effect, all the other regions depend on the resources of the 
Niger Delta for their economic and infrastructural development and will seek to 
protect this interest through any means including consigning the Niger Delta to a 
dump yard for environmental hazards if it guarantees the unhindered flow of oil 
and gas revenues from the region. This means that, in the absence of a 
fundamental constitutional protection of the environmental interests of the Niger 
Delta, meaningful progress may not be made towards improved environmental 
protection for the region, because the regions with the democratic majority to 
institute such regulatory frameworks consider such progress antithetical to their 
economic and developmental interests.28 
                                                          
26 A Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ 12 
<http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/publications/0_1221_humanrightsorenvironmentalrig
htsareasses.pdf> accessed 2 December, 2015. 
27 International Monetary Fund, ‘Nigeria: Selected Issues’ (2017) IMF Country Report No. 17/81 
<https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr1781.ashx> accessed 09 
December 2017.  
28 P Olalere, ‘Nigeria: When Stepping Back is a Panacea to Moving Forward: The Legislative 
Story of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill’ November 2017 
<http://www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/649902/Oil+Gas+Electricity/httpwwwmondaqcomarticlea
sparticleid649878> accessed 08 January 2018.  
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Constitutionalising environmental rights plays a vital role in halting the ongoing 
ecological imperialism in the Niger Delta by entrenching a fundamental protection 
of the environmental interests of the Niger Delta people from a democratic 
majoritarian oppression by the other regions. A constitutional right to a clean 
environment, coupled with an enforceable governmental obligation to protect the 
environment for present and future generations, will act as a fundamental 
protective bulwark from any legislative or executive instrument by the legislative 
or executive arms, dominated by the other regions, which prejudicially affect the 
environmental sanctity of the Niger Delta.  The validity of these legal instruments 
become assessed against the background of their compliance with the 
constitutionally entrenched right to a clean environment and not merely on their 
compliance with the democratic/constitutional mechanisms for enacting the 
instruments. The constitutional environmental right, therefore, acts as a check on 
democratic environmental destruction by a democratic majority/political elite 
focused purely on economic/developmental objectives. 
One importance of constitutionalization of rights, as discussed in Chapter 4, is its 
role as a counter-majoritarian policy in a society for the protection of vulnerable 
groups and individuals vis-à-vis the potential tyranny of political majorities in a 
democratic setting. Under the evolutionist theory, rights are entrenched in the 
constitution to protect special interest groups by restricting manoeuvring of 
policymakers and limit the power of majorities in legislatures.29 Various examples 
abound of the utilisation of constitutional rights to protect vulnerable minority 
groups in a society, including the entrenchment of the aboriginal and treaty rights 
of the aboriginal people in Canada’s Constitution of 1982 as a means of protecting 
these rights from infringement by the majority population. In the United States, the 
recent US Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges30 nullified California’s 
majority voter-approved Proposition 831 prohibiting the rights of same-sex couples 
to marry on the ground that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-
sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause32 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Without these 
                                                          
29 G Tsebelis, ‘Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism’ (1995) 25 British J Pol Sci 289, 323. 
30 Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 576 U.S.34. 
31 Proposition 8 - which eliminated the right of same-sex couples to marry- was a statewide ballot 
proposition in California passed through a referendum on November 4, 2008, whereby voters 
approved the prohibition of same-sex marriages in California. 
32 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. 
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constitutional protections, the rights of sexual minorities to marry throughout the 
United States would have remained determinable by the democratic majority in 
the various states which were opposed to such rights on religious, cultural and 
social grounds.  
Similarly, the absence of constitutional environmental rights in Nigeria will leave 
the environmental future of the Niger Delta to remain determinable by the 
democratic majority of the other regions opposed to any form of sustainable 
environmental regulation in the region as a means of securing the unhindered 
exploitation of oil and gas resources from the region.  
There are various ways constitutional environmental rights will impact ecological 
imperialism in the Niger Delta. First, it will render statutes such as AGRA, 
Petroleum Act, EIA Act, Land Use Act and EGASPIN invalid to the extent they 
permit state grant of licenses/regulatory approvals for pollution/flaring or other 
environmentally injurious activities. Second, it will restrict the scope of legislation 
that can be passed by the democratic majority in the legislature or executive 
policies implemented by the government (controlled by the majority from the other 
regions) which do not promote the constitutional right. Third, it will mandate the 
executive and legislature to pass laws/introduce policies to implement the 
constitutional right. Where the constitutional environmental right is couched in a 
coalesced anthropocentric manner proposed in Figure 10 of Chapter 4, an 
enforceable obligation is imposed on the government to actively take measures 
to alleviate the environmental sufferings of the Niger Delta people. This will create 
a constitutional platform for Niger Delta representatives in the legislature to push 
through legislation to protect the environment in the region and also a 
constitutional platform for environmental activists to successfully lobby for 
improved environmental accountability by government and corporations involved 
in oil and gas exploitation in the region.  
In summary, constitutional environmental rights address ecological imperialism 
by instituting environmental restrictions on the democratic majority from 
prejudicially exploiting the region’s environment through legislative instruments. 
Currently, there is no constitutional right that can serve the purpose of restricting 
environmental despoliation through legislative instruments by the democratic 
majority in the country. Although the constitutional right to life in section 33 can 
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be utilised to impose restrictions on legislation that permit pollution,33 the Nigerian 
courts have proven unwilling to expand this right to cover environmental sanctity 
and have instead relied on ‘austerity of technical legalisms’ to circumvent this 
approach.34 Therefore, an explicit constitutional environmental right is an effective 
solution to this problem as it presents a guaranteed way of nullifying legislative 
instruments unfavourable to environmental protection and the courts will be 
obliged to enforce the constitutional right.    
 
7.4 Impact on Access to Environmental Justice in the 
Niger Delta  
Environmental injustice in the Niger Delta is an offshoot of ecological imperialism 
whereby external parties reap the economic benefits of natural resources 
exploitation without bearing the consequent skewed environmental burdens 
because their communities are insulated by distance from the direct sources of 
toxins.35 The definition and circumstances of environmental injustice in the Niger 
Delta have been extensively discussed in Chapter 1. To a large extent, 
constitutional environmental right addresses this problem in a similar way as it 
does to ecological imperialism- by creating a fundamental protection of the 
environmental interests of the Niger Delta people from exploitation by the 
government, corporation and vested interests in the other regions.  
Nevertheless, a peculiar sub-theme in environmental justice worthy of a separate 
consideration in this context is the concept of ‘meaningful participation’ in 
environmental decision making by the Niger Delta people. This is an important 
feature of environmental justice necessary in the Niger Delta context because of 
the exclusion of the region from decision making affecting their environment by 
the EIA Act discussed in Chapter 4. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) defines environmental justice as ‘the fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement of all people, regardless of race, colour, national origin, culture, 
education or income, with respect to the development, implementation and 
                                                          
33 See Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria, Federal High Court of 
Nigeria, Benin Division, Judgment of 14 November 2005, Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05. 
34 See Oronto Douglas v Shell, (1998) LPELR-CA/L/143/97 and Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. 
v. Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723)168.  
35 R. Ako., ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice’, (2009) 53(2) Journal 
of African Law pp 289-304. 
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enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies’.36 The four pillars of 
meaningful participation identified by the EPA are the provision of ‘appropriate 
opportunity’ to affected communities to participate in the environmental decision-
making; the contribution of these communities should be capable of influencing 
the outcome/decision rather than cosmetic and irrelevant; the concerns of the 
affected communities should be given considerable weight in the decision-making 
process; and the decision makers should seek out and facilitate the involvement 
of those potentially affected.37  
These pillars of meaningful participation are well represented within the realm of 
procedural environmental rights covering access to justice, access to information 
relating to environmental matters and participation in environmental decision 
making. Currently, the rights of the Niger Delta people to access information 
relating to environmental matters affecting them and participate in environmental 
decision making is insufficiently protected by extant laws in Nigeria. Although the 
EIA Act provides for these two rights, the procedures and outcomes are 
structurally flawed rendering it insufficiently expressive of the procedural 
environmental rights of people of the region.38 Furthermore, access to justice for 
environmental wrongs is deeply lacking in Nigeria’s legal framework as the 
Nigerian judiciary generally adopt restrictive technical doctrines to defeat 
environmental claims.39In this regard, environmental injustice continues to be 
perpetuated in the Niger Delta through the systemic restriction on the participatory 
rights of the region in environmental decision making and by curtailing their 
access to courts for environmental justice. 
Constitutionalising environmental rights addresses this feature of environmental 
injustice by instituting fundamental procedural environmental rights for people of 
the region through the incorporation of explicit provisions recognising and 
guaranteeing such rights. Adopting a coalesced anthropocentric constitutional 
right as shown in the sample draft in Figure 10 of Chapter 5 will ensure that 
comprehensive procedural environmental rights are guaranteed for people of the 
                                                          
36 United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ‘Environmental Justice 2020 Action 
Agenda: EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy’, <https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ej-
2020-action-agenda-epas-environmental-justice-strategy> accessed 10 July, 2017.   
37 ibid.  
38 The shortcomings of the EIA Act as a framework for procedural environmental rights have been 
discussed in chapter 6. 




region. This will include the right to have access to information pertaining to the 
environment in the possession of public bodies, participate in the public decision-
making process likely to affect their environment and the right to easy access to 
the courts for the ventilation of environmental rights and concerns without the 
need to demonstrate that any person has incurred loss or suffered injury will 
ensue. 
The cognisable impact of this constitutional right will be felt in terms of the EIA Act 
provisions and other legal instruments regulating access to courts including the 
civil procedure rules of the various superior courts in Nigeria. Importantly, the EIA 
procedure instituted by the Act which permits executive waiver of EIA procedures 
for environment-impacting activities and considers compensatory measures as an 
adequate remedy for adverse environmental impacts will become inconsistent 
with the constitutional provision and will consequently be invalidated. The Niger 
Delta inhabitants will be conferred with a constitutional right of unrestricted access 
to information held by government agencies relating to matters arising from oil 
and gas licensing, petroleum sharing contracts and transactions relating to the 
industry. Currently, there is a lack of transparency by the government regarding 
affairs in the oil and gas sector notwithstanding the Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative Act (NEITI) 2007 under which the government is 
committed to transparency in the extractive industries in line with the international 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).40 Complying with the 
constitutional guarantee of access to information ensures transparency by 
government authorities, allows effective monitoring of government’s regulatory 
activities by Niger Delta inhabitants and environmental activists and ensures 
environmental accountability by government agencies and oil companies in the 
region.  
Procedural environmental rights are important for the achievement of 
environmental rule of law, as it ensures the involvement of individuals, civil society 
and other interested stakeholders in the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental rights.41 Thus, effective procedural environmental rights are central 
to the attainment of environmental justice in the Niger Delta as it enables the 
                                                          
40 Okeke, V.O, ‘A Critique of the Enforcement of Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) Act 2007 in Nigerian Oil and Gas Sector’ (2013) 14 British Journal of Arts and 
Social Sciences 3. 
41 UNEP First Global Report on Environmental Rule of Law, January 2019. 
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people of the region have access to information regarding developments and 
activities likely to affect their environment within the region; involves them in the 
decision making process thereby allowing them influence the mode and manner 
activities withinthe region impact their environment.   
Environmental injustice in the Niger Delta is sustained by the poor access to 
courts to redress environmental wrongs in the region. Access to courts provides 
a means to enforce environmental laws, correct erroneous administrative acts, 
decisions and omissions and to push competent authorities to do their job.42 
Several procedural hurdles in the civil procedure rules of the superior courts in 
Nigeria help to frustrate aggrieved litigants from the region from ventilating their 
claims before the courts. These hurdles include the locus standi principle which 
defeat claims by environmental activists on the basis of lack of personal interests 
affected in the environmental pollution complained against; the untenable burden 
of proof placed on litigants to substantiate their claims, undue delay in the judicial 
process for civil claims leading to most cases taking up to a decade to be 
concluded and bulky paper filing systems and attendant costs which discourage 
indigent claimants from seeking redress before the courts.43  
Environmental Rights Action, an environmental NGO, conducted a survey of 
several cases filed on behalf of litigants seeking environmental reliefs in the region 
and found that the structural deficiencies in the court system in Nigeria (identified 
in the preceding paragraph) results in much resources and energy being 
dissipated in pursuing these claims with minimal results.44 As Mmadu argues, “the 
war against environmental degradation is too important to be clogged in a web of 
legal technicalities else man would have no environment to live in.”45 
Legal technicalities in Nigeria’s judicial system result in the increasing number of 
transnational environmental litigation pursued by aggrieved inhabitants of the 
region in foreign courts in the US, UK and Netherlands.46 Popoola argues that the 
                                                          
42 J Ebesson, “Access to Justice at the National Level,” in Marc Pallermaerts, ed. The Aarhus 
Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and 
EU Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2011), 247. 
43R Mmadu, ‘The Search for Environmental Justice in the Niger Delta and Corporate 
Accountability for Torts: How Kiobel added Salt to Injury’ (2013) 1(1) Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 73-85. 
44 G Ojo, ‘Access to Environmental Justice in Nigeria: The Case for a Global Environmental Court 
of Justice’, Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth publication, October 2016.  
45 R Mmadu, ‘The Search for Environmental Justice in the Niger Delta’, supra, n 45, 25. 
46 See the US case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., No. 06- 4800, 2010; the UK 
case of Bodo Community and Others v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd 
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transfer of environmental lawsuits from Nigerian courts to foreign courts is a 
means of circumventing legal obstacles and multiple barriers at the national level 
which communities in the Niger Delta face when suing multinational oil companies 
in Nigerian courts.47  
While a convenient strategy, transnational environmental litigation is 
unsustainable as a means of entrenching environmental accountability in the 
Niger Delta. Such form of forum conveniens48 has little or no impact on 
environmental regulation in Nigeria seeing that the foreign courts cannot grant 
orders regarding regulatory reforms by the government of Nigeria to comply with 
environmental protection. Such suits are exclusively compensatory in nature 
without any long-term impact on the ongoing environmental degradation in the 
region in terms of preventing or reducing their occurrences. Moreover, in recent 
times, foreign courts are increasingly considering such strategy as forum non-
conveniens.49 In Kiobel v Shell50 where the claimants sued Royal Dutch Shell in 
the US for environmental wrongs and consequent human rights abuses in the 
Niger Delta, the US Supreme Court ruled against the extra-territorial application 
of the Alien Torts Act to activities occurring in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and 
dismissed the suit. Effectively, the decision rendered the US a forum non-
conveniens for such environmental claims arising from the Niger Delta because 
of the danger of judicial interference in the foreign policy of another country- 
Nigeria.51  
Similarly, the UK Court of Appeal in the most recent case in February 2018 
rejected a suit by communities in the Niger Delta against Shell Petroleum filed in 
the High Court of England for environmental wrongs committed in the region.52 
The court reasoned that ‘claims by Nigerians against a Nigerian company about 
                                                          
[2014] EWHC. 1973 and the Dutch case of Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, District Court of The Hague [2013] 
ECLI.NL.RBDHA.BY9854. 
47 Ebunoluwa Popoola, ‘Moving the Battlefields: Foreign Jurisdictions and Environmental Justice 
in Nigeria’ (2017) SSRC 2 <http://items.ssrc.org/moving-the-battlefields-foreign-jurisdictions-
and-environmental-justice-in-nigeria/> accessed 09 February 2018.  
48 The court or forum most suitable for the ends of justice. 
49 A legal doctrine whereby courts refuse to take jurisdiction over foreign matters where there is 
a more appropriate forum available to the parties, usually the local courts of the country from 
which the case arose.  
50 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
51Kearney Colin, ‘Corporate Liability Claims Not Actionable Under Alien Tort Statute’, (2013) 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 2.  
52 Okpabi & Ors v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd (2017) EWHC 89 (TCC).  
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events in Nigeria, governed by Nigerian law, should be heard in a Nigerian court.’ 
Declaring the English High Court as forum non-conveniens for such transnational 
environmental suits, the High Court judge, Justice Fraser, ruled- 
“There is simply no connection whatsoever between this 
jurisdiction and the claims brought by the claimants, who are 
Nigerian citizens, for breaches of statutory duty and/or in 
common law for acts and omissions in Nigeria, by a Nigerian 
company.”53 
The affirmation of this decision by the English Court of Appeal is a restatement of 
the need for the reliance on domestic judicial mechanisms for resolving 
environmental matters arising from the Niger Delta rather than ‘outsourcing’ 
environmental justice to foreign courts. While it is convenient for indigenous 
communities to argue, as the Billie and Ogale communities argued in the above 
case, that the foreign courts are the only effective forum for securing 
environmental justice from the oil companies operating in the region,54 the long-
term effect of such outsourced environmental justice is unfavourable to the 
environmental interests of the communities involved. Such suits serve to 
undermine confidence in the Nigerian judiciary in the eyes of foreign courts as the 
litigants will have to disparage the domestic judiciary in order to convince the 
foreign courts to entertain the case. Also, the outcomes of such suits will likely be 
met with strong opposition by the Nigerian government and its agencies seeking 
to protect the country’s sovereignty from foreign interference. In the above case, 
for instance, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), 
the Nigerian government agency responsible for ensuring companies clean up oil 
spills, joined the suit on Shell’s behalf and defended the latter’s position, arguing 
that local judicial remedies were sufficient to address the dispute and opposed 
any attempt by the English courts to interfere in a domestic environmental 
problem in Nigeria.55  
                                                          
53 ibid, 123. 
54 Chief Temebo, spokesman for one of the communities involved in the case, said he could not 
get justice in Nigeria, stating that “If the claim does not continue in the English courts, we have 
no hope that the environment will ever be cleaned up and the fish will ever return to our waters. 
Shell will do nothing unless they are ordered to by the English courts.” Adam Vaughan, 
‘Nigerian oil pollution claims against Shell cannot be heard in UK, court rules’, The Guardian, 
26 January 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/26/nigerian-oil-pollution-
shell-uk-corporations> accessed 15 June 2017.   
55 Okpabi & Ors v Royal Dutch Shell Plc, supra, n 50.  
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Transforming an environmental dispute into a foreign policy and sovereignty 
dispute is unlikely to be beneficial for the environmental interests of the region as 
it diverts attention from the need to address the genuine environmental concerns 
of people of the region. Moreover, as stated earlier, no enforceable regulatory 
reforms orders can be gotten from such transnational suits but only compensatory 
financial reprieve are available as remedies.56  
Utilising the domestic judicial forum can result in enforceable judicial orders 
against the government that transcends merely compensatory measures but can 
extend to wide-reaching regulatory reform orders directed at the Nigerian 
government and its agencies which can have a meaningful impact on 
environmental justice in the region. The Nigerian courts can, for instance, nullify 
provisions of the EIA Act and other statutory and regulatory instruments that 
restrict the participatory rights of the indigenous people or restrict their access to 
courts to redress environmental wrongs. This role can be effectively played by 
establishing specialised environmental courts for adjudication of environmental 
disputes in Nigeria.  
Constitutionalising environmental rights obviates the outsourcing of 
environmental justice by strengthening the access to the domestic courts with the 
institution of a fundamental provision which renders the restrictive, technical 
legalisms that bedevil the judicial process in Nigeria inoperative and invalid. By 
becoming a fundamental right enforceable through the FREPR procedure, several 
restrictive legal principles such as the locus standi rule, statute of limitation and 
the inordinate burden of proof in civil cases will cease to be applicable to suits 
seeking to enforce the constitutional right to a clean environment. As discussed 
above, the availability of the FREPR Rules for enforcing environmental rights will 
positively transform the access to justice situation in redressing environmental 
wrongs and entrench the procedural environmental rights of people of the region. 
Therefore, while aggrieved persons from the Niger Delta and environmental 
activists currently view foreign courts as their best shot at having access to 
                                                          
56 While a few transnational environmental suits against Shell Petroleum have been successfully 
pursued in Dutch Courts, this is due to the fact that Royal Dutch Shell, its parent company, is 
domiciled in the Netherlands and, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts. In 
such cases, the decision of the Dutch Courts to entertain the cases hinged on the ascription 
of responsibility to the parent company for the actions of its subsidiary operating in Nigeria. 
See the Dutch case of Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Petroleum 




environmental justice, a view which has support in some literature,57 
constitutionalising environmental rights is a more sustainable, effective home-
grown solution to the problem of access to environmental justice in the Niger 
Delta.  
 
7.5 Impact on Incorporation of International 
Environmental Treaties and Principles 
International environmental law recognises the inviolable right of people to live in 
a clean and healthy environment58 and this is evidenced by the fact that all 
proclamations of environmental rights beginning from the Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment of 197259 and the Brundtland Report of 198760have 
reiterated the inexorable link between human rights and environmental protection. 
In addition, various rendition of international environmental law principles 
reinforces the protection of the environment as a primary objective for sustaining 
human health as recognised in the Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the 
Environment.61 Other international conventions such as the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity,62 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) 199263 and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution 197964 provide for the protection of the ecosystem, the ozone layer 
and managing climate change as a necessary condition for advancing human 
rights and interests.  
                                                          
57 See Ebunoluwa Popoola, ‘Moving the Battlefields: Foreign Jurisdictions and Environmental 
Justice in Nigeria’ supra, n 45; Rufus Mmadu, ‘The Search for Environmental Justice in the 
Niger Delta and Corporate Accountability for Torts: How Kiobel added Salt to Injury’, supra n 
41); Godwin Uyi Ojo, ‘Access to Environmental Justice in Nigeria: The Case for a Global 
Environmental Court of Justice’, supra, n 41. 
58 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 
(OUP, 2009) 3.  
59U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Report of 
the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 2-7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).   
60 World Commission on Environment and Development Report, 1987 <http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf > accessed 02 December 2015. 
61 The Draft Declaration on Human Rights and The Environment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I 
(1994). 
62 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 available at <http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-
en.pdf > accessed 02 December 2015. 
63 The UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992, and opened for signature on 4 June 1992. The 
UNFCCC has 197 parties as of December 2015. 
64 The convention opened for signature on 1979-11-13 and entered into force on 1983-03-16. The 
convention has been ratified by 51 countries.  
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Despite the proliferation of various international law instruments on environmental 
protection, this has not had any meaningful impact in the environmental situation 
in the Niger Delta neither have the people of the region benefitted in any way from 
the rights and principles enunciated in any international convention or protocol 
that Nigeria has ratified. Presently, Nigeria is a signatory to at least 14 
international environmental conventions65 and several African regional 
instruments on environmental conservation and protection66 but these 
instruments have not had any direct impact in the environmental situation in 
Nigeria owing to a fundamental legal hurdle in Nigeria’s constitutional framework. 
Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution renders treaties and conventions ratified 
by the government inoperative in the country until they have been domesticated 
by an Act of parliament. As a result, the rights, obligations and principles 
enunciated in these important international conventions ratified by Nigeria cannot 
be relied upon in seeking environmental redress before the Nigerian courts and 
no enforceable rights can be drawn therefrom.  
This means that treaties relevant to the Niger Delta situation, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Basel Convention on Movement and 
Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs) and the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, cannot be relied upon within Nigeria’s domestic judicial forum 
to ensure environmental accountability of the government. Suits cannot be 
brought within the domestic forum to compel the government to act in accordance 
with its obligations under these instruments to protect the Niger Delta environment 
from pollution. Although the inaction by the government is a breach of its 
obligations under these instruments, the remedy for such breach only lies in public 
international law by other states/international bodies, not individuals affected by 
                                                          
65 They include the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) 
1990, International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1987, International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1981, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter 1976, International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation 1995, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
2001 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992.  
66 They include the Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region 1981, the African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1968 and the Bamako 
Convention on the ban on the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa 1998.  
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environmental pollution in the region or environmental activists pursuing such 
claims.67 As Dixon states, ‘a subject of international law is a body or entity 
recognized or accepted as being capable of possessing and exercising 
international law rights and duties’.68 States are the primary subjects of 
international law and individuals, corporations and other organisations cannot sue 
states before international judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice as 
they are not recognised as having international legal personalities before these 
judicial bodies.69  
In terms of domestication of international environmental treaties, Nigeria has only 
domesticated two environmental treaties – the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage 198770 and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1981.71 These domesticated treaties have a common theme- 
compensation for oil pollution- and this evinces the focus of the government on 
pursuing compensation for affected communities and individuals rather than 
preventive actions to protect the environment from pollution in the first place.  
In the same vein, international environmental law principles have not found their 
way into the Nigerian domestic judicial system except the polluter pays principle72 
(again focused on compensatory reprieve). This is because there is no domestic 
legal basis for the application of international environmental law principles by the 
Nigerian courts, seeing the inapplicability of the international legal instruments. In 
the absence of any domestic legal platform for the courts to adopt international 
environmental law principles like the precautionary principle,73 the courts are 
content to rely on domestic legal instruments on environmental protection which, 
as has been repeatedly shown, are unfavourable to safeguarding the 
environmental rights of the Niger Delta people.  
                                                          
67 See M Dixon, International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th Edn, 2013) 113.  
68 ibid, 116.  
69 G Ignatenko and S Marochkin, ‘Subjects of International Law’ (2008) 2 Russian Law: Theory 
and Practice 13.  
70 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 2006.  
71 International Convention on Civil Liability for oil Pollution Damage (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act, 1992. 
72 See Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Isaiah, supra, n 33. 
73 T  O'Riordan, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Routledge: 2nd Edn, 2013). 
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The precautionary and preventive74 principles are important principles of 
international environmental law as they shape responses to environmental 
protection issues by governments and stakeholders. They also influence the 
drafting of the major international environmental treaties. For instance, the 
prevention principle, which postulates that preventing environmental harm is 
cheaper, easier, and less environmentally dangerous than reacting to 
environmental harm that already has taken place, is the fundamental principle 
behind international instruments regulating the treatment, storage, and disposal 
of hazardous waste and pesticides. The principle was the foundation of the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal (1989), which sought to minimize the production of hazardous 
waste as a means of preventing its dumping in the environment.  
The precautionary principle, on its part, focuses on a cautious approach to 
activities which has uncertain impacts on the environment. The principle 
advocates for restraints in carrying out activities with unpredictable environmental 
impacts until scientific proof exist of its actual impact. This principle finds 
expression in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration which stipulates that where there 
are “threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”.75 At the national level, the precautionary principle is 
enshrined in France’s Environmental Charter 2005 by obliging public authorities 
to adopt due respect for the principle of precaution when the occurrence of any 
damage, albeit unpredictable in the current state of scientific knowledge, may 
seriously and irreversibly harm the environment.76The precautionary principle has 
become so fundamental to environmental protection and widely accepted by 
states in the international community that the advisory opinion of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) held that the precautionary principle could 
be considered today as ‘part of customary international law’.77  
                                                          
74 P Sands and J Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 
75 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 
3-14 June 1992). 
76 Article 5, Charter for the Environment 2005 of France. 
77 Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Request for 
Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber on “Responsibilities and 




Implementing the provisions of international treaties and other principles of 
international environmental law in Nigeria can help to enshrine better 
environmental protection for the Niger Delta by instituting sustainable 
environmental practice which the government is obliged to adopt and which can 
be judicially enforced in cases of default by the government. Constitutional 
environmental rights can be used to enshrine international environmental law in 
Nigeria by making international environmental treaties directly applicable and 
enforceable in Nigeria and by empowering the courts to adopt and apply 
international environmental law principles relevant to environmental protection in 
adjudicating environmental claims.  
The first approach - making international environmental treaties directly applicable 
in Nigeria - has been adopted in relation to constitutionalising labour rights in the 
Third Alteration to the Nigerian Constitution in 2010. Section 254C (2) of the 
amended constitution conferred the National Industrial Court (NIC) with the 
jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the 
application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has 
ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters 
connected therewith. This provision circumvents section 12 of the Constitution by 
rendering treaties related to labour and employment applicable and directly 
enforceable by the NIC with or without their domestication under section 12.  This 
was done to side-step the reluctance of the Nigerian government to domesticate 
relevant labour treaties and ensure that the NIC implements contemporary labour 
principles and international best practices in adjudicating labour matters in 
Nigeria. In Maduka v. Microsoft Nigeria Limited & Ors78 the NIC held that section 
254C (2) empowers it to adopt and apply any labour treaty Nigeria has ratified 
even where it has yet to be domesticated under section 12.79Adopting a similar 
approach in constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria will ensure that the 
courts are able to directly apply the provisions of all environmental treaties that 
                                                          
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf> 
accessed 09 December 2017.   
78 Ejieke Maduka v. Microsoft, 19 December 2013, Case No. NICN/LA/492/2012, National 
Industrial Court of Nigeria.  
79 The NIC relied on the General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women of the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ILO Termination of 
Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158) and ILO Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), all of which have been ratified but not yet 
domesticated by Nigeria, in deciding that sexual harassment amounts to a breach of an 
employee’s fundamental right to dignity of person. 
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Nigeria has acceded to without limitations based on their non-domestication by 
the government.  
For the second approach – empowering the courts to apply international 
environmental principles- the framing of a constitutional environmental right in 
accordance with the sample draft in Figure 10 of Chapter 5 will provide a domestic 
platform which ensures that the Nigerian courts are empowered to adopt and 
apply these principles to environmental claims before them. Section 2(b) of the 
sample draft provides that ‘general principles of international environmental law 
recognised by the community of nations shall be applicable to redressing 
environmental concerns and environmental management procedures.’ 
Incorporating this provision as part of a constitutional environmental right will 
create a broad platform for the courts to adopt and apply international 
environmental principles in adjudicating environmental claims arising from the 
Niger Delta situation. This will broaden the scope of remedy and redress that can 
be obtained from the courts by aggrieved environmental claimants in the region.  
 
7.6 Impact on the ‘Full-Belly’ Syndrome 
Constitutionalization also has potential impacts on the ‘full-belly’ pursuit of the 
Niger Delta inhabitants which degrade the environment as discussed in Chapter 
1. The impoverished inhabitants engage in these prejudicial activities in order to 
either claim compensation from the oil companies which will then be used to 
provide food and other basic necessities for their family or gain financial rewards 
from selling the oil obtained from the vandalised pipelines or illegal crude oil 
factories on the black market for significant sums. Either way, the aim is to satisfy 
their ‘full-belly’ and gain immediate rewards to the detriment of the sanctity of their 
environment.  
This is a difficult type of environmental problem to address through legal 
mechanisms. If the inhabitants were simply passive towards environmental rights 
while pursuing their sustenance, it is easier to renew their enthusiasm in 
protecting their environment in the medium term when they begin to see how a 
clean environment provide foods, economic and health benefits through a 
reformed legal framework which ensures environmental sustainability. However, 
where the inhabitants are actively undermining environmental sanctity 
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themselves and reaping immediate financial rewards from the process, it is 
difficult to encourage them to adopt a rights’-based approach in circumstances 
where they are, themselves, part of the environmental oppressors whose criminal 
environmental activities the reformed legal framework seeks to suppress in order 
to protect the environment. Further, they are likely to be less patient to wait for 
medium-term benefits when they are already used to successfully reaping short-
term financial benefits from their environmentally injurious activities. 
The challenge for advocates of environmental rights and constitutionalization is, 
therefore, how to ensure that constitutionalization creates a platform for the 
impoverished inhabitants to trust in the environmental rights framework as a 
rights’- based approach that will address their immediate quest for food, health 
care and sustenance. In this respect, constitutionalization can create and sustain 
a multi-stakeholder platform which addresses the various perspectives of 
environmental degradation in the region. It also presents the inhabitants with 
tangible environmental benefits that will, over time, discourage the resort to 
destructive self-help measures as they become able to once again provide food 
and sustenance from their agricultural lands, fishing industry and other 
subsistence industries which have been negatively impacted by environmental 
degradation over the past decades.  
The multi-stakeholder platform will consist of government, the multinational oil 
companies, environmental NGOs, civil society organisations and individual 
activists in the region that will embark on litigation and other forms of political 
pressure on the government to comply with the new constitutional environmental 
right. The government will be obliged to reform environmental legislation in the 
country to align with the constitutional right and institute institutional and policy 
mechanisms to protect and promote this right. In the event of failure to do so, this 
can be judicially compelled through litigation. Existing legislation can also be 
judicially restructured by expunging environmentally prejudicial provisions and 
interpreting other provisions in accordance with the constitutional environmental 
right.  
Oil companies and other corporations involved in environment-impacting 
activities will be compelled to revise their operational processes and introduce 
facilities that ensure their activities do not negatively impact the environment as 
statutory licenses/regulatory approvals that allowed them to circumvent 
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environmental protection become invalid. The UN Business and Human Rights 
resolutions80aim to encourage corporations to revise their activities in line with 
environmental protection objectives. The constitutional environmental right will, 
therefore, create platforms that will push them closer towards achieving this 
mandate espoused under international environmental law.  Environmental NGOs 
and individual activists will play their role as watchdogs over compliance with the 
constitutional right by the government and corporations utilising litigation and 
political pressure as useful tools. A key factor in achieving the aim of 
constitutional environmental rights in relation to the full-belly syndrome is the 
changing of the perception of the communities about the oil and gas corporations; 
a change from the perception of these corporations as environmental abusers to 
a perception as corporate entities that can be engaged as partners for 
environmental protection. The negative perception of these oil corporations leads 
the indigenous communities to attack, vandalise and sabotage the corporations’ 
oil and gas facilities as a means of payback for their environmentally injurious 
activities, in the process further damaging the environment as a result of spills 
from these vandalised facilities.  
The environmental civil society groups and activists can ensure that this negative 
perception is gradually erased in favour of a perception of the corporations as 
potential partners in protecting the environment. That way, more co-operative 
alliances can be formed between the corporations and the people in the 
communities towards policing and safeguarding the oil facilities against 
vandalisation by criminal elements within the communities. This achieves a 
mutually beneficial environmental outcome for the communities and the oil 
corporations as the reduced vandalisation reduces the environmental damage for 
the communities and also reduces the corporations’ liability to clean up these 
environmental damages.    
Even though the impoverished individuals in the region may, in the short term, 
continue their ‘full-belly’ pursuit, their activities can be checkmated by the 
introduction of stringent legislation on these activities and comprehensive 
education and enlightenment campaigns by environmental NGOs and individual 
                                                          
80Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework 2011 HR/PUB/11/04  
<https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> 
accessed 29 April 2019.  
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activists from the region who the inhabitants know and trust to represent their 
best interests.  
It is, however, pertinent to point out that the positive impacts of 
constitutionalization on the full-belly syndrome will be painstakingly slow, but 
steady, for several interconnected reasons. First, the current levels of 
environmental degradation in the region will take some time to clean up and for 
any reclamation effort to be felt. As a result, the inhabitants will not see an 
immediate change in their environment and they will not be immediately able to 
return to their farming, fishing and other subsistence industry they need to sustain 
their full-belly. This will likely lead to a reluctance to give up their injurious 
environmental activities for full-belly sustenance in the interim until they are able 
to reliably shift back to the alternative i.e. fishing, farming etc. Second, education 
and enlightenment campaigns to positively change the orientations of the 
inhabitants will take a little while to gain any reasonable foothold. Third, 
environmental litigation on the constitutional right will also take a little time to 
achieve meaningful results in ensuring environmental accountability by the 
government and corporations. Even though enforcing the constitutional right is 
guaranteed an expedient judicial process under the FREPR, enforcing judicial 
orders on issues involving significant government resources/policies do not take 
place overnight, especially where it involves legislative restructuring or 
institutional mechanisms to be instituted by the government. Also, judicial orders 
directed at the oil corporations may require a little time to be implemented, 
especially where it involves the closure of large or significant oil and gas 
processing facilities causing pollution e.g. flare producing facilities. Such facilities 
have to be safely shut down in accordance with procedural safety requirements 
which may take a while to implement.  
 
7.7 Conclusions 
Constitutionalization is not the panacea to the environmental challenges in the 
Niger Delta, but it has the potential to address the root causes of the 
environmental degradation in the region as examined in this chapter. By 
addressing these root causes, it opens room for meaningful efforts to be 
implemented towards the actual clean-up of the environment and reform of the 
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environmental policies of the oil and gas sector which is majorly responsible for 
a significant part of the pollution in the region.  
By addressing the ‘full-belly’ tendency of the inhabitants which undermine the 
environment, constitutionalization removes an important hurdle to the 
institutionalisation of sustainable environmental clean-up and remediation 
because it is futile for the MNCs to commit resources to clean up the environment 
while the inhabitants are themselves polluting the same environment through 
vandalising oil pipelines and operating illegal crude oil factories. 
Constitutionalization, therefore, ensures synchronization of efforts between the 
MNCs and the inhabitants towards achieving environmental sanctity. It then 
compels the government to exercise its regulatory duties in ensuring the 
entrenchment of proper environmental protection strategies through legislation 
and improved regulatory control of MNCs.   
While the impacts of constitutionalization of environmental rights in the Niger 
Delta may be slow in manifesting, it will create an enduring legal platform upon 
which a strong and virile environmental ethics can be built by stakeholders in the 
region. Its impacts will, therefore, reverberate throughout the existing legal and 
socio-economic frameworks in the country, and the Niger Delta in particular, and 
reposition environmental sustainability as a fundamental objective overriding all 
socio-economic and developmental objectives.  
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CONCLUSION     
 
The thesis focused on providing answers to the key research question set out in 
the introduction - Should environmental rights be constitutionalized in Nigeria’s 
legal framework? From this central question, two sub-questions were distilled – 
i. Will constitutionalising environmental rights address the key problems 
of environmental protection in the Niger Delta region? 
ii. How should the constitutionalised environmental rights be normatively 
framed to achieve the desired objectives? 
In answering these questions, the arguments in this thesis has been developed 
across seven chapters building on the conceptual nature of environmental rights 
and its preference over the regulatory and civil liability approaches, the 
importance of constitutionalization of rights and how constitutional environmental 
rights can be implemented in Nigeria. These theoretical discussions were then 
applied to the Niger Delta environmental situation and critically examined the 
practical ways constitutional environmental rights address the key environmental 
challenges in the region.  
Chapter 1 set the scene for the discussions by mapping the geopolitical and 
environmental situation of the Niger Delta and analysed the root causes of the 
intractable nature of environmental degradation in the region. Chapter 2 
established the theoretical basis of environmental rights and developed the 
coalesced anthropocentrism model as an effective environmental rights paradigm 
for protecting the inter-dependent interests in the environment (humans, future 
generations and Mother Nature). 
Chapter 3 established the first general premise of the argument in this thesis - 
that an environmental rights approach to protecting the environment is more 
effective than the regulatory and civil liability approaches. This is based on the 
fact that - a) a rights’ approach removes environmental protection from the realm 
of mere policy objectives of government; b) it makes environmental protection no 
longer an easy trade-off for socio-economic and developmental goals; and c) 
unlike the civil liability approach, it does not focus on the monetisation of 
environmental concerns but on proactive and preventive methods of stopping 
environmental harms before they even occur or restrain further occurrences. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 established the second general premise of the argument in this 
thesis – that elevating environmental rights to a constitutional platform (i.e. 
constitutionalization) is an effective way of ensuring better environmental 
protection in a country as it will create a fundamental platform that will lead to 
improved environmental legal framework, better access to environmental justice 
and protection of the vulnerable minority subject to environmental oppression. 
The supremacy of the constitution over statutory and regulatory instruments 
ensures that constitutionalised environmental rights are not subject to political 
manoeuvrings or drawbacks by statutory or regulatory instruments.  
However, the normative content of the constitutionalised environmental right is 
essential in achieving this goal, as the global study of constitutions in Appendix 1 
showed that some countries have constitutionalised environmental rights 
couched in normative structures that render than cosmetic and ineffective. To 
ensure its effectiveness, therefore, chapter 4 established the essential 
constituents of an effective constitutional environmental right incorporating the 
coalesced anthropocentrism model. This was graphically captured in Figure 9 
and a sample draft of an effective constitutional environmental right clause 
incorporating this model was made in Figure 10.   
Chapter 6 established the two particular premises on which the argument in this 
thesis is based – a) that the poor environmental rights framework in Nigeria is 
responsible for the inability to effectively tackle environmental degradation in the 
Niger Delta, and b) constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria in a 
coalesced anthropocentrism structure will improve the country’s environmental 
rights framework and create an assured platform to tackle the environmental 
problems in the Niger Delta because it will ensure environmental protection 
trumps the quest for unbridled resource exploitation by the Nigerian government 
at the expense of the environment. Specifically, it will result in environmentally 
prejudicial legislation like the AGRA, the Petroleum Act, EGASPIN and the EIA 
Act becoming invalidated to the extent they restrict the enjoyment of the 
constitutional right to a clean environment.  
Chapter 7 provides the deduction to the premises in the thesis – that 
constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria will solve the root causes of the 
intractable environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region and ensure a 
sustainable ecological protection in the region. It analyses the specific ways that 
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a constitutionalised environmental right will address the key issues identified in 
Chapter 1 and show that the solution to these issues can be derived from a 
constitutional environmental rights platform.  
Consequently, the logic of the arguments of this thesis is developed on the basis 
of two general premises, two particular premises and a deduction arising from the 
premises as follows- 
 
General Premise 1- an environmental rights approach to protecting the 
environment is more effective than the regulatory and civil 
liability approaches; (chapter 3) 
General Premise 2- elevating environmental rights to a constitutional platform 
(i.e. constitutionalization) is an effective way of ensuring better 
environmental protection in a country; (chapters 4 and 5) 
Particular Premise 1- the poor environmental rights framework in Nigeria is 
responsible for the inability to effectively tackle environmental 
degradation in the Niger Delta; (chapter 6) 
Particular Premise 2 - constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria in a 
coalesced anthropocentrism structure will improve the 
country’s environmental rights framework and create an 
assured platform to tackle the environmental problems in the 
Niger Delta; (chapter 6) 
Deduction -  therefore, constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria 
will solve the root causes of the intractable environmental 
degradation in the Niger Delta region and ensure a 
sustainable ecological protection in the region. (chapter 7). 
 
Chapter 6 answers the central research question whether constitutional 
environmental rights should be adopted in Nigeria in the affirmative by 
establishing the weaknesses of Nigeria’s environmental legal framework and the 
extent of improvements that can be gained by constitutionalising environmental 
rights. Chapter 6.2 examined the structural defects in Nigeria’s environmental 
legal framework and chapter 6.3 analysed the benefits that can be derived from 
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constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria, showing that its impact will be 
positively significant. 
Chapter 7 answers the first sub-question in the affirmative by sequentially 
demonstrating the specific impacts of constitutionalising environmental rights on 
the key environmental challenges in the region.  
The answer to the second sub-question is provided by chapter 4.3 which 
examined the formulation of the normative structure of an effective 
constitutionalised environmental right based on the coalesced anthropocentrism 
model developed in this thesis. A draft sample of an exemplar constitutional 
environmental right was done in Figure 10 (Chapter 4.3.3) to provide a guide on 
the ideal normative formulation of such right. Chapter 6.3 narrows down the 
answer to this sub-question by examining specifically how a prospective 
constitutional environmental right should be formulated in the Nigerian 
constitution in other to achieve the desired objectives. Chapter 6.3.1 examined 
the three pillars of the desired normative structure while 6.3.2 examined the 
prospective location of the right in the constitution which will give it maximum 
effectiveness.  
In summary, seeing the repeated failure of the regulatory and civil liability 
approaches to quell environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, this thesis 
proposes a shift towards a rights’ based approach in tackling the problem as a 
way of empowering the people to take control of their environmental destiny. 
Beyond merely enthroning an anthropocentric environmental right, this thesis 
argues for a merger of the various environmental interests under a coalesced 
anthropocentrism model which appropriately represents the tripod interests in an 
environment and ensures an inclusive approach to ecosystem protection around 
the globe and in the Niger Delta.  
More importantly, the thesis canvasses for this environmental right to be given a 
fundamental platform by incorporation into the Nigerian constitution as a way of 
fortifying the protection afforded by the right and removing its susceptibility to 
political manoeuvring and rollbacks on the basis of other socio-economic and 
developmental pursuits.  Seeing that constitutional rights trump all statutory and 
regulatory instruments, constitutionalising environmental rights will elevate it 
above other considerations which have over the years taken priority over 
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environmental protection and can be used to nullify all statutory approvals of 
environmental pollution, such as that in the Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1984. 
In addition, incorporating the constitutional right amongst the fundamental rights 
provision will enable litigants to utilise the expeditious process for ventilating 
fundamental human rights in the constitution and obviate the various restrictive 
civil procedure rules and principles which have been the bane of the judicial 
process in Nigeria.  
The originality of this thesis stems from its analysis of the little known fundamental 
issues of ecological imperialism and the ‘full-belly’ syndrome within the context of 
the Niger Delta environmental situation and the analysis of how constitutional 
mechanisms can be utilised to solve these challenges.  
Also, the coalesced anthropocentrism model developed in this thesis represents 
an improvement on the existing environmental rights paradigms that focus on 
anthropocentrism and its different variations (Regwell’s dilute anthropocentrism1 
and Nickel’s accomodationist approach2). The analysis of the constituents of a 
coalesced anthropocentrism approach to environmental protection and how this 
can be incorporated in a constitutional structure is a contribution to existing 
knowledge on the subject.  
In addition, the global study of constitutions in the Appendix represents an 
essential addition to existing knowledge as it provides detailed guidance on the 
shortcomings of constitutional protection of environmental rights across states 
globally. It expands Boyd’s global study of constitutions3 by going deeper into the 
normative contents of the constitutional environmental rights and classifying the 
constitutions according to their compliance with the identified markers of the 
coalesced anthropocentrism model.  
 
 
                                                          
1 C. Redgwell, ‘Life, the Universe and Everything: a Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’ in Alan 
Boyle and Michael Anderson (Eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(OUP 1996). 
2 J. Nickel, ‘The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope 
and Justification’ (1993) 18 YALE J INT’L L 281–85. 
3 D. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, 
and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 3. 
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Environmental Constitutionalism and the Nigerian 
Judiciary  
Constitutionalising environmental rights in Nigeria will be less effective if not 
matched with a robust and independent judiciary willing to enforce this 
constitutional right. Fortunately, while the Nigerian judiciary is generally 
conservative, in cases bordering on enforcement of constitutional rights, the 
judiciary in Nigeria has been noticeably more liberal and activist, refusing to adopt 
restrictive interpretations that undermine access to courts and protection of 
constitutional rights.  
This posture in constitutional cases is more pronounced in respect of cases 
bordering on fundamental human rights in Chapter IV of the Constitution. Even 
though the existence of FREPR 2009 has set the stage for the abandonment of 
conservatism by explicitly removing technical doctrines like locus standi and 
limitation of statues, the court has also played its role by adopting a liberal 
interpretative stance which disregards technicalities in the enforcement of these 
rights. This approach was espoused by the Nigerian Supreme Court in the 2017 
case of Nweke v State4 involving fundamental rights in Chapter IV where the court 
advocated for generous interpretations in respect of fundamental rights provisions 
in the constitution. 
‘Generous interpretation’ in this context refers to a liberal, non-strict 
constructionism approach as opposed to ‘tabulated legalism’.  The Supreme Court 
had earlier adopted this liberal stance in Grace Jack v University of Agriculture5 
where it removed the jurisdictional hurdles to enforcing fundamental rights in the 
constitution.  
What emerges from a review of the Nigerian judiciary’s posture in constitutional 
cases is the abandonment of the strict constructionism approach in favour of a 
liberal interpretative stance. Based on this, it can be deduced that 
constitutionalising environmental rights as one of the fundamental human rights 
will be subjected to an activist and courageous interpretation by the Nigerian 
                                                          
4 Nweke v. State (2017) LPELR-42103(SC). See also Odubu v. Stephen & Ors (2012) LPELR-
19792. 
5 Grace Jack V University Of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 14 WRN 91-103. 
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judiciary which will enshrine environmental constitutionalism based on the explicit 
constitutional environmental rights. 
Nevertheless, enshrining environmental rule of law is essential for the Nigerian 
judiciary to play an effective role in implementing the potential 
constitutionalization of environmental rights. Consequently, beyond merely 
incorporating  the constitutional environmental rights on paper, efforts must be 
made to improve other associated factors like the independence of the Nigerian 
judiciary, the obedience of judicial orders and making it easier for civil societies 
and other environmental defenders to have access to the courts without 
restriction or governmental oppressions.  
Another issue to be considered is the possibility of constitutionally enshrining 
specialised environmental courts in Nigeria for effective adjudication of 
environmental disputes in the country. Part of the clamour for improving 
environmental protection in Nigeria has featured strong arguments in favour of 
establishing a specialised court to handle environmental matters in the country.6 
Proponents argue that this will institutionalise a specialised forum for 
environmental justice and ensure the adjudication of environmental claims by 
persons with sufficient knowledge/expertise in the field. 7Several countries around 
the world have established specialised environmental courts including India, 
Brazil, Chile, Kenya, Tanzania, New Zealand etc.8  
The arguments for and against the establishment of specialised courts is one that 
is based on perspectives, as there are equally valid points to support both sides 
of the debate. Dreyfuss9 highlights some of the pros of a specialised court as 
including the use of experts in judicial administration, efficiency in adjudication, 
administrative benefits arising from reduction of the workload on the regular 
                                                          
6 See Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, ‘Access to Environmental Justice in 
Nigeria: The Case for a Global Environmental Court of Justice’ (2016) 
<https://www.foei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Environmental-Justice-Nigeria-Shell-
English.pdf> accessed 08 March 2018.  
7 See George Pring & Catherine Pring., ‘Environmental Courts & Tribunals: A Guide for Policy 
Makers’, (2016) UNEP Publication, 
<http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10001/environmental-
courtstribunals.pdf?sequence=1>   accessed 19 March, 2018: George Pring & Catherine 
Pring, ‘Greening Justice: Creating and Improving Environmental Courts and Tribunals’, 
<http://www.accessinitiative.org/resource/greening-justice> accessed 19 March, 2018.   
8 B Preston, ‘Benefits of Judicial Specialisation in Environmental Law: The Land and Environment 
Court of New South Wales as a Case Study’ (2012)  29 Pace Environmental 395–440. 




courts, injecting doctrinal stability into the area of law and more sympathetic 
judicial officers who understand the unique plights of the subjects in that area. 
Revesz10 identifies some of the drawbacks of specialised courts to include 
administrative duplicity of courts and horizontal proliferation of courts and 
resultant judicial incoherence from conflicting decisions of the specialised court 
vis-à-vis the regular courts. Others object to specialised courts claiming that 
specialization will produce a court with tunnel vision, with judges who are overly 
sympathetic to the policies furthered by the law that they administer or who are 
susceptible to "capture" by the bar that regularly practices before them.11 As 
Dreyfuss contends, ‘when faced with difficult policy choices intermingled with 
complicated technical issues, these courts will hide their biases behind 
impenetrable specialized jargon.’12In essence, specialised courts are highly likely 
to have difficulty interfacing appropriately with the regular courts and inculcating 
wider socio-economic and political factors in their decision making. 
The actual necessity of establishing a specialised court in a particular sector and 
lack of a viable alternative is the key factor in assessing its merits as there are 
strong arguments on both sides. In some cases, the argument for its 
establishment can be managed by adopting a minimal approach which results in 
mere differentiation of different units of an existing court rather than a full-blown 
establishment of another separate court. As Dreyfuss puts it, ‘if courts cannot 
grow out, and if growing up is unhelpful, what is left is differentiation’.13 This 
obviates the need for institutionalising new administrative systems and protocols 
where simple delineation of existing administrative judicial systems will address 
the problem. Pring & Pring added some words of wisdom in this respect, stating 
that- 
A comprehensive assessment of the existing justice system is the 
first step in considering if an ECT (Environmental Court and 
Tribunal) is warranted. There is truth in the old adage, “If it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it”… Even if the current system is not “just, quick 
and cheap,” there may be avenues for reform within the existing 
                                                          
10 Richard Revesz, ‘Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System’ (1990) 138 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1111.  
11 Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts’ supra (n 68) 3.   
12 ibid; See also Harold Bruff, ‘Specialized Courts in Administrative Law’, (1991) 43 Admin. L. 
Rev. 329 and Ellen Jordan, ‘Specialized Courts: A Choice’, (1981-1982) 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 745.  
13 ibid, 2.  
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system, such as mandatory judicial training, more judges or better 
cost controls”.14 
This assertion emphasises the importance of not establishing a specialised court 
for the sake of it or merely based on idealistic beliefs and utopian expectations. 
There must be a real need for the specialised court which cannot be satisfied by 
reforming the existing judicial system or differentiation of judicial units within the 
existing system. 
In the Niger Delta environmental context, environmental rights protection in the 
region will be helped by establishing a specialised court exclusively focused on 
environmental matters. Already, at present there are 10 environmental courts and 
tribunals in Nigeria at the state and local level. At local level, they are referred to 
as Environmental Sanitation Courts. These environmental sanitation courts can 
be used as a blueprint for establishing a national environmental court to handle 
environmental cases arising from claims under the constitutional right to a healthy 
environment and under other national and state environmental statutes. There is 
a strong argument to be made in support of the potential impacts that establishing 
a specialised court has on a sector, drawing experience from the labour sector in 
Nigeria where the constitutional establishment of the National Industrial Court has 




Wider Potential of Environmental Rights Constitutionalization 
Constitutionalization of environmental rights is an important subject of discussion 
beyond its impact on environmental pollution and degradation. It is aimed at 
instituting sustainable environmental protection and management strategies as 
an integral part of a country’s legal framework. As a result, it impacts on other 
areas of human/corporate activities affecting the environment e.g. other 
extractive industries outside of the oil and gas industry including large industrial 
and chemical industries. There are also other contemporary areas of 
                                                          
14George Pring and Catherine Pring, ‘Environmental Courts & Tribunals: A Guide for Policy 
Makers’, supra (n 7) 64.  
15 I Ukonu & G Emerole, ‘The Role of National Industrial Court in Sustaining Harmony in Nigerian 
Health Sector: A Case of University of Abuja Teaching Hospital’, (2016) 6(1) Journal of 
Management and Sustainability 171-181.  
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environmental concerns such as climate change and fracking where the 
constitutional set up of the environmental legal framework is an important 
consideration in determining the national response to these issues.  
Fracking,16 for instance, is a controversial issue in the UK based on concerns 
over its environmental impact.17 Prolonged legal battles between environmental 
groups and the UK government over the regulatory approval of fracking by the 
government have sometimes assumed a violent dimension with the government 
forcefully evicting a protest camp set up by environmental activists to block a 
prospective fracking site.18 Constitutional environmental rights can be useful in 
balancing individual rights to environmental sanctity with resource exploration 
through fracking and provide the courts with guidance in resolving the plethora of 
fracking litigation before it.19  
Beyond the protection of environmental rights, constitutionalization also performs 
an important function of ‘sign-posting’ responsibilities, particularly on corporations 
that are involved in environment-impacting activities. While the primary 
responsibility for environmental protection is generally conferred on the 
government, a well-drafted constitutional environmental right such as that in 
Figure 10 can confer responsibilities on corporations with respect to 
environmental protection. This constitutional responsibility can constitute the 
basis for the institution of alternative regulation methods such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) by corporations as they work towards meeting their 
constitutional obligation.20 Already, global environmental constitutionalism is 
influencing the international movement towards ensuring corporate accountability 
for environmental activities as reflected in the UN Business and Human Rights 
resolutions.21  
                                                          
16 Fracking is the process of injecting liquid at high pressure into subterranean rocks, boreholes, 
etc. so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas. 
17 Adam Vaughan, ‘Campaigners celebrate as oil drilling at Surrey Hills site is blocked’ The 
Guardian, 04 September, 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/04/michael-
gove-oil-surrey-hills-defra-bury-hill-wood> accessed 05 September 2018.  
18 ‘Leith Hill oil test protest: Bailiffs begin evictions’ BBC News, 21 June 2017 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-40355919> accessed 07 June 2018.  
19 Barclay Nicholson, Kadian Blanson, ‘Tracking Fracking Case Law: Hydraulic Fracturing 
Litigation’ (2011) 26 Nat. Resources & Env't 25.  
20 Kathy Babiak, Sylvia Trendafilova, ‘CSR and Environmental Responsibility: Motives and 
Pressures to adopt Green Management Practices’ (2011) 18(1) Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management 14. 
21Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework 2011 HR/PUB/11/04  
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The constitutional obligation ensures that corporations can no longer rely on lax 
government regulatory systems to shield their environmental impacts but are 
compelled to seek alternative regulatory systems to ensure they meet the 
constitutional baseline for environmental protection, even where the government 
is failing in its duties. This alternative regulation can either be internal, such as 
integrating environmental protection projects into its CSR strategies, or the 
setting up of institutional voluntary regulatory frameworks amongst corporations 
within the industry (oil and gas, chemical, mining or other industries).  
In addition, the move towards protecting vulnerable persons from constructive 
displacement and other unpleasant consequences of compelled relocation as a 
result of development-based activities is fueling international efforts to update the 
relevant instruments relating ton refugees and internally displaced persons to 
include persons suffering environmentallyu induced constructive displacement as 
a result of loss of sese of place. This forms the basis for the he UN Refugee Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Development based Evictions 2018.22  
Mackie23 suggests the introduction of financial regulatory schemes for 
corporations to regulate their impacts on the environment by insurance 
companies and other third-party financiers. In countries with significant 
environmental pollution, constitutionalization makes the consideration of 
alternative regulation schemes by corporations an imperative and reduces the 
over-reliance on weak government regulations.  
Although the analysis in this thesis has focused on Nigeria’s Niger Delta, it has a 
wider application to other countries (majorly developing countries in Africa, South 
East Asia and Latin America) with significant problems of environmental pollution 
and degradation. India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
amongst the top 10 most polluted countries in the world24 and one common 
denominator is that they all lack constitutional environmental rights. Although 
                                                          
<https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> 
accessed 29 April 2019.  
22Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement 2018 
Annex 1 of the report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living A/HRC/4/18.  
23 C. Mackie, ‘The Regulatory Potential of Financial Security to Reduce Environmental Risk’ 
(2014) 26 Journal of Environmental Law 189-214. 
24 Conserve Energy Future, ‘11 Top Most Polluted Countries in the World as of 2017’ 
<https://www.conserve-energy-future.com/top-most-polluted-countries-world.php> accessed 
08 August 2018.  
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India’s Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional right to life as 
incorporating the right to a clean environment,25 this greening of human rights 
does not substitute the need for a comprehensive constitutional protection of the 
environment in a coalesced anthropocentric structure which protects future 
generations, Mother Nature and establishes procedural environmental rights. 
While not definitive, instituting constitutional environmental rights in these 
countries has the potential to improve their environmental legal frameworks as 
discussed in this thesis.  
Other countries with constitutional environmental rights in Latin America (e.g. 
Colombia, Peru, Jamaica and Chile) and in Africa (e.g. Kenya and South Africa) 
do not embody the full spectrum of effective constitutional environmental rights 
developed in this thesis (only Ecuador and Bolivia come close to embodying 
coalesced anthropocentrism in their constitution). This is an area that will be 
relevant to these countries in future revisions of their constitutions, as chapter 4 
has shown the benefits of embodying coalesced anthropocentrism which these 
countries can aspire to achieve.  
Ultimately, however, the effectiveness of constitutional environmental rights may 
depend on other factors outside sheer constitutionalization. As examined in 
chapter 3.4, environmental constitutionalism and an independent judiciary are 
central to the enforcement of environmental rights and protection. Seeing that it 
is possible to have environmental constitutionalism without a constitution and a 
constitution without environmental constitutionalism, it is arguable that having an 
independent judiciary that enforces the rule of law and constitutionalism perhaps 
trumps mere constitutionalization, as the UK example shows. Nevertheless, 
having both an independent judiciary and constitutional environmental rights 
represents the ideal scenario for an effective protection of the environment.    
 
Final Reflections   
While there is the potential that amending the Nigerian constitution to incorporate 
environmental rights may face opposition from the ‘dominant’ majority fearing 
environmental liberation by the Niger Delta will be detrimental to their interests, 
                                                          
25 Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 420 . 
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this scenario may not play out in real life owing to the seemingly benign nature of 
a constitutional environmental right.  
Arguing for the incorporation of a right to a clean environment looks non-
threatening, as there can hardly be a logical opposition to the assertion that 
everyone has the right to a clean environment. Coupled with pressures from the 
international community on Nigeria, the other regions can be convinced to 
concede to the incorporation of a right to a clean environment in the constitution 
considering it as a benign exposition of an internationally recognised right. It is in 
the implementation and interpretation of this right that the full impact of this 
‘benign’ right will begin to be felt by the dominant regions, by which time it will be 
too late to expunge it from the constitution seeing the extreme rigidity of amending 
the fundamental rights provisions in the constitution.  
The unpleasant experience with the PIB which has been repeatedly shot down 
by the ‘dominant majority’ arises from the explicit attempt of the PIB to institute 
environmental management systems, reform the environmental regulatory 
framework and give the Niger Delta inhabitants more control of the resources in 
the region. This apparent attempt at environmental liberation was bound to 
frighten the dominant majority and increase their resistance. A ‘right to a clean 
environment’ in its bare form will not likely have the same effect and can easily 
pass as a restatement of internationally recognised principles. This is essential 
to ensuring the environmental liberation of the Niger Delta as the ability to 
successfully incorporate environmental rights in the constitution is the biggest 
hurdle the Niger Delta region will face in pursuit of environmental liberation. 
Without such incorporation, however, discussions about the benefits and 
potential impacts of constitutional environmental rights on the environmental 
challenges in the region will remain hypothetical and moot. 
There are a number of implementation challenges that will be faced in 
enshringing environmemntal constitutionalism through constitutionalization of 
environmental rights in Nigeria. The most prominent of these challenges is the 
difficulty in enthroning environmebtal rule of law in the country. Nigeria has a rule 
of law deficit whereby laws are routinely ignored, circumvented or blatantly 
breached without consequences. Several laws exist mostly on paper as the 
implementation and enforcement is irregular, incomplete, and ineffective. Part of 
the challenge with the rule of law in Nigeria is problem with independence of the 
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judiciary, as although the constitution institutes various mechanisms to insulate 
the judiciary from executive influences, the executive still unconstitutionally 
execute undue influence on judicial officers, thereby undermining a crucial 
element of the rule of law in the country. In February 2019, the President 
uncermeonially sacked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the head of 
the judiciary on the basis of an ex parte order unconstitutionally procured from an 
administrative tribunal.26 
Despite the brazen illegality of this action which flies in the face of explicit 
constitutional provision on removal of the head of the judiciary, nothing was done 
about it and, a few outrage aside, the country moved on like nothing happened 
with the replacement Chief Justice taking office without any legal resistance. 
Environmental rule of law is a subset of the general principle of rule of law and 
the absence of rule of law will undermine any attempt at enthroning environmental 
constitutionalism in Nigeria.  
Another implementation challenge is the difficulty of balancing the economic and 
developmental needs of the country against the environmental needs. Seeing the 
overwhelming reliance on oil and gas revenues for economic sustenance, any 
attempt to utilise environmental constitutionalism in a way that will curtail the 
conomic benefits from oil and gas exploration is bound to meet with stiff 
opposition from the government that should be in charge of enforcing these 
environmental principles. Although adopting a rights’ approach circumvents 
reliance on government’s regulatory mechanisms and empowers citizens to 
directly enforce these environmental standards, government’s willingness to act 
on judicial orders and declaration on environmental issues is still indispensable. 
The culture of disregard for judicial orders that pervades governance in Nigeria 
renders it difficult to enforce judicial orders that go against government’s 
economic and developmental pursuits, leading back to the main challenge of 
enthroning environmental rule of law in Nigeria.  
Finally, corruption has remained the bane of socio-political and economic 
progress in the country, seeping deep into the social fabric of the nation. 
Corruption of judicial officers and other public officials that are charged with 
                                                          
26 J Agbakwuru, ‘Breaking: Buhari suspends CJN Onnoghen’ (Vanguard, 25 January 2019) 




adjudicating and enforcing these constitutional environmental rights is a 
significant implementation challenge that must be overcome for effective 
environmental constitutionalism and the protection of the environment through 





Breakdown of Environmental Right Provisions in Constitutions  
 
COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    Afghanistan    
    Albania    
    Algeria    
    Andorra    
    Angola    
    Antigua and Barbuda    
    Argentina    
    Armenia    
    Australia    
    Austria    
    Azerbaijan    
    The Bahamas    
    Bahrain    
    Bangladesh    
    Barbados    
    Belarus    
    Belgium    
    Belize       
    Benin    
    Bhutan    
    Bolivia   *(living things) 
    Bosnia and Herzegovina    
    Botswana    
    Brazil    
    Brunei    
    Bulgaria    
    Burkina Faso    
    Burundi    
    Cape Verde    
    Cambodia    
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COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    Cameroon    
    Canada    
    Central African Republic    
    Chad    
    Chile    
    China    
    Colombia    
    Comoros    
  Congo, Democratic Republic 
of the 
   
    Congo, Republic of the    
    Costa Rica    
    Côte d’Ivoire    
    Croatia    
    Cuba    
    Cyprus    
    Czech Republic    
    Denmark    
    Djibouti    
    Dominica    
    Dominican Republic    
    East Timor (Timor-Leste)    
    Ecuador    
    Egypt    
    El Salvador    
    Equatorial Guinea    
    Eritrea    
    Estonia    
    Ethiopia    
    Fiji    
    Finland    
    France    
    Gabon    
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COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    The Gambia    
    Georgia    
    Germany    
    Ghana    
    Greece    
    Grenada    
    Guatemala    
    Guinea    
    Guinea-Bissau    
    Guyana    
    Haiti    
    Honduras    
    Hungary    
    Iceland    
    India    
    Indonesia    
    Iran    
    Iraq    
    Ireland    
    Israel - - - 
    Italy    
    Jamaica    
    Japan    
    Jordan    
    Kazakhstan    
    Kenya    
    Kiribati    
    Korea, North    
    Korea, South    
    Kosovo    
    Kuwait    
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COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    Kyrgyzstan    
    Laos    
    Latvia    
    Lebanon    
    Lesotho    
    Liberia    
    Libya    
    Liechtenstein    
    Lithuania    
    Luxembourg    
    Macedonia    
    Madagascar    
    Malawi    
    Malaysia    
    Maldives    
    Mali    
    Malta    
    Marshall Islands    
    Mauritania    
    Mauritius    
    Mexico    
    Micronesia, Federated States 
of 
   
    Moldova    
    Monaco    
    Mongolia    
    Montenegro    
    Morocco    
    Mozambique    
    Myanmar (Burma)    
    Namibia    
    Nauru    
    
365 
 
COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    Nepal    
    Netherlands    
    New Zealand - - - 
    Nicaragua    
    Niger    
    Nigeria    
    Norway    
    Oman    
    Pakistan    
    Palau    
    Panama    
    Papua New Guinea    
    Paraguay    
    Peru    
    Philippines    
    Poland    
    Portugal    
    Qatar    
    Romania    
    Russia    
    Rwanda    
    Saint Kitts and Nevis    
    Saint Lucia    
    Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
   
    Samoa    
    San Marino    
    Sao Tome and Principe    
    Saudi Arabia    
    Senegal    
    Serbia    
    Seychelles    
    
366 
 
COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    Sierra Leone    
    Singapore    
    Slovakia    
    Slovenia    
    Solomon Islands    
    Somalia    
    South Africa    
    Spain    
    Sri Lanka    
    Sudan    
    Sudan, South    
    Suriname    
    Swaziland    
    Sweden    
    Switzerland    
    Syria    
    Taiwan    
    Tajikistan    
    Tanzania    
    Thailand    
    Togo    
    Tonga    
    Trinidad and Tobago    
    Tunisia    
    Turkey    
    Turkmenistan    
    Tuvalu    
    Uganda    
    Ukraine    
    United Arab Emirates    
    United Kingdom - - - 




COUNTRY Humans Future Generations Nature 
    United States    
    Uruguay    
    Uzbekistan    
    Vanuatu    
    Vatican City    
    Venezuela    
    Vietnam    
    Yemen 1   
    Zambia    
    Zimbabwe    
 
 
1 Yemen’s Draft Constitution of 2015 provides for a substantive right to a clean 
environment in Article 117 but this draft is yet to be ratified and take effect. The 
current constitution (first adopted in 1990 and amended in 1994, 2001 and 2009) 
makes no reference to environmental rights.   
 
2 There are 196 countries in the world today. This total comprises 194 countries 
that are member states of the United Nations and 2 countries that are non-
member observer states: the Holy See and the State of Palestine. 
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